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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis investigates how families in northern Senegal negotiate between state and 
Islamic schools. Studies of education strategies within anthropology of education 
predominantly employ Bourdieu’s concept of capital. These studies are useful for 
illuminating the role of education within people’s strategies of social mobility, but tend 
to render invisible preferences based on non-material considerations like spiritual 
benefits. To overcome this challenge, this thesis uses economic theory which 
acknowledges both intrinsic and material factors informing school choice. It draws on 
fifteen months’ ethnographic fieldwork comprising life histories, informal interviews 
and participant observation. 
 
The thesis contributes to several debates in anthropology of development and education. 
Findings reveal the importance of a caste-like social hierarchy in shaping education 
strategies, and challenge simplistic predictions common in development discourse about 
how gender or being Muslim influence educational trajectories. Results also show how 
education preferences reflect context-specific routes to social mobility. In northern 
Senegal, lack of formal sector employment makes the secular state school’s promises of 
economic advancement largely inaccessible. Qur’anic schools present a more certain 
investment for men of privileged social groups who monopolise access to this 
education, for the prestige of Islamic knowledge and insertion into trade and migration 
networks. Intrinsic benefits of Qur’anic schooling, like blessing and moral education, 
also inform school preference. These factors are neglected in development discourse 
and state education provision - including recent reforms to engage Islamic knowledge to 
meet Education For All and the Millennium Development Goal – due to secularist and 
rationalist biases. This undermines families’ access to affordable schooling that 
combines the intrinsic and material benefits which they prioritise, and privileges those 
who can afford private alternatives. Inspired by applied anthropology committed to 
social justice, this thesis draws on people’s strategies to overcome these challenges to 
recommend non-formal alternatives to enable education provision compatible with 
popular worldviews. 
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Note on transcription and orthography  
 
The first formal attempt to designate a standardised writing system for Pulaar in the 
Latin alphabet based on specificities of the vernacular occurred at a UNESCO 
conference in Bamako in 1966. The norms adopted in this thesis follow the conventions 
of the Bamako system, including changes made to represent implosive consonants 
specific to Pulaar as ɓ and ɗ, and the nasal ‘ny’ sound as ñ. Short vowels are transcribed 
as single vowels – a, e, i, o, u. Long vowels are transcribed by a doubling of the letter. 
With the exception of the letter ‘c’ prounced as in ‘church’, consonants are pronounced 
as in English. 
 
The orthography of place names in Senegal is complex as they vary according to author, 
historical period in which they were recorded, and spelling conventions used (French, 
English, recent standardised systems for Pulaar). I have tried to use the most common 
forms of spelling to avoid confusion. Similarly, names of persons can be transcribed in 
diverse ways. My informants generally spelled their own names according to French 
orthography which has become widespread due to state procedures such as birth 
certificates and identity cards. While all informants’ names are rendered using 
pseudonyms, I use the French orthography for these names as it is these versions my 
informants would be most familiar with.  
 
To transcribe Arabic words, names and honorific titles, many of which have been 
loaned into Pulaar and French in Senegal, I have followed a simplified system omitting 
diacritical marks with the exception of the ayn (’) and hamza (‘). I have employed the 
most common and simplified transcriptions for places and people’s names used in 
English language publications and standard bibliographic reference texts. I have used 
the common anglicised construction of plurals using an ‘s’, for instance tariqas for the 
plural of tariqa or Sufi order, as opposed to the correct Arabic but less familiar turuq. 
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Chapter 1. Educational decision-making and development: Understanding a 
paradox  
1.1 “Only poor people attend Qur’anic schools”: Assumptions about school choice 
in Senegal  
 
In 2010, I travelled to Senegal to undertake a pilot study to prepare a PhD proposal. I 
wanted to compare official development discourses on the value of sending girls to 
school, with the perceptions of parents and girls themselves which I felt were neglected 
in these debates. When I started talking with development practitioners I met in the 
capital Dakar, they universally considered state schooling to be beneficial and 
empowering for girls. For them, anything short of 100% female enrolment in primary - 
if not at higher levels - was a problem to be solved. Policy includes widespread support 
for the promotion of state schooling for the goal of girls’ empowerment. For instance, 
the reference document of the Senegalese government’s Coordinating Framework for 
Interventions on Girls’ Schooling (CCIEF)1 states: “girls’ education remains the 
principal motor for human development” as in theory it reduces their vulnerability, 
favorises their participation in decision-making, contributes to diffusion of innovative 
behaviour, reduces poverty, promotes gender equality, reduces female fertility, and 
increases uptake of antenatal services and awareness of HIV/AIDS (CCIEF 2011, 
pp.14–16). Such proclamations are, of course, repeated widely in national and 
international policy frameworks. 
 
For many development agents I spoke with, a perceived advantage of secular state 
schools was their potential to overcome social barriers to girls’ empowerment including 
‘patriarchal Islamic or cultural values’. This is an important issue given that Senegal’s 
population of roughly 13.5 million is 94% Muslim (CIA 2013). The notion that secular 
state schools should be promoted as empowering for girls, including as an antidote to 
‘religion’ and ‘culture’ which is supposedly oppressive, also appears in grey literature. 
Griffiths (2011) cites a UNDP report on women in Senegal, Les Sénégalaises en 
Chiffres (Sow et al. 2000), which argues that socialisation of gender roles, based on pre-
Islamic customs and local interpretations of Islam, places all domestic responsibilities 
on girls and frames their self-worth as being through marriage and motherhood, notions 
                                                 
1
 In French: Cadre de Coordination des Interventions sur l’Education des Filles. 
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whose practical implications limit girls’ achievement in state schools. In the report, the 
secular state school is by contrast “presented as key to breaking the cycle of [gendered] 
disadvantage” (Griffiths 2011, p.204).  
 
To investigate competing attitudes towards girls’ schooling between development 
agents and communities who adhere to these ‘religious and cultural values’, I had 
planned to conduct my doctoral fieldwork in an area of Senegal where female enrolment 
was relatively low but on the rise, where NGOs and community associations were 
actively advocating in its favour. It was therefore by chance that I travelled to a village 
named Medina Diallobé2 in the region of St Louis in the north of Senegal. This region 
does not have the lowest female enrolment in the country, and I made the trip on a 
whim having recently made a friend from the village. In Medina Diallobé I had the 
opportunity of staying with a prestigious family of the Pulaar-speaking Haalpulaar 
ethnic group, whose male members were renowned Muslim clerics.3 My host family 
followed relatively strict local norms of piety, as the compound was segregated by 
gender and the women always wore headscarves and long-sleeved dresses when outside 
the home. The village was considered a hub of Islamic scholarship throughout the 
region, and the clerics exerted significant authority and influence over social life. 
 
Based on the information I had received in Dakar I assumed that, given the strong 
Islamic culture in Medina Diallobé, female state school enrolment would be low as 
parents would either not send their daughters to school at all, or prefer to educate them 
in Islamic schools. This was a reasonable assumption to make as similar patterns of 
parental decision-making have been observed in neighbouring contexts. In Mali (Tolo 
1991 cited in Brenner, 2000: 234) and Niger (Meunier 1995, p.624)  parents who sent 
their girls to Islamic schools did so hoping that they would learn the basic requirements 
of the religion to be good wives. Indeed, recent Senegalese education policy has 
involved construction of Islamic schools which teach religion alongside secular subjects 
                                                 
2
 A pseudonym. 
3
 The term used most often in Francophone academic scholarship, and among people in Senegal, for a 
Muslim teacher, practitioner or Sufi leader is marabout. This is a French version of the Arabic term 
murabit meaning a man of religion. However, Seeseman (2011, pp.12–13) warns against academic use of 
the term marabout given its derogatory connotations inherited from the colonial period and implication of 
clerics as fraudulent and self-interested. Although my informants used the term marabout, and I use their 
words when citing them directly, I employ the more neutral ‘cleric’ throughout this thesis. In later 
chapters on dynamics in Medina Diallobé I also use the Pulaar term ceerno, meaning a teacher of the 
Qur’an or Islamic sciences. 
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in French and Arabic, in “zones of resistance” to state schools, in order to increase 
female enrolment (CCIEF 2011, p.17). I was therefore surprised to discover that all the 
adolescent girls in my host family, and indeed, most in Medina Diallobé, attended local 
primary if not lower secondary (collège) and upper secondary (lycée) state schools. 
Some were even at university in Dakar. It was boys and young men in my host family 
who were less likely to attend state schools, preferring to completely memorise the 
Qur’an in Qur’anic schools, locally called daaras.4  
 
These observations were greeted with surprise when I discussed them with development 
practitioners in Dakar. It was not the high rates of boys attending daaras which 
appeared unusual. Indeed, many Senegalese education policies and reports acknowledge 
that in areas of the country with strong commitment to Islamic education, male 
enrolment in primary school can be lower than that of girls (CCIEF 2011, p.19). Rather, 
it was the high rates of female secondary school enrolment in this strongly Islamic 
context which came as a surprise. Intrigued by the combined commitment to state and 
Islamic education among families in Medina Diallobé, and the apparent reversal of a 
common gender trend in which Muslim parents prefer Islamic over secular schools for 
girls, I shifted focus to make decision-making in this community the central question of 
my PhD.    
 
Another aspect of the Medina Diallobé context which contradicted the assumptions of 
development actors and in policy literature was with regard to constructions of ‘quality’ 
education with respect to daaras. Whenever I mentioned that I was researching Islamic 
education in Senegal, it was assumed that I was interested in talibés. While the Wolof 
word talibé literally means student of Islam, in Senegal the term is associated with the 
highly visible phenomenon of young boys, brought by clerics from rural areas, who beg 
for food and small change in the streets of cities throughout West Africa. Since the early 
1990s, UNICEF and a host of national and international NGOs have pushed the 
government to reform or control the daaras under the banner of child rights and child 
protection. They demand an end to child begging, corporal punishment, unhygienic 
conditions in which some talibés live, and other dangers they can be exposed to such as 
                                                 
4
 The Pulaar term for Qur’anic school is duɗal (pl. dude), meaning hearth, alluding to the fires around 
which students learn. However, inhabitants of Medina Diallobé use the Wolof term daara borrowed from 
the Arabic word dar, meaning house, the original term being dar al-Qur’an or house of the Qur’an. I also 
employ the term daara as it is more prevalent in state, academic and media discourses on Senegal. 
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drug and sexual abuse. In the dominant NGO and media discourses on talibés, clerics 
tend to be depicted as abusive monsters. 5  
 
In policy terms, over the last decade the interest in talibés has shifted from being 
predominantly a child protection issue to a concern that daaras constitute a barrier to 
‘quality’ education. However, these two bodies of discourse share commonalities, 
namely that daaras are a ‘problem’ to be solved. Certain key critiques reoccur, often 
made in highly value-laden language. Examples can be found in the policy document 
titled Plan Stratégique de Développement des Daara (Strategic Plan for Development 
of the Daara) published by the Senegalese Ministry of Education. The daaras are 
described as being in an “archaic state” and “situation of marginalization, exclusion and 
oblivion” (MEN 2009, p.9). The report refers to the lack of state control of the daaras, 
criticising the absence of policy documents, regulations or evaluation, and the plurality 
of school models and their “anarchic proliferation” (ibid., p4). The learning 
environment often comes under attack: “the majority of daaras are in a very precarious 
state. They are in total destitution” (ibid., p.5) and “their buildings often do not respect 
ergonomic norms” (ibid., p.7). Finally, teaching and content are assumed to be of low 
quality, as there are no standardised curricula and teachers do not undergo state training 
programs. Students who ‘just’ learn the Qur’an are portrayed as having few economic 
options: “the daara sector undermines the very future of thousands of children each 
year” (ibid., p.3).  
 
Such disparaging remarks are also commonplace in academic literature, even among 
otherwise critical scholars of comparative education, for instance: “Within Africa, 
Qur’anic and other Muslim schools have generally not been a serious academic 
alternative to secular (i.e. Western and at least unofficially Christian) education” 
(Samoff & Carroll 2007, p.370). Publication of NGO reports on talibés are usually 
accompanied by a media frenzy which, despite occasional disclaimers contained within 
them that these cases reflect only some of the daaras in Senegal, largely in urban areas, 
has led to a widespread international impression that Islamic education in Senegal is 
synonymous with begging talibés. One simply has to type ‘Islamic schools in Senegal’ 
                                                 
5
 See in particular Ware’s analysis of the Human Rights Watch report Off the Backs of Children: Forced 
begging and other abuses against talibés in Senegal (2010), and accompanying media responses, in 
Chapter One of his recent book The Walking Qur’an (2014). 
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into the image bank of an internet search engine to find evidence of the sector’s popular 
association with the overwhelmingly negative image of begging talibés. 
 
In contrast to Qur’anic schools which primarily teach religion and operate outside state 
control, I found that many development actors consider schools which are standardised, 
under state control, and which incorporate Islamic elements within a predominantly 
secular curriculum and Western-style school model, to be more desirable alternatives. 
Indeed, a cornerstone of the government’s current ten-year education strategy, the 
Programme d’Amélioration de la Qualité, de l’Equité et de la Transparence 2013-2025 
(PAQUET) includes creating such state-controlled religious schools to encourage a 
move away from classical Qur’anic schools in communities “resistant” to state 
schooling (MEN 2013, p.35). Terminology used to describe these different kinds of 
Islamic schools often reflects an opposition between modernity and tradition. For 
instance, the Plan Stratégique de Développement des Daara defines “modernisation” of 
daaras as formalising daara functioning, providing concrete classrooms with desks, 
integrating non-religious subjects and official languages into curricula, and using ICTs 
in teaching (MEN 2009, p.5). This tendency among some development actors to frame 
religious and secular education on a continuum from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ goes 
beyond Senegal, for instance Gandolfi, chair of UNESCO Italy and Professor of 
Comparative Education at Bologna University, states:  
 
From the beginnings, the médersa [Islamic school] in Africa has taken two 
directions: the first modernist, in the image of the European School, where one 
studies Arabic, Islam and scientific subjects in a European language; the second 
conservative, namely to take the model of the Arab world with Arabic as the 
sole language of instruction (2003, p.268, my translation from French). 
 
These assumptions among development actors about the low quality of daaras are often 
accompanied by presumptions regarding parental choice of such schools. Parents who 
send their children to daaras are often portrayed as traditionalists ignorant of the 
schools’ poor standards, or too poor to choose otherwise. For instance, a report on 
talibés in Senegal published by Human Rights Watch and titled Off the Backs of 
Children: Forced Begging and Other Abuses Against Talibés in Senegal states: 
“parents’ treatment of the children they choose to send hundreds of kilometers away to 
14 
 
marabouts ranges from neglect to knowing complicity in abuse”. They also assert that 
“pressed financially, some parents send their children ostensibly to learn the Quran, but 
also to alleviate household expenditures” (2010, p.85). A report on child labour in 
Senegal titled Comprendre le Travail des Enfants et l'Emploi des Jeunes au Sénégal by 
Understanding Children’s Work, a collaborative project between UNICEF, the ILO and 
World Bank, also asserts that: 
 
If a child entrusted to a Qur’anic teacher is an ancient practice in Muslim 
settings, originally for the purpose of religious education, the phenomenon of 
pauperization, people looking for survival strategies that promote fostering of 
children, […] has generated a ‘perversion’ of these traditional practices, 
slippages in which children are the first victims (UCW 2007, p.46).  
 
The assumption that it is primarily poor parents who send their children to Qur’anic 
schools also goes beyond Senegal. Gandolfi generalises across West Africa to assume 
that “without adaptation, Qur’anic schools […], risk becoming a refuge for the poor and 
all those who do not benefit from access to state education” (2003, p.273). In the ‘war 
on terror’ discourse, the supposed association between poverty and Islamic education is 
currently driving the fear of Qur’anic schools among development actors in countries 
like Pakistan, as the poor and unemployed are seen as easy recruitment targets for 
terrorist organisations (Bano 2012b, pp.45–46; Bayat & Herrera 2010; Rao & Hossain 
2011, p.624). Meanwhile, the empirical observation is made that many affluent parents 
take advantage of the state school by sending their children to daaras only as a form of 
pre-school before beginning primary school, or as extra-curricular study during school 
holidays (Gandolfi 2003, p.267). Thus, scholars and development practitioners who 
asked me about my research also presumed that well-off people in Medina Diallobé 
would ‘do both’ according to the pattern of state-schooling-with-the-daara-on-the-side, 
with full-time Qur’anic schooling preferred only by the poor  
 
However, the reality I observed in Medina Diallobé completely challenged these 
dominant perceptions of Qur’anic schools as being associated with destitute talibés. The 
daara students toured the village households requesting alms when not learning the 
Qur’an, and did face beatings, but were never taken to cities to beg in horrific 
conditions. Indeed, the overwhelmingly negative portrayals of daaras in much NGO 
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and government literature have been criticised for not reflecting their diversity (Thorsen 
2012, pp.8–9).6 The Qur’anic schools were also not perceived by parents as being of 
poor quality. As documented elsewhere (Perry 2004; Ware 2004b; Ware 2014, pp.39–
40), parents and students agreed that education in a daara entailed some hardship, and 
had well-developed arguments as to why a degree of discomfort was necessary to the 
learning process. The Qur’anic schools were also considered to be better run and more 
effective in their stated goals than state schools. This view challenged stereotypes that 
state-run schools are by definition more efficient in their performance and day-to-day 
running that the supposedly “anarchic” daaras operating outside state control. The 
clerics were considered in high esteem by the majority of village inhabitants, for their 
teaching practice and wider social roles. Nor were my host family who chose the 
Qur’anic school ignorant, poor traditionalists. They belonged to a noble lineage and 
were relatively affluent by local standards. Several of the men had advanced levels of 
education in state and Islamic sectors and had travelled extensively, including to study, 
to Europe, Central Africa, the USA and Middle East. Many had deliberately chosen 
full-time Qur’anic schooling for their sons over the state school, and were not forced to 
do so by poverty or similar constraints.  
 
One final aspect of the situation in Medina Diallobé which contradicted that expected 
by many development practitioners I spoke with in Dakar, was the degree of influence 
different individuals exerted over the education trajectories of children and young 
people. The professionals I met often assumed that young people have limited control 
over their educational trajectories which are defined by their parents, their fathers in 
particular. It is difficult to find mention of family educational strategies in policy 
literature. Most discussion is focused on offer, with school demand assumed to be 
linearly related to supply (Lange 2003a). However, implicit assumptions about family 
educational decision-making dynamics are revealed within research studies of 
organisations and education ministries. A recent report by the French Directorate 
General of International Cooperation and Development titled Systèmes de Production, 
Revenus et Pratiques de Scolarisations des Agriculteurs on educational decision-
                                                 
6
 In fairness, the latest report by Human Rights Watch (2014), titled Exploitation in the name of 
education: Uneven progress in ending forced child begging in Senegal does very well to make clear that 
not all daaras in Senegal exhibit the abusive and unsanitary conditions characteristic of some urban 
schools. It shows how many clerics deplore these conditions, and that they reflect the experiences of a 
minority of talibés (2014, pp.4, 9, 23–25). However, the report continues to reproduce the stereotype of 
poor, neglectful parents and passive students critiqued below.  
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making in Senegal recognises that decisions are taken at the level of the family. 
However, it then describes children’s input as “marginal” and focuses on investigating 
the views of male heads of households rather than any other family members (DGCID 
2008, p.24). A study conducted for the Ministry of Education on conditions in daaras 
states that “talibés are placed in daaras by direct family members” which acknowledges 
that the wider family plays a role in children’s education, but infers that children 
themselves have no say (MEN 2010, p.125).  
 
Many reports are more explicit in presenting children including talibés as passive 
victims without agency. A study by Anti-Slavery International titled Begging for 
Change: Research Findings and Recommendations for Forced Child Begging in 
Albania, Greece, India and Senegal describes all begging within daaras as forced 
begging, namely “forcing boys and girls to beg through physical or psychological 
coercion”. Forced child begging is then framed as falling under the wider category of 
forced labour defined by the ILO as “work or service which is exacted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily” or “slavery, servitude or a practice similar to slavery” (Delap 2009, pp.1–
2). The practice of children travelling with clerics to daaras where they beg on arrival 
has been labelled by many NGOs as trafficking. Trafficking is defined by the UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking of Persons Especially Women and 
Children as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons 
[…] for the purpose of exploitation”. As all child begging is assumed to be forced, and 
therefore exploitative, any children migrating to Qur’anic schools are considered to be 
trafficked whether or not a they agree to it, thus denying them any agency (Delap 2009, 
pp.3, 6–7; c.f. Einarsdóttir et al. 2010). 
 
However, in Medina Diallobé extended family members had significant influence over 
young people’s educational trajectories, often with as much or even more authority than 
fathers. Young people were also far from passive ‘victims’ of their families’ decisions. 
Boys attending daaras were self-reflective and keen to talk to me about their 
experiences and aspirations for the future. I witnessed children as young as eight 
actively pursuing solutions to education-related problems, including asking me for help 
with homework when their parents could or would not. Even more indicative, many 
young people, male and female, from the age of twelve upwards pursued educational 
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trajectories which went against their parents’ wishes, including choosing to attend 
Qur’anic rather than state schools.  
 
To summarise, the lived reality in Medina Diallobé thus seemed to be at odds with some 
important prevailing assumptions about educational decision-making held by 
development professionals I met, and which are manifest implicitly and explicitly in 
education policy documents and development grey literature. These assumptions can be 
summarised as follows: 1) state schools constitute a ‘quality’ education including being 
economically beneficial, while Qur’anic schools do not; 2) state schools are 
empowering to girls while Islamic schools are not; 3) in a strongly Muslim context, 
parents will prefer religious rather than state schools for their daughters; 4) affluent 
parents prefer state schools, while poor families are more likely to send their children to 
Qur’anic schools; and 5) within families, parents, but fathers in particular, have the 
most power over educational decisions while women and especially children have little 
or no influence.  
 
In the rest of this chapter, I explore the logics underlying such assumptions in order to 
frame the questions and argument that I will develop in this thesis. I also develop an 
alternative way of understanding both parents’ and young people’s evaluations of 
different forms of schooling, which might account for the apparently unusual realities in 
Medina Diallobé. In this process, I establish the role of the complex intersection of 1) 
preferences for school types; 2) the influence of identities; and 3) other practical factors 
that shape educational decision-making. These different elements shaping educational 
trajectories are considered in the next three sections. 
 
1.2 Understanding school preference: Debates surrounding “quality education”  
 
The first assumption noted above relates to the value, usefulness, or worth attributed to 
the different schools available in Senegal. In dominant development discourse, secular 
state schools are considered to be economically beneficial, while Qur’anic schools are 
not. This is considered to have a relatively simple and linear influence over people’s 
preferences, namely that they will only choose Qur’anic schools if they cannot afford 
state schools or because state schools are poor ‘quality’ and fail to deliver on their 
promises of economic benefit. This section unpacks the logic behind this assumption, 
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demonstrating that it carries significant weight in development thought despite its flaws. 
The section finally proposes an alternative way of comprehending educational value and 
its relationship to people’s preferences. 
 
One of the most embedded assumptions in development is that a system of mass secular 
schooling confers economic benefits on the individual and society. The greatest support 
for this notion is Human Capital Theory, first elaborated by economist Gary Becker 
(1964). He argues that, regardless of a pupil’s background, ‘education’ has utilitarian 
benefits. Becker recognises schooling, university and learning through work as forms of 
‘education’ but places most emphasis on the benefits of primary school. Individuals 
gain directly by increasing their earning potential, while ‘external’ benefits - which go 
beyond the individual - are conferred on everyone in society through economic growth 
(McMahon 1987). Becker acknowledges other ‘non-monetary’ social benefits, 
including increased propensity to vote and improved health, although he states that 
these benefits are less significant than monetary ones (Becker 1993). Human Capital 
Theory and its utilitarian approach to schooling has enjoyed enormous influence within 
economics, and the social sciences including development studies and education (Ball 
2007). It has also greatly shaped education policy in the global South. Comparative 
macro-statistical studies were used to support Becker’s proposition that primary 
schooling confers utilitarian benefits, especially in less developed countries 
(Psacharopoulos 1973; 1981). Investment in mass school systems to kick-start economic 
growth and reduce poverty was therefore pushed by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Sayed 2008, p.54).  
 
These assumptions about the utility of mass schooling lead to presumptions about 
people’s preferences and choices for different kinds of schools. The dominant model to 
explain decisions in neo-classical economics, and also for explaining educational 
decision-making within development studies (Nkurunziza 2007, p.15), is Rational 
Choice Theory. According to this framework, people are assumed to be rational actors 
who prefer the most utility-maximising option available (Schulz 1987). As economists 
assume that economic analysis is objective and universally applicable, they also assume 
that people share preferences for a given asset (Stigler & Becker 1977), in response to 
the market value of that asset. The value of schooling as an asset with future productive 
potential (Woodhall 1987) is considered a given, and hence parents’ preference for this 
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mode of education for their children is assumed. Objectively-measurable school value is 
therefore assumed to coincide with and school preference.   
 
When people’s choices do not match these expectations, economists impute inadequate 
information of opportunities as an explanation (Allais 2012, p.262), or observable 
structural barriers rather than unobservable differences in preference (Blaug 2001, 
pp.124–125). This logic is widespread in scholarship on education in international 
contexts. Given the prevalent assumption of universal school utility/value, anything 
short of universal school enrolment or situations where people do not engage with the 
school, are framed in negative terms as a ‘problem’ to be ‘solved’. Reasons for not 
attending school are described as ‘barriers’, not valid preference for alternatives. The 
three main reasons or ‘barriers’ given for not attending state school are: direct and 
indirect poverty whereby parents cannot afford school fees, uniforms, stationery, extra 
tuition, or the opportunity costs of losing their children’s labour; equity barriers which 
make the school inaccessible to people with certain social characteristics for instance 
along the lines of gender; and poor ‘quality’ schools which do not confer economic 
returns (e.g. Hunt 2008). Households are classified as ‘poor’ according to neo-classical 
economic norms of household income and consumption, typically the ability to 
purchase a basket of pre-defined goods (Nkurunziza 2007, p.23). The ‘solutions’ 
economists and development actors propose are: reducing direct and indirect costs of 
school; reducing structural barriers like gender discrimination; and improving ‘quality’ 
(e.g. Sayed 2008).  
 
However, although Western education scholarship initially accepted Human Capital 
Theory’s model that schooling universally conferred utilitarian benefits, it has been 
challenged since the 1970s. Critical sociologists demonstrated that schools do not 
embody a universal and objective economic utility, nor do they lead to meritocratic 
social mobility. Marxist-inspired scholars (Althusser 1969; Bourdieu & Passeron 1977; 
Young 1971) focused on class as the most significant basis of social inequality, and 
argued that schooling positions pupils to take on unequal roles in the capitalist class 
structure (Siegel 1998). Undoubtedly, the model of universal school utility falls down 
when tested empirically. To support the notion that state school is economically and 
socially beneficial, economists tend to rely on statistical analyses using country-level 
survey data showing correlations between schooling and other variables considered 
20 
 
‘desirable’ such as lowered fertility rates and improved child nutrition. This ‘proof’ can 
be criticised for imposing value judgements on what constitutes ‘desirable’ social 
outcomes; focusing on the macro-level rendering local variation invisible; using proxy 
variables such as school enrolment rates which do not prove evidence of school 
achievement or learning; and assuming schooling is causal in these correlations, when 
micro-level studies show that pathways of cause and effect are more complex and 
unpredictable (Jeffrey et al. 2008; Pilon et al. 2001; Stephens 1998).  
 
The economic model of utility and meritocracy also masks how, in many postcolonial 
settings (Dore 1976; Irizarry 1980; Jeffrey & Mcdowell 2004; Lipton 1977), including 
African countries (Argenti 2002; Bloch 1998; Serpell 1999), rising participation in 
school has been accompanied by declining salaried employment among all but the most 
privileged members of society. Indeed, formal schooling inherited from the European 
model typically devalues manual work, reproducing class position and privilege 
(Bourdieu & Passeron 1977; Willis 1981). It is thus largely irrelevant to agricultural 
economies with detrimental effects for the rural poor, leading to “de-skillment” for rural 
livelihoods (Froerer 2011, pp.700, 704; Rival 2000, p.115). 
 
Alternative models of education provision which go beyond economic utility have been 
elaborated. Paulo Freire’s model of popular education and grassroots literacy developed 
in Brazil in the 1960s (1970/1993) reflects a more communal vision of human 
development. Education is offered to marginalised populations in order to encourage 
reflection on structural inequalities, with the ultimate aim of supporting political action 
for the redistribution of wealth and power. Tanzania’s first independent president, Julius 
Nyerere, conceived of a school system designed for the development of the most 
marginalised citizens, run by communities and intimately connected to local rhythms 
and culture (Nyerere 1967). Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize-winning economist working in 
international development, also challenged Human Capital Theory (Drèze & Sen 1995; 
Sen 1999). Sen’s alternative framework, known as the Capabilities Approach, argues 
that the goal of development should not be economic growth but increasing people’s 
capabilities to do or be the things they consider valuable. Sen emphasises the intrinsic 
value of education as an opportunity for improving life, seeing it as an “unqualified 
good” for expanding people’s capabilities and freedoms (Walker & Unterhalter 2007, 
p.8). He is therefore against universalising constructions of capabilities, and advocates 
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for processes of inclusive participatory debate to define policies and ‘quality education’ 
in a given context (Drèze & Sen 1995).  
 
However, Human Capital Theory has continued to enjoy popularity and has greatly 
influenced the development of formal education globally. In much of Latin America, 
although Freire’s model of popular education and adult literacy prevails in NGOs, 
formal schooling is characterised by an economic efficiency approach (Bartlett 2003). 
While education innovations have sporadically flourished on the African continent, aid 
dependence has discouraged experimentation oriented towards social rather than 
economic goals (Samoff & Carroll 2007, p.378). Similarly, while the World Bank 
rhetorically embraced the Capabilities Approach in the 1990s, its education policy 
remains directed by its utilitarian concerns. A range of actors with contrasting 
approaches convened during the EFA Conference in Jomtien in 1990, and the World 
Declaration defined the goal of EFA broadly as universal access to education services 
“of quality”, emphasizing the importance of “recognising that traditional knowledge and 
indigenous cultural heritage have a value and validity in their own right and a capacity 
to both define and promote development” (UNESCO 1990, p.6). However, the World 
Bank and its utilitarian ideas came to dominate policy (Vaughan 2010, pp.415–418). In 
practice ‘meeting EFA by 2000’ became synonymous with the narrow goal of attaining 
universal primary school enrolment for children of appropriate age. While the 
declaration stresses ‘partnership’ between donors and developing countries in designing 
country-specific education policies, in reality donors have more influence within this 
relationship than national governments, while what teachers, parents and pupils 
consider valuable is rarely taken into consideration (Lange 2003a, pp.147–148). Indeed, 
the notion that the principle benefit of formal state schooling is its potential to promote 
production remains widespread within African development policy (Samoff & Carroll 
2007), as reflected in Senegalese Ministry of Education reports (MEN 2006, p.40). 
 
Hence, in practice the model of ‘education’ promoted within international development 
policies throughout the world today is remarkably homogenous (Lange 2003a, p.150). 
Regardless of location, the model of ‘education’ promoted to achieve economic growth 
is that of the school, reflecting common characteristics including: ideals that mass 
education is a universal human right and that schooling has positive effects including 
productivity, economic growth and national development; basic structure of mass, often 
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compulsory, schooling organised by a central bureaucracy whether a government 
institution or ministry, with recent efforts made to ensure universal enrolment; an 
educational institution based on the ‘principle of the classroom’, age-graded classes7 
with one teacher, and pupils taught together regardless of differences such as ethnicity, 
caste, and often gender; and content and instruction based on an official, nationally-
universal core elementary curriculum of language, maths, social and natural sciences, 
arts, and physical education, with pedagogy usually whole-class lecture and recitation 
with seatwork (Anderson-Levitt 2003, p.6). While the influence of neoliberal ideology 
on education policy has caused states to withdraw from school provision, this process 
has been accompanied by increased regulation of private education, so that the 
officially-sanctioned school model is still promoted despite a greater diversity of 
providers.  
 
Of crucial importance to the Senegalese context, this global model of ‘quality 
education’ includes assumptions about the value of religion, and the appropriate role of 
faith in schools. The school promoted by international development actors is ideally 
secular, although faith-based schools are considered acceptable as long as they are 
‘weak’ or ‘moderate’ and teach religion within strict parameters (Deneulin & Bano 
2009, p.116).8 For instance, religion can be taught as a subject as long as it is 
compartmentalised so that other subjects are taught within a rationalist conception of 
the world whereby events are explained in materialistic terms according to scientific 
principles. Any faith must preferably be taught in an objectified manner, as one belief-
system among many. Finally, a school can teach religious or moral education as long as 
it does not compromise on the core curriculum described above. Proponents of this 
model of ‘quality education’ typically display negative attitudes towards ‘strong’ faith-
based schools which focus on religious instruction and encourage a strong, distinct 
religious identity – such as Qur’anic schools in the Senegalese context. Common 
accusations include that strong religious schools promote intolerance towards other 
faiths and neglect the core curriculum, and hence have little economic utility as they 
supposedly fail to equip pupils for the modern world.  
 
                                                 
7
 See Serpell (1999, pp.115–117) for a brief history of the development of age-graded classes in Europe, 
and a critique of their inappropriate promotion in other cultural contexts. 
8
 See comparable debates about faith-based schools in the UK (Burtonwood 2003). 
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The notion that strong faith-based schools do not confer economic benefit is also linked 
to another pervasive assumption in Western social science - the secularisation thesis. 
This theory, developed by sociologists in the classical tradition including Emile 
Durkheim (1912/1959), Max Weber (1920/1963) and Jürgen Habermas (1962/1989) 
holds that processes of ‘modernisation’ in production in 18th century Europe were 
accompanied by a parallel shift in values and beliefs from ‘traditionalist’, ‘primitive’, 
‘superstitious’ religious thought to rational, scientific explanations. It was assumed that 
this pattern was universal, and that the role of religion would decline as all societies 
modernised, retreating to the private sphere of personal faith (for summaries see Furseth 
& Repstad 2006; Stark & Finke 2000). The secularisation thesis underpinned 
Modernisation Theory dominant in development studies from the 1950s, and its 
proponents assumed that reorganisation of social and cultural institutions would not 
only accompany economic growth but actually facilitate it. Hence, religion was mainly 
considered, like ‘culture’, as an obstacle to economic growth and hence development 
(Nkurunziza 2007, p.34).  
 
-o0o- 
 
Beyond the flawed assumption that state schools confer economic utility, a second 
fundamental critique of Human Capital and classical Rational Choice Theory is that 
education cannot be compared analytically with an asset with productive potential 
(Allais 2012, p.262). In turn, people do not pursue education solely for economic 
reasons, but also for its ‘intrinsic’ value (Unterhalter & Brighouse 2007, pp.79–80), 
including to have a more rewarding and fulfilling mental state, increased self-esteem or 
well-being. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that everyone agrees on universal 
definitions of value (Noddings 1995, pp.122–131). To clarify, critical theorists who 
demonstrated that schools do not lead to social mobility and equal utility for all pupils 
have also argued that schools are not sites of knowledge transmission based on neutral 
or shared values. Rather, the knowledge and values they promote reflect the worldview 
and interests of the elite, imbued with class, gender, race and other biases (Bourdieu & 
Passeron 1977; Connolly 1998; Reay 1995). Within this understanding, controlling 
knowledge and school institutions is central to the exercise and reproduction of power 
relations. It enables elites to greatly influence the ways we think about the world, 
24 
 
favouring reproduction of social structures that underpin their social, economic, cultural 
and political privilege, as Durkheim (cited in Eickelman 1978, p.486) notes:  
 
“Changes in ideas of knowledge in complex societies and the means by which 
such ideas are transmitted result from continual struggles among competing 
groups within society, each of which seeks domination or influence. […] Thus 
the forms of knowledge shaped and conveyed in educational systems […] must 
be considered in relation to the social distribution of power.” 
 
Scholars working within a critical post-colonial framework have used this observation 
to argue that from the colonial period onwards, historically and culturally particular 
conceptions of educational value and practices of schooling have often been imposed on 
very different, locally-situated or ‘indigenous’9 systems of knowledge and learning 
(Levinson 1996; Levinson & Holland 1996; Masemann 2005; Rival 1996). Although 
well-intentioned, the goal of universal compulsory schooling is a consequence of a 
distinctly Western set of values and practices, which has been diffused around the world 
along with a more general cultural model of the modern nation-state (Meyer et al. 
1997). Mass schooling emerged in Europe in the 19th century as part of the state-
building process, and was adopted by the rest of the world after the Second World War, 
under economic pressure from the World Bank and other aid donors (Arnove 2003, p.2; 
Samoff 2003). This narrow model of schooling excludes many other things which 
people consider valuable, including teaching vocational or practical skills, adult 
learning, or indigenous knowledge including local customs, history, geography or 
cosmology (Abdi 2008; Aikman 1999; Altbach 1971). European and official national 
languages tend to be prioritised over minority ones (Brock-Utne 2006; Brock-Utne & 
                                                 
9
 I use the term indigenous according to its definition by Sefa Dei (2002, p.339): “Indigenous knowledge 
is knowledge arising with the long-term occupancy of a place (Fals Borda 1980; Fals Borda and Rahman 
1991; Warren, Slikkerveer and Brokensh 1995). It is knowledge unique to a given culture or society 
characterized by the common sense ideas, thoughts, values of people formed as a result of the sustained 
interactions of society, nature and culture. Roberts (1998) has also defined “indigenous” as knowledge 
“accumulated by a group of people, not necessarily indigenous, who, by centuries of unbroken residence, 
develop an in-depth understanding of their particular place in their particular world” (p. 59). “Indigenous” 
from these perspectives rejects colonial imposition and signals the importance of problematizing anything 
which is imposed or dominating (Fanon 1963; Memmi 1969).” Breidlid adds that the term “indigenous” 
need not only apply to people of indigenous minorities as defined by the UN, like “the Indians in the 
Americas, the Lapps in the circumpolar North, or minority indigenous groups in Asia or Oceania”, but 
also to “the majority population in Africa that originated on the continent before the colonization process 
of the 19th and 20th century” who “adhere to cultures, belief systems, and epistemologies that differ from 
the hegemonic Western ones” (2013, 31–32). 
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Skattum 2009). Pedagogy rarely includes apprenticeships, learning-through-doing, or a 
differentiated curriculum (Anderson-Levitt 2003, pp.6–7). Teaching is based on groups 
of common age rather than shared ability, although there is no evidence that this is 
always necessary for effective pedagogy (Serpell 1999, p.115).  
 
With respect to faith-based instruction, the dominant model of school as ideally secular 
and materialist also reflects an ideological legacy specific to the Western context. In the 
1960s, Western philosophy of education was dominated by epistemological 
assumptions that knowledge claims were objectively true or false depending on their 
conformity to rational criteria. Leading theorists of the time (e.g. Hirst 1974) therefore 
defined liberal education as intellectual initiation into conceptually discrete forms of 
rational knowledge which they felt would be conducive to creating unbiased and 
tolerant citizens of a liberal-democratic society, and which they distinguishedfrom  
processes of social conditioning or indoctrination (Carr 1998, p.4).  
 
However, these theoretical claims to objectivity made by education philosophers have 
been challenged by social scientists for reflecting the embedded assumption of the 
secularisation thesis, and presuming that religious education entails indoctrination. The 
liberal model neglects how religion plays an integral part in many people’s definitions 
of well-being (Deneulin & Rakodi 2011) and comprehensively learning one’s faith 
within ‘strong’ faith-based schools is often a crucial aspect of this (Bano 2012b; 
Deneulin & Bano 2009, p.116). Hence, extensive evidence from Southern contexts from 
the colonial period onwards reveals tensions between states’ prioritisation of secular or 
‘moderate’ faith-based schools, compared with parents’ demands for ‘strong’ forms 
(Bano 2009; Hefner 2006). However, the liberal secular school model as the model of 
‘quality education’, which permits a limited role for religion, continues to exert most 
influence on education policy (Carr 1998; Siegel 1998) including in international 
development (e.g. as in the work of Nussbaum 1997; 2003; 2006). While in the past 
fifteen years significant donors and organisations including the World Bank have 
engaged more with faith-based organisations to deliver development goals, including 
supporting faith-based schools to meet EFA, they tend to cherry-pick those whose work 
is compatible with secular agendas (Deneulin & Bano 2009, p.25). Hence, the state 
school on a secular, materialist model continues to be promoted within development 
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policy, with ‘strong’ faith-based schools not meeting this definition of quality education 
assumed to be of less economic and social value. 
 
Proponents of Rational Choice Theory, who assume that people’s school preferences 
follow an objective definition of school value, thus face dilemmas when trying to 
explain why people choose to attend religious schools over state schools, if the former 
supposedly have no economic value. Rational Choice theorists have thus attempted to 
adapt the model which assumes people are utility-maximising, to accommodate non-
economic forms of value which can include religion. Explanations for people’s 
preference for faith-based schools draw heavily upon influences from sociology, often 
shaped by the secularisation thesis. One theory is that choosing religion is an ‘irrational’ 
anomaly. This assumption has its roots in the 19th century, as many classical 
sociologists and anthropologists presumed that religious belief was a figment of the 
imagination of pre-modern or ‘primitive’, irrational minds (Stark & Finke 2000). While 
it is no longer considered acceptable to voice such anti-religious sentiment and pass it 
off as scientific, the idea that religion is somehow irrational has nonetheless persisted in 
other guises. Socialisation Theory is a second explanation for religious behaviour, 
associated with functionalist approaches to social science popular in the mid 20th 
century. It suggests that there is an element of irrationality in religious behaviour by 
arguing that people are passively socialised into religious belief and make decisions 
reflecting this internalised logic even if it does not benefit them (Furseth & Repstad 
2006).  
 
However, alternative explanations reject this assumption of irrationality, but instead 
attempt to attribute religious belief to materialist explanations, as opposed to, say, 
intrinsic value of religious affiliation. Karl Marx’ (1844/1955) idea that religion is the 
‘opium of the people’, a compensatory comfort to those at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, has proved particularly influential. This has been translated into Deprivation 
Theory which proposes that people choose religion because of difficult circumstances of 
material or social poverty and psychological insecurity (Glock & Stark 1965). Finally, 
Rational Choice theorists propose that people choose religion for material rewards at the 
lowest cost possible (Iannaccone 1997). While overcoming the idea that religious 
behaviour is irrational, these theories nonetheless marginalise the intrinsic benefits of 
religion, tending to attribute its popularity to a social or material deficiency. 
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In contrast to these narrow and value-laden constructions of ‘quality education’ and a 
priori assumptions of school preference, anthropologists have attempted to define 
education in broad and neutral terms to capture the complexity of learning practices and 
forms of knowledge which people in diverse times and places have considered to be 
valuable. They remind us that schools are but a subset of the broader field of education 
that occurs throughout everyday life, and focussing only on school misses the broader, 
continual but less visible efforts everyone engages in to transform their conditions 
(Friedman Hansen 1979; Varenne 2008a; 2008b). This can include small things like the 
routine instructions people give each other about what to do or what not to do, and the 
everyday pursuit of information or advice. Varenne’s definition of education (2008a, 
p.22) is useful for acknowledging these micro practices:   
 
“The deliberate, systematic, and sustained effort to transmit, evoke or acquire 
knowledge, attitudes, values, skills or sensibilities, and any learning that results 
from the effort, direct or indirect, intended or unintended. It includes a whole 
host of individuals and institutions and relations between them, and effects of 
each on the other.”  
 
In addition, while schools are important sites of struggle where elites attempt to 
influence and control knowledge, social theorists have also demonstrated that people do 
not unquestioningly accept the school institution or its values. While it is important to 
consider how educational systems can embody strategies of social control, it is also 
essential to look at the other side of the coin and people’s agency, namely how 
“populations appropriate educational systems for their own purposes” (Starrett 1998, 
p.61).  Hence, rather than passively accepting models of school utility dominant in 
international development, people’s perceptions of educational value are ‘culturally 
constructed’. This process of cultural production of educational value, as developed by 
Willis in his ethnography Learning to Labour (1981) about working class young men’s 
engagement with schooling in England, can be defined as “the active, collective use and 
explorations of received symbolic, ideological, and cultural resources to explain, make 
sense of, and positively respond to ‘inherited’ structural and material conditions” 
(Willis 1983 quoted in Demerath 1999:163).  
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In order to overcome limiting models of school preference informed by Human Capital 
and Rational Choice Theory, social scientists have proposed alternative theoretical 
frameworks to accommodate the different forms of value people attribute to educational 
options. Particularly popular in sociology and anthropology of education is Pierre 
Bourdieu’s framework of habitus, or “systems of durable, transposable dispositions” 
(Bourdieu & Nice 1977, p.72; Bourdieu & Passeron 1977), which are internalised and 
often unconscious ways of thinking about and interacting with the world. Habitus is 
developed through past experience and pursuit of capital (Bourdieu 1987; 1990), 
defined as “scarce goods and resources which lie at the heart of social relations” 
(Connolly 1998, p.20), understood as existing in economic, social, symbolic and 
cultural forms. Scholarship using the concepts of habitus and capital have greatly 
informed this thesis, especially for illuminating the reproduction of social inequalities 
through schooling; the importance of social networks and pursuit of status in shaping 
education preference; the complex ways in which intersecting dimensions of identity 
influence different groups’ experience and access to the benefits of schooling; and how 
behaviour reflects a balance of social constraints but also choice and agency on behalf 
of social actors (Connolly 1998; Froerer & Portisch 2012; Gérard 2001; Jeffrey et al. 
2008; Lange 2003b; Lydon 2004; Reay 1995; Robinson 2000b).  
 
However, I would question how well Bourdieu’s framework fits discussion surrounding 
faith-based schooling. Bourdieu’s writing on religion has been criticised for being 
overly influenced by Weber, tending to portray religion as an instrument of oppression 
and exploitation by the elite which seeks to indoctrinate a particular habitus. Although 
later theorists have argued that spiritual ideologies and dispositions like piety can be 
regarded as a form of cultural capital manipulated by lay people as much as elites 
(Verter 2003), the conceptualisation of religion as capital still tends to reduce its pursuit 
to instrumentalist ends. Developed in the context of faith-informed educational 
decision-making in Pakistan, Masooda Bano (2012b) has proposed an alternative model 
which overcomes this tendency, and which I employ in this thesis. Bano suggests that 
people’s preferences reflect three categories of value. The first is economic, as people 
consider which knowledge or skills best facilitate their access to employment. The 
second form of value Bano describes as ‘material’, and is linked to status. This type of 
benefit can lead to improved physical circumstances which are not necessarily 
economic, such as increased marriage prospects, access to useful contacts or networks, 
29 
 
and greater authority in the home or community. The third form of value is ‘ideational’, 
or intrinsic, which corresponds to the fact that people pursue education for ideas or 
ideological reasons regardless of whether it leads to economic or material benefits. 
Bano points out that consideration of these three forms of value operate simultaneously, 
and are combined in unique ways, in shaping people’s preferences. She further 
highlights that educational evaluations are highly context-specific, and reflect inherited 
historical trends (2012b, pp.13–17):  
 
“People […] value different things in different contexts; this is because they 
have different propensities and historically shaped preferences. Preference 
formation cannot thus be understood without recognizing the influence of 
history and culture, and the subjective nature of individual preference.”  
 
Paying attention to the specific forms of knowledge which people in a given context 
value is therefore essential to understanding their educational preferences, especially 
when they contradict dominant expectations held by development actors, as in Medina 
Diallobé. This theoretical insight has informed a central question of this thesis, namely 
what forms of knowledge people in Medina Diallobé consider valuable. 
 
1.3 The role of identity in shaping preference  
 
The following two assumptions which inspired the research of this thesis are that (2) 
state schools are empowering to girls while Islamic schools are not, and (3) Muslim 
parents prefer Islamic rather than state schools for their daughters. These assumptions 
concern constructions of identity – of gender and being Muslim - and their supposed 
links to evaluations of schooling. As I will demonstrate, both assumptions were 
challenged in Medina Diallobé: parents, including Muslim clerics, preferred state 
schools rather than Islamic schools for their daughters, while the experience of 
attending state school did not necessarily provide girls with more social options than 
those who did not attend school, or who attended Islamic schools. To make sense of 
these assumptions, this section begins by discussing scholarship which acknowledges 
that people’s evaluations of education are embedded in constructions of identity. It then 
unpacks the assumptions about gendered decision-making to show that, while these 
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assumptions usefully recognise that identity plays an important part in influencing 
people’s preferences, they are nonetheless flawed as they entail simplistic and 
prejudiced predictions about how gender intersects with other aspects of identity such as 
religious affiliation. 
 
Along with demonstrating that schools do not impart value-neutral forms of knowledge, 
an important contribution social scientists have made to our understanding of education 
is to show that in addition to transmitting knowledge, schools also form certain kinds of 
persons and shape their identity. Again, defining ‘education’ as referring not only to 
schooling but to “continuous, ubiquitous, pervasive” processes of social interaction 
(Cremin 2007:8), anthropologists have pointed out that all social institutions and 
groups, from the family, to religious institutions, work spaces and schools, have 
definitions of the ‘educated person’. This construction relates not just to knowing 
specific information or having the ability to carry out technical procedures, but also to 
doing so according to established expectations and rules. These social rules of 
interaction may be arbitrary and irrelevant to the task being carried out. Hence, the 
definition of being ‘educated’ in a given situation involves more than the acquisition of 
knowledge, but of being a certain kind of person, and possessing a defined identity 
(Levinson & Holland 1996). The definition of the educated person in a given context 
entails a model of how to achieve that identity, and so defines the logic behind people’s 
preferences for various learning opportunities available to them.  
 
A crucial question this raises is to what extent people accept the dominant constructions 
of identity in their social context. Social scientists in the 1970s strongly argued that 
people are constrained by constructions of identity, in educational institutions and 
beyond. For instance, Michel Foucault (1976) developed the concept of discourse to 
conceptualise how often unconscious cultural framings influence identity constructions 
which restrict the options to which people can aspire. Discourse produces ‘truth’, or 
what a given society, at a particular historical time, holds to be self-evident. Therefore 
“discourses not only dictate what it is possible to say or do, but also establish the kind 
of person one can be” - people are “fabricated” into the social order (MacLure 2003, 
p.176). Foucault’s idea of discourse can be compared to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, 
where norms and practices shaping one’s behaviour result in habitualised ways of 
thinking, and hence become internalised and unquestioned. The social order is then 
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perceived not as arbitrary, but as self-evident and natural, and alternative ways of being 
and doing become unimaginable (Bourdieu & Nice 1977). 
 
While discourse and habitus are useful concepts, several scholars have criticised 
Foucault and Bourdieu for implying that people always accede to the hegemony of 
dominant frameworks (MacLure 2003; De Certeau 1984). Reynolds (2005) argues that 
Bourdieu’s formulation is too static as it underestimates flexibility in everyday 
situations through which individuals can affect change, so that relationships are more 
malleable and negotiable than he would suggest. For example, Reynolds documents 
how young people in Zambia question dominant identity constructions, and resist 
complying silently with tradition. Similarly, in rural Sudan, Katz found that children 
“resisted the identifications offered by the larger society by constructing identities 
outside the normative trajectory” – whether with the approval of, or in opposition to, 
household members and community elders (2004, p.256). 
 
Indeed, qualitative scholarship on decision-making in postcolonial contexts reveals that 
evaluations of school value, and constructions of educated persons, are highly context-
dependent. Each context is based on a specific historical legacy, but also the constantly 
evolving dynamic of dialogue between education providers and recipients. For example, 
studies from Papua New Guinea (Demerath 1999), Tanzania (Stambach 1998), Nigeria 
(Bankole 1988) and Mexico (Levinson 1996) show that once attending state school 
failed to lead to salaried employment, young people began to celebrate ‘traditional’ 
knowledge and identities in opposition to the school. In parts of the Middle East (Adely 
& Starrett 2011), Pakistan (Bano 2012b), Mali (Amselle 1992; Brenner 2000; Warms 
1992) and Niger (Meunier 1995), this has been linked to popularity of Islamic schools. 
However, contrasting evidence from India (Jeffrey et al. 2008 Chapter 3), Mali (Kail 
1999, cited in Gérard 2001, p.79), Côte d’Ivoire (Proteau 1995) and Burkina Faso (Yaro 
1995) reveals that parents and young people facing a similar predicament have instead 
embraced the status of a state school-based definition of the educated person despite the 
institution’s low economic returns.  
 
Examples such as these show how the range of educated identities people pursue is 
diverse and fluctuating, and high valorisation of a school-based educated identity cannot 
be assumed. Certain factors have been found to correlate with certain evaluations of the 
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school, namely cultural and religious history of a location; the degree of cultural 
proximity between the school and pupils’ everyday lives; previous relations between the 
state and a given community; the extent to which state school-based definitions of the 
‘educated person’ have become entrenched due to attending public school becoming a 
norm or “institutionalised” (Gérard 2001, p.64); and the availability of alternative forms 
of school and their relationship to power (Morgan & Armer 1988; Pilon et al. 2001, 
p.214). However, these factors do not have great predictive potential, as although some 
trends can be identified at macro-level, simple correlations are harder to make at micro-
level. Indeed, qualitative evidence shows that educational decisions are highly specific 
to spatial and temporal contexts. Common strategies are not necessarily motivated by 
the same evaluations of value, and vice versa, similar preferences can result in divergent 
strategies. Educational strategies are certainly not linearly related to school supply, 
despite this being assumed in much international education policy (Gérard 2001; Lange 
& Martin 1995; Lange 2003b). 
 
Thus far, this section has neglected to consider how the culturally-specific criteria 
associated with being intelligent or socially competent that makes up definitions of the 
‘educated person’ also shifts according to an individual’s social position or group 
membership (Bloch 1998; Levinson & Holland 1996, pp.2, 21). Hence, ethnic, 
gendered, and age-appropriate identities feed into constructions of the identity of the 
‘educated person’. This observation invites us to consider the assumptions described at 
the beginning of this section which reveal the role of gender constructions in definitions 
of school value and people’s preference for different schools. Development 
professionals I met assumed that Islamic schools are less economically and socially 
beneficial to girls than state schools, and that Muslim parents prefer to send their 
daughters to Islamic rather than state schools. 
 
The promotion of mass schooling in the global South by international development 
actors has always been accompanied by constructions of gender which advocate in 
favour of girls’ formal education. According to Human Capital Theory, education for 
girls as well as boys should be encouraged for utilitarian reasons. Constructions of 
gender identity prevalent among economists in the 1970s assumed girls’ role to be 
reproductive while boys’ was productive. Girls’ schooling was promoted to indirectly 
ensure economic growth as ‘educated females’ were expected to have lower fertility. 
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Knowledge of ‘modern’ housekeeping was considered to make the household run more 
smoothly to the advantage of male producers, and improved child-rearing skills seen to 
prepare the next generation more effectively. It was only in the 1970s that girls’ 
schooling was seen in terms of making them productive actors in their own right (Jones 
2006; Resnik 2006; Unterhalter 2007; Vaughan 2010). Feminists from the 1980s 
criticised the utilitarian approach of Human Capital for instrumentalising girls’ 
schooling, and accepting constructions of femininity entailing subordination to men. 
They argued that education has an important role to play in fostering more egalitarian 
gender identities, by eliminating structures of power and exclusion including 
discriminatory laws and customs (Kelly 1978). Their ideas dovetailed with those 
developed within the Capabilities Approach, that education is important for achieving 
social justice by addressing gender inequalities in access to capabilities. Gender and 
education theorists criticise the still-dominant utilitarian focus on girls’ school 
enrolment (e.g. Hanushek 2008), arguing instead that the definition of quality schools 
needs to ensure that the curriculum, learning materials, pedagogy and teacher–pupil 
relations reject gender discrimination and social injustice (Aikman & Unterhalter 2005; 
Stromquist 2003; Unterhalter 2007). 
 
As commendable as these endeavours are, there is a strong current in international 
development thought and practice, specifically among gender and development theorists 
and practitioners informed by secular feminisms, that ‘religion’, and hence religious 
schools by definition, inculcate patriarchal constructions of gender at odds with Western 
feminist ideals of equality. These constructions include cultural norms which frame 
women’s primary role as being domestic and reproductive, and men’s as being 
productive. Religion supposedly places limited importance on women’s formal 
education, especially if it encourages them to challenge these practices and social 
relations (Tomalin 2007, p.1). Islam in particular receives strong critique from many 
Western feminists, and the religion is often held responsible for being at the root of all 
Muslim women’s problems (Balchin 2011). Hence, it is assumed that Muslim parents 
will prefer strong faith-based schools for their daughters so that they learn appropriate 
domestic roles. By contrast, these theorists tend to value secular public schools for 
overcoming these supposedly harmful religious discourses.  
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As an illustration of this logic, in her review of gender and development literature on 
issues including women’s reproductive rights violations and spread of HIV/AIDS, 
Tomalin (2007, p.13) finds that authors frequently blamed religion for these ills while 
promoting secular schooling as the solution, despite their providing little empirical 
support for either assumption. Such views are evident in reactions to the post 
‘Harnessing religion to improve education in Africa’ on the Oxfam GB blog ‘From 
Poverty to Power’ (Green 2012).10 The post reviews a study on how governments in 
Niger, Mali and Senegal have incorporated Islamic elements into state schools to 
address popular demand for religious education, resulting in an increase in female 
enrolment (Villalón & Tidjani-Alou 2012). One commentator responded:  
 
“We need to talk about how women’s rights […] are compromised by religious 
education. […] I wouldn’t want my own children in a faith-based school […]. 
Secular education is a right fought for in many countries, so let’s not let 
pragmatism blind us to the sacrifices we make if we have to accept faith 
providers. […] Well sorry, I think religion is just that - brainwashing.”  
 
However, these discourses about the economic and social benefits of secular or 
moderate faith-based state schooling as compared to strong faith-based schools are not 
necessarily supported by empirical evidence. The assumption that secular state schools 
are necessarily beneficial to girls ignores how they are embedded in patriarchal 
societies. For instance, teachers from secular state and Islamic schools in Bangladesh 
(Asadullah & Chaudhury 2010) and Pakistan (Saigol 1995; 2003) hold similar 
ideological views relating to gender. Furthermore, there is no linear relationship 
between a girl’s years of schooling and age of marriage, and while women’s earnings 
increase with schooling they usually remain economically dependent on men 
(Stromquist 2003, p.152). State schooling does not necessarily increase women’s 
decision-making authority or control over their fertility (Rao 2012, p.31).  
 
In addition, while religious discourses are certainly mobilised in many contexts to 
constrain women’s options, generalisations on this basis ignore religious movements 
countering such trends. Religious discourses can be used to promote women’s 
                                                 
10
 This post, and ensuing debate, can be read at https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/harnessing-religion-to-
improve-education-in-africa/ 
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autonomy or education, as in the work of Islamic feminists (Badran 2011; Mernissi 
1996; 1997). Scholars have documented the empowering potential of Islamic education 
and religious discourse for women in recent decades in Asia (Jamal 2005; Matsumoto & 
Shimbo 2011; van Doorn-Harder 2012), the Middle East (Minesaki 2012; Sakurai 2011) 
and Europe (Spielhaus 2012). Even within a framework where women are subordinate 
to men, religious knowledge or proficiency can confer more material status on girls than 
secular state schools, with significant implications for girls’ and parents’ education 
preferences.  
 
Furthermore, as with economic models of school utility, gender constructions promoted 
by international development actors are not value-neutral but reflect specific ideologies 
surrounding what ideal gender relations should look like. In many cases they collide 
with alternative models that people in specific local circumstances subscribe to. Indeed, 
girls’ school attendance can contribute to ‘de-skillment’, eroding the basis of women’s 
locally-situated domestic or ‘indigenous’ knowledge and the status it confers on them 
(Aikman 1999; Naji 2012). Alternatively, advanced schooling can reduce girls’ 
marriageability which is often their main opportunity for social mobility (Heissler 2011, 
pp.737–738). In many Muslim contexts, Islamic feminists disagree with the 
assumptions embedded within much Western gender theory that social construction of 
gendered difference necessarily entails “a hierarchical division between women and 
men” (e.g. Jackson & Scott 2002, p.1) and hence oppression of one gender over another. 
Many Islamic feminists would argue that Islam considers that women are different to 
men and play different roles, but they are nonetheless equal. They criticise feminist 
goals which aim to make men and women more similar as being an imposition of 
Western secular values (Tomalin 2007, pp.21–22). 
 
In response to contexts where women have lower preference for state schools than men, 
leading to lower female school enrolment, Amartya Sen (1995) and education 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2001) propose that women have been so socialized into 
accepting subordinate status that they have lost any sense of alternatives. They call this 
phenomenon “adaptive preference”. Other gender theorists have pointed out that these 
assumptions which construct certain patterns of behaviour – for instance based on 
Muslim women’s “adapted preferences” – as irrational or devoid of agency is deeply 
problematic (Baber 2007; Mahmood 2005). Indeed, Bano (2012b Chapter 6) notes how, 
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in Pakistan, parents’ preference for Qur’anic schools for their daughters reflect a 
weighing-up of economic, material and intrinsic value. Parents prefer this option to 
counter unrealistic and consumerist aspirations their daughters learned in the state 
schools, and to further their marriage prospects given that their chances of salaried 
employment are slim anyway. Young women also value this education for economic 
income as religious teachers, intrinsic benefit of self-esteem and psychological well-
being, and material gain of respect in their community and authority in their family.  
 
In addition, while gender has become a central variable of analysis in education and 
development research, policy and practice since the 1990s, other forms of 
differentiation for instance linked to race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or 
socioeconomic status, have been documented but not subjected to as much rigorous 
analysis (Samoff & Carroll 2007, p.370). Indeed, as I show later, social hierarchy 
identities comparable to a caste system operate in the Senegalese context and strongly 
influence education preference. Yet, there is a lack of research on the impacts of these 
constructions of identity, or of their intersections with gender. Compared to state 
schooling, there is little comprehensive research conducted on preferences and decision-
making surrounding faith-based schools in postcolonial contexts by either economists 
(Asadullah et al. 2015) or scholars of comparative education (Starrett 1998). While 
gender and development theorists frequently repeat that religion is a barrier to women’s 
empowerment, there is a dearth of concrete research within this field actually on 
decision-making and the implications of religious values on women’s education and 
employment (Tomalin 2007, p.27). The result is that simplistic ideas about the 
intersections of religious and gender identity are allowed to circulate, for instance 
neglecting questions such as how religious discourse intersects with other contributory 
factors like poverty in influencing limiting constructions of gender. These insights 
inform central questions of this thesis, namely how gender and being Muslim – and 
other facets of identity - intersect to influence people’s subjectivities and education.  
 
1.4 Understanding educational decision-making processes  
 
The previous sections have debated education preferences, but scholars including Bano 
(2012b, p.14) stress that it is important to make a distinction between preferences and 
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decision-making processes leading to educational outcomes. An observed endpoint like 
enrolment in a particular kind of school can be arrived at through entirely different 
combinations of preferences and/or decision-making processes. To consider one 
example, imagine two girls who drop out of state school to get married. One preferred 
to stay in school, but her father forced her to marry which she did as she had little 
influence over the decision-making process. The second girl preferred to marry and 
drop out of school, and although all her family members and husband wanted her to 
continue she took the decision independently to get pregnant thus legitimising her 
dropping out. Distinguishing between these two cases – and that they reflect divergent 
preferences and decision-making dynamics - is essential for development practice, as 
recognised in qualitative educational research on drop-out stressing the difference 
between ‘push’, ‘pull’ and ‘falling out’ factors on school drop-out (Doll et al. 2013). 
This is not, however, to ignore that preferences and decision-making mechanisms are 
related; they exist in a perpetual cycle as people re-adjust their preferences or 
aspirations in light of past decisions and possibilities (Bourdieu 1974; 2000; Froerer 
2012). 
 
The final two assumptions identified earlier in this chapter concerned educational 
decision-making processes, namely the mechanisms through which people attempt to 
transform their preferences into reality. The first of these assumptions is that (4) affluent 
parents are more likely to send their children to state schools, while poor families send 
them to Qur’anic schools. This assumption therefore attempts to explain decision-
making patterns observed between households of different socioeconomic status. The 
last assumption (5) is that educational decisions are made within nuclear families, and 
that male heads of households exert most power over children’s trajectories. Women are 
supposed to have less influence, and children in particular are seen as passive. This 
assumption therefore makes predictions about decision-making within individual 
households, theorising who the main actors are, and who have most influence. As I will 
show, both of these predictions are countered by realities in Medina Diallobé, as it is 
sons from affluent rather than poor families who are more likely to attend daaras, and I 
observed children, young people and women all actively debating education and 
influencing the trajectories of themselves and other members of their extended family. 
This section therefore reconsiders models which make assumptions about the link 
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between socioeconomic status, identity and school choice, and the implications of 
alternative approaches for this thesis.  
 
As argued earlier, Rational Choice Theory takes for granted that parents will value mass 
public schooling for its economic benefits, which leads development actors to infer that 
most parents, especially affluent ones, are more likely to send their children to state 
schools for income-generating possibilities. By contrast, it is presumed that religious 
schools, particularly those which provide pupils’ board and lodging like Qur’anic 
schools, appeal to parents who cannot afford the fees and costs associated with secular 
state schools. Similarly, the increased popularity of private faith-based schools teaching 
secular and religious subjects among middle-class parents in recent decades is attributed 
not to intrinsic value of religious education, but rather the deprivation posed to parents 
by the fall in ‘quality’ of secular public schools. In addition, the implicit categorisation I 
encountered among development professionals, and even within some academic 
literature, that parents who choose secular schools, or faith-based schools which fit 
liberal education criteria, are not only richer but also more ‘modern’ than ‘conservative’ 
or ‘traditional’ parents who choose strictly religious schools, smacks of deep-rooted 
prejudices about the ‘primitive mind’.  
 
Bano’s model shows how people’s preferences combine evaluations of intrinsic, 
material and economic benefits, and that this also applies to decisions taken as much as 
preferences. Indeed, this model proves very useful in avoiding the pitfalls of 
sociological theories discussed above which create dichotomies between ‘economic 
utility’ and ‘intrinsic value’, and hence reduce religious behaviour, including choice of 
faith-based schools, to either ‘irrationality’ or economic deprivation. As Bano puts it, 
within dominant approaches to religious behaviour “even when religion is considered to 
be intrinsically appealing, this appeal is believed to exist because of dire material 
conditions, and not because religious ideas themselves can have meaning” (2012b, 
p.7)”. Brenner (2000, p.236) also warns against this simplistic dichotomy between 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘economic’ appeal  of religion in the context of educational decision-
making, specifically when discussing parental choice for Islamic schools in Mali:  
 
“The juxtaposition of money with religion often appears in discussions of 
schooling choices. The issue at stake is not ‘work’ or ‘money’ versus ‘religion’ 
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but also to the larger social order and whether one’s children will be fully and 
properly educated so that they become the kind of responsible and productive 
adults their parents want them to be.” 
 
Bano therefore argues that recognising intrinsic value underpinning people’s choices is 
crucial, and one cannot assume that religious behaviour is motivated by instrumental 
reasons alone. Having said this, people might prefer a particular school type because 
they perceive that it has high intrinsic value, but they are more likely to transfer that 
preference into a real-life decision to attend that school type if the intrinsic value 
coincides with material and/or economic value. However, this is not the same as arguing 
that pursuing material and economic value was the only, or over-riding, factor in their 
decision. Similarly, one cannot assume that a particular decision was taken, not because 
someone actually wanted it, but because they had no other choice due to material or 
economic deprivation.  
 
In addition to its problematic assumptions about the relationship between families’ 
socioeconomic status, religiosity, and decisions to attend faith-based schools, 
neoclassical economics has also been critiqued for subscribing to a simplistic definition 
of poverty based on household income which does not adequately reflect access to 
assets, or barriers to them (Greeley 1994). This raises problems when generating 
quantitative correlations between a household’s socioeconomic status and educational 
outcomes of its members. For instance, dominant definitions of the ‘household’ used in 
development studies to generate statistics on income tend to focus on people who live 
together. This can exclude members who are absent, such as migrants, but who 
contribute significant amounts to household budgets (Randall et al. 2008, p.3), a 
situation typical in Senegal as shown in the following chapters.  
 
In addition, anthropological evidence from many African contexts shows that logics of 
accumulation based on “wealth in people” (Guyer 2009), or networks of allies or 
dependents owing favours, operate alongside material acquisition. Many contexts of 
entrenched political and economic inequality – including Senegal - are also 
characterised by clientelism, defined as the social relationship between people with 
more control over resources and those with less, based on an interpersonal relationship 
and an unequal exchange between the two (Coulon 1975, p.38). Patrons distribute gifts 
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to followers to obtain and strengthen loyalty and support, while clients obtain material 
benefits and protection (Clapham 1985). Indeed, evidence from Nigeria (Morgan et al. 
2010; Willott 2011) and Côte d’Ivoire (Proteau 1995, pp.637–638) show that 
relationships of clientelism between individuals or families are as important as income 
in mediating access to educational opportunities. Finally, the neoclassical model of 
socioeconomic status treats households as individuals, and thus ignores relationships 
between them such as structural or identity-based forms of inequality which restrict 
people’s access to income or wealth. As I show later, the caste-like social hierarchy in 
Senegal (which exists more widely in West Africa and the Sahel) exerts such an 
influence and is strongly related to households’ assets. 
 
The assumption presented at the beginning of this section also presumes how 
educational decisions are taken within families. The dominant model in neoclassical 
economics considers that the nuclear family of a heterosexual couple and their children 
is the basic decision-making unit. While classical Rational Choice theory proposed that 
parents make joint decisions which maximise their combined utility (Becker et al. 1977; 
Becker 1973), gender theorists have strongly argued that this assumption exaggerates 
the degree of agency people have, and erroneously presumes that decisions taken are 
mutually beneficial to all household members (Folbre 1984; 1986a; 1986b; Kabeer 
1994). Reacting to the unencumbered rational actor model, other scholars (e.g. Sen 
1990) have gone the other way by assuming that women internalise the dominant 
patriarchal ideology of marriage and conform to its norms despite it not contributing to 
their definitions of well-being, a trope common in much Western feminist writing (c.f. 
Jackson 2007; Rao 2012, p.26). As a result, women have come to be framed as passive, 
and/or irrational. Again, ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ are often blamed, and a pervasive 
notion exists within gender and development studies that there is an Islamic model of 
the family entailing a monolithic set of behavioural prescriptions. In this model, Muslim 
men are homogenously depicted as patriarchal oppressors, and Muslim women as 
passive victims (Mohanty 1994, pp.342–343). Finally, classical economic models of the 
family presume that children are passive and have little influence over decisions. 
Indeed, little attention is paid in development to children’s influence over their school 
trajectories (Hashim 2004, p.118). 
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These assumptions can all be challenged in several ways. The idea that decisions 
affecting children are taken within nuclear families has been critiqued for being 
ethnocentric and not reflected empirically in many African contexts. Instead, ties of 
lineage often override conjugal bonds (Oyěwùmí 2002, p.3; Sudarkasa 1996, p.81); 
members of extended families and wives within polygnyous marriages frequently co-
habit and exert significant influence over each other’s lives (Pilon & Vignikin 2006; 
Teolis 2009); and fostering children into the care of extended family or non-kin, 
including for educational reasons, is widespread (Einarsdóttir 2006; Kielland & Gaye 
2010; Pilon 2003).  
 
The idea of women’s passivity in household decisions has been countered empirically. 
Although there is no doubt that in many African contexts men enjoy public decision-
making roles which women do not (Adriansen 2008, p.211), and women will state when 
asked formally that men make most educational decisions (Kielland & Gaye 2010, 
p.98), this can mask the degree to which women exert covert influence over household 
decision-making. For instance, Silberschmidt (1992) describes how, when questioned 
directly, women in Kenya ascribed most decision-making power to their husbands, but 
accounts of informal decision-making revealed that in reality many women took 
decisions themselves, avoiding open confrontation while still getting their own way, and 
feigning ignorance if challenged later. In addition, in many non-Western contexts older 
women exert significant informal influence in family-related decisions, sometimes 
contradicting and opposing the views of their adult sons (Aubel 2006). 
 
Children’s supposed passivity can also be challenged. It is true that social norms in 
many African contexts mean that children must restrain from overt expressions of 
feelings, preferences and decisions if they contradict those of their elders, at the risk of 
causing significant tensions within the family (Thorsen 2006, p.94). This has also been 
documented with respect to educational decision-making, for instance in Ghana (Twum-
Danso 2009) and Mali (Sanou & Aikman 2005). Nonetheless, while the official line is 
that children should be seen but not heard, in reality evidence from Burkina Faso 
(Thorsen 2006), Mali (Brenner 2000, p.240), the Sudan (Katz 2004) and the African 
continent more generally (Argenti 2002) reveals that due to massive economic and 
social changes, children and especially adolescents in postcolonial African settings 
frequently disagree with their parents and elders including with regards to educational 
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trajectories. Alternatively, children covertly influence education-related decisions, as 
documented in Ghana (Hashim 2004 Chapter 6).  
 
One report titled Child Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau provides a detailed empirical 
repost to the widespread assumptions that children are forced into attending Qur’anic 
schools, and that their migrating with clerics to study by definition constitutes 
“trafficking”. The researchers identified talibés who had run away from Qur’anic 
schools, but also ones who wanted to attend for the opportunity to travel, and others 
who had actually been forcibly “repatriated” home against their will by NGOs. As the 
quote below demonstrates, in such examples it can be the NGOs who, ironically, are 
more guilty of transporting children against their will than clerics: 
 
The boy and others from the village were sent to [a daara in] Dakar. […] 
According to what the boy said, some Senegalese people approached the boy 
when he was begging and fooled him. These people said they were going to give 
the boys money but then locked them up in a room together with many other 
boys like him. All the boys were then put into an aeroplane and sent to Bissau. 
[…] Having their child repatriated was very embarrassing for the family 
members and they argued they were not at all happy with the situation. The boy 
himself wanted to go back to Dakar and complete his studies there (Einarsdóttir 
et al. 2010, p.41). 
 
To counter these models which deny women and especially children agency, social 
scientists have proposed that, rather than imagining characteristics associated with age 
and gender to be fixed, to see these categories as socially constructed and relational. 
From the 1980s it has been increasingly recognised that although childhood is a 
universal phase of human life characterised by rapid physiological growth and 
psychological development, the way biological facts are interpreted in relation to 
notions about children’s appropriate behaviour and abilities including agency varies 
hugely between cultures (Spyrou 2001; James & James 2004). The idea that children 
are passive is therefore a construction, and while they are often constrained in their 
actions, they nonetheless actively use their own opinions, skills and abilities to organise 
their environment, and creatively produce and reproduce cultural facts through 
negotiations with adults and peer cultures (Lombardini 2001). Similarly, households are 
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neither harmonious decision-making units nor rigid and completely constraining sites of 
gender and age-based subordination. They are characterised by cooperation and pursuit 
of individual interest, shaped by malleable culture and context-specific norms which 
allow members a degree of leverage and bargaining power (Jackson 2007; Kabeer 1994; 
Kandiyoti 2005).  
 
However, classical economic research - including within development studies - tends to 
ignore these social power relations between people, informed by culturally-dictated 
expectations which shape individuals’ possibilities, instead treating women, men and 
children as separate categories with different characteristics existing alongside each 
other. Economic models of decision-making generally treat social behaviour as based on 
aggregated individual behaviour. Indeed, Fine argues that mainstream economics has 
little to offer social analysis as it does not consider the systemic nature of social 
relations, structures, power, conflicts and meanings (2002). For instance, gender and 
age are seen as characteristics of persons rather than complex and constantly shifting 
systems of norms or relationships which come into play through social interaction.  
 
The theoretical flaws of economic explanations for behaviour are compounded by 
methodological weaknesses. The aggregate model of social behaviour is reinforced 
through positivist statistical analyses based on nationally-collected data or pre-defined 
questionnaires, which use generalised categories for the sake of comparison. This is at 
the expense of context-sensitive qualitative interviews or case studies which explore the 
reasons people give for behaving the ways they do (Bano 2012b, p.13). For instance, 
much comparative education literature on education and social mobility aims to uncover 
statistical relationships between social variables, school attendance and earning power 
(Froerer & Portisch 2012, pp.333–334). Similarly, while a great deal of gender and 
development literature argues for a nuanced analysis of power relations influencing 
people’s educational experiences, this is “little evident in studies of African education, 
which for ther most part continue to list variables and attempt to test their relative 
importance” (Samoff & Carroll 2007, p.372). This results in a wealth of data on factors 
coinciding with educational outcomes, but render invisible people’s actual preferences 
and the complex processes of decision-making (Hunt 2008, p.23; Pilon et al. 2001). 
Many NGO reports are clearly even worse, cherry-picking examples which fit their 
agenda to only present one side of a complex story. 
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However, when studying human behaviour it is essential to use a methodology which 
does not attribute values to people’s observed actions without empirical evidence for 
doing so (Tomalin 2007, p.28), hence the need to consider how preferences and 
decision-making processes combine to produce final observed outcomes. To recall the 
anthropological definition of education as “the deliberate, systematic, and sustained 
effort to transmit, evoke or acquire knowledge, attitudes, values, skills or sensibilities” 
(Varenne 2008a, p.22) cited in a previous section, ‘deliberation’ implies “the joint 
activity of people talking about something that happened outside their immediate 
setting, making practical decisions about what is to happen next, and then publically 
reflecting on what just happened” (2008a, p.31). The inclusion of the notion of 
deliberation in the definition of education therefore recognises micro-level practices 
entailed in the process of materialising educational preferences, best captured through 
qualitative research methods. 
 
1.5 Towards an applied anthropology of education  
 
As described above, this thesis originally responded to an empirical conundrum: what 
explains the disparity between the patterns of educational decision-making among 
inhabitants of Medina Diallobé village, and the predictions of development scholars and 
practitioners? I could have used this case study to ask questions from the point of the 
development actors: why do people from Medina Diallobé behave so strangely? What is 
anomalous - or even ‘irrational’ - about them that their behaviour does not correspond 
to any common-sense predictions? Instead, I do the opposite, and use this empirical 
anomaly to open up a theoretical Pandora’s Box to challenge these ‘common sense’ 
ways of thinking dominant in development studies and comparative education. 
 
Section 1.2 considered the widespread notion that state schools are economically 
beneficial while Qur’anic schools are not, and that this is the defining issue which 
informs parents’ preferences. However, qualitative research has shown that a universal 
and objective measurement of school utility does not exist, as people’s definitions of 
educational value informing their preferences are highly dependent on current and 
historical context, and must be investigated rather than taken for granted. Economic 
45 
 
incentives are not the only factor people consider, rather intrinsic and material benefits 
are additionally taken into account. Human Capital Theory and the secularisation thesis 
ignore how people’s evaluations of educational utility reflect how schools are embedded 
in political economies at local, national and global levels, and differential access to 
employment opportunities. These insights encourage us to ask of the Medina Diallobé 
context, how do local perceptions of economic opportunities influence people’s 
evaluations of education utility? What forms of knowledge do people value, which do 
not confer economic benefit? In what ways do people’s school evaluations break down 
the assumed dichotomy between the school as conferring economic utility, and religious 
education chosen ‘irrationally’ for its intrinsic value, or for reasons of material 
deprivation? 
 
Section 1.3 illuminated how constructions of identity are central to ideas of the 
‘educated person’ and shape evaluations of different types of education in a given 
context. While this is acknowledged to some degree within comparative education and 
development research, emphasis on gender as the dominant form of identity operating to 
influence school decisions has resulted in neglect of how other forms of social 
difference shape people’s experiences. Assumptions about how gender and religious 
identity inform people’s education preferences also reflect Western constructions of 
ideal gender relations, and prejudices about the impact of religion – especially Islam - 
on these dynamics. These critiques push us to ask, to what extent are dominant 
definitions of the ‘educated person’ in Medina Diallobé informed by the state school, in 
comparison to other forms of knowledge? How do constructions of gender and religious 
identity actually influence educational preference? Aside from the other ‘usual suspects’ 
of age, ethnicity and class, a caste-like social structure is widespread in West Africa but 
rarely comes up on the radar of those unfamiliar with the local context. This thesis 
therefore asks, how does this additional significant form of identity distinction play a 
crucial role in school choice?  
 
Section 1.4 problematised dominant understandings surrounding educational decision-
making processes. The idea that affluent parents will choose state schools and poor 
parents send their children to Qur’anic schools reflects not only rationalist and secularist 
biases about educational preference, but also assumptions about the influence of 
‘poverty’ on people’s ability to operationalise their preferences. Measures of poverty 
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based on individual household income ignore how assets enabling people to achieve 
their educational preferences circulate within networks. This observation invites us to 
ask, how is wealth conceptualised in Medina Diallobé and what are the pathways 
through which it circulates? How is access to wealth affected by identity constructions, 
such as caste-like social hierarchies? In what ways does access to assets influence 
educational trajectories?  
 
Section 1.4 also critiqued the idea that men are the main decision-makers within nuclear 
households. It demonstrated how lineage-based family norms and relational 
constructions of gender and age grant members of extended families, women and 
children various degrees of influence over children and young people’s educational 
trajectories. These flawed economic models of decision-making rely on quantitative 
studies which simplify complexity, use pre-defined categories of analysis, and attribute 
preferences and decision-making processes to observed outcomes. Qualitative and 
ideally ethnographic research is therefore recommended to capture people’s own 
explanations for their behaviour, embedded within their cultural and epistemological 
perspectives. These methods permit us to ask, what are the micro-practices of agency 
surrounding educational trajectories, missed through statistical analyses focussing on 
proxies for decision-making processes such as school enrolment? How do these 
practices illuminate power struggles and inequalities, but also sites for potential change? 
 
Through answering these questions, this thesis contributes to wider debates in the 
anthropology of education by uncovering local meanings and values attributed to 
education, the ways in which people in globalised and shifting socioeconomic contexts 
build learning in formal and informal settings into projects of self-fashioning and social 
mobility, but also the inherent constraints to their realisation (Froerer & Portisch 2012). 
Furthermore, it is inspired by critical transformative anthropologists of education who 
pursue research destined to inform more empowering educational arrangements.  
 
By understanding people’s engagement with educational options, I contribute to debates 
on social justice in education - or access to the benefits conferred by education - by 
drawing on Connell’s distinction between distributive and curricular justice (1992; 
1993). Connell argues that since the advent of state-funded, bureaucratically controlled 
mass primary school systems, ‘education and justice’ has been framed predominantly in 
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terms of distributive justice and how to provide the whole population access to mass 
schooling. Such projects generally take the content and form of education for granted, 
as debates about “quality” in international development and comparative education 
mainly work within the school model. As Connell puts it, “The underlying weakness of 
this approach to educational justice is its indifference to the nature of education itself. 
For education is a social process in which the ‘how much’ cannot be separated from the 
‘what’.”  
 
He urges us to re-think ‘social justice in education’ using the concept of curricular 
justice which gives a crucial role to education form and content. As Levinson and 
Holland (1996, pp.23–24) argue: “If we are to pursue the ideals of distributive and 
curricular justice […] then we must seek to expand educational spaces which might 
accommodate diverse models of the educated person.” Reminding us that “social 
research can usefully be thought of as a process of translation, carrying experience from 
one social milieu to another,” Connell (1992, p.145) suggests that by ‘thinking from’ a 
diversity of social standpoints (Harding 1991) we can develop education which reflects 
a more extensive reality. Indeed, the following chapters show how the strategies of 
inhabitants of Medina Diallobé illuminate the barriers to distributive and curricular 
justice in Senegal, but also practical ways of achieving social justice relevant to policy-
makers.  
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis  
 
Based on the insight that people’s educational preferences are shaped by historical and 
contemporary patterns of decision-making, Chapter Two analyses the implantation of 
different school types in the Islamic world including Senegal, with a focus on the region 
in which Medina Diallobé is situated. It analyses the evolving power relations between 
school providers, and how engagement with schools has been shaped by perceptions of 
their relevance to shifting political and economic realities, and constructions of ethnic, 
gendered, Islamic and – the most neglected in education research on the region - ‘social 
category’ identities similar to caste. Chapter Three develops methodological arguments 
in favour of ethnographic research and sensitivity to cultural understandings. It also 
presents the processes of data collection used in fieldwork, and specific contextual 
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information on Medina Diallobé relevant to educational choices, including dominant 
modes of livelihood and history of school institutions there.  
 
The subsequent chapters are organised according to four dominant educational 
trajectory ‘types’ among young people in Medina Diallobé, and the preferences and 
processes of decision-making which lead to them. Chapter Four considers people who 
pursue full-time, long-term Qur’anic school education. Chapter Five examines young 
people who attend state primary school but then drop out during lower secondary school 
or collège. Chapter Six analyses the trajectories of those who do invest in secondary 
state school diplomas, namely collège and lycée. The seventh chapter looks at how 
young people try to ‘do both’, combining skills and knowledge associated with the 
Qur’anic and state schools, by attending private Islamic schools, learning informally, or 
alternating between school types. Chapter Eight ties together the themes which come 
out of this ethnographic material, and their contributions to anthropology of 
development and education.  
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Chapter 2. The evolution of knowledge, power, schools and educational decision-
making in Senegal  
2.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that constructions of educational value and identity 
which inform people’s school trajectories reflect highly context-specific realities. 
People are influenced by the patterns of decision-making of those around them, which 
are embedded in historical trends. To understand how individuals evaluate schools it is 
therefore essential to comprehend the history of different schools in that location. 
Because actors weigh up the intrinsic value of education alongside material and 
economic benefits, it is also necessary to consider the social, political, and economic 
context in which the schools were, and are, embedded. This chapter therefore provides 
an account of the development of schools which feature in the decisions of Medina 
Diallobé residents. Section 2.2 describes the Qur’anic schools from their implantation in 
Senegambia to the dawn of colonisation. Section 2.3 considers the arrival of colonial 
state schools, and charts the emergence of private Islamic schools whose founders drew 
upon European school models to envisage a novel type of Muslim education. Section 
2.4 documents the evolution of these three types post-independence. The final section 
(2.5) complements this picture of school supply with information on school demand and 
decision-making in the contemporary context. 
 
This account encompasses three vertical levels. The main focus is the ‘national’ level, 
namely Senegambia and later the state of Senegal. However, where relevant I refer to 
the regional or global levels, by nodding to parallel developments in West Africa and 
the wider Muslim world. I also provide details about the ‘local’ level, namely 
particularities of the northern region of Senegal where Medina Diallobé is located. 
According to contemporary administrative divisions, this area corresponds to the 
department of Podor, in the region of St Louis (Map 2.1). However, Medina Diallobé 
lies in a wider zone straddling the Senegal River in the departments of Podor and 
Matam, referred to by its inhabitants from the 16th century as the Futa Tooro (Map 2.2). 
The dominant population of the Futa Tooro are the Haalpulaar’en who share, and have 
long shared, language, social structure, means of livelihood, a distinctive Islamic 
culture, common experiences of colonial occupation and implantation of different types 
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of schools. The following chapters reveal that it is essential to understand characteristics 
specific to this region as well as wider Senegal in order to make sense of current 
educational decision-making trends in Medina Diallobé.  
 
Map 2.1: Senegal specifying the regions of St Louis and Matam, and departments of 
Podor and Matam.11 
 
  
                                                 
11
 Map obtained from www.ausenegal.com (Ausenegal.com 2010), adapted by the author. 
51 
 
Map 2.2: Futa Tooro and surrounding areas in the nineteenth century.12 
 
 
2.2 The Qur’anic schools: 1000 to 1890  
 
Qur’anic schools throughout the Islamic world prior to European colonisation were 
remarkably similar despite their vast geographical spread. This account uses 
descriptions mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa, following implantation of Islam from the 
9th century (Reichmuth 2000; Robinson 2004), although schools with similar form have 
existed from the first century of Islam (Kane 2012, p.27; Ware 2014 Chapter 1). 
 
Qur’anic schools primarily taught memorisation of the Qur’an - from short verses for 
daily prayers to the entire text. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamisation was not 
accompanied by arabisation, and populations continued to speak their own languages 
(Robinson 2004, p.27). Students learned to memorise the Qur’an without literally 
understanding its meaning, as other subjects including Arabic grammar, Qur’anic 
interpretation and legal sciences were taught in specialised schools after completing 
memorisation (Kane 2012, p.28). This emphasis on memorisation before literal 
comprehension has little value from a European philosophy of education standpoint. 
                                                 
12
 Map obtained from  Chiefs and Clerics (Robinson 1975) at 
http://www.webpulaaku.net/defte/david_robinson/chiefs_clerics/chap1.html. 
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However, it had several pedagogical justifications built around the school’s primary aim 
of moral education to transform the student into a living example of the revelation, who 
could apply Islamic values to any context. The Qur’anic school was based on the 
epistemological understanding that the value of the Qur’an is not only its literal 
meaning, but that the text is imbued with a sacred essence called baraka (Cruise 
O’Brien 1988b; Eickelman 1976; Geertz 1968). Acquiring baraka through 
memorisation was an essential aspect of a student’s moral education as it unlocks the 
potential of knowledge learned, protects the recipient from temptation, and cleanses the 
soul (Brenner 2000, p.223; Fortier 2003, p.253; Ware 2014, p.53). In Senegal baraka is 
a central ideological concept, and the enduring legitimating framework underpinning 
the pedagogical, social, economic and political organisation of dominant religious 
institutions (Gilsenan 1982, p.111; Dilley 2004b, p.10).  
 
Students also learned to be model Muslims through imitation (taqlid) of the cleric’s 
behaviour (Gérard 1997, p.230; Starrett 1998, p.100; Ware 2014, p.54). The 
qualification to teach, or ijaza, was based not on possession of knowledge alone but on 
proving one’s exemplary religiosity (Fortier 2003, p.254; Lydon 2004, p.48). Hence, 
individualised instruction was valued over knowledge acquired through impersonal, 
written texts, as until an individual had mastered moral virtues, it was considered 
inappropriate and potentially dangerous that they engage in Qur’anic interpretation 
(Messick 1993). European travellers have long documented the strict discipline 
Qur’anic school students receive (Reichmuth 2000, p.423), used to instil respect for the 
text and those who possess its knowledge (Brenner 2000, p.223; Ware 2014, pp.42–44). 
Students were conferred to the care of clerics sometimes for many years, often far from 
their homes – a wider trend in the Islamic world that students be encouraged to travel to 
seek knowledge (Gellens 1990). To support their studies they begged for alms including 
food, and worked in the clerics’ fields. These practices had educational benefits as in 
return for their labour students received baraka transmitted from the cleric through 
prayer or physical touch. Enduring hardship and begging were seen as essential for 
learning humility, generosity and the ability to withstand difficult life conditions (Perry 
2004, pp.59–60; Ware 2009). 
 
Although its primary purpose was a moral education, the Qur’anic school also had 
economic utility for students who studied there long-term. They could learn from the 
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cleric skills relevant to agricultural livelihood or trade, which has long been associated 
with Muslims in West Africa (Cohen 1971; Curtin 1975; Hopkins 1973; Stoller 2002). 
They could become teachers, jurists, or receive income for officiating at ceremonies 
such as marriages, baptisms, circumcisions and funerals. Students could also learn to 
use the properties of the Qur’an to act upon the material world. Many clerics 
participated in the ‘prayer economy’ to supplement their incomes, performing prayers 
on behalf of others, or selling products associated with the ‘esoteric sciences’, including 
amulets and medicines (Last 1988; Soares 2005).  
 
For several reasons, the Futa Tooro today has a particularly dense network of Qur’anic 
schools and strong commitment to this type of education. The region is a band of 
savannah 15-20km wide straddling the Senegal River, bordered by the Sahara to the 
north and the Ferlo semi-desert to the south. It is 450km long, marked by the town of 
Dagana to the west and Bakel to the east. Despite its hot climate, the river floods every 
rainy season, inundating the river plain, or waalo, allowing for intensive cultivation. 
Vegetation on the highlands, or jeeri, consists of a little rain-fed agriculture and grass 
for pasture of cattle and sheep. Fishing is also practised, accompanied by secondary 
production of artisanal manufacture (Kane 1987, pp.23–26, 29). The waalo’s fertility 
has seen the river basin settled from at least the 9th century by several important 
empires. Islam was spread to the region, then known as Takrur, by Berber Almoravid 
traders in the 10th century, and became renowned throughout the Islamic world as the 
cradle of Islam in West Africa (Lydon 2004; 2009). 
 
In the 16th century, a king of the fulɓe ethnic group founded a kingdom called the 
Deniyanke, renaming the Takrur region the Futa Tooro – Futa meaning land of the 
Fulɓe, and Tooro after a province on the river (Robinson et al. 1972). Despite their 
diverse origins, the inhabitants shared Islam, a sedentarised lifestyle, and Pulaar 
language, so developed a shared identity as ‘speakers of Pulaar’ or the Haalpulaar’en 
(Wane 1969). By this time, Muslim clerics played an important social role, having 
spread Islam peacefully throughout the society via Qur’anic schools (Ware 2014, 
pp.79–81). However, they had diverse and lowly origins, and were excluded from 
political office and economic power. In the 18th century, the clerics constituted a group 
calling themselves the tooroɓe (s. tooroɗo) (Willis 1978), and launched a jihad against 
the Deniyanke, defeating them and establishing an Islamic state or Almamate in 1776. 
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A renowned cleric, Abdul Qadir Kane, was appointed leader or Almamy (Pulaar: 
almaami, from the Arabic al-imam). Under the Almamate, imams were recognized as 
the principal political as well as religious figures. Almamy Abdul Qadir established 
mosques and Qur’anic schools throughout the territory to islamicise the society. 
Although Abdul Qadir’s assassination by rival factions in 1807 marked the end of a 
strong centralised Islamic state in the Futa Tooro, the legacy of the tooroɗo revolution, 
including the integration of Islam into public life and political fabric, persists (Dilley 
2004b, pp.34–37; Ware 2009). 
 
A further reason for the high density of Qur’anic schools in the Futa Tooro is linked to 
its being the site of implantation of the first institutionalised Sufi order in West Africa. 
To clarify, the French traded along the Senegal River from the 17th century, but in the 
19th century expanded into the interior where they faced resistance from Islamic 
reformers competing for power after the fall of the Almamate (Robinson et al. 1972, 
p.580). The most significant was tooroɗo Cheikh Umar Tall who advocated holy war 
(jihad) or emigration (hijra) against the French. He recruited an army in the 1850s to 
establish a theocratic state in what is present-day Mali. Cheikh Umar was killed in 
1864, and his state toppled from 1890-93, marking the definitive beginning of French 
rule in Senegambia (Robinson 2000c, pp.142–143; Sall 2000).  
 
A crucial element of Cheikh Umar’s authority among the Haalpulaar clerics was his 
affiliation to the emergent Tijaniyya Sufi order; a form of Muslim social organisation 
which came to define Senegambian Muslim societies. Previously, Sufi tariqas in the 
region from the 17th century were loose associations of mystics. Only in the 18th century 
did Sufi leaders facing political struggle develop stronger institutional frameworks 
called orders (Vikør 2000). The Tijaniyya13 order emerged out of the older Qadiriyya in 
the 18th century (Abun-Nasr 1965). In the 1820s, while on hajj, Cheikh Umar received 
permission to be its representative in West Africa. Cheikh Umar’s defeat stimulated an 
exodus of people back from his state capital to the Futa Tooro where they created a 
further dense network of Qur’anic schools in the new colonial administrative centres, 
this time of Umariyya Tijaniyya affiliation, to resist French influence. They cemented 
                                                 
13
 Sufi orders are generally named after their founder: the Qadiriyya by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani from 
Baghdad in the 9th century; the Tijaniyya by Cheikh Ahmad Al-Tijani from Morocco in the 18th century; 
the Umariyya branch of the Tijaniyya by Cheikh Umar Tall, etc. 
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the link which still persists today between the trinity of leydi or homeland (the Futa 
Tooro), leñol, meaning lineage or ethnicity (the Haalpulaar) and laawol, the path or Sufi 
way (the Umariyya Tijaniyya) (Sall 2000).  
 
Access to Qur’anic schools throughout the Muslim world was restricted along the axes 
of age and gender. Long-term memorisation before interpretation reflected how 
knowledge was framed as something produced by elders and acquired by youth 
(Eickelman 1978; Mead 1978; Janson 2010). The high status of Islamic knowledge also 
tended to be a male preserve, and in West Africa the ceremony to mark a young man’s 
memorisation of the Qur’an often coincided with his wedding (Reichmuth 2000, p.424). 
While norms in the Muslim world differed, women were usually excluded from the 
most powerful forms of Islamic knowledge (Kalmbach 2012). In 18th century West 
Africa, several women from clerical families became respected scholars, teachers and 
jurists (Lydon 2004, p.48; Schmitz 2000, p.251), including in the fulɓe Islamic states of 
Futa Jallon in southern Senegambia (Robinson 2000c, pp.134, 138–9), and Sokoto 
caliphate in northern Nigeria (Mack & Boyd 2000). However, women were largely 
barred from esoteric knowledge (Soares 2005, pp.145–147). Women were especially 
excluded from Islamic knowledge in the Futa Tooro, as there is no example of female 
Haalpulaar scholarship during the Almamate or Cheikh Umar’s movement. Indeed, 
under Cheikh Umar’s militaristic jihad there were fewer possible roles for female 
scholars, and women were relegated to marriage and the home (Robinson 2000c, p.143) 
where they learned domestic skills. If girls from clerical families studied at Qur’anic 
schools, it was as day students, learning the minimum of verses, and how to behave 
according to norms of female piety and politeness (Ware 2014, p.172). 
 
Specific to West Africa and the Sahel, lineage also structured access to Islamic 
knowledge. Communities from at least the 13th century were organised into largely 
endogamous groups observing social segregation, with hereditary occupations 
associated with specific bodies of mystical and practical knowledge or lore (Conrad & 
Frank 1995; Dilley 2004b; Tamari 1991). Early on, the specialisms of freeborn groups 
were distinct but largely complementary. However, over time they became more 
stratified under the influence of Islam, with the artisans becoming more marginalised 
and stigmatised (Ware 2014, p.82). Groups were therefore divided into three ‘ranks’: 
freeborn lineages including clerics, warriors and kings; artisans; and captives. Among 
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the Haalpulaar, these ranks are known as rimɓe (singular: dimo), who today make up 
around 70% of the population; ñeeñɓe (s. ñeeño) at 10% of the population; and 
bondsmen (s. maccuɗo, pl. maccuɓe) and bondswomen (s. korɗo, pl. horɓe) making up 
20% of the population. The term maccuɗo is confusingly used to refer to slaves or 
liberated slaves, and also carries negative connotations. Therefore, in this thesis I 
employ the more neutral term gallunkooɗo (pl. gallunkooɓe), to refer to slave 
descendants (Schmitz 2009, p.96), although when presenting informants’ quotes I use 
their own words. Each rank includes a number of distinct social categories based on 
social function, relative power, and status (Dilley 2004b). Among the Haalpulaar, the 
freeborn rank includes Muslim clerics (s. tooroɗo, pl. tooroɓe), warriors (s. ceɗɗo, pl. 
seɓɓe), courtiers or advisors (s. jaawanɗo, pl. jaawanɓe), pastoralists (s. pullo, pl. 
fulɓe), and fishermen (s. cuballo, pl. subalɓe). The artisans include leatherworkers (s. 
sakko, pl. sakkeeɓe), blacksmiths (s. baylo, pl. wayluɓe), weavers (s. maabo, pl. 
maabuɓe), wood workers (s. labbo, pl. lawɓe), and musicians (s. naalanke, pl. 
naalankooɓe) including praise singers (s. gawlo, pl. awluɓe).  
 
Members of ranks and categories have shifted throughout history, for instance as 
conquerors enslaved their former rulers (Dilley 2004b; Willis 1978), but the overall 
structure has remained (Coulon 1975). This is because, although categories are named 
after occupations, membership is perceived to be irrespective of profession, and rather 
hereditary and ascribed through birth. Differences between categories are essentialised, 
understood as “a way of being, a […] moral and physical constitution of persons”, of 
sharing an “essence” or being of the same “kind” (Dilley 2000, p.150). Category 
distinctions are maintained through prohibitions on inter-marriage, and socialisation of 
children as the notion of characteristics specific to each category is inculcated and 
monitored from childhood through informal education mechanisms (N’Gaïde 2003). 
 
I follow Dilley’s (2004b, p.27) terminology of ‘ranks’ and ‘categories’ over ‘caste’ or 
‘estates’ to avoid cultural or theoretical overtones from Hindu caste or European feudal 
systems. The term ‘caste’ is nonetheless widespread in francophone academic literature, 
used to refer to groups within the artisan rank. The term ‘caste’ was also employed by 
my informants but to refer to any individual social category (e.g. ‘he is of X caste’), and 
to the system of ranks and categories as a whole (e.g. ‘the question of caste in 
Haalpulaar society…’). When quoting informants directly I use their own terminology.  
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In West African societies prior to colonisation, clerical lineages dominated the Islamic 
prayer economy and professions of teacher, jurist and healer. Islamic knowledge was 
closely guarded as it underpinned the clerics’ group identity and livelihood (Sanneh 
1976; Ware 2009). Artisans were perceived by other groups as polluting and more 
prone to witchcraft (Fortier 2002; Tamari 2012), blacksmiths in particular given their 
craft’s use of fire and its perceived association with hell (Dilley 2004b, p.71; N’Gaïde 
2003, p.728; Wane 1969, p.54). They, and captives, were barred from Qur’anic schools. 
Other freeborn lineages were excluded from advanced Islamic education (Dilley 2004a; 
Hanretta 2009; Ware 2014, pp.166–170; Willis 1978). This was especially the case in 
Haalpulaar society, as once the tooroɗo clerical category ruled the Futa Tooro following 
the creation of the Almamate, they sought to maintain their power monopoly by 
restricting access to the knowledge which underpinned their social authority. To clarify, 
Almamy Abdul Qadir and Cheikh Umar Tall allowed any man (including artisans and 
former slaves) to be a cleric on the basis of knowledge, and under these leaders the 
tooroɗo category swelled to 45% of the population (Bouteiller et al. 1962 cited in 
Coulon 1975, p.34). However, after the deaths of these progressive leaders, the tooroɓe 
justified their hold on power by defining their group status in terms of inheritance, 
developing genealogies and even claims of descent from the Prophet’s family - the 
status of sharif - to support their position (Dilley 2004b, p.94). They excluded all other 
categories from prestigious inherited religious positions (seeremɓe), such as imams, 
clerics, or khalifa (the village representative of a Sufi tariqa).  
 
Under the Almamate, the tooroɓe lineages who lead the revolution appropriated the 
fertile waalo land and hence primary source of wealth (Kyburz 1994). In many villages, 
they took over the inherited political titles of village chief (joom wuro) and chief of the 
land (joom leydi) - although some fulɓe and seɓɓe lineages still kept the titles they had 
held under the Deniyanke – thus becoming the aristocratic elite of the Futa Tooro. Other 
tooroɓe and rimɓe had to pay taxes to cultivate waalo land. Ñeeñɓe could only access 
less fertile jeeri plots, so lived through patron-client relationships with freeborn lineages 
(Schmitz 1986, p.362). Captives depended on their masters for subsistence. The society 
was therefore characterised by patrimonial rule based on a mixture of customary 
authority and clientelism (Beck 2008 Chapter Four). It was a religious oligarchy rather 
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than a genuinely theocratic state as power and wealth were held not by the tooroɗo 
category as a whole, but a handful of elite aristocratic tooroɗo families. 
 
The tooroɓe maintained their authority, and ideology of hereditary superiority, by 
controlling access to Islamic knowledge. For tooroɗo boys, especially of seeremɓe 
lineages, advanced Qur’anic school education carried huge status, and was an obligatory 
mark of family honour (Ware 2004a). Other freeborn boys could learn the basic 
Qur’anic verses but were discouraged from long-term live-in study by the tooroɓe 
(Coulon 1975). While slave labour enabled the tooroɓe to study and maintain their 
high-status pious image (Willis 1978), slaves were excluded from Qur’anic schools, as 
within Islamic law study of the Qur’an would grant them claims to freedom (Ware 
2014, pp.168–171). The tooroɓe framed the mystic knowledge of artisans, associated 
with contact with spirits or jinn, as ‘black’ lore (gandal ɓalewal), of the wild or bush, 
and morally problematic, in contrast to Islamic esoteric knowledge constructed as 
legitimate, religious or ‘white’ (gandal diine or gandal danewal). Ñeeñɓe were barred 
from the Qur’anic schools, but valued and taught their own occupational and mystic 
lore through apprenticeship (Dilley 1989; 2004b).  
 
The idea of a Muslim society characterised by a caste-like hierarchy, which restricts 
Islamic piety and the status of being a cleric to one group according to essentialised 
notions of difference, must surely appear bizarre to Islamic Studies scholars unfamiliar 
with West Africa. Indeed, from a doctrinal perspective there is no justification for such 
social stratification within the core Islamic texts. However, along with other 
anthropologists of Islamic societies, I follow Asad’s working definition of Islam as a 
“discursive tradition” (1986, p.14) which acknowledges that practices among Muslims 
in specific contexts are highly diverse but are characterised nonetheless by certain core 
elements. In the Islamic discursive tradition, practices and definitions of orthodoxy are 
related to the founding texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith. In West Africa, the existence 
of caste-like groups of artisans certainly appears to pre-date the widespread introduction 
of Islam (Dilley 2004b, p.83), and the religion was adapted to suit long-established 
social distinctions. Using a reported incident involving Shaykhu Amadu, the leader of 
the Masina Empire - another theocratic state founded by fulɓe in present-day Mali 
during the nineteenth century – Dilley (ibid., p.98) demonstrates that “the tension 
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between ‘caste’ inequality and ideal of equality among believers” was reconciled by 
arguing that nowhere did the founding texts explicitly forbid ‘caste’ distinctions: 
 
Ahmadu’s Muslim advisors, basing themselves on the Qur’anic verse which 
states that ‘true believers are brethren’, asked for the abolition of castes. The 
ruler responded by serving them a stew of frogs and lizards mixed with the usual 
fish, mutton and chicken. He added that while the Holy book did not forbid it, it 
was repugnant to him to mix the freeborn and casted people (Monteil 1980: 381-
2). The ideological justification for the continuance of the cultural separation of 
men-of-skill [artisans] and the distinctions between ‘castes’ was based on the 
claim that although they were not advocated by Islam, neither were they 
forbidden by it. 
 
2.3 The evolution of education under French colonial rule: 1890-1960  
 
European colonisation of Muslim populations by the late 19th century profoundly 
disrupted the classical Qur’anic education system. Colonising nations differed in 
attitude towards the inclusion of religion in public schools. In British, Portuguese and 
Belgian colonies, Christian mission schools were encouraged (Madeira 2005; White 
1996). In French colonies, including West Africa, religion was excluded from public 
schools following the model of laïcité enshrined in French law in the early 20th century 
(Harrison 1988).14 The French model of secularism is a “political choice defining the 
place of religion in an authoritarian and legal sense” and an intended process whereby 
“religion ceases to be the focus of men’s lives, even when they still define themselves 
as believers […] men’s actions and the meaning they give to the world no longer come 
under the sign of the transcendental or the religious” (Roy 2005, pp.19–20).  
 
These differences notwithstanding, colonisers judged Qur’anic schools according to 
European theories of rationalist modernity combined with racism. Peoples and religions 
were classified along a hierarchical continuum from white, evolved, civilised, rational, 
modern and intelligent at the top, to black, savage, traditional, irrational and ignorant at 
                                                 
14
 Note, however, that the earliest schools in the French West African colony were Catholic mission 
schools (Bouche 1968) and in contrast to other francophone African colonies, Catholic mission schools 
were encouraged in Haute Volta (now Burkina Faso) (Englebert 1999). 
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the bottom. Religion, especially mystic forms, was seen as irrational superstition, with 
the assumption being that societies would adopt a secularised form of Christianity on 
the European model as they ‘modernised’ (Saler 2006). Schools implanted during the 
colonial period valued knowledge that was abstract, written, and objectified. The value 
of a text was considered to be its literal meaning, and literacy was thus considered a 
skill of utmost importance. The notion that the Qur’anic text holds intrinsic properties 
able to act upon the world through the recitation of verses or wearing of amulets, was 
considered superstitious. Administrators critiqued the Qur’anic schools’ emphasis on 
memorisation rather than literal understanding of texts, seeing the former as pointless 
(Loimeier 2009; Starrett 1998; Ware 2004a). Teachers’ morality was considered 
irrelevant to knowledge transmission, and their legitimacy granted through written, 
state-granted diplomas not ijaza testifying to their morality. Administrators opposed 
corporal punishment and begging as harmful and violating European standards of 
hygiene, ignoring the cultural logics of forming moral persons which underpinned these 
pedagogies.  
 
Whether mission or public, colonial schools were structurally similar and designed to 
create entirely different kinds of persons to the Qur’anic schools. Schools resembled 
those developed in Europe during the 19th century, a system of mass socialization to 
produce disciplined, competent workers (Smelser 1991). Teaching followed a timetable 
based on Christian rest days, unlike Qur’anic schools adjusted to the local agricultural 
calendar and Islamic celebrations. Learning took place within state-constructed 
buildings, with children sitting in rows at desks in front of a teacher, rather than on the 
ground in the home of the cleric. The school inculcated submission to the state rather 
than to the teacher as a bearer of God’s knowledge (Barthel 1985). School knowledge 
was only considered relevant to a small, largely male elite, and colonisers usually 
recruited among political chieftaincy lineages. Schooling for girls in the colonial period 
was limited, usually emphasising Christian feminine norms and professions considered 
gender-appropriate (Barthel 1985; 1989). 
 
The colony of French West Africa or Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), which 
included what is now the state of Senegal, was similar as the French established a 
school system to create a docile corps to undertake executive tasks (Jézéquel 2007). The 
first public school, l’Ecole des Otages, was established in St Louis in 1853. It aimed to 
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attract the sons of chiefs and in 1893 was aptly renamed l’Ecole des Fils de Chefs 
(Robinson 2000b, p.69). In 1908 a more extensive system of primary schools was 
established (Bryant 2011). Academic subjects considered useful to the administration 
and capitalist extraction economy were taught (Harrison 1988), rather than vocational 
skills for the predominantly agricultural economy (Balans 1972). Schools were mainly 
secular as experiments in the 1920s to create médersas, or state-run schools teaching 
Arabic and Islamic sciences, were quickly abandoned (Harrison 1988 Chapter Four). 
Where Muslim leaders were mentioned they were portrayed negatively, and Haalpulaar 
hero Cheikh Umar Tall was denounced for his cruelty (M. Kane 1972, p.53). Schools 
were based mainly in the towns of Dakar and St Louis, neglecting rural areas including 
the Futa Tooro. Colonial administrators perceived low utility in girls’ schooling. 
Although some public primary schools for girls were founded in Senegal during the 
early 20th century, enrolment was 10% of boys’, who only numbered 2500-5000 
(Barthel 1989, p.69). Girls in the Futa Tooro would virtually never have attended school 
due to lack of infrastructure and social resistance. Nonetheless, biographical evidence of 
Malian pullo intellectual Hampâté Ba (Brenner 1997), and Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s 
novel An Ambiguous Adventure set in the Futa Tooro (Ba-Curry 2008; C. H. Kane 
1972), show that women influenced educational decision-making in their families and 
communities. They also provided economic support for children’s education (Lydon 
1997, p.568).  
 
From the beginning, the French perceived Qur’anic schools as a barrier to enrolment in 
their schools and, by extension, their influence and control. Schools were accompanied 
by forced conscription to attend and aggressive policies, especially in urban areas, to 
control the opening of Qur’anic schools or require that clerics teach French (Harrison 
1988, pp.57–58). These policies, however, had little impact for two reasons.  
 
Firstly, although they attempted to control the Qur’anic schools, the French 
simultaneously bolstered the social and political power of the clerics. To clarify, in 
addition to the first branch of the Tijaniyya Sufi order brought to the Futa Tooro by 
Cheikh Umar Tall in the 1850s, several other Sufi orders emerged between the 1880s 
and 1930s, especially in the new economic hub of the peanut basin to the west of 
Senegal (Launay & Soares 1999; Triaud 1997a). These included the Muridiyya (Cruise 
O’Brien 1971); the Tijaniyya Malikiyya (Bousbina 1997; Robinson 2000a); and the 
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Tijaniyya Niassiyya (O. O. Kane 1997b; Seeseman 2011). While these ‘big three’ 
receive most scholarly attention, a less-documented Tijaniyya community was also 
established in Medina Gounass in southern Senegal, founded by a Haalpulaar disciple of 
the Umariyya in 1936, which enjoys significant popularity in the Futa Tooro today 
(Smith 2008; Van Hoven 1999). The French feared that Islam would provide a rallying 
point for colonial subjects to rebel. According to racist logic of the time, they perceived 
Islam as a ‘natural’ attribute of Arab populations, and were suspicious of ‘Arab’ strains 
of Islam of Istanbul, Egypt or Arabia, which they framed as orthodox and pan-Islamist 
(Harrison 1988; Launay & Soares 1999). They imagined that the ‘natural’ religion of 
black Africans was ‘primitive’ animism (Wooten 1993). Those who claimed to be 
Muslim had been recently converted, they argued. They practiced a ‘syncretic’ and 
unorthodox form of Islam, ‘Black Islam’ or ‘Islam noir’, characterised by ‘African’ 
customs including divination, spirit possession, talismanic uses of the Qur’an, and 
allegiance to Sufi clerics. Islam noir was supposedly safe and docile, and a bulwark 
against ‘dangerous’ Arab Islam. The empirically inaccurate construct of Islam noir 
informed French colonial policy until the First World War, as the administration 
supported Sufi leaders they saw as helpful to their cause. Ironically, these colonial 
policies enabled the Senegalese Sufi leaders to become a powerful force able to resist 
the colonial, and later postcolonial, administration (Robinson 2000b), and to protect and 
expand the Qur’anic school network. 
 
The second reason the French failed in reducing the Qur’anic schools’ popularity was 
because the three new Sufi orders and Medina Gounass expanded access to Islamic 
education to non-clerical lineages, boosting their success (Wane 1974; Ware 2014, 
pp.175–176). Islam spread rapidly during the colonial period despite efforts by French 
administrators to the contrary, creating a new ‘Islamic public sphere’ characterised by a 
more standardised form of Islam. Divisions based on occupational lineage declined, 
with less discernible differences in outward demonstrations of piety among ‘clerics’, 
‘warriors’, ‘artisans’ and ‘slaves’ (Launay 2007; Robinson 2000b). Formal slavery was 
abolished in 1909 and disappeared by the 1930s, so freed peoples migrated to towns and 
the peanut basin to work and redefine themselves free of stigma (Klein 1998; Launay & 
Soares 1999).15 As clerics had maintained that the most prestigious definition of 
                                                 
15
 Migration to mask one’s low-status caste identity has also been documented in other contexts such as 
Nepal (Valentin 2005).  
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educated persons rested on Islamic knowledge, live-in Qur’anic study became an 
important strategy for these people to reclaim their dignity (Last 2000; Ware 2014, 
p.188). In urban centres, non-tooroɗo Haalpulaar’en could become clerics (Diop 1965; 
Wane 1969). The new Sufi orders and Qur’anic schools in towns also opened access to 
girls. By the 1920s, in Dakar and Saint-Louis, girls made up 30-50% of day students 
(Ware 2014, p.174). Girls from families of clerics, and sons of civil servants and 
traders, enrolled in Qur’anic schools as day students far faster than in colonial schools 
(Alidou 2005, pp.75–84; Ware 2014, pp.172–174). Clerics and parents who feared their 
children would abandon their religion, culture and social responsibilities resisted the 
colonial school (Launay n.d.; Gérard 2001). However, the tooroɓe aristocracy preserved 
the hierarchical social structure in the Futa Tooro, and the Qur’anic schools there 
continued their exclusionary practices against girls, and boys of non-tooroɗo lineages 
(Coulon 1975).  
 
Nonetheless, throughout much of the Muslim world, many parents’ definitions of 
educational value shifted in favour of colonial schools over Qur’anic schools for 
economic reasons (Berkey 2006; Brenner 2000; Robinson 2000b). In Senegal, despite 
the disparity between school content and cultural realities, elites saw its material utility. 
As Haalpulaar author Cheikh Hamidou Kane puts it, the school was like a cannon, in its 
inculcation of submission and cultural annihilation, and a magnet, in its promises of 
advance in the new order (1972, pp.40–41). Among academics and laypersons in 
Senegal, I frequently heard the stereotype that the Haalpulaar’en resisted French 
schooling, and that when the administration recruited for l’Ecole des Fils de Chefs, 
notables preferred to send the sons of their slaves. However, reality was more complex, 
as the aristocratic political lineages especially stood to gain from state schooling 
(Coulon 1975; Jézéquel 2003; Sall 1997) – a trend documented in other Muslim 
contexts (Hefner 2006). In 1895, the French appointed indigenous officials such as 
canton chief and village chief at local level. In line with neo-patrimonial politics, in the 
Futa Tooro these “administrative chiefs” (Olivier de Sardan 2011, p.23) were drawn 
largely from the customary aristocratic village chief and chief of the land lineages 
(Schmitz 1983). Such chiefs became powerful brokers between the colonial state and 
local populations, who could grant privileges to members of their clientelist network 
(Coulon 1975). In the 1940s, eligibility for canton chief became tied to state school 
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education as well as customary aristocratic lineage, creating a veritable “caste of chiefs” 
(Zucarelli 1973, p.224).  
 
Beyond this political elite, until the 1920s school enrolment in the Futa Tooro hovered 
around the tens of pupils. Seeremɓe tooroɗo lineages valued Qur’anic school for 
spiritual benefits and the material utility of social role, identity and the elevated social 
status it had conferred for centuries. For the masses without access to state positions, the 
school represented the loss of children’s labour and threat of indoctrination into French 
culture and religion. This fear of colonial education at village level was actively 
encouraged by the Haalpulaar political elite, who then discreetly sent their sons to 
schools to monopolise the new opportunities they offered (Kane 1987, p.358). While in 
towns the sons of low-status families could take advantage of schooling, in the Futa 
Tooro this remained a privilege for the elite. The school-educated class even demanded 
that school content more closely match that of France for the status such diplomas 
conferred, which the regime granted in 1945 (Bouche 1968; Bryant 2011; Coulon 1975; 
Jézéquel 2005; Obichere 1972). It was only in the 1930s that the schooled male elite 
demanded more public schools for girls, to provide ‘educated’ wives for their sons, and 
secure good marriages for their daughters (Barthel 1985, pp.144–145). 
 
In Senegalese towns, the popularity of colonial school among parents led to strategies to 
combine it with Qur’anic school. One option was sending children to Qur’anic schools 
from a younger age, before state school. Parents bribed officials to alter birth records to 
reduce a child’s age, enabling them to learn the Qur’an for longer before starting school 
at the ‘correct’ official age (Ware 2004a, p.86). A second option was sending children 
to Qur’anic schools as day students, around the state school schedule. By the 1930s, 
payment for Qur’anic schools in towns had become more routinised and based on 
colonial currency. Day students did not have time to work for the cleric or beg, so had 
to pay their tuition, requiring that their family had a cash surplus. Attending both 
schools simultaneously thus became a sign of privilege, and evaluations of pedagogies 
associated with long-term live-in study shifted accordingly. While begging and working 
for the cleric were once considered signs of privilege and the best ways to become good 
Muslims, affluent urban dwellers preached a new ideology depicting begging and 
hardship as signs of genuine poverty. They portrayed day study as a better quality 
education because students were not ‘distracted’ by work, although time spent learning 
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the Qur’an was halved. Elites were thus able to maintain their social status associated 
with Islamic piety, while simultaneously benefitting economically from colonial schools 
(Ware 2014, pp.188–190). However, this commodification of Islamic education, and 
shift in value accorded to live-in Qur’anic study, was initially an urban phenomenon. In 
the rural Futa Tooro, live-in study continued to be highly valorised and associated with 
the privileged tooroɗo elite.  
 
While colonial administrators throughout the Muslim world had a low opinion of 
Qur’anic schools, they embraced the Islamic knowledge they perceived as useful and 
which served their interests. Administrators engaged in the étatisation (Hefner 2006, 
p.9) of Islamic education, appropriating it within projects of nation-building. They 
reformed existing systems or created state-controlled Islamic schools, to counter the 
influence of Qur’anic schools, undermine the clerics’ power, and instrumentalise 
Muslim populations. Two processes occurred to package Islam within a European-style 
school curriculum alongside other subjects. The first is objectification, whereby Islam 
comes to be seen as a bounded and coherent system of beliefs and practices. As Starrett 
puts it, ‘knowing’ Islam thus becomes “being able to articulate the religion as a defined 
set of beliefs such as those set down in textbook presentations” (1998, p.9). In 
standardising Islam, diversity and differences in opinion are minimised without 
acknowledging the subtlety of contextual and historical factors affecting interpretation 
(Eickelman 1992; Eickelman & Piscatori 1996; Messick 1993). The second process is 
functionalisation, namely a “translation in which intellectual objects from one discourse 
come to serve the strategic or utilitarian ends of another discourse” (Starrett 1998, p.9). 
The newly systematised forms of Islam were appropriated through mass education to 
serve colonial interests. For the colonisers, the main “marketable skills” (Loimeier 
2009) Islamic education had to offer were literacy in Arabic to train men for positions 
as civil servants and interpreters, and eventually fiqh to create judges in indigenous 
tribunals or loyal clerics. These subjects were taught alongside ‘secular’ topics like 
maths, science, geography and history.  
 
Colonising nations differed in their commitment towards Islamic education reform, 
which has had a significant impact on the relative abundance of Qur’anic schools in 
different parts of the Muslim world today. British openness to including religion in 
public schools meant they systematically incorporated Qur’anic schools and clerics into 
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the public education system. They also created state schools combining Islamic subjects 
in Arabic with secular subjects in English. The result was that the classical Qur’anic 
school system and associated pedagogical methods were undermined (Kobo 2012; 
Loimeier 2009; Sanneh 1997; Skinner 1976; Starrett 1998; Umar 2001). In contrast, the 
French in AOF hardly integrated Islam into the state system due to their commitment to 
laïcité and theory of Islam noir. In Senegal, Mauritania and Mali they experimented 
with hybrid schools or médersas teaching Arabic, Islamic sciences and secular subjects 
in French to form a pro-colonial clerisy, but gave up the idea by the 1930s deciding that 
teaching black populations Islam was misguided and could destabilise society (Brenner 
2000, p.43; Harrison 1988, p.109). The French administration  abandoned its initial 
attempts at control, and ironically this laissez-faire policy was one reason why the 
Qur’anic school system survived longer in francophone West Africa than elsewhere in 
the Muslim world (Ware 2014, p.202). 
 
Functionalisation of Islam and low valorisation of Qur’anic schools came not only from 
colonial actors. Many Muslims exposed to European schools also questioned classical 
Islamic pedagogy. While Muslims throughout the world developed similar critiques 
based on their personal experiences (Kobo 2012; Loimeier 2003) this orientation was 
crystallised into a movement in the late 19th century by scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani in British India, whose ideas were elaborated by Muhammad Abduh and 
Rashid Rida in Cairo. For them, Islam was threatened by European domination because 
Muslims had abandoned correct practice and corrupted it with unorthodox elements. 
Their solution was to return to Islam as practiced by the Salaf or rightly guided 
Companions of the Prophet, from which the movement became associated with the label 
‘Salafism’ (Lauzière 2010). Reviving the ‘true’ form of Islam involved purging it of 
bid‘a or unlawful innovations. The Salafis borrowed the European classification of 
practices reflective of mystic or esoteric forms of Islam, including fabrication of 
amulets and the prayer economy, as superstition. They saw the veneration of Sufi 
shaykhs as excessive and equated it with polytheism (shirk) (Dilley 2004a). The 
challenge against Sufism was political as well as theological, as reformers disagreed 
with the monopoly clerics held over Islamic knowledge, and the religious and social 
power it conferred. It should be noted that 18th and 19th century West African Sufi 
jihadist reformist movements (Brenner 1987; Kaba 1974; Robinson 1985), including of 
Cheikh Umar Tall (Dilley 2004a), included critiques of certain esoteric practices, and 
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rationalisation of advanced Islamic education had taken place in the Medieval period 
(Berkey 2006). However, Salafi ideology marked a radical shift in its adoption of an 
Islamised version of European constructions of modernity and greater objectification of 
Islamic discourse (Brenner 1993; Hefner 2006; Kobo 2012). 
 
The Salafis derided pedagogies characteristic of the classical education system -  
including imitation, value accorded to memorisation, and close teacher-student 
relationships - as the routes through which innovation entered Islamic practice (Launay 
n.d., p.11). ‘Modernising’ Islamic education and creating a standardized school system 
became a key element of their strategy for social transformation, and to reconcile 
Islamic values with capitalism and skills for formal employment (Tripp 2006). The 
content of their schools retained memorisation of the Qur’an, Arabic grammar, Islamic 
sciences and moral education, but was grounded in a paradigm which prioritised 
abstract discursive knowledge. Pedagogy resembled the form of colonial schools with 
classrooms, blackboards, desks, standardised examinations and depersonalised learning. 
Moral education was considered as best achieved not through imitation, or amassing 
baraka (through Qur’anic memorisation or work for the cleric) which acts directly upon 
the heart, but by acquiring discursive knowledge through the mind which then applies 
the lessons to the body (Ware 2014, p.67). Reformers saw the Qur’anic text as 
representing self-evident, objective facts, in contrast to classically trained clerics for 
whom content was more opaque, truths to be contemplated rather than hard facts. From 
the reformists’ perspective, understanding the meaning of the Qur’an lay in its literal 
meaning, and Arabic grammar and literacy became the most highly valued skills and 
knowledge to be acquired (Ware & Launay 2009). While reformed Islamic schools 
usually had more religious content than state hybrid schools, they also sometimes taught 
secular subjects and European languages for their economic utility (Loimeier 2009; 
Meunier 1995). Access to such schools was democratised, including to women, leading 
to a “fragmentation of sacred authority” (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996, p.70) whereby 
these “new Muslim intellectuals” (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996, p.40) destabilised the 
monopoly of interpretation held by the male clerical elite in order to engender new 
social relationships (Dilley 2004a; Gomez-Perez 1997).  
 
Such philosophies and school models spread quickly in the early 20th century as Salafi 
doctrine was appropriated by the Saudi royal family via cleric Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It 
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became a much stricter creed, with narrower definitions of bid‘a, and rejection of all 
esoteric understandings of Islam and Sufi practice (Launay & Soares 1999, p.511) – 
although many acts they labelled as innovations, such as imbibing liquid derived from 
handwritten Qur’anic texts, were actually practised by the Salaf (Ware 2014, pp.62–63). 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo, restructured alongside functionalised, modernised lines in 
the late 19th century, reflected this doctrine and became a popular destination for 
students from north and Sub-Saharan Africa. These arabophone intellectuals – 
arabisants in French - then spread reform ideologies back in their home countries (Kaba 
1974).  
 
However, the degree to which reformed Islamic schools replaced the Qur’anic schools 
depended on colonial attitudes towards Salafi-inspired groups and modernist Islamic 
education. The British in West Africa, Egypt and Zanzibar enabled Muslim reformists 
to create new schools similar to European models (Fisher 1961; Reichmuth 1993; 
Starrett 1998).16 In north Africa, Salafi ideology also implanted rapidly, and Qur’anic 
schools in Morocco and Algeria had declined by the 1930s (Loimeier 2003, p.243; 
Eickelman 1985 cited in Ware 2014, p.202). However, the French in West Africa 
developed a powerful paranoia against ‘Arab Islam’ and what they saw as the ‘Wahhabi 
threat’ to Islam noir. Until the 1940s, press reflecting Salafi or Wahhabi thought was 
banned, pilgrimage to the Hijaz curtailed, and reformist groups violently oppressed 
(Triaud 1997b). Ideologies of modernist Islamic reform only spread to AOF in the 
1930s by students returning from study in the Hijaz, Middle East and the Maghreb 
(Loimeier 2000).  
 
One of the first Senegalese arabisants was El Hajj Mahmud Ba from the eastern Futa 
Tooro. Exposed to reformist ideology and pedagogies while on hajj in the 1930s, he 
opened a school named Al-Falah in his village in 1941. He taught Arabic grammar 
alongside Qur’anic memorization, using a blackboard, within a weekly timetable. From 
a fulɓe pastoralist family, he argued that “tribal and professional considerations” be 
abandoned in school provision, implicitly critiquing the tooroɗo exclusion of other 
categories (Dilley 2004b, p.203). Within ten years, graduates had created sixty similar 
schools in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali. Young men of lower social status were more 
                                                 
16
 See, however, the exception that reformist Muslims in Kenya, Uganda and mainland Tanzania were 
never able to mount an effective combined offensive against Christian missions (Loimeier 2003). 
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receptive to Ba’s reformist agenda, as were rich merchants who desired Arabic literacy 
for accounting and increasing their religious practice (M. M. Kane 1997, p.461).  
 
However, in the 1950s, the colonial administration and tooroɗo clerics allied to oppose 
such reformists, as national political interests among the former, and local grievances 
among the latter, coincided. They allied to vilify Mahmud Ba as a dangerous extremist. 
The state prevented Ba from opening new schools, and in the 1960s he went into quasi-
exile in Cameroon (M. M. Kane 1997, pp.456–462). Hence, in contrast to many other 
parts of the Islamic world where Qur’anic schools declined during the colonial period 
(Berkey 2006), French policy enabled the clerics, and Sufi orders in Senegal especially, 
to adapt comfortably to colonial rule, and the Qur’anic schools thrived in comparison to 
schools of Salafi-inspired reformist associations (Loimeier 2000; 2003).  
 
It was not only Salafi or Wahhabi reformers who innovated; clerics and Sufi leaders 
also reformed their pedagogy. They still valued long-term memorisation of the Qur’an 
and live-in study with classical pedagogies for acquisition of baraka and moral 
education. However, they accepted the necessity to incorporate discursive forms of 
knowledge into Qur’anic schools at earlier stages of instruction, teaching Arabic literacy 
and Islamic sciences, and even European languages and secular subjects (Clarke 1988; 
Mbacké 2005; Seeseman 2011). In 1937, Shaykh Ibrahima Niasse, founder of the 
Niassiyya Tijaniyya, even requested that the French administration provide Islamic 
schools teaching the Qur’an, Arabic and manual skills, although no action in this 
direction was ever taken (Harrison 1988, pp.190–191). These clerics shared in the 
ideological shift which redefined the relationship between religious knowledge and 
personhood more broadly than the classical Qur’anic schools, opening access beyond 
the sons of the male clerical elite to girls, and artisan and former captive lineages (Klein 
1998; Loimeier 2003). Indeed, Salafi-inspired reformers and Sufis were rarely as 
separate as some scholarship makes out – a dialogue which continued after 
independence (Otayek & Soares 2007).  
 
In West Africa, Islamic schools placing high value on literacy, and especially those 
which integrated secular subjects and European languages, were popular among fathers 
educated in the colonial schools, and the young arabophone intellectuals who disagreed 
with the authority of the clerical elite and wished to reconcile their religion with 
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ideologies of modernity (Kaba 1974; M. M. Kane 1997; Kobo 2012; Launay 2007; 
Loimeier 2000; Masquelier 2001). These schools also appealed to the clerical elite, 
including leaders of Sufi orders, who sent their sons because they were attracted to the 
new pedagogies and wished to improve their own practice, but still within an esoteric or 
Sufi paradigm (O. O. Kane 1997a; Ware 2014, pp.224–227). 
2.4 Schools in Senegal after independence: 1960 – 2014  
 
African anti-colonial nationalist movements demanded mass public school systems, and 
after independence states rolled out school systems inherited from the colonial period 
(Samoff & Carroll 2007). In Senegal, pupils still follow the French system (although it 
was altered in France in 1989), officially beginning primary school at age seven, 
continuing for six years (grades CI, CP, C1, C2, CM1 and CM2). Pupils are awarded 
the Certificat de Fin d’Etudes Elementaires (CFEE) upon successful completion. Lower 
secondary school, or collège, lasts for four years (grades 6ème, 5ème, 4ème and 3ème), 
marked by award of the Brevet de Fins d’Etudes Moyennes (BFEM) diploma. Upper 
secondary school or lycée consists of three grades (2ème, 1er, Terminal) culminating in 
award of the baccalaureate. During the 1960s, parental demand for school soared as 
they perceived high economic returns (Gérard 2001, p.64), and the state and UN 
agencies invested significantly (M. Kane 1972). However, these systems were never 
suited to mass education (Ki-Zerbo 1990). In Senegal, schools had low cultural 
relevance and maintained a secular curriculum despite integration of Arabic as a foreign 
language in the 1960s. The system maintained a hierarchical structure to create an 
overpaid civil service; urban bias in school provision; gender disparities in enrolment; 
and under-investment at higher levels meaning few who enrolled in primary would ever 
benefit from formal employment (Balans 1972; Capurro 1972; M. Kane 1972; Obichere 
1972). Schools stimulated migration from rural areas like the Futa Tooro as graduates 
undervalued locally-relevant forms of knowledge and considered agriculture low 
prestige (Schmitz 1994, p.426). The political elite saw no need to reform the school 
system which had conferred them their advantage (Sylla 1985; 1991). 
 
Across the continent, belief in economic utility of school faltered in the 1970s as lycée 
and university graduates failed to obtain formal sector jobs. Young male graduates were 
unable to accede to power promised by the state, and were still marginalised in the 
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gerontocracies that controlled social life especially in rural areas (Argenti 2002; Herrera 
2006). They faced prolonged periods of ‘waithood’ (Honwana 2012, pp.22–27) where 
social markers of transition from childhood to adulthood including marriage, 
establishing a household, and having a voice in the community, were indefinitely 
delayed. Throughout Africa, disillusioned lycée and university students led strikes from 
the 1970s, forcing governments to make schools more relevant (Bianchini 2004; Bratton 
& Van de Walle 1992; Lange & Martin 1995; Nkinyangi 1991; Silvia & Caffentzis 
2000). In 1981, Senegal’s second president Abdou Diouf organised the first Etats 
Généraux de l’Education et de la Formation (EGEF) to formulate more relevant 
education, including integrating religious instruction as the system was still secular 
(Sylla 1991). However, these good intentions were undermined by economic crisis and 
structural adjustment forcing withdrawal of funding from the education sector. 
Throughout Africa, the 1980s were marked by a decline in enrolment and growing 
educational inequality (Henaff 2003; Lange 2003a; Lange & Martin 1995). 
 
The 1990s marked a further shift in African schooling politics. After the global 
conference on EFA, international donors granted more aid for education. However, 
despite the progressive rhetoric of the declaration to provide education of quality as 
defined by people themselves, various donors dominated policy and emphasised market 
liberalism and retreat of the state (Lange 2003a, p.147). In Senegal, sectoral plans were 
developed with the World Bank and IMF, namely the Programme Décennal de 
l’Education et de la Formation (PDEF) in 2000, to increase primary school enrolment 
and gender parity in line with the MDGs. In 2012, enrolment rates of boys and girls 
reached 80% and 87% in primary, 55% and 55% in collège, and 29% and 23% in lycée 
(Pôle de Dakar 2013). However, measures taken focused on quantity, access and 
enrolment in primary, over quality or investment in higher levels. To reduce 
government spending, additional categories of teachers were created, who are trained 
for only a few months before learning in-service, and paid half a fully-trained teacher’s 
salary. Volontaires with the BFEM collège diploma teach in primary, and vacataires 
with the baccalaureate teach in collège or lycée. The low salaries of such teachers have 
led to repeated union strikes throughout the 2000s (Barro 2009).  
 
Although more children from disadvantaged backgrounds attend primary school, rural-
urban differences exist in quality and achievement (Montgomery & Hewett 2005), and 
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rural schools receive less material support and more under-qualified 
volontaire/vacataire teachers (Lewandowski 2011, p.45). Although more collèges were 
built in the 2000s, the proportion of the education budget accorded to secondary 
schooling has fallen. Scholarships for lycée and university students have been reduced, 
and 40% of lycée students come from the richest quintile of the population (Barro 2009, 
p.37). Despite the rhetoric that schooling confers economic benefits the problem of 
educated unemployment is entrenched in Senegal (Cruise O’Brien 1996; Dia 2007). 
Jobs which require school diplomas and pay well are scarce: 100,000 youth migrate 
internally each year to cities like Dakar, where only 2000 find steady work (Tandian 
2005, p.237). Only 5% of the population works in the formal sector, and most have a 
university degree (Barro 2009, p.23). Increasingly, the only salaried options available 
for school graduates lacking university degrees are as volontaire/vacataire teachers. 
Half of teaching jobs are of this type (UNESCO 2014, p.257). These jobs are underpaid 
(starting at 50,000CFA a month or £56, less than half of a modest household’s monthly 
expenses) and low prestige, yet competition for them (30,000 applicants for 1200 places 
in 1995) reflects how the teaching corps is a route out of unemployment among youth 
with diplomas (Barro 2009, p.23). 
 
Given the secular nature of the state schools, to meet popular demand for religious 
education the private Islamic school sector in West Africa proliferated after 
independence. During the 1970s, multilateral Islamic donors, NGOs and Arab states – 
especially Saudi Arabia - provided aid to build schools and fund scholarships to Arab 
universities (O. O. Kane 1997a; Kobo 2012; Loimeier 2003; Schulze 1993; Zarour 
1989). Liberalisation of public services under structural adjustment, combined with 
pressure to meet EFA, encouraged such non-state actors to provide education (Kaag, 
2008, 2009; Otayek, 2003; Otayek & Soares, 2007). In Senegal, Arab funding helped 
two important Islamic reformist associations to emerge. The Al-Falah movement started 
by Haalpulaar Mahmud Ba in the 1940s became an official association in 1971; and the 
Jama’at ‘Ibad ar-Rahman (JIR), or Society of the Servants of the Merciful, was 
founded in 1979 (Loimeier 2000, pp.178, 182). Al-Falah and JIR developed Franco-
Arab schools, including to support students who completed Qur’anic memorisation 
(Loimeier 2000, p.180). By the late ‘80s, they had opened over three hundred primary 
and secondary schools in over twenty areas in Senegal, although they are concentrated 
mainly in Dakar (Ware 2009, p.34). Private Islamic schools charge from 10,000 to 
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50,000CFA a month (between £11 and £55 – the monthly salary of a maid or labourer). 
Although reformists of Salafi orientation emphasise lower participation of women in 
economic activities, and stricter norms of gender segregation than is customary in 
Senegal (Augis 2013; Dilley 2004b, p.203), they propose more roles for women as 
teachers and preachers (Janson 2008; Schulz 2008).  
 
Leaders of the Niassiyya, Malikiyya andMuridiyya Sufi orders also created Arabo-
Islamic institutes using Western-style classrooms, teaching methods, and study of 
Islamic scripture alongside Qur’anic memorisation, in the holy cities of the peanut basin 
from the 1950s onwards (Cruise O’Brien 1988a; 1988b; Loimeier 1998; Ware 2014, 
pp.224–226). The orders and Medina Gounass continued to teach non-tooroɗo 
categories (Coulon 1975, pp.76–77; Dilley 2004b, pp.206–211). The Niassiyya in 
particular opened access to Islamic schools and mystical knowledge through Sufi 
practice or tarbiya to women (Hill 2010; Seeseman 2011, pp.164–170). While such 
trends are slowly permeating into the Futa Tooro (Jourde 2012), Islamic education for 
girls and non-tooroɗo men is more visible in urban areas and the peanut basin. While 
non-tooroɗo clerics and imams exist in the Futa Tooro, they often live in villages with 
no tooroɗo inhabitants or endure having their authority challenged by tooroɓe (Coulon 
1975, p.33; Schmitz 1994, p.442). Indeed, as Schmitz notes, for ñeeñɓe and 
gallunkooɓe in the Futa Tooro “emancipation through piety” or Islamic education 
typically only succeeds away from villages of origin (2009, p.106). 
 
Ordinary clerics also adapted their Qur’anic schools to deal with economic change and 
shifting demand. Following agricultural decline in the 1970s, rural exodus to cities 
included impoverished clerics travelling with their students. Ineligible for government 
subsidies as they do not teach French (Ware 2004a, p.276), clerics adjusted to urban 
conditions by placing more emphasis on students’ alms-seeking, engaging more in the 
prayer economy, or charging fees. Many urban Qur’anic schools today are day schools 
teaching very young children of both sexes, or school pupils during the holidays. The 
majority are internat or boarding schools, and teach memorisation of the Qur’an in 
return for monthly tuition of 15,000-25,000 CFA (£17-28, the monthly salary of a maid 
or manual labourer) (Villalón & Bodian 2012, p.15). Even in rural areas where 
agricultural labour and begging often still complement memorisation of the Qur’an, 
clerics are integrating literacy into teaching earlier. In cities and the peanut basin with a 
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strong history of Arabo-Islamic and Franco-Arab schools, many clerics have had an 
educational trajectory combining Qur’anic schools with these other types (Ware 2014, 
pp.77–78). The daaras are not quantified although the Ministry of Education states that 
doing so is a priority (2009, p.6). An approximate figure given to me by the director of 
UNICEF Senegal is 15,000 Qur’anic schools – twice the number of state primary 
schools (8000). In the late ‘90s, the number of children attending daaras was estimated 
as being between 600,000 and 1 million (Charlier 2002, p.100)17 – the current primary-
school-aged population is 2.2 million (Pôle de Dakar 2013) - although these statistics 
are questionable and do not differentiate between full and part-time students. 
 
After independence, the Senegalese government continued trying to control and 
instrumentalise Islamic education. By the 1970s, colonial stereotypes criticising 
begging, and framing Qur’anic students or talibés as a public nuisance and lacking 
career possibilities, became widespread in urban areas (Ware 2004a, pp.291–292), 
reflecting an urban-rural divide in education evaluations. The 1990s saw the 
internationalisation of the talibé ‘problem’ and more explicit state attacks on clerics and 
daaras. Following ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, 
in 1992 UNICEF supported the state to offer funds to clerics to end begging and 
corporal punishment. Many NGOs got involved providing funds to ‘modernise’ the 
Qur’anic schools. Official recognition was granted to CFEE and BFEM diplomas 
awarded in the private Franco-Arab schools; and scholarships were provided for 
students to study abroad in Arabic-speaking countries. These moves served the state’s 
interests by: reducing its education budget; promoting a new category of Muslim 
teacher – the ustaas, from the Arabic, ustadh - to co-opt private Islamic school 
graduates who otherwise had few career options and could have started an over-
educated and under-employed militant movement (Ware 2004a, p.290); and indirectly 
weakening the popularity of the Qur’anic schools, and by extension, clerical influence 
(Loimeier 2000, pp.183–184). 
                                                 
17
 Charlier (2002, p.100) states: “The number of children taught at daaras is estimated at between 
600,000 and one million by local sources. This is but an approximation essentially because daaras are not 
surveyed and are not obliged to provide statistics to any authority, which means a distinction cannot be 
made between those who take full care of children and those which are active only outside of formal 
school hours. The often-cited figure of 800,000 children must have been obtained by subtracting the 
number of children attending [primary] school in 1998-1999 from the total number of children of 
[primary] school age that same year.” (my translation from French). Even these statistics are problematic 
as Charlier provides no clear identification of the “local sources” or population statistics to which he 
refers. 
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The latest permutation of functionalisation of Islamic education has taken place in the 
context of increasing primary school enrolment to meet EFA. Most independent 
francophone West African governments remained committed to laïcité, and have only 
created state Islamic schools in the past fifteen years (Villalón & Bodian 2012). In 
Senegal, reforms began in 2002 and consist of three elements: adding optional religious 
studies classes into the existing primary school curriculum; establishing roughly four 
hundred Franco-Arab primary schools, with official recognition granted to existing 
private Franco-Arab schools which adopt a state-approved bilingual curriculum; and 
creation of eighty “modernised” Qur’anic schools teaching a curriculum in national 
languages, Arabic, French, and professional skills (UNICEF 2009; Villalón & Bodian 
2012, p.7). More recently, the government has announced further plans to modernise the 
existing daaras by requiring that they teach a common curriculum of three years of 
Qur’anic memorisation, followed by Qur’an combined with the primary school syllabus 
(MEN 2015). The state makes explicit that these reforms are intended to meet popular 
demand for Islamic education, as well as being a strategy to increase enrolment statistics 
to meet EFA goals by ‘capturing’ pupils currently attending Islamic schools 
(Lewandowski 2011, p.52).  
 
There is limited evidence that these reforms relating to Franco-Arab schools or daaras 
have affected education provision in St Louis or Matam, the regions equivalent to the 
Futa Tooro. The proposed “modern” Qur’anic schools do not yet exist. Aside from 
Dakar, the new Franco-Arab schools are in the regions of Kaolack, Diourbel and Louga, 
and while they do have very low primary enrolment rates, observers have criticised the 
state for strategically placing schools to pander to influential Sufi leaders based there 
(Mbow 2008, p.8). With the exception of one state Franco-Arab school in the town of St 
Louis, the proposed schools are not located in regions equivalent to the Futa Tooro, 
although parents there also demand accessible Islamic schools beyond the Qur’anic 
schools.  
 
There is no research on the reactions of Haalpulaar people – whether clerics, parents or 
students - to the reforms. The limited research on popular reactions in Senegal more 
widely shows divergent opinions. For instance, members of JIR and Al-Falah approve 
(Villalón & Bodian 2012, pp.27–28), as they share the government’s preference for 
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abstract Islamic knowledge taught through objectified texts over memorisation of the 
Qur’an and personalised pedagogy of the Qur’anic school. They would also benefit 
from state-approved curricula, for employment opportunities in the public sector. In 
comparison, members of the Muridiyya order are opposed to bilingual curricula for their 
Arabo-Islamic schools, arguing that there is too much emphasis on French, as well as 
being suspicious of the threat of state control (ibid., pp.29-30). Clerics of the National 
Federation of Qur’anic School Associations in Senegal18 object to the state’s 
terminology of “modernising” the daaras, its not collaborating with them to elaborate 
the plans, and placing too great an emphasis on non-Islamic subjects with some 
categorically opposing that French be taught in daaras (Abdourahman 2015; Balde 
2015; Lo 2015; SeneWebNews 2015a; 2015b). A pertinent critique of the state’s most 
recent proposed curriculum for the daaras is that it seeks to harmonise the daaras with 
existing legislation designed for private schools conforming to a Western school model, 
rather than being elaborated with clerics to respond to the entirely different mode of 
functioning of the Qur’anic schools (Abdourahman 2015). 
 
2.5 Understanding contemporary educational choices  
 
The plurality in education provision in Africa and the wider Islamic world today 
coincides with a broad range of education preferences and choices, and many of these 
trends can also be observed in Senegal. Many parents still see economic value in state 
schools despite high levels of graduate unemployment. In Mali (Brenner 2000, pp.187–
188) and Niger (Meunier 1995, p.623), these parents tend to be from privileged social 
classes and have resources to ensure their children obtain diplomas and succeed in the 
formal sector. Indeed, Lewandowski (2011, p.49) finds that in Dakar, middle-class 
families (civil servants, merchants, NGO employees) and upper-class parents (high-
ranking civil servants, staff of INGOs) prefer secular and Catholic private schools, or 
state schools supplemented by extra tuition.  
 
Many members of the middle and lower-middle classes have experienced declining 
opportunities for formal sector employment, but still perceive material utility of status 
or networks from state schools. In parts of Côte d’Ivoire (Proteau 1995), Mali (Kail 
                                                 
18
 In French: Fédération Nationale des Associations d’Ecoles Coraniques du Sénégal (FNAECS). 
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1999, cited in Gérard 2001, p.79), Burkina Faso (Yaro 1995) and India (Jeffrey et al. 
2004) the definition of the ‘educated person’ associated with at least primary schooling 
has become so ubiquitous as to be “institutionalised” (Gérard 2001, p.64) and a 
prerequisite for social integration. In Mali (Sankara 1996, cited in Gérard 2001, p.69) 
and Bangladesh (Heissler 2011, p.741) parents value school for inserting their children 
into networks to help find work rather than for knowledge, and in Tanzania (Bonini 
1995, p.589), India (Froerer 2011, p.700) and Morocco (Naji 2012, p.380) for basic 
numeracy and literacy rather than diplomas. Parental investment in girls’ schooling was 
until the 1980s and even 1990s low because it presented minimal material value – girls 
lost the valued skills associated with domestic work, and schooled girls were considered 
disobedient and hence unattractive wives. Yet, female enrolment has increased, 
especially as aspiring parents consider primary school useful given that husbands 
increasingly value wives with basic education, either for raising children or to work 
given men’s weakened earning power after economic crises, as in Morocco (Naji 2012, 
p.380), Bangladesh (Heissler 2011, p.737) India (Froerer 2011, p.701) and Egypt 
(Singerman 1995, p.164, cited in Starrett 1998, p.178). 
 
However, although the popularity of Islamic schools is intimately linked to perceptions 
of intrinsic benefits, material factors are also influential. The crisis of unemployed state 
school graduates has increased the popularity of private Islamic schools teaching 
official languages and secular subjects alongside religion. Cheaper than investment in 
the public system to university level, these schools appeal to middle or lower-middle-
class Muslim parents from Mali (Brenner 2000, pp.214–217; Gérard 1997, p.228), the 
Middle East (Adely & Starrett 2011, p.359; Marsden & Retsikas 2013, p.20) and Indian 
subcontinent (Bano 2012b, pp.102, 116; Rao & Hossain 2011, p.625), who would 
usually have chosen state schools for their sons but not Qur’anic schools, for moral 
education and economic utility. Indeed, in contexts such as Bangladesh (Rao & Hossain 
2011, p.624) these schools are perceived as better suited to economic realities than state 
schools. In India (Jeffery & Jeffery 2004), Pakistan (Bano 2012b, pp.136–142), 
Bangladesh (Rao & Hossain 2011, p.631) and Mali (Brenner 2000, p.234) these schools 
are also popular among middle-class parents for their daughters, to provide possible 
income-generating skills, while teaching Islamic gender norms considered attractive to 
prospective husbands, which offset the perceived negative influence of ‘Western’ 
culture conveyed in secular schools and media.  
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Schools teaching Arabic grammar and Islamic sciences are growing in popularity 
among parents, including the clerical elite, who would otherwise have chosen a 
Qur’anic school. They value a predominantly religious education, including for the 
possibility of working as an Arabic teacher or imam, and do not want to compromise on 
memorisation of the Qur’an. In Pakistan (Bano 2012b Chapter 5), Niger (Meunier 1995, 
p.624) and Senegal (Ware 2004a, p.308), such Islamic schools are popular among 
middle-class and affluent parents – including the leaders of Senegalese Sufi orders - 
who can afford the fees, and wish to practice their faith and reaffirm their Muslim 
identity. Evidence from Mali and Senegal shows that perceived benefits of different 
Islamic schools are influenced by context-specific material returns, including whether 
the state recognises private Islamic school diplomas (Brenner 2000, p.16; Loimeier 
2000, p.176) or if schools are linked to networks of Wahhabi traders or reformist 
associations with access to Islamic development funds (Amselle 1992; Roy 2012, p.101; 
Warms 1992). Perry (2004, pp.61–62) found that Wolof farmers in the peanut basin of 
Senegal prefer local Arabo-Islamic day schools over Qur’anic schools as they do not 
lose their children’s labour, and girls have access. They no longer consider the hardship 
entailed in Qur’anic school as necessary for a moral education. 
 
In parts of West Africa, the popularity of live-in Qur’anic school education has fallen 
relative to private Islamic schools (Gandolfi 2003, p.268; Hoechner 2011, p.6), hence 
the stereotype described in the previous chapter that live-in Qur’anic schools are for 
poor parents who cannot afford other options. This is true of some contexts, as the shift 
to market economies and encroachment of neoliberal ideology has provoked a 
commodification of education. Long-term exchange relationships in return for Islamic 
knowledge or clerics’ esoteric services have shifted towards payment of fixed fees, 
leading to new hierarchies of access of who can afford to pay (Butler 2006; Soares 
2005). 
 
However, the popularity of Qur’anic schools remains high elsewhere, and its correlation 
with poverty is not universal (Einarsdóttir et al. 2010, p.61; Kielland & Gaye 2010, 
p.101; Meunier 1995, p.628). Evidence from Pakistan (Bano 2012b, p.116) shows that, 
as fully memorising the Qur’an requires significant investment of time and loss of a 
child’s labour, the poorest are less likely to succeed. In India, the religious professions 
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of imam or teacher are highly valued, not a last economic resort (Jeffrey et al. 2008, 
pp.137–138). In Senegal, the popularity of Qur’anic schools has been documented 
among middle and upper-class parents (Loimeier 2002, p.125). Like other schools, 
Qur’anic school choice is linked to material returns, including contacts, skills and 
baraka to succeed in trade networks associated with the Muridiyya Sufi order (Bocquier 
1996, p.181; Teolis 2009, p.10; Ware 2014, p.245), or in a thriving prayer economy, 
demand for which can be enhanced during times of crisis, as documented in Nigeria 
(Last 1988) and Niger (Masquelier 2009, p.61). In Medina Gounass, and Djourbel 
dominated by the Muridiyya Sufi order, resistance to secular state schools remains 
among parents (Loimeier 2002, p.125; Villalón & Bodian 2012, p.9). In Dakar, lower-
income parents (petty traders, shopkeepers, seasonal workers, manual labourers, 
unemployed) also prefer the Qur’anic schools followed by apprenticeships, seeing little 
economic value in state schools, and social benefits of Islamic education (Lewandowski 
2011, pp.49–50).  
 
Clear patterns of combining different forms of schooling can also be observed, 
including where parents send one child to state school, another to Qur’anic school, and 
a third to private Islamic school, in order that benefits of each, whether blessing, 
knowledge, status, or income, be shared among everyone. Contrary to individual-actor 
analyses of costs and benefits embedded within the EFA paradigm, this collectivist 
logic observed in locations as diverse as Mali (Gérard 1997), Pakistan (Andrabi et al. 
2006, p.459) and Senegal (Kielland & Gaye 2010, p.70) sees the education of one or 
some as being for the good of all (Lange 2003a, p.160). Studies from Benin (Amadou & 
Koto Sero 2001 cited in Thorsen 2006, p.5) and Senegal (Delap 2009, p.12) show 
parents sending children to different schools throughout their educational careers, such 
as combining Qur’anic school with some French literacy or apprenticeships, to enhance 
their range of skills and income prospects. These strategies some scholars have defined 
as adaptive “multiskilling” for “occupational multiplicity” (Froerer & Portisch 2012, 
p.339). The pattern of attending Qur’anic schools as day students alongside state 
schools, which first developed during the colonial period, has spread beyond the elite to 
parents around the Islamic world, including Morocco, Yemen and Nigeria (Boyle 2006, 
pp.483–484). These parents often state that memorising the Qur’an helps children’s 
faculties of memory, concentration and literacy, useful for state schooling afterwards 
(Boyle 2006, p.495). 
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The appeal of different schools among young people themselves is also mediated by 
context-specific evaluations of their value. The attraction among some young Muslim 
men to Islamic knowledge – whether Arabic literacy and textual analysis within 
‘reformist’ paradigms from the Gambia (Janson 2010), Côte d’Ivoire (LeBlanc 1999) 
and Cameroon (Holtedahl & Djingui 1994), or mystic knowledge within Senegalese 
Sufi orders (Jourde 2012) – can coincide with material status value, enabling them to 
critique the monopoly elders have over religious knowledge and hence gerontocratic 
authority.19 In Mali, choosing an Islamic school can be an explicit rejection of secular 
state school and thus a mark of distinction for frustrated male youth (Gérard 2001, 
pp.72–73). In Guinea Bissau, some boys wish to attend Qur’anic schools in Dakar for 
the opportunity to travel as much as to learn the Qur’an (Einarsdóttir et al. 2010, p.41). 
Young women have embraced Islamic education within reformist ‘piety movements’ in 
Mali (Schulz 2008), Pakistan (Bano 2012b Chapter 6), Bangladesh (Huq 2008), Egypt 
(Mahmood 2005) and Niger (Masquelier 2009), but also within the Niassiyya Sufi order 
in Senegal (Hill 2010), for personal spiritual benefits which can also confer them 
respect and status in their communities, and sometimes the ability to challenge 
gerontocratic and patriarchal family structures. The availability of new media, as well as 
greater availability of print media, has also expanded access to Islamic knowledge 
outside of formal education, while simultaneously creating new hierarchies (Hirschkind 
2006; Schulz 2006; Sounaye 2014). Using media to study informally applies to pupils in 
state schools learning Islamic knowledge, but equally to students of Qur’anic schools 
who supplement their education with additional skills (Hoechner 2011, p.12). 
 
Decision-making in Medina Diallobé today has to be considered in the context of these 
patterns observed in the wider Islamic world, but also needs to be situated in the 
specific socioeconomic and political context of the Futa Tooro. A significant 
characteristic of this region is its status as an area with the highest levels of male out-
migration in Senegal (Dia 2007, p.2). Under colonisation, Haalpulaar men migrated 
seasonally to towns or the peanut basin to earn cash, returning to their villages to 
cultivate (Diop 1965; Schmitz 2006; Wane 1969). Droughts from the 1950s made this 
                                                 
19
 See, however, Gomez-Perez, LeBlanc and Savadogo’s argument that the focus on intergenerational 
conflict is over-simplistic and masks the frequent collaboration between young men and established 
elders in religious activities such as proselytization, as in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (2009). 
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pattern untenable, and men increasingly migrated long-term, mainly to Dakar, but also 
to central African countries as ‘diamantaires’ in the illicit diamond trade (Bredeloup 
1993). Migration from the Futa Tooro increased during the 1960s and ‘70s following 
droughts and food insecurity. From the 1990s, the USA and southern European 
countries became important additional destinations of Haalpulaar migration (Tandian 
2005; Touré 2001). By the 2000s, 30-50% of active males from the river valley area 
were absent, and while in the 1970s remittances contributed 8% of household budgets 
(Touré 2001, p.236), today it is more like 80% (Daum 1993, p.13 cited in Tandian 2005, 
p.244). 
 
Customary professions associated with social categories have long been in decline, yet 
the hierarchy remains (N’Gaïde 2003) through the Haalpulaar aristocracy’s capture of 
new sources of economic and political power and maintenance of patronage 
relationships, and perpetuation of the essentialist “indigenous discourse of difference” 
(Dilley 2000, p.154). Tooroɓe and other privileged freeborn have always migrated more 
easily, given their inherited wealth (DuPire 1970, p.439). Young male migrants of 
different categories shared rooms together and, like a microcosm of village life, 
reproduced hierarchical relationships (Diop 1965, pp.155–162; Schmitz 1994, p.424). 
The mixture of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic forms of domination, or neo-
patrimonialism,20 characteristic of the colonial state was reproduced post-independence. 
Members of the Haalpulaar aristocracy with posts as indigenous officials under the 
colonial regime - such as canton chief - were integrated into the independent 
administration and elected at local level. These local political brokers restricted 
implementation of egalitarian social policies in the Futa Tooro, including blocking land 
reforms in the 1960s (Coulon 1975). They co-opted communautés rurales or rural 
councils created in the 1970s to re-distribute land, and cooperatives to manage irrigated 
rice plots along the Senegal River basin created in the 1980s to increase access of ñeeño 
and gallunkooɗo families to land (Dilley 2004b, p.48; Schmitz 1994, pp.426–427). 
Migration was accompanied by creation of village development associations (VDAs), 
where migrants pooled savings to invest in local infrastructural projects (Dia 2008; 
Kane 2001; Quiminal 1991), but were dominated by tooroɓe who thwarted changes that 
                                                 
20
 My use of the term neopatrimonialism, drawn from Erdmann and Engel (2007) and Therkildsen (2014), 
takes into account recent critiques that the term has been used wirhin political science to imply that 
African states are characterised by solely neopatrimonial logics, when empirical evidence shows they 
coincide with legal-rational bureaucratic norms (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 2014a; 2014b). 
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might undermine their status (Lavigne-Delville 2000). From the 1990s, with state 
withdrawal of service provision, the VDAs have increasingly collaborated with NGOs 
and donors to provide infrastructure in villages (Kane 2001) thus becoming powerful 
“development brokers” mediating between development actors and local communities 
(Bierschenk et al. 2000).  
 
Although the original “caste markers” (Beck 2008, p.123) of the Haalpulaar ruling elite 
have declined - economic wealth tied to agricultural land, and monopoly on customary 
political positions - the aristocracy appropriated new sources of status through state 
employment and migration to increase their local political popularity, being elected as 
mayors of communes following decentralisation from the 1970s (Sall 2001; Lavigne-
Delville 2000). The shift of a one-party state to a multi-party democracy in 2000 has not 
altered tooroɗo dominance. While ostensibly democratic, communes in the Futa Tooro 
remain dominated by tooroɗo men over forty years of age (Blundo 2000, pp.80–81). 
While ñeeñɓe and gallunkooɓe have entered the national Assemblée Générale and civil 
service since independence, their posts rarely translate into elected posts or increased 
authority in decision-making at village level. While they can disguise their origins 
through migration to urban centres, this process is not accompanied by a revalorisation 
of their category status (Mbow 2000, p.90). Ñeeñɓe who become professionally 
successful in Dakar or abroad are still considered by many freeborn as polluting, and 
marriage with them shunned (Mbacké 2005, p.33; Mbow 2000, p.90). If they have few 
economic alternatives, ñeeñɓe and gallunkooɓe in the Futa Tooro can often perpetuate a 
submissive identity in order to maintain clientelistic relationships with their former 
freeborn patrons, thus benefitting materially (N’Gaïde 2003, p.718).  
 
With respect to gender relations, children in the Futa Tooro are socialised into strict 
roles based on a hierarchical division of labour. Girls learn to cook, clean, look after 
children, fetch water and firewood, while boys do house repairs, mind livestock, and run 
errands (O’Neill 2012, pp.167–172). Marriage is obligatory for both genders (Ndiaye & 
Ayad 2006, p.99) and female virginity strictly monitored (O’Neill 2012). Although 
marriages used to be arranged by the couple’s parents to strengthen family ties, parental 
monopoly over choice of spouses has been declining (Teolis 2009, p.17). While girls 
used to marry around age twelve (Mackintosh 1989, p.48), average age of first marriage 
among Senegalese women has increased to 18.5 years in 2010, although 16% of girls 
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are still married by age fifteen (ASND 2012, p.3). Polygyny was widespread prior to 
Islam, as a sign of male status and advantageous for women to share domestic work 
with co-spouses (Teolis 2009, pp.36–38). In 2010, 39% of married women in rural areas 
were in polygamous unions, and average fertility per woman was six births (ASND 
2012, pp.4–5), often a strategic decision among poorer families to have surplus labour 
in times of crisis (Kielland & Gaye 2010, pp.7–8).  
 
Social expectations of men are still tied to their breadwinning role, but rising living 
costs mean young men can no longer profitably work their family’s land or practise the 
customary profession of their category. Social markers of adulthood, including marriage 
and establishing a household, are increasingly delayed until men reach their thirties 
(Mackintosh 1989, p.48). While female status is still earned through being a dutiful and 
obedient wife and bearing many children (O’Neill 2012, pp.170–171), women have also 
taken on greater income-generating roles to supplement household budgets. Although 
creating additional burdens, in some rural contexts female status and bargaining power 
within households has increased, creating insecurity among some men (Mackintosh 
1989, p.171; Perry 2005; Tandian 2005, p.253). While women head local women’s 
associations, and a few are elected as councillors in communautés rurales and 
communes, they are still under-represented in formal political office (Blundo 2000, 
p.81). 
 
In the contemporary Futa Tooro, male “figures of success” (Dia 2007, pp.3–4) reflect 
this evolution of routes to status throughout the last century, with implications for 
evaluations of education. The customary aristocratic titles of village chief and chief of 
the land still carry symbolic prestige and inherited assets, while seeremɓe lineages of 
imam and Qur’anic teacher continue to perform vital social functions. The trader, high-
ranking civil servant, politician and development broker, roles dominated by tooroɓe 
although not necessarily of customary political aristocratic lineages, are also associated 
with wealth and prestige.  
 
Among young men, however, the migrant trumps the lot. Although jobs abroad, even 
for those with school or university diplomas, are often manual and carry low status 
locally, the migrants’ distance from home overcomes this stigma (see also Heissler 
2011, p.738; Rao & Hossain 2012, p.630). Wealth translates into status through 
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purchase of property, luxury consumer goods, and ostentatious giving at lifecycle 
celebrations (Dia 2007, p.7). By contrast, the local economy remains stagnant. Indeed, 
those with greater inherited and accumulated wealth can migrate internationally more 
easily, which often becomes a strategy for the local elite to maintain its economic, social 
and political dominance (Azam & Gubert 2005). The aristocracy and/or migrant elite 
blocks projects which challenge their authority or equilibrate local relationships - like 
attempts by some VDAs to create income-generating activities for youth (Dia 2007, 
pp.11–13) and Pulaar literacy projects (Humery 2012). Young men remaining in 
villages are unemployed, or work in low-prestige, low-paid customary professions, or 
trades like tailor, shopkeeper, carpenter, mechanic, and petty commerce. Girls and their 
parents prefer a migrant husband over these young men ‘left behind’, or even teachers 
and low-paid civil servants (Schmitz 2008, p.10). This creates further incentives to 
migrate, even among skilled professionals in Dakar, who are among most recent waves 
of international emigrants (Riccio 2005, pp.102–103). This context has ambiguous 
implications for school demand among parents and young people. Schooling has been a 
privileged site of investment by VDAs, whose members advocate in favour of French 
literacy skills (Fall 2001, p.206). However, although positions in the civil service or 
NGOs require state school diplomas, becoming a successful migrant does not 
necessarily. 
 
Despite the wealth of evidence on the social, economic and political realities of the Futa 
Tooro, there is a dearth of research on educational decision-making. Auriol and 
Demonsant’s (2012) quantitative analysis of survey data from six villages in the region 
of Matam is the exception. In these villages, 51% of 7 to 17 year-olds are enrolled in 
state schools. The authors argue that men of the “high / ruling caste” are more likely to 
have attended Qur’anic schools and migrated abroad, while the “low caste” invested in 
state schools. This observation is not particularly helpful given the simplistic and 
ambiguous distinction between “high / ruling caste” and “low caste” employed as 
variables. They conclude that “high caste” fathers knew their sons would migrate, so 
invested in Qur’anic schools to encourage pro-family values among their sons, thus 
making them more likely to send remittances. However, these conclusions are 
questionable given analytical flaws in the study, namely the assumption that current 
observations of migration and remittance trends can be used as ‘evidence’ of historical 
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parental decision-making patterns. This points to an urgent need for qualitative research 
to explain current decision-making trends in the Futa Tooro. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter started from the theoretical point developed in Chapter One that 
constructions of educational value reflect highly context-specific social, economic and 
political realities. Hence, several key issues emerge from the history of education 
provision in Senegal provided in this chapter which are relevant to understanding the 
trajectories of Medina Diallobé inhabitants today. Qur’anic schools valorising moral 
transformation via imitation and acquisition of baraka, through memorisation of the 
Qur’an and work for the cleric, have existed in Senegal for over a thousand years. The 
Futa Tooro region has a particularly strong Islamic culture and network of daaras for 
specific historical reasons. In contrast, the state system of mass education dates only 
from the 19th century, and is still concentrated in urban areas. The daara reflected a 
form of domination as it was an exclusive education only for boys of clerical Muslim 
families. Nonetheless, its providers had social authority, and its form and content were 
in line with cultural realities and popular epistemology. The colonial school system 
therefore reflected a form of domination of an entirely different order: it was designed 
to create a small male elite who submitted to the colonial state rather than to God, based 
on an alien language and culture, and denigrated mystic forms of religion as 
superstition. It was also accompanied by forced conscription and enrolment, attacks on 
the Qur’anic schools, and associated with other forms of physical and symbolic violence 
perpetrated under the colonial regime. In turn however, many Muslims were influenced 
by European models of schooling, criticised the classical Islamic education system on 
theological and pedagogical grounds, and re-packaged Islam to coincide with the format 
and curricula of Western-style schools thus widening the criteria for Islamic knowledge 
acquisition and authority. 
 
All Muslim societies under European colonial rule experienced this evolution of 
education provision. However, the Senegalese account shows that the relative influence 
of these different education providers and their respective schools varies between 
contexts due to specific factors, and cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, compared to 
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many other Islamic contexts, the network of Qur’anic schools in Senegal has been 
protected against mass state education and alternative models of private Islamic 
education advancing a rationalist interpretation of Islam sceptical of esoteric or Sufi 
practice. This is linked to two key factors whose origins lie in the policies of the French 
colonial administration. First, under their theory of Islam noir the French bolstered the 
social, economic and political power of the Sufi order leaders, whose power has 
continued post-independence. Second, they created strictly secular state schools under 
the model of laïcité which have remained secular until recently in many former colonies 
of AOF. Indeed, public state schools in Senegal continue to be ill-adapted to cultural 
and economic realities of all but a tiny elite, despite their being transformed into a 
system of mass education after independence and currently promoted under the MDG 
agenda. Thus, Qur’anic schools which address popular demand for Islamic education 
based on memorisation of the Qur’an and acquisition of baraka continue to thrive 
despite criticisms from the state, Western-educated elite, Islamic reformers and NGOs.  
 
This situation of education provision is mirrored by relatively unusual patterns of 
education demand among parents and young people compared to other Islamic contexts. 
Certain trends are comparable to other post-colonial Muslim societies. From the 
colonial period onwards many parents perceived state schools as valuable in the new 
order. They sought ways to combine Islamic moral education with skills for the formal 
economy, including sending their children to private, Western-inspired Islamic schools. 
However, the assumption that these trends of decision-making are universal, and that 
full-time Qur’anic schooling is unpopular among all but the poorest parents, is a 
stereotype. In Senegal, preference among parents, including affluent ones, for Qur’anic 
schools or Arabo-Islamic schools, remains high.  
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, high evaluations of the intrinsic spiritual or 
moral value of schools typically coincide with perceived material or economic benefits. 
To take the Futa Tooro specifically, Qur’anic school education prior to colonisation was 
embedded in a social hierarchy in which clerics dominated political and economic 
power, and status and self-worth for men from tooroɗo lineages was based on 
memorisation of the Qur’an. This ideology has survived today although the Haalpulaar 
aristocracy have co-opted new sources of income to maintain their status. Hence, 
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intrinsic value of memorising the Qur’an has, for the elite clerical category of tooroɓe, 
continued to be supported by material and economic value.  
 
Therefore, in terms of understanding the decisions of contemporary inhabitants of 
Medina Diallobé, the educational landscape in the Futa Tooro has three main relevant 
characteristics: a dense network of exclusive Qur’anic schools and associated 
livelihoods of trade and migration which remain popular for the male tooroɗo elite;  
relatively low-cost state schools which offer economic and material alternatives to the 
Qur’anic schools but which are a relatively recent and ambiguous aspect of the 
educational landscape; there are few accessible Islamic schools teaching Arabic and 
religious science which offer alternative material and economic opportunities, and are 
open to girls and non-tooroɗo boys, as they tend to be located elsewhere in Senegal 
and/or charge high fees.  
 
The trajectories of individual inhabitants of Medina Diallobé reflect this broad backdrop 
of school provision. However, their preferences – which in turn hint at alternative faith-
infused notions of being ‘educated’ in contrast to the mainstream development models - 
and concrete decision-making processes, reflect further contextual specificities which 
can only be understood through ethnographic research. In Chapter Three I therefore 
describe the process of data collection in Medina Diallobé and the village’s main 
characteristics, to situate the material analysed in the subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter 3. Situating learning in Medina Diallobé: Methodology, access and 
context  
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the political, social, economic and educational context of Medina 
Diallobé village, and the specific realities which frame the school-related decision-
making processes analysed in the following chapters. However, before presenting the 
what, this chapter begins by unpacking how I learned about Medina Diallobé, including 
my methodological stance, processes of relationship-building, moments of insight, and 
the biases, barriers and challenges I encountered in the field. I spent a total of sixteen 
months in Senegal. My first visit was a month-long pilot study in October 2010, which I 
mostly spent in Dakar combined with two short (three to four day) trips to the south and 
north of the country. I returned to Senegal in February 2011 to commence fieldwork 
proper, and initially spent six months mainly in Dakar learning Pulaar with a tutor at the 
ACI Baobab Language School. Between August 2011 and July 2012 I spent nine 
months in Senegal, namely eight months in Medina Diallobé (divided into four stays of 
six to ten weeks), interspersed with rest breaks of one to two weeks in Dakar. 
 
3.2 Learning about learning in Medina Diallobé 
3.21 Understanding across epistemologies: Methodological reflections  
 
Chapter One made the case that the global model of schooling, and assumptions about 
decision-making, reflect Western-centric value judgements about what constitutes 
“quality” education. These assumptions are linked to a broader problem central to this 
thesis: the danger of employing Western-centric frames of reference when studying the 
realities of people following other epistemologies or cosmologies. Indeed, it is essential 
not to attribute value judgements to people’s behaviour without empirical evidence 
(Tomalin 2007, p.28). However, scholars from non-Western cultural backgrounds have 
shown that Western scientists have tended to analyse other people from within their 
own perspective and not through the lens of others’ own worldviews, and this has been 
used to justify colonisation and domination of other peoples (Nakata 2007; Tuhiwai 
Smith 1999). The legacy of colonial frameworks has permeated into scholarship today, 
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and alternative ways of knowing and conceptualising knowledge continue to be 
denigrated within Western academia (Abdi 2008; Brock-Utne 2006; Foley 2003; Varese 
2003).  
 
These insights are equally applicable to the study of Muslim societies, with Sub-
Saharan Africa a specific case where racist and Orientalist biases intersect (Ware 2014, 
pp.17–23, 30). Senegalese historian Ousmane Kane (2012, pp.1–3) makes the case that 
much research on Africa, Islam and Islamic education in Africa, including the work of 
African intellectuals trained in Western universities working in European languages, has 
tended to use categories and conceptual systems derived from Western epistemologies. 
Much contemporary Western academic scholarship still bears the imprint of colonial 
stereotypes about Islam noir or ‘African Islam’ (Otayek & Soares 2007; Seeseman 
2011, pp.11–13). This has resulted in widespread binaries constructed between ‘African 
Islam’, perceived as a syncretic form of religion, and ‘Islam in Africa’ – namely 
‘Salafi’, ‘Wahhabi’, or ‘Islamist’ reformist trends, presented as orthodoxy.  
 
In his recent book, The Walking Qur’an, on Islamic education in Senegambia, Rudolph 
Ware (2014, pp.17–23, 30) demonstrates how this construction currently influences 
many scholars, including Muslims, who judge Qur’anic and Islamic schools along a 
hierarchy from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’. According to Ware, the Qur’anic school is 
embedded within a logic which accords high value to oral transmission of knowledge, 
and the moral transformation of students through imitation, and acquisition of baraka. 
This logic is denigrated in much scholarship as being representative of ‘African Islam’, 
namely traditional, syncretic, heterodox, locally African, peripheral, and inferior. In 
contrast, the ‘reformist’ Islamic schools based on European school models are 
characterised by modernist denigration of mystic forms of religion, and high 
valorisation of literacy and abstract transmission of textual knowledge. These schools 
and value-logic are framed with much academic discourse as modern, orthodox, 
universal, and superior. It is these stereotypes which influence many of the problematic 
value judgements about Qur’anic schools, by development actors and scholars, 
described in Chapter One.  
 
Moving beyond these biases is not straightforward, however, although scholars have 
suggested various methodological strategies. Ousmane Kane argues that to break down 
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these problematic categorisations, more dialogue is needed between Western-educated 
sociologists of knowledge and scholars familiar with the pre-colonial Islamic 
intellectual tradition in West Africa. Engaging with literature written in non-European 
languages is essential, especially scholarship in Arabic and adjami literature in 
vernacular African languages written in Arabic script, which reflect an “Islamic space 
of meaning” (Kepel 2000, p.74) structured by Islamic beliefs and practices. While I 
cannot read Arabic, I have made efforts to engage with the work of both anglophone 
and francophone academics, including wherever possible West African scholars, with 
an understanding of this corpus. I have attempted to draw upon the body of literature 
which constitutes a “post-colonial space of meaning shared by Europhone intellectuals 
and non-Europhone intellectuals, as well as intellectuals who result from a mixture of 
the two” (Kane 2012, p.3).  
 
In terms of my own research practice, I have been drawn towards hermeneutics and the 
work of Hans-Georg Gadamer (2001) who proposes a practical framework to theorise 
what happens when people try and engage in understanding with individuals from 
different cultures or backgrounds. Gadamer argues that it is impossible to shift entirely 
from your own background, history, culture, language or worldview, into a different 
system of beliefs and ways of thinking. It is inevitable that we will interpret the stories 
people tell us based on our own experiences and prejudices. However, Gadamer argues 
that it is possible to go beyond our own standpoint. We will never achieve the 
standpoint of another, but we can arrive at understanding with others in which we meet 
midway between our old standpoints and theirs, by developing a “horizon”. As 
Gadamer puts it, “a person who has no horizon is a man who does not see far enough 
and hence overvalues what is nearest to him” (1975, p.302). Understanding therefore 
involves not putting one’s views forward and asserting them, but taking part in a 
process of dialogue, where the other person’s opinions and experiences are taken 
seriously. Thus, a “fusion of horizons” takes place among the participants in dialogue, 
as each one’s horizon is broadened by the other’s, and each person is “transformed into 
a communion in which [they] do not remain what [they] were” (1975, p.378).  
 
Research practice conducive to creating instances of understanding includes constant 
self-reflection – which can include reading critical literature including written by people 
from other perspectives, and keeping and re-reading our fieldwork notes - to identify 
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those biases and remain vigilant about how they influence our thoughts, actions, and 
interpretations of others’ realities (Scott-Villiers 2009, pp.43–55). Dialogue must be 
based on active listening, with the researcher alternating between speaking and 
listening, and actively drawing on their conversation partner’s statements to open up 
further questions or lines of clarification (Garrison 1996; Geanellos 1999; Haroutunian-
Gordon & Laverty 2011; Purdy 1986).  
 
Finally, empathy, the process of entering the perceptual world of another person 
(Rogers 1975, p.4) and establishing rapport to gain deeper understanding of their lives, 
is essential, as many ethnographers have documented (Jackson 1998; Ridler 1996; 
Wikan 1992). Empathy can be enhanced by shared embodied experience (Gieser 2008). 
To clarify, based on Bourdieu’s observation that “there are a great many things that we 
understand only with our bodies, at a sub-conscious level without having the words to 
say them” (1988, p.160), anthropologists (e.g. Ingold 2000) have argued that differences 
in cultural knowledge are more a matter of variation in skills or perceptions derived 
through different embodied experiences, than differences in discursive knowledge 
transmitted through language. Indeed, Jackson argues that learning embodied 
knowledge is of interest in the ethnographic encounter because “a bodily awareness of 
the other in oneself […] assists in bringing into relief a reciprocity of viewpoints” 
(1989, p.130). The rest of this section unpacks how I applied these principles of 
dialogue, active listening, empathy and embodied learning in seeking to understand the 
experiences of Medina Diallobé’s inhabitants. 
 
3.22 Building relationships as the basis of dialogue  
 
When in Dakar, most of my informants were academics working at public and private 
universities, personnel at national and regional INGO offices, employees at the Ministry 
of Education, and staff of several NGOs working on education or with talibés. I was 
introduced to some of these individuals by contacts at the University of Sussex, but 
mostly I approached them independently through email or phone to arrange meetings. 
For the most part, these encounters consisted of one-off interviews in people’s places of 
work. The exception was when I arrived in Dakar in early 2011, as I was hosted for 
several weeks by a senior official at an important regional INGO office. They invited 
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me to several dinners and parties, which enabled me to speak with elite development 
practitioners more informally. It was the viewpoints of these informants in Dakar which 
demonstrated to me the widespread nature of stereotypes about education and Islam in 
Senegal that I described in Chapter One. 
 
However, it was with my host family in Medina Diallobé, and wider network of friends 
I made in the village, that I developed deeper relationships in which I engaged in 
dialogue. My meeting with my host family was highly serendipitous as during my pilot-
study visit to Dakar in 2010, I was introduced to Mamadou Sy, a 40-year-old tooroɗo 
from a clerical family in the Futa Tooro, as a possible Pulaar teacher. Mamadou invited 
me to visit his family’s village, Medina Diallobé, and although it was not part of my 
original itinerary as it did not fit my ideas of a suitable field-site based on low female 
school enrolment and a high density of NGOs, I accepted out of curiosity. Over the 
three days I spent in Medina Diallobé, I found the surroundings both unexpected and 
fascinating. The head of Mamadou’s family had been a well-respected and well-
travelled erudite in Islamic scholarship, and I learned much about his life, and Islamic 
education and culture in the Futa Tooro.  
 
I was plunged into a setting which seemed worlds removed from the stereotypes of 
development actors in Dakar, about abusive clerics and suffering talibés, and Islam 
blocking girls’ schooling, that I had planned to study. I enjoyed the fact that the 
presence of NGOs was not immediately obvious, as it was in the south of Senegal 
where on every street corner sits a hulking four-by-four emblazoned with donor and 
organisation insignia. I respected the family’s devotion to the pursuit of knowledge in 
both Islamic and state school education. They stated explicitly that the state and Franco-
Arab schools failed to meet their educational desires. Their commitment to memorising 
the Qur’an in daaras was not a constraint of poverty but a deliberate choice, 
independent of – and even in resistance to – the desires of the state and development 
actors. Acknowledging my biases in retrospect, I was drawn to the fact that I felt that I 
had encountered “organic intellectuals”, in Gramsci’s terms, shaping their own 
trajectories of development (Hoare & Smith 1971). I asked Mamadou’s family if they 
would mind if I returned to live with them, and they agreed to be my hosts, known in 
Pulaar as njatigi. 
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Based on fieldwork experience in the Futa Tooro, anthropologist Olivier Kyburz (1994, 
p.10) argues that a stranger’s relationship with their host family or njatigi provides the 
foundation for their integration into the community. A guest is expected to behave 
appropriately, and any violation of this code reflects badly on the host’s reputation. As 
my relationship with my host family formed the bedrock of connections I built in 
Medina Diallobé, I did the utmost to behave in ways which made them proud. For 
instance, as an unmarried woman in my late twenties, my dress and interactions with 
men were two areas crucial to my maintaining an image of a respectable femininity. 
O’Neill, who conducted her fieldwork in a much smaller village in the Futa Tooro, 
describes how she was reprimanded by her host family for being outside the compound 
and in the company of men after dark (2012, pp.49–50). However, my experience was 
not as difficult; my host family permitted me to walk home at night from the houses of 
families I visited. I could spend time with male acquaintances after dark, but I made 
sure I had discussions in public, such as outside a shop on the main road, or in the yard 
of their compound with other family members present, to avoid gossip. I think one 
significant reason my mobility was accepted is because I dressed according to my host 
family’s locally high standards of modesty, always wearing a long dress with sleeves, 
wraparound skirt, headscarf, and outer shawl covering my arms.  
 
However, I found barriers to my interactions based on social category harder to 
negotiate than gender. Haalpulaar children are socialised to spend time with those of the 
same category (N’Gaïde 2003), and among the freeborn there are taboos against 
associating with ñeeñɓe. Some members of my host family tried to stop me spending 
time outside of the extended family, and several criticised my seeing wayluɓe 
blacksmith families. They warned me that baylo people are witches and that I should 
never eat with them. Once I stubbornly kept a date to dine at a baylo friend’s house 
despite warnings it was “dangerous”, and a few days later when I suffered a bout of 
diarrhoea I received several smug “I-told-you-so” remarks, my ailments taken as proof 
of wayluɓe witchcraft. Although I did my best to resist these injunctions, I had to avoid 
offending my host family, and as a result spent more time overall with tooroɓe. My data 
therefore reflects a bias towards their stories. However, these experiences also enabled 
me to better understand social category socialisation processes. The importance of such 
informal learning for understanding gendered patterns of Islamic education is 
considered in depth in Chapter Four.  
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I wanted to develop relationships beyond my host family for a broader understanding of 
perspectives among Medina Diallobé inhabitants. I hoped to interview people from 
families of different social categories, and speak with several members separately to 
gain insight into divergent realities (Lewis 2008), including conflicts of interest, and 
gender or generational differences (Song 1998). I originally intended to identify families 
and systematically interview both parents and a son and daughter from each – a 
methodology employed by Arnot and Naveed (2011) when studying educational 
trajectories in Pakistan. However, while I conducted fairly formal interviews with 
teachers and civil servants, several other informants complained how ‘white’ 
researchers just come and ask questions without sharing anything about themselves. 
Therefore, building relationships required a relatively high investment in terms of time 
spent discussing or sharing meals. I enjoyed having conversations with people, and if 
they asked I gave my views and experiences on religion, education and development, as 
well as other topics, which deepened our friendship.  
 
Rather than identifying families systematically, I used a snowball sampling technique 
(Noy 2008) which spread outwards from my host family to extended family and their 
friends. I also approached teachers and clerics individually, and got to know other 
young people when I visited the school, sometimes developing relationships with their 
families. While I spoke with families of all social categories in Medina Diallobé, most 
were tooroɓe. Further bias was towards young people, those more confident speaking 
French, and women as many young and middle-aged men were not living in the village. 
Nonetheless, of my 147 total informants, I did speak with several members of various 
families, of different genders and generations, as demonstrated in the summary tables 
below (Figure 1). 
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Table 3.1. Informants’ characteristics by age, social category and gender. 
 
Age  No. % Category No. % Gender  No.  % 
5-9 2 1 Baylo 12 8 Female 71 48 
10-14 57 38 Ceɗɗo 3 2 Male 76 52 
15-19 23 15 Cuballo 1 0.7 
20-24 34 23 Gallunkooɗo 8 6 
25-29 19 13 Pullo 3 2 
30-39 14 9 Tooroɗo  108 73 
40-49 20 13 Unknown, N/A 12 8 
50-59 8 5 
60-69 6 4 
70+ 4 3 
 
I also developed particularly close friendships with several people who became ‘key 
informants’, including many members of my extended host family, teachers at the 
schools, and three individuals who became my interpreters, described below. One 
person helped me in particular, and I owe him a great debt. Samba Ka was tooroɗo, 
married, in his late thirties, originally from the Futa Tooro and raised in Dakar. I met 
him in January 2012 as he worked as an administrator at the commune. Having studied 
international development at university, he was one of the few people in Medina 
Diallobé with whom I could discuss my research in depth. He provided me invaluable 
support and information, including insider information about the functioning of the 
commune and extra-legal activities of its personnel. He was well-respected in the 
village for his correct behaviour, and was always polite and gallant towards me. Overall, 
he was someone I trusted and felt safe to be around. However, there is another side to 
every access coin, and in some ways my close relationship with Samba hindered my 
obtaining other information which would have been useful. 
 
To clarify, I received marriage proposals throughout fieldwork, and my close friends 
jokingly told me that many men in Medina Diallobé thought they “might as well try” 
proposing to a white woman, given that you never know when you might strike lucky. 
In most cases I would politely decline, or make a joke by proposing an exorbitant bride 
price, and there would be no hard feelings. However, the mayor’s representative at the 
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commune, Aliou Sow, was more persistent and his propositions more vulgar. Several 
informants later told me he was known in the village for being an aggressive 
womaniser, and as he was well-connected to the mayor and had salaried employment, 
was used to getting what he wanted. Feeling somewhat vulnerable as the town hall was 
the only place I could check my emails and found myself alone with him on more than 
one occasion, on his third advance I assertively declared that I found his behaviour 
inappropriate. The fact that I was close friends with Samba, who was Aliou’s colleague, 
seemed to make my rejection an even bigger affront.  
 
After this incident, Aliou blocked mine and Samba’s access to data held at the 
commune which could be useful to me. In particular, the commune had recently 
conducted a survey of households in Medina Diallobé for tax purposes, asking heads of 
families what schools their children were attending. This would have been valuable 
quantitative data on family educational choices to corroborate my observations and 
interviews. I never did my own survey as Samba assured me this document would meet 
my needs, and he suspected that my conducting formal surveys might negatively alter 
inhabitants’ views of me. However, despite his efforts over many months, Samba was 
never able to obtain this survey as Aliou deliberately withheld it, knowing its value.  
 
My experience was similar to Willott’s (2014) account of becoming ‘factionalised’ - 
namely affiliated to one of two similar but competing associations or factions - when 
studying academic promotion in a Nigerian university. Risks of such a process are that 
the researcher takes on the view of the clique to which they belong, and loses access to 
the other clique(s) (Olivier de Sardan 2003, p.49). I feel I overcame the first issue as I 
triangulated Samba Ka’s views with perspectives and experiences of other inhabitants 
of Medina Diallobé. In terms of access to the other clique, I had had difficulties gaining 
information from Aliou Sow before the ‘incident’ described above. As he was involved 
in extra-legal activities at the commune, I suspect – as Willott did in his comparable 
context - that Aliou would not have shared much information with me whether I was 
friends with Samba or not. Furthermore, while the lack of quantitative data on the extent 
of Qur’anic and Islamic school attendance is a weakness of this thesis that I 
acknowledge, becoming inadvertently embroiled in commune politics proved insightful 
nonetheless. It greatly enhanced my understanding of the benefits of inclusion in – and 
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disadvantages of exclusion from – relationships of clientelism with locally influential 
political actors, whose impact on educational trajectories features in Chapter Six.  
 
In addition, I was nonetheless able to obtain some relevant local quantitative data, 
namely documents containing historical and socioeconomic information compiled by a 
local government development agency in support of Medina Diallobé’s transition to 
commune status in 2008. I also consulted statistics from the Agence Nationale de la 
Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD) in Dakar. Unfortunately, a map of the village 
was unavailable at the time of my fieldwork.  
 
Finally, I also made several Senegalese friends of my own age in Dakar, who I met 
during my pilot study in 2010 in the neighbourhood where I was staying. They were 
affiliated to the Niassiyya Tijaniyya order, introduced me to their shaykh, and I began to 
attend regularly their Friday sessions of zikr, a Sufi practice involving chanting the 
names of God. My friends had very different educational experiences, and in some 
cases divergent interpretations of Islam, to young people in Medina Diallobé. However, 
perhaps because several had university degrees and experience engaging with people 
from other cultures, I found that I could discuss topics with them in more explicit ways 
than I often could in Medina Diallobé. Conservations with these friends therefore 
helped me to clarify and make sense of many of the observations I made in the village, 
particularly regarding the significance of baraka and logics underpinning the value 
people accorded to different types of religious education. 
 
3.23 The politics of language and interpretation  
 
Building relationships and having dialogues with people raised the issue of language 
barriers. In Dakar, I conducted interviews with academics or development practitioners 
in French, and occasionally English. In Medina Diallobé, while schooled individuals 
spoke French at varying levels of proficiency, Pulaar is the dominant language. While I 
had originally planned for Mamadou Sy to be my Pulaar teacher and interpreter, once I 
returned to Senegal in February 2011 to begin fieldwork, his personal circumstances 
had changed and he could no longer accompany me to Medina Diallobé. With an ESRC 
Difficult Language Training grant, I spent three months learning Pulaar at a language 
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school in Dakar, followed by two months’ immersion in Medina Diallobé. Although 
over time I managed basic conversations and could follow a large amount of people’s 
discussions, I never became fluent, and was reliant on an interpreter for complex 
interviews especially with groups. I spent the first two months of fieldwork trying to 
find a suitable interpreter. At various points, I worked with three different individuals: 
Hawa Thiam, a 40-year-old baylo woman working as a teacher in the collège; Chérif 
Konté, a 26-year-old ceɗɗo man involved in the local youth association introduced to 
me by my host-brother; and Habib Ndaw, 40-year-old tooroɗo of the village chieftaincy 
lineage, who had coordinated an NGO project in the village some years ago, introduced 
to me by Chérif Konté.  
 
I developed good relationships with all three, and had highly productive interviews with 
their families, members of their age-group, and/or social category networks. However, 
the common challenge emerged that my interpreters felt most confident working within 
these networks, and when I asked them to organise interviews outside they appeared 
uncomfortable, or made excuses to avoid it. At first I felt frustrated, perceiving my lack 
of a flexible interpreter to be a barrier to getting information. However, after reading 
Berreman’s (1962) reflexive ethnography on using interpreters from different caste 
backgrounds in India, I saw that the experience of working with Hawa, Chérif and 
Habib had been useful for gaining insights into people’s divergent subjective 
experiences of the multiple cross-cutting social hierarchies in Medina Diallobé.  
 
I met Samba Ka after my experiments with interpreters, and was able to talk explicitly 
with him about the implications of social hierarchies on my data collection. Samba 
agreed that although individuals offered to organise interviews for me out of politeness, 
if they then felt uncomfortable doing so they might then save face by finding excuses, 
rather than tell me so directly. Samba also emphasised the importance of soutoura, a 
concept found across Senegal, as the maintenance of privacy, dignity and respect, 
whose most important aspect is preserving the family’s name and reputation. Keeping 
sensitive information within ‘safe’ networks of trust, where they will be kept secret, is 
crucial to people’s efforts to keep soutoura (Ndiaye 2008, pp.156–158). Given the 
potentially sensitive nature of my research on family dynamics and decision-making 
processes, I suspected that people might only divulge information if they perceived me 
and the interpreter as part of the ‘safe’ network. Samba and I discussed the possibility of 
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an interpreter from outside Medina Diallobé but, given that social hierarchies and 
networks in the Futa Tooro extend over hundreds of kilometres, introducing a third 
party into an interview could still make people uncomfortable, and disturb the close 
relationships which I had managed to build so far.  
 
Finally, I decided to see the fact that my interpreters were able to help me within their 
own networks as an advantage rather than a problem. Wherever possible, I asked friends 
or host family members to interpret for those present in the conversation who spoke 
French less well. This often happened spontaneously without my requesting it. Rather 
than see this technique as problematic because of the biases it generated, I followed the 
premise that all interviews, whether with interpreters or without, constitute creative 
dialogues in which the interaction between researcher and informant shapes what people 
say (Elliott 2005). With the exception of formal interviews that I conducted with clerics 
interpreted by Habib Ndaw, this approach limited my data collection among people who 
did not speak French confidently to the networks of friends and family I had developed. 
While this restricted my access to non-French speakers, I am certain that because of the 
high levels of trust built within these relationships, the opinions expressed were more 
honest and hence of greater value in contributing to my understanding of dynamics in 
Medina Diallobé, than they would have been with a third party interpreter, even if this 
had meant greater access to people who only spoke Pulaar. 
 
3.24 Methods  
 
In order to overcome the flaws of classical economic analyses of behaviour, reinforced 
by positivist statistical analyses based on questionnaires using pre-defined categories, 
the methods used in this thesis are ethnographic. I spent time with people over a lengthy 
period – eight months each in Medina Diallobé and Dakar - across a range of social 
contexts, engaging in casual conversations, observing and participating in activities 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1995; Lüders 2004). After getting to know people and 
building trust (Ellen 1984, p.257; Heissler 2011, p.732), I complemented participant 
observation with semi-structured interviews inspired by studies investigating the values 
that different family or community members attribute to knowledge and education 
(Bryman 2004; Bartlett 2008; Levinson 1996; Luttrell 1996), and life histories of 
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educational trajectories (Antikainen 1996; 1998; Perry 2004). This combination of 
methods helped me notice tacit knowledge or behaviour not explicitly expressed; 
illuminated the conflicts between competing discourses or forms of value that people 
subscribed to (Lawler 2002); and highlighted the discrepancy between their 
explanations of official social norms or ideal scenarios, and actual behaviour (Olivier de 
Sardan 2005). This enabled me to understand the complexity of intersecting values 
informing people’s preferences, and the subtleties of decision-making processes 
including micro-practices of deliberation to reach desired educational goals (Varenne 
2008a, p.31).  
 
One telling example of behaviour which went against official accounts, but which 
ethnographic methods illuminated, was women’s religious learning. Time and again I 
was told by both men and women that men study in daaras but “women do not learn the 
Qur’an” beyond the basic verses. I started to believe this official story. It was only 
during the final months of fieldwork, when the temperature soared and I was restricted 
to the house for most of the day, that I observed women in my host family learning the 
religion, examples which form a significant part of the discussion in Chapter Seven on 
informal learning.  
 
Another topic which ethnographic methods helped me understand is social category, 
which can be difficult to talk about explicitly, with or without an interpreter. In general, 
category inequalities have been neglected, disregarded, or rendered invisible by colonial 
and post-colonial governments in Francophone West Africa (Pelckmans & Hahonou 
2011). In Senegal, “since independence it has been against the law to make reference to 
an individual’s caste origins or to discriminate against a person in employment on these 
grounds” (Dilley 2004b, p.202). Referring to someone as maccuɗo in particular is 
considered to be derogatory (Dilley 2000, p.152).21 Hence, despite my observations 
confirmed by one informant that “caste is central to everything”, making reference to 
someone’s social category remains taboo. This raised the obvious challenge that no 
official data is collected which could provide quantitative support for the observations I 
made, for instance, on the proportions of different social categories in the population of 
                                                 
21
 See, however, the recent emancipation movement, Endam Bilaali (Thioub 2012), organised by 
gallunkooɓe in the Futa Tooro, who seek to re-valorise their category’s status and positively re-
appropriate the term maccuɗo. 
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the commune, or of pupils enrolled in state schools. However, many people obliquely 
referred to social category, speaking in terms of ‘racism’ or ‘hierarchies’. Having 
experienced social category dynamics in my own relationships, I could identify these 
references, and found generally that if I probed people in private, they spoke more 
explicitly about social category, and found ways to bypass taboos against doing so.  
 
For example, when trying to ascertain the influence of social category on dynamics 
within the state schools, I asked school directors - once I had already got to know them 
well over several months, and judged they would feel comfortable discussing sensitive 
topics - to prepare a list of teachers, the subjects they taught, and their qualifications. I 
later met with them to discuss the data, but at the end of the conversation broached the 
subject of teachers’ ‘origins’, whether ethnic group or social category, and whether this 
had an impact on classroom dynamics. With the first director, our initial discussion had 
been clear and open, but once questions of origins arose I noticed that his voice dropped 
so that, over the whir of the electric fan, no one in the adjoining staffroom could 
overhear us. “I don’t ask about this sort of thing you know”, he assured me. “It doesn’t 
interest me. But you hear, you know, you overhear conversations…so-and-so lives in 
this neighbourhood, is related to so-and-so… and you find out that way.” Another 
director used a similarly covert tactic to answer my questions. He gave me a printed-out 
list of teachers’ names and in front of me wrote their social category next to their name. 
Upon arriving two-thirds down the page he gave a start, leaned across the desk and 
conspiratorially hissed, “He’s maccuɗo! But I daren’t write that here!” After a moment 
of chewing his pencil he found a solution; while the other teachers’ names were 
partnered with the labels ‘baylo’, ‘tooroɗo’, or ‘pullo’, beside the latter the director 
traced a discreet ‘M’.  
 
I also used ethnographic methods to help inform my strategy for communicating with 
young people, whose viewpoints are an important aspect of my research. In common 
with Johannes Kaland (2014), I found that scholarship on methodology concerning 
young people is scarce, and tends to be conflated with that of children. The idea that 
children are similar to adults but possess different competencies (James et al. 1998) has 
inspired researchers to employ task-based or visual methods to provide a focus for 
discussion, engage children in enjoyable social activity, and facilitate expression among 
children who might not be comfortable articulating verbally (Gordon 1998; Kellett & 
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Ding 2004; Roberts-Holmes 2005; Van Blerk 2006). I originally considered conducting 
a collaborative photography project (Frith & Harcourt 2007; Gauntlett & Holzwarth 
2006; Singhal et al. 2007) with young people in Medina Diallobé, providing participants 
with a camera, and inviting them to take pictures of their everyday surroundings which 
we would then discuss together. I hoped this technique would enable young people a 
degree of control over the creation of representations of their own lives, and capture 
abstract phenomena such as what knowledge it is valuable to learn, or aspirations about 
the future.  
 
However, several scholars have advised the use of ethnography to test the viability of 
such methods before implementing them (Hinton 1995; James 2001; Knupfer 2009). I 
soon realised that cameras or phones which take photos are rare enough in Medina 
Diallobé to attract attention, and introducing a prestige object into the networks I was 
part of would potentially be problematic. Researchers who had inspired me by using 
similar methods had studied fairly small and bounded groups of individuals, such as 
Qur’anic school students in one Nigerian Qur’anic school (Hoechner 2011), street 
children in Kampala (Young & Barrett 2001), or children of migrant parents in one 
Ghanaian school (Fassetta-Guariento 2010). In contrast, my sample was much broader. 
I did not feel prepared to offer the camera option to everyone, but based on experiences 
of giving gifts to members of my extended family I knew that unless everyone was 
included it would create jealousy. Finally, creating visual representations in general did 
not figure prevalently in people’s everyday experience. 
 
Yet, I was able to make use of photos in other ways to open up and facilitate dialogue. 
In Senegal, families who can afford it document weddings through a photo album  
(Buggenhagen 2014; Mustafa 2005). Among recently married girls I met in Medina 
Diallobé, the wedding album was a source of pride and one of the first things they 
showed me. Without my prompting, girls’ explanations of their photos revealed how 
they got engaged, their expectations about marriage, and their relationship with their 
husband and in-laws. Many of these discussions form the basis of Chapter Six on how 
married girls negotiate the competing ideals of marriage and schooling. I brought my 
own camera on fieldwork and took photos of my host family especially on special 
occasions, albums of which I left behind as gifts. These were frequently consulted and 
enjoyed when I was there, and often used to test young children’s knowledge (and 
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mine!) of people’s names, and ties of relatedness between extended family members, 
reinforcing the importance of family networks in an individual’s sense of self.  
 
In the end, rather than employing ‘special’ youth-friendly methods, I used observation 
to identify spaces in which they felt more at ease to speak (Twum-Danso 2009, p.139). 
In a communal setting with little personal space, where those lower down in the social 
hierarchy are subject to greater surveillance, I learned to notice people’s subtle 
negotiations of their surroundings to create opportunities to speak confidentially. One 
tactic several people used was to take advantage of the norm of ‘duusde’, meaning to 
see one’s guests out (Niang 1997, p.24). According to rules of Haalpulaar hospitality, it 
is polite to accompany a guest when they leave, either escorting them to the threshold of 
the compound, or even across the village to their home. On countless occasions I spent 
the whole day with friends in their homes, surrounded by their families, eating and 
chatting. It would only be when they accompanied me beyond the gate of the compound 
and out of earshot of their families that they would launch into more intimate topics. For 
young married women this phenomenon was especially apparent. Their ability to leave 
the compound is largely limited to functional trips of short duration, such as visiting the 
market, for which they needed their mother-in-law’s or husband’s approval. Duusde, on 
the other hand, is a culturally condoned practice for which permission is rarely refused, 
and enabled young women a small degree of freedom to socialise. Some of the most 
intimate conversations I had, especially where young people voiced perspectives 
contrary to their parents’, husbands or in-laws’ views, were upon being accompanied 
home. A 100m walk to my house would be conducted at snail’s pace and made to last 
half an hour. Other similar tactics involved talking in a low voice so as not to be heard 
over the noise of the television, or in the kitchen where the hiss of the cooking pot 
masked our conversation. 
 
3.25 Situating ethics  
 
Finally, my relationships, data collection process, and presentation of material in this 
thesis reflect the decisions I have made while trying to uphold standards of ethical 
practice. Researchers must ensure that informants have sufficient information about the 
research, their role within in, what it hopes to accomplish, consequences of 
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participating, how their views will be documented and the outcome of the data, and that 
there is no coercion to participate.Guidelines of the ESRC and Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA) state that ideally information 
should be in written forms which are signed by the research participants to indicate 
consent. However,  if participants are illiterate or suspicious of formal bureaucratic 
procedures, verbal consent can be obtained which should preferably be witnessed and 
recorded (ASA 2011, p.1; ESRC 2012, p.29). However, in Medina Diallobé the 
logistics of informing people about my research and obtaining consent through a 
formalised one-off event proved inappropriate, and I opted for a ‘situated ethics’ 
approach, grounded in self-reflexive adaption to the particular context, rather than based 
on ethical absolutes (Simons & Usher 2000). This is supported by the ASA’s guidelines 
that “ethical decision-making has to be undertaken repeatedly throughout the research 
and in response to specific circumstances” (ibid, p1) and that “consent in ethnographic 
research is a process, not a one-off event, due to its long-term and open-ended qualities” 
(ibid, p5).  
 
It took me time to learn how to explain the purpose and content of my research in ways 
that were clear and meaningful to people. I remember telling a 30-year-old woman that I 
was “doing research” and “writing a thesis”. She had a niece at university and I assumed 
she would be familiar with the idea of a thesis. A month later, I talked about “my work 
at the university”, whereupon she burst out laughing, saying: “University?! I didn’t 
think you had finished primary school – you can’t even cook!” From then on I told 
people that I was “learning about Haalpulaar culture”, and “writing a book about it” - 
ideas they were more familiar with. More specifically, I explained that I was interested 
“in how people choose between the French school and the daara”. With university 
graduates, teachers and administrators, I added that I was enrolled in an 
anthropology/sociology department. People occasionally asked if I would make lots of 
money from the book, and I told them it was unlikely, although it might help me get a 
decently paid job. I did tell them that while I doubted my book would have any direct 
impact on Medina Diallobé or its inhabitants, I hoped that I would eventually raise 
awareness about the importance of Islamic education among the students I taught at the 
university, and policy-makers (“people making the decisions”), because many 
Westerners currently see little value in it. People welcomed this endeavour, and I hope 
that over the course of my life I will meet their expectations. 
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While I judged that written consent forms would be inappropriate, I originally asked 
people if they would be comfortable “doing an interview”. I immediately discovered 
that challenges arose as, while teachers, administrators and clerics were comfortable 
with formal interviews, others felt awkward at the proposal. I remember the first time I 
met Malik Ba, a 22-year-old sharia student whom I became close friends with. After 
chatting for twenty minutes about his education, I asked if he would mind “doing an 
interview” because I was interested in his experiences for my research. I was shocked 
when he backed away saying he couldn’t possibly, as he was too busy. I was terrified 
that I had offended him, but to my relief he invited me to spend the afternoon with his 
family the following day. There we spent several hours discussing my research, his 
education, his worries for the future, and difficulties of finding work. A similar pattern, 
of informants being suspicious of formal interviews but nonetheless comfortable to 
share personal information in informal settings with full awareness of the researcher’s 
intentions, has been documented by other researchers (Gill & Temple 2014, pp.5–7).  
 
For months I worried that my conversations with Malik and others were not 
‘consensual’ as I had not framed them in formal terms as an ‘interview’, and there had 
not been a clear ‘event’ I could count as receipt of consent. At this point I spoke with 
several other Senegalese people to ask their opinion, including my Pulaar teacher, 
university graduate friends, academics in Dakar, and Samba Ka and Hawa Thiam in 
Medina Diallobé. They all agreed that many people were unfamiliar with formal 
interviews or one-off formalised giving of consent, so the idea did make them feel 
uncomfortable. However, they said people constantly gauge whether they trust someone 
enough to confide in them, and that I would be no exception. As Hawa Thiam 
concluded, “If they agree to talk to you at all, it’s because they trust you. That’s 
consent”. To reciprocate trust, I kept other’s secrets, a highly valued quality as one of 
my friends put it: “Kongol ko ndiyam; so rufii, ɓoftotaako” meaning words are like 
water, once spilt, they cannot be picked up. I felt that their advice fitted with my 
observations, and that consent arose through my constant negotiations of relationships 
rather than happening in a one-off event.  
 
I then concentrated my efforts on ensuring that no harm came to people as a result of 
their talking to me, including “risk to a subject’s personal social standing, privacy, 
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personal values and beliefs, their links to family and the wider community, and their 
position within occupational settings” (ESRC 2012, p.27), and protecting informants’ 
anonymity and the confidentiality of information they gave me. An obvious aspect of 
this involved not divulging sensitive information and maintaining soutoura. I have also 
anonymised the name of the village I worked in and provided pseudonyms for the 
names of my informants. Most studies on the Futa Tooro, including recent doctoral 
theses, clearly declare the precise name and location of the village(s) studied. There can 
be admirable reasons for doing so, for instance, “to provide a public account of recent 
history of development in the Futa Tooro” (Dia 2001). However, my data illuminates 
conflicts of interest and social injustice, and my informants would have wanted personal 
confessions, and tensions within and between families, to remain private. I feel that 
changing names of people but not of the village is inadequate for protecting anonymity, 
as even people in far-flung diaspora communities are connected by social networking 
sites, and are aware of the extended genealogies of families throughout the region. 
Villages in the Futa Tooro are structurally similar, with families inheriting the titles of 
cleric, imam and village chief. My research findings have broad applicability which is 
not undermined if I mask the identity of the individual village. However, if one knows 
the name of the village, even if I change the name of a leading cleric, or the mayor, it 
becomes easy to identity that person.  
 
The name I have used for my field-site, Medina Diallobé, effectively meaning ‘village 
of the Diallo lineage’, is inspired by Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s seminal novel An 
Ambiguous Adventure (1972). Kane’s central character, Samba Diallo, is a Haalpulaar 
tooroɗo boy who attends Qur’anic and French school during the colonial period. Kane 
names the Futa Tooro where Samba lives “the country of the Diallobé”, or country of 
the Diallo lineage, the figure of Samba Diallo being a personified metaphor of the 
broader philosophical collision between African/Islamic and European worldviews. If 
the name I have chosen, Medina Diallobé, resembles the name of any real villages in the 
Futa Tooro this is purely coincidental.  
 
The following section reveals the main characteristics of this particular village, relevant 
to understanding its inhabitants’ educational decisions. I have maintained essential 
descriptive information about places and people which are necessary to situate 
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informants’ viewpoints. Otherwise I have been vague, or provided altered details about 
people to disguise their identity (ASA 2011, p.5). 
 
3.3 The context for educational decision-making in Medina Diallobé 
3.31 Social, economic and political context  
 
The Route Nationale 2 is an artery of asphalt snaking its away around northern Senegal. 
As it leaves the bustling city sprawl of Dakar, it heads north along the coast to the 
regional hub and old colonial capital of St Louis, before curling eastwards, entering the 
department of Podor, and the beginning of the Futa Tooro. Skirting the Senegal River 
and its tributaries, the road joins up with the dusty trading outpost of Ndioum, before 
dipping southeast into the department of Matam and the south-eastern edge of the Futa.  
 
Along the Route Nationale 2, are large villages of 3000-6000 inhabitants which provide 
a focal administrative and economic point for smaller villages, dotted along dirt tracks, 
further into the waalo and jeeri countryside. Medina Diallobé is one such large village, 
located in the department of Podor, which on a good day with a functioning bus and 
competent driver, is a day’s drive from Dakar. According to predictions (ASND n.d.) 
from national statistics collected in 2002 (ASND 2008), Medina Diallobé has just under 
five thousand residents, two-thirds of whom are women. It is therefore not as small as a 
rural village, but not as big as a provincial town, far enough from Dakar to exhibit 
cultural characteristics typical of the Futa Tooro, but well-connected enough that many 
inhabitants are familiar with Dakar and opportunities in the capital. As several 
informants observed, people in Medina Diallobé preserve their traditions but are also 
open to the modern world. As the following chapters demonstrate, this negotiated and 
contested balance is apparent in their attitudes towards education. The following 
description of Medina Diallobé is compiled through observations; interviews with 
school directors, teachers, clerics and village elders, Habib Ndaw and Samba Ka 
familiar with the political context of the village; documents compiled by the local 
government development agency; and statistics collected from the ANSD. 
 
Contemporary social relationships, including between categories, reflect the early 
settlement of Medina Diallobé. The village was founded not far from the Senegal River 
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in the 16th century by a pullo leader who took the titles of village chief and chief of the 
land. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Haalpulaar social hierarchy counts 
twelve categories. In the Futa Tooro overall, the freeborn make up 70% of the 
population, the gallunkooɓe 20%, and the artisans 10%. The tooroɓe are the most 
significant single category at 45% (Bouteiller et al. 1962 cited in Coulon 1975, p.34). 
However, it is rare that all categories are represented in a single village. Indeed, Medina 
Diallobé’s pullo founder was joined by a ceɗɗo warrior lineage, tooroɗo clerical 
lineages, jewellery blacksmiths or wayluɓe ndaneeɓe, and each of these families’ 
domestic slaves. After the creation of the Almamate in the 18th century, the original 
fulɓe founders became tooroɓe, a transition then common among sedentarised 
pastoralists (Kyburz 1994, pp.153–159). Two additional tooroɗo lineages loyal to the 
Almamy were appointed as village chief and imam.  
 
Educational decisions of inhabitants must be situated in the specific economic context 
of the village. In the early 20th century, a weekly market or luumo was established in 
Medina Diallobé. The subsistence economy of livestock, milk, crops, fish and artisanal 
crafts continued to thrive throughout the colonial period, although the administration’s 
imposition of cash taxation pushed male inhabitants of Medina Diallobé to travel 
seasonally to work as hotel boys or traders in towns, returning annually to farm. After 
the first droughts in the 1950s, migration became more long-term with men staying the 
full year in these locations. In the late 1950s, a handful ventured further afield, to central 
Africa to work as diamantaires, and sometimes to France. One of the few surviving 
diamantaires told me it was so arduous that few in his generation travelled that far. 
Hence, until the 1980s, men - especially tooroɓe – migrated but rarely ventured further 
than Dakar or other parts of Senegal, working in hotels or setting up fabric boutiques. 
Others stayed in the village practicing agriculture, which now includes irrigated rice 
production and market gardens. Wayluɓe continue to practice their customary 
profession of jewellery-making alongside agriculture.  
 
Today, the weekly market in Medina Diallobé is still bustling, with stalls housed under 
permanent wooden structures in the centre of the village, with more traders selling 
wares on sheets of fabric on the ground, branching out through the side-streets and 
alleyways. The bus garage along the Route Nationale 2 is busy throughout the week but 
multiplies in density on Fridays, crammed with minibuses of traders and clients; 
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competing for space with trucks laden with refrigerated fish, sacks of onions, trussed-up 
sheep and chickens; all dodging donkey-drawn carts shuttling people who have been 
ferried across the river by pirogue. Customary artisanal products like hand-made 
jewellery, woven cloth, incense, ceramic water pots, wooden mortar and pestles, 
calebasse bowls and spoons, and leather-bound Qur’anic amulets are still sold, but 
compete with cheaper polyester clothes, bolts of nylon fabric, mobile phones, plastic 
bowls, utensils and jewellery, mainly imported from China and India. The market is a 
significant generator of income and its presence has influenced, and still shapes, the 
identity of Medina Diallobé residents and their educational decisions. 
 
Alongside the luumo, Medina Diallobé hosts several other small businesses. The post 
office with money-sending facilities was created in the 1980s; there is a health centre 
and dispensary; several wells; a water tower borehole since the 90s; and electricity 
installed in the 2000s. A survey conducted in 2007 by a local development agency lists 
over fifty shops, mainly general stores selling daily rations of rice, eggs, oil, sugar, salt, 
pepper, vinegar, powdered milk, soap, washing powder, coffee, juice, and mobile phone 
credit; a number of tailors, carpenters, builders, mechanics, welders and electricians; 
several bakeries and mills; fifteen restaurants or cafés; several butchers’ stalls selling 
grilled meat; a private pharmacy; money-sending facilities; and a cyber café. These 
manual professions reflect a growing minority of single Wolof men who make up 2% of 
the village population. Being non-customary professions, they are open to individuals of 
any social category. By contrast, the craft of jewellery-making is still reserved for 
wayluɓe, and the seven workshops are all located in their neighbourhood. All the jobs 
mentioned in the survey are performed by men with the exception of one tailor, women 
who run cafés with their husbands, and two shop owners. The survey does not include 
thirteen female school staff out of a total of fifty-odd; two women working in the health 
centre; several tooroɗo women who trade in fabric; many gallunkooɗo women and fulɓe 
from the jeeri work as maids or cooks for village households; and countless women of 
all categories engaged in cottage industries such as selling juices, fried doughballs, 
incense, and activities like hair braiding and embroidering sheets.  
 
Despite locally-based trade, migration and remittances play a significant role in shaping 
the local economy, household budgets, and family relationships. More men migrated 
internationally from the mid-1990s, but the trend really took off in the early 2000s. The 
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2007 survey documents over a hundred migrants in Africa, predominantly Gabon, the 
Gambia, Sierra Leone and Mauritania; another hundred in the USA; thirty in Europe, 
mainly Italy and France. In Dakar there are at least twenty affluent traders and fifteen 
civil servants. The numbers today are no doubt higher. A few dozen young people of 
different social categories, mainly male and aged 25-30, work throughout Senegal as 
vacataire school teachers, discussed further in Chapter Six. Over the past decade, the 
increase in migration has been accompanied by greater decline in agriculture. Now that 
many families have at least one member sending home 100,000CFA (£112) a month 
(which can just about cover a rural household’s expenses) from Dakar or abroad, even if 
they own land they tend not to work it. There is little interest among the younger 
generation to engage in physical labour, and it is now mainly practiced by families with 
no choice to do otherwise, or to supplement other main sources of income.  
 
Today, the spatial layout of houses and neighbourhoods, land ownership, 
socioeconomic status of families, and their degree of political influence all reflect the 
legacy of Medina Diallobé’s early settlement according to social category hierarchies, 
combined with evolving economic and political dynamics. Eight neighbourhoods are 
recognised in total, each headed by a chief. Four are inhabited by the village’s founding 
lineages of tooroɓe, and the gallunkooɗo families who used to be their slaves. A fifth 
neighbourhood consists of seɓɓe warriors and the gallunkooɗo families affiliated to 
them. These neighbourhoods are located in the centre of the village, and their tooroɗo 
and ceɗɗo residents own the largest tracts of fertile waalo land nearest to the river. They 
are densely inhabited, with as many as ten households crammed into the one compound, 
facing into a central courtyard. Other compounds have grown up alongside, encircled 
with haphazard woven branch fences, usually adorned with colourful laundry, separated 
by narrow criss-crossing alleys. The sixth neighbourhood is Mbayla, further south 
towards the jeeri, and home to the wayluɓe blacksmiths who originally settled there, and 
their affiliated gallunkooɗo families. The tooroɓe therefore make up the highest 
proportion of the population in Medina Diallobé, followed by gallunkooɓe, wayluɓe, 
and seɓɓe.  
 
On the northern outskirts of the village are two newer neighbourhoods called Sinthiane 
Hammadi and Sinthiane Sakho, from the verb siñcude, meaning to build a new village 
or compound. These neighbourhoods are more diverse, home to descendants of families 
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who have moved away from the overcrowded central neighbourhoods, or people who 
have recently settled in Medina Diallobé. They include minorities of fulɓe and subalɓe 
fishermen, and Wolof traders, in addition to the other dominant categories.  
 
In the more recent neighbourhoods, the building plots are large and compounds lie 
dotted across the land, encircled by concrete outer walls, sealed by wrought-iron gates 
which open on to a large courtyard. In the middle of the yard sits a square concrete 
house, windows adorned with latticed ironwork grilles, which close with shutters 
against the wind. Even these houses are starting to look dilapidated as the youngest 
generation of migrants are building their houses even further out, with crenelated 
balconies, internal tiled bathrooms rather than privies, with even a dusty Mercedes or 
jeep parked in the yard. Other signs of status include being able to own a television, an 
electric fan, sofa cushions, furniture other than a marital bed, or employ a maid. Today, 
only some houses in Mbayla are still made from clay from the riverbank as concrete has 
taken over, and most have electricity. A handful of gallunkooɗo families still live 
alongside their old masters, but most have moved away to other plots. One such family 
in particular has become rich through migration, but mostly they make up the poorer 
members of the population. Indeed, many still maintain relations with their former 
masters’ families, helping to slaughter animals and cook during large celebrations, in 
return for material assistance.  
 
In the 1980s, Medina Diallobé became the headquarters (chef lieu), of a rural 
community (communauté rurale) which grouped thirty surrounding villages under one 
administrative unit. From 2008, Medina Diallobé was granted independent commune 
status, the surrounding villages were transferred to another rural community, and a 
mayor and forty municipal councillors were locally elected. Officially speaking, with 
the creation of the commune, the customary political power held by the tooroɗo village 
chieftaincy lineage was replaced by a democratic system in which all social categories 
are equally represented. However, although the councillors proportionally reflect the 
social category make-up of the village, and six are women, the most important positions 
of mayor and his two appointed representatives are tooroɓe men from old aristocratic 
families. Indeed, the mayor, a tooroɗo civil servant working in Dakar called Ibrahima 
Sy, is related to the leading clerical family in the village. Similarly, while all 
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neighbourhoods have gallunkooɓe residents, no neighbourhood chiefs hail from this 
category, demonstrating how they are still marginalised from formal authority.  
 
This local geography, especially the dwellings of migrants as a reference point for 
success, and differential access to wealth and political power - and ensuing clientelist 
relations - linked to social category relations, all inform people’s evaluations of 
education in significant ways, as the following chapters document. 
 
3.32 Educational infrastructure  
 
The observation made above that villages of Medina Diallobé’s size and location 
represent a combination of preserving old ways while being open to change is reflected 
in educational provision, the high density and mutual co-existence of both Qur’anic and 
state schools, and range of different educational evaluations among the population. The 
oldest schools are of course the Qur’anic schools. Medina Diallobé is a ‘clerical village’ 
where renowned religious leaders and clerics reside (O’Neill 2012, p.224)22, known in 
the area for its four daaras dedicated to memorisation of the Qur’an. The oldest of the 
four is at the house of the imam, Souleymane Ba, next to the village’s largest and most 
central mosque. Souleymane explained how he was the 11th imam of the village, having 
inherited the position since his ancestor was appointed in the late 18th century following 
the tooroɗo revolution and establishment of the Almamate. In 2011, Souleymane was in 
his seventies and taught only twenty or so young children. While his daara had few 
students compared to the others, informants told me it was considered important 
because of the influential social role played by the imam, and prestige of his lineage.   
 
The three other daaras are all run by members of the Sy family, whose ancestor settled 
in Medina Diallobé in the early 20th century. The founder, Djibril Sy, was appointed 
khalifa or representative of the Umariyya Tijaniyya Sufi order in the village, and passed 
his daara to his son, and then grandson Ceerno Ousmane. During my fieldwork, Ceerno 
Ousmane’s daara was one of the biggest in Medina Diallobé with roughly a hundred 
students of all ages. A few compounds away was another equally large daara run by 
                                                 
22
 O’Neill uses the term marabout throughout her thesis, and hence “maraboutic village” where I use 
“clerical village”. 
113 
 
Ousmane’s paternal cousin, Ceerno Alfa Sy. The final daara in the village was that of 
Ceerno Amadou Sy, the younger half-brother of Ceerno Ousmane. Ceerno Amadou’s 
daara is smaller than Ceerno Ousmane’s and Alfa’s, with around ninety students.  
 
There were four state schools in Medina Diallobé in 2012, but compared to the daaras, 
they have a recent history of only sixty years for primary, and a decade post-primary. 
Until the 1950s, the closest primary school to Medina Diallobé was located in the 
headquarters, or chef lieu, of the canton, and served forty to fifty surrounding villages. 
The first primary school in the village itself, Medina Diallobé I, was built in the 1950s. 
By 2012 it had twelve classes, two for each of the six grades in primary. For over forty 
years, Medina Diallobé I had remained the only state school in the village. Until the late 
1980s there was only one collège at the department headquarters of Podor, several 
hundred kilometres from Medina Diallobé. In order to attend lycée, pupils had to travel 
over 500km to the regional headquarters of St Louis. In the 1990s, the state built more 
collèges throughout Senegal, but the next closest to Medina Diallobé was still 100km 
away. In 2001, the first collège was built in Medina Diallobé. A new grade was added 
each subsequent year, so by 2004/2005 the collège taught the complete cycle of four 
grades, and could award the Brevet de Fin d’Etudes Moyennes (BFEM). By 2012, the 
collège had a total of twelve classes: three each for grades 6ème, 5ème, 4ème and 3ème. 
In 2006, another primary school, Medina Diallobé II, was built to the south of Medina 
Diallobé to meet growing demand there, and in the surrounding villages.  
 
In 2009, the lycée or high school opened its doors, and like the collège added one grade 
each year that followed. Hence, academic year 2011/2012 was the first time a pupil 
could attend state school in Medina Diallobé from elementary until completion of high 
school, culminating in the award of the baccalaureate. When I conducted fieldwork, 
there were three classes for grade 2ème, and two classes in both 1er and Terminal (in 
order to differentiate between different scientific and humanities streams). However, 
although the lycée was recognised by the state and teachers allocated, there was no 
physical lycée building and pupils learned in the collège infrastructure. Below are tables 
summarising the state schools in the village, the grades they teach, and qualifications 
they award (Figures 2-4). However, ‘age groups’ reflect official categories more than 
local realities, as many pupils are enrolled in grades aged five or six years older than 
these figures. 
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Table 3.2 Primary school grades, official ages and history in Medina Diallobé. 
 
Year Grade title Official Approximate  
Age Group (years) 
Academic year since this grade  
became available in Medina 
Diallobé 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
CI 
CP 
C1 
C2 
CM1 
CM2 
7 – 8 
8 – 9 
9 – 10 
10 – 11 
11 – 12 
12 – 13 
1957/1958 
1958/1959 
1959/1960 
1960/1961 
1961/1962 
1962/1963 
Qualification: Certificat de Fin d’Etudes Elémentaires (CFEE) 
 
Table 3.3 Lower secondary school (collège) grades, official ages and history in Medina 
Diallobé. 
 
Year Grade 
title 
Official Approximate  
Age Group (years) 
Academic year since this grade  
became available in Medina 
Diallobé 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6ème 
5ème 
4ème 
3ème 
13 – 14 
14 – 15 
15 – 16 
16 – 17 
2001/2002 
2002/2003 
2003/2004 
2004/2005 
Qualification: Brevet de Fin d’Etudes Moyen (BFEM) 
 
Table 3.4 Upper secondary school (lycée) grades, official ages and history in Medina 
Diallobé. 
 
Year Grade 
title 
Official Approximate 
Age Group (years) 
Academic year since this grade 
became available in Medina 
Diallobé 
1 
2 
3 
2ème 
1er 
Terminal 
17 – 18 
18 – 19 
19 – 20 
2009/2010 
2010/2011 
2011/2012 
Qualification: Baccalauréat 
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All schools are concrete buildings with tin roofs, arranged around a central yard, with 
the director’s office (and for the collège, a staffroom) at the centre. Dwellings 
purposefully built for the director and teachers exist on the school site or in the village. 
Toilets and water taps are present on all sites. All schools with the exception of Medina 
Diallobé II have a computer in the director’s office. Inside the classroom, a teacher 
instructs from the front, while pupils sit at wooden desks attached to tables (table-
bancs). There are few textbooks available, so teachers write the lesson on the 
blackboard with chalk, which pupils copy into their exercise books with ballpoint pens. 
Rote learning is a common method of instruction in primary school, and at secondary 
level I observed pupils continue to memorise their lessons by heart. Lessons run from 
8am until 2pm, and resume from 4pm until 6pm, although collège and lycée pupils can 
have several free periods. Saturday and Sunday are days off, while holidays fall over the 
Christian celebrations of Christmas, Easter, and three months from July to September. 
Officially, primary school subjects are reading, writing and oral expression; history and 
geography; numeracy and science; art and music; civic education and hygiene; Arabic; 
and optional religious education introduced in the last decade under President Wade’s 
reforms. The secondary school curriculum drops art and music, civic education and 
hygiene. It expands on science by differentiating between life sciences, chemistry and 
physics; and introduces French literature, English and Spanish as foreign languages, and 
philosophy. Religion is not taught, although Arabic language is an optional subject. 
 
Despite the widespread view that the Qur’anic schools are independent of the state 
while the state school is run by the government, in reality both are embedded in the 
same local political economy in Medina Diallobé, and receive financial support from 
common sources. The clerics are not officially represented in the commune and receive 
no state funding. However, as they exert important social influence, local politicians 
give them significant gifts especially on the occasion of annual religious celebrations 
called ziara. Ceerno Ousmane is particularly privileged in this regard, as he is related 
directly to the mayor Ibrahima Sy, and hence has the support of the mayor’s political 
allies. The daaras are also funded by the students’ agricultural labour in the clerics’ 
fields, and gifts from parents. In addition, graduates who have found work, especially 
through migrating, regularly send money back. I was told that Ceerno Ousmane and 
Ceerno Alfa’s daaras are the most popular, and they have had the most students who 
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have gone on to become successful. There is a rivalry between them which encourages 
students to compete to provide lavish gifts, and both the houses and cars of Ceerno 
Ousmane and Alfa were built by former students. Hence, the clerics in Medina Diallobé 
are affluent enough that they do not need to travel to towns with their students to beg, as 
in other parts of Senegal documented in Chapters One and Two. 
 
As for the state schools, a plethora of actors are involved in their functioning. Several 
government bodies influence provision starting with the Ministry of National Education, 
or Ministre de l’Education Nationale (MEN), supported by additional ministries. At 
regional level is the Academic Inspectorate, or Inspection Académique (IA), based in St 
Louis. The next level of decentralisation is the Departmental Inspectorate for Education, 
or Inspection Departementale de l’Education (IDE), based in Podor. At municipal level 
the commune is responsible for the primary school. The directors of each school plan 
timetables, check teacher practice, and liaise with parents (UNESCO & BIE 2011).  
 
In addition, as with daaras, non-state actors, especially migrants, also influence state 
school provision. Typical of many villages in the Futa Tooro, Medina Diallobé has a 
Village Development Association (VDA), called the General Union of Natives of 
Medina Diallobé, l’Union Générale des Originaires de Medina Diallobé, (UGOMD), 
founded in the 1970s. The UGOMD has branches based in Medina Diallobé, Dakar, and 
large diaspora communities, and members regularly raise money, through donations or 
seeking donor partnerships, to undertake local infrastructural projects. During the 1970s 
and ‘80s, the UGOMD’s projects were small-scale, such as buying mats for the mosque 
or repairing its walls. However, in the 1990s, Ibrahima Sy – the current mayor - was 
elected president. Under his leadership, the priorities of the association shifted and 
UGOMD members pushed for the creation of the collège, and financed its construction 
in partnership with the state in 2001. They also raised money for the building of Medina 
Diallobé II primary school in 2010, which previously taught under a temporary shelter. 
The distinct roles of the different state bodies were not always entirely clear to me or 
informants in Medina Diallobé, who often disagreed over who was responsible for 
resolving problems. This was compounded by the additional involvement of the 
UGOMD. The implications of this confusion over school functioning and pupils’ 
experiences are analysed in Chapter Five. 
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3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter frames the data on education preferences detailed in later chapters by 
presenting contextual information about Medina Diallobé, but also insights into the 
reflection and data collection processes which have shaped the form and nature of my 
findings. Section 3.2 addressed the complex methodological issues raised when 
researching the perspectives of people from different worldviews and epistemologies, 
and the techniques I employed to try and understand people’s perspectives. I started 
from the notion that understanding is achieved through self-reflective practice, dialogue 
and active listening. The quality of our interactions shapes the nature of dialogue, so my 
starting point was developing relationships with my host family as my main point of 
contact with inhabitants in Medina Diallobé. Behaving in ways which they found 
respectable was sometimes limiting as it affected my ability to develop greater 
relationships with non-tooroɓe, but was also enlightening for learning about social 
category and gender-based socialisation processes. My difficulties in finding 
interpreters also reflected the influence of strict social category hierarchies on 
interactions. Ethnographic methods enabled me to identify spaces and processes which 
facilitated the building of relationships with people and strengthened our dialogues. 
Observation and experience also helped me situate the views people shared explicitly 
with me through interviews and life histories in the broader context of everyday realities 
like political dynamics, characteristics of which were often not explicitly mentioned.  
 
Section 3.3 presented an introductory description of Medina Diallobé village, 
anonymised in name and devoid of non-essential incriminating details to protect people 
from harm by safeguarding their confidentiality and anonymity. Importantly, Medina 
Diallobé is a fairly large and well-connected village in the Futa Tooro. It is 
characterised by a local economy focussed on trade in a weekly market; small 
businesses including some run by women; agriculture; and customary professions, like 
clerics and traders among the tooroɓe and jewellery-makers among the wayluɓe 
blacksmiths. However, the highest-status means of earning income are civil service 
employment in Dakar, and internal and international migration, dominated by tooroɓe. 
Indeed, tooroɓe dominate numerically, socially and politically in the village despite the 
creation of a commune, as the main elected positions are dominated by aristocratic 
tooroɗo families.  
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Medina Diallobé has a high density of both Qur’anic and state schools. However, the 
latter date from the creation of the Almamate in the 18th century, while the primary state 
school was opened in the 1950s and the secondary schools are less than a decade old. 
Both school systems are embedded within common political and economic dynamics, as 
both have received large amounts of funding from migrants. The state schools in 
particular are characterised by a multiplicity of actors claiming responsibility for their 
functioning, which can cause confusion in the case of problems. With these specific 
contextual characteristics providing the backdrop, the following four chapters move to 
consider how parents and young people negotiate the competing forms of intrinsic, 
material and economic value associated with the different schools and their associated 
bodies of knowledge.  
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Chapter 4. Long-term study in the Qur’anic school or daara  
4.1 Introduction  
 
Many development professionals I met in Dakar stated that long-term daara education 
has no utility because it does not teach the skills needed in the ‘modern’ economy. 
Affluent, urban Senegalese parents I encountered agreed with this assessment, 
perceiving that the daara imparts moral education while the state school confers 
economic benefits. To reconcile the two, they enrol their children when young in a 
daara as day students to learn how to pray, before sending them to primary school. 
Several were even of the opinion that the daara was dying out. However, the reality in 
Medina Diallobé tells a different story. Here, as in much of the Futa Tooro, many boys 
continue to spend not only their childhoods in customary daaras as live-in students, but 
much of their adolescence and even adulthood. This schooling is seen by many parents, 
including affluent ones, to have as much value as the public school, if not more. I spent 
my fieldwork trying to understand this pattern of attendance.  
 
Contrary to dominant economic assumptions, local people’s evaluations of educational 
opportunities are not tied solely to possibilities of income generation. And when they 
are, their perceptions of the relevance of education to local and global economic 
opportunities differ to those of state actors, development personnel, and affluent urban 
Senegalese parents. After presenting the experience of long-term study at a live-in 
village daara in section 4.2, and which families in Medina Diallobé send their children 
to such schools, section 4.3 reveals why this choice remains an attractive one for many. 
First, I explain the spiritual benefit, embodied blessing, and moral value of daara 
education in terms of the local Islamic idiom of baraka. Second, I unpack how gender 
and social category identity play into people’s evaluations of the daara. Third, I 
consider the material utility of the daara. Section 4.4 brings these different factors 
together by illuminating the patterns of decision-making which lead people to invest in 
the daara. It shows that to say simply that the daara is dying out is simplistic. However 
what is definitely true is that evaluations of the daara are shifting as local people adjust 
to changing socioeconomic realities.  
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4.2 Life as a student in the village daara  
 
Life for students, or almudɓe, in the large daaras of Ceerno Ousmane, Alfa and 
Amadou still share many elements inherited from the classical model of Qur’anic 
instruction developed before colonisation. Day students are Medina Diallobé residents, 
mainly male, and usually attend state school alongside the daara. Children of all social 
categories in Medina Diallobé receive some Qur’anic instruction. However, live-in 
students are all male, mainly tooroɓe, and come from other villages. Likewise, children 
from Medina Diallobé who attend daaras full-time are often sent elsewhere to 
concentrate and learn better without the distractions of friends and family.  
 
The younger live-in students or baydas23 of the daaras in Medina Diallobé are colourful 
personalities in the village landscape. Their life is tough; they are grubby with a few 
ragged clothes and often no shoes. To earn their keep, live-in baydas beg at houses at 
breakfast and lunchtime with a metal tin or plastic pot. We would give them a few sugar 
cubes or a handful of rice or millet from the storeroom, or the leftovers of lunch. 
Sometimes we gave for nothing, other times in return for small errands like fetching 
groceries from the shop next door, or sweeping the yard. Once students finish their 
studies, they also send gifts back to the cleric. Between breakfast and lunch the baydas 
learn the Qur’an; in the afternoons they work the cleric’s fields and do other jobs for 
him like fetching wood for the evening fire. After sundown they study again, from a 
wooden tablet or alluwal – from the Arabic alwah - inked with a particular Qur’anic 
verse. Walking through the village past the daaras at night (8-10pm) through gaps in 
fences I could catch glimpses of almudɓe hunched around the fire, the smells of 
woodsmoke and murmur of young voices wafting out of the compound. Alternatively, 
they sit reciting beneath streetlamps or under shop awnings along the main streets of the 
village, where their chanting competed with the drone of the mosquitoes.  
 
If students continue their studies until late adolescence they become sandas. Few non-
tooroɗo boys reach this level. Sandas no longer live in the cleric’s compound or beg in 
the village, but request lodging and meals from local households. If lucky they find 
somewhere to eat, if not they try to earn enough through doing odd jobs to buy bread, or 
                                                 
23
 See Einarsdóttir et al. (2010, p.IV) for the same distinction between baydas and sandas among the Fula 
in Guinea Bissau. 
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their parents provide them with pocket money. Like giving alms to baydas, hosting 
sandas is a way for local people to give alms (sadaqa) and receive baraka. Many 
sandas work in the clerics’ fields, although less intensively if they teach instead, 
instructing bayda students from the bigger daaras or other village children the Qur’an 
and correct behaviour. Girls and very young children often learn with sandas rather than 
in the bigger daaras. Many households in Medina Diallobé have a resident sanda; two 
slept in a disused building in my host family’s compound, while another two joined 
them to study during the day. The sandas had swept the shed clean, and decorated the 
room with mats woven from bright plastic threads, mattresses and sheets, and their 
essential belongings: alluwals, a copy of the Qur’an, pens and ink, a soggy football, and 
plastic sandals in place of trainers.  
 
The sound of their reciting the Qur’an very much shaped our everyday soundscape. If I 
rose early enough in the morning, around 4am, in the clear darkness I could hear the low 
melodic hum of the sandas reciting on the far side of the compound. After daybreak the 
murmur continued, blending with the tweeting of birds around the water tap, the 
rhythmic thunk thunk of wooden mortar in pestle, squealing children, and the swish of a 
grass broom on concrete floor. Stillness fell during the shimmering heat of the 
afternoon, but the sandas resumed their chanting in the chill of nightfall, and as we 
dragged our mattresses out under the stars and tucked our mosquito nets around us, they 
bathed us in the Qur’an. Whether it was rainy season, when water hammered on the zinc 
roof and streamed in rivulets over the clogged sand, or dry season when the sun baked 
the cracked earth and we all veiled our faces from the biting desert wind, the sandas’ 
recitation was constant, like breathing. 
 
Only a few sandas complete memorisation of the Qur’an. Afterwards, they can learn 
other Islamic subjects, like sharia and Arabic language. Several middle-aged and older 
men in Medina Diallobé had studied these subjects and taught them informally, such as 
Ceerno Mukhtar Sall, the imam’s nephew, known locally for his fluency in Arabic and 
knowledge of the sharia. However, such men lack the means to establish their own 
daara. Thus, to study full-time, under a teacher of prestige in the camaraderie of 
meeting other students, young men travel to specialised advanced daaras in the Futa 
Tooro, including in Thilogne, Bokidiawé, Kahédi, or Ourosougi.  
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There are clear patterns regarding which families in Medina Diallobé send their children 
to daaras, and for how long. From the age of four, boys and girls of all social categories 
learn the Arabic alphabet, essential Qur’anic verses, the ablutions and how to pray, 
usually with a sanda. Having mastered these essentials, children from six years of age 
may then give up Qur’anic study to attend state school. Alternatively, they might 
continue further in memorising additional verses throughout middle childhood and even 
early adolescence while at primary school, and will stop once domestic tasks or 
schoolwork mean they can no longer continue. In Medina Diallobé this is a common 
trajectory for girls and non-tooroɗo boys. However, this chapter focuses on full-time, 
long-term study to memorise most if not all of the Qur’an, and hence boys who either 
never attend state schools or who drop out of primary school to concentrate on Islamic 
study. The following section describes theirs and their parents’ incentives for choosing a 
daara education. The students interviewed were all male and tooroɓe, aged fifteen and 
upwards, although most I met were between 20-25.24  
 
4.3 The multiple values of a daara education  
4.31 Blessing and moral education  
 
Me: Why do you learn the Qur’an?  
Yagouba: Because it’s a book written by God, brought by Mohamed. And it 
translates life, all the rules and the stories of the Prophets, what is and isn’t 
forbidden, it talks about a lot of things. And it’s through the Qur’an that we can 
pray, if you haven’t learned the surat al-fatiha you can never pray, your prayer 
won’t be valid. If you learn the Qur’an, angels will come. If you finish, lots of 
angels will come and pray for you. And, the Qur’an contains secrets, BIG 
secrets. Everything that is hard or difficult can be cured with the Qur’an. All 
illnesses, problems and catastrophes can be cured with the Qur’an. 
 
                                                 
24
 This description of daaras in Medina Diallobé is fairly typical of the Futa Tooro. A survey of 54 
daaras in Podor and Matam departments showed an average number of 97-137 talibés per school, 6-18% 
of whom were girls; begging practised by between 57-74% of students; most daaras charging minimal 
monthly fees of up to 500CFA; and on average 10 years required for full Qur’anic memorisation although 
only 20% of students stay this long (MEN 2010). 
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This exchange with Yagouba Sy, a 22-year-old tooroɗo studying the Qur’an in his spare 
time while attending lycée, captures several of the reasons given by Medina Diallobé 
inhabitants for learning the Qur’an in the daara: practical instruction for leading a pious 
life, the receipt of blessing, and learning invocations which allow one to influence the 
material world to one’s advantage. The common logic underlying these different 
elements is the pursuit of baraka or blessing. Baraka can be acquired directly from God 
through one’s personal actions. Memorising and reciting the Qur’an is thus a significant 
source of baraka: “There are extraordinary benefits for those who memorise the 
Qur’an”, explained Samba Ka, tooroɗo and administrator at the town hall, “They 
benefit from God’s mercy. When you learn the Qur’an, each time you recite it you are 
in a state of grace, God glorifies you and you will bear the trace of His words.” Baraka 
is also accumulated through performing pious acts; a self-enhancing cycle as baraka 
cleanses your heart making you more inclined to do good deeds. While memorisation of 
the Qur’an is the main ‘curriculum’ of the daara and is in itself a moral education as the 
recitation cleanses the soul, students also learn moral behaviour through emulating the 
cleric’s disposition and receiving informal lessons about pious comportment. While 
students in advanced daaras learn sharia with reference to Imam Malik’s books of 
jurisprudence translated into Pulaar, in the typical daara moral values are not 
necessarily taught in association with hadith or specific quotes from the Qur’an. Instead 
they reflect a body of oral lore which is passed through clerics. 
 
Following the moral proscriptions of the Qur’an imparted in the daara is considered 
essential for one’s own, and the community’s, happiness and well-being. This moral 
education is often contrasted against secular state schooling. Stories which abound 
throughout Senegal were repeated by my informants, including how in colonial times 
parents feared sending their sons to the French school, seen as the school of the Bible 
and the fires of hell. Indeed, one of Medina Diallobé’s primary school directors told me 
that the Pulaar word lekkoñ, or faggot burned for firewood, sounded so similar to the 
French word for school, l’école, that the association between the latter and hellfire was 
easily made, and he remembered a cleric preaching to this effect in the 1960s. Another 
ceɗɗo man in his forties explained that even in his generation the school “was 
associated with the West and with Satan”.  
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Although in previous decades, the discourse connecting the secular state school with 
immorality deterred people from sending their children, today in Medina Diallobé this 
type of schooling is the most popular in the village. Even clerics like Amadou and 
Ousmane Sy are sending their daughters, although not their sons. Nonetheless, even 
among those who send their children to the state schools, I witnessed statements 
associating it with immoral behaviour. Moussa Dem, a 40-year-old tooroɗo migrant 
living in Italy, expressed such ideas when referring to Baaba Ndaw, a member of the 
Ndaw family of village chiefs, and a local politico frequently associated with corruption 
allegations: 
 
Here, they say people who have been to Qur’anic school are more moral, but 
people like me who have been to French school have learned trickery, we’re not 
honest. Even now, if you say you’re an almuɗo, they say ‘Well, that’s someone 
who knows God’, they take him seriously. But those who have been to school, 
they say they are rascals. Like Baaba Ndaw, you’ve heard of him? The Ndaw, 
they went to French school, and they’re cheating people. They eat public funds. 
The Qur’anic students are praying in the mosque, they don’t get into these 
things. So school creates a bad image. 
 
Aside from being embodied through recitation of the Qur’an and performing moral 
behaviour, baraka can also be received through transmission from a very pious person, 
such as a saint or cleric. In the context of the daara, this is achieved through work, as 
Samba Ka, secretary of town hall explains: 
 
Working for the cleric, there is a big notion here that you need to understand, 
which is baraka, or blessing. This goes hand in hand with knowledge. The more 
you work for him, when you leave, you could have the same knowledge as 
another student […] but more satisfaction of the cleric, and then when he blesses 
you he prays for you. 
 
The third way in which baraka can be acquired is through inheritance, and so members 
of lineages of saints, clerics and sharif are seen to possess more baraka than other 
people. It is for this reason that daara students seek to study under a cleric from a 
seeremɓe tooroɗo lineage, as such men are recognised within the local community as 
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having more baraka. Students who study under them are therefore seen to be more 
likely to acquire baraka themselves throughout the duration of their studies.  
 
Amassing baraka carries significant benefits in the afterlife. Tacko, a 35-year-old 
tooroɗo woman explained that if you know the 99 names of God you are sure to go to 
heaven. And Sidy, an 18-year-old tooroɗo man, also gave the following benefit of 
memorising the full Qur’an: 
 
Sidy: There’s a secret inside. If you learn it off by heart you’re assured of going 
to paradise. You can also take 500 people with you, like friends and family.  
Me: Do you need all the Qur’an in your head or a little just?  
Sidy: Even with a little, but it’s more assured if you have it all.  
 
In addition to benefit in the afterlife, being imbued with baraka makes God more 
inclined to look favourably on you in the current material world. This can be combined 
with du‘a or using invocations which express one’s faith and desire for specific things. 
Learning which Qur’anic verses, invocations, or names of God can be recited for which 
purposes is therefore accorded high value, as Mohamed, a 15-year-old tooroɗo, 
inferred: “Even if you stay in your room and just pray and learn the Qur’an, you will 
have all you need, because all the du‘as are in there, du‘as are to have what you want, 
and to protect you.” The value and power accorded to baraka cannot be underestimated, 
and as such its acquisition is closely controlled. For instance, the question of whether or 
not non-Muslims could learn Qur’anic verses sparked considerable debate within my 
host family. Sisters Fatou and Diara, aged 22 and 35, were both against non-Muslims 
memorising: “Being Muslim, praying, and learning the Qur’an all go together,” Fatou 
protested, “Non-Muslims can’t learn the Qur’an because it brings lots of benefits”. 
Their brother agreed, saying “If they learn the Qur’an, they will learn the names of God 
and they don’t have the right to, only a Muslim does, as it’s very powerful.”  
 
A further attribute of possessing baraka is enhanced mystical power and the ability to 
perform miraculous feats. While amassing baraka generally through the pathways 
mentioned above increases one’s mystic ability, it is strengthened by a body of specific 
knowledge termed batin (from Arabic al-batin meaning hidden) or lasarar (from Arabic 
al-asrar meaning secret) associated with the esoteric sciences, practitioners of which are 
126 
 
called dabotooɓe (s. dabotooɗo) in Pulaar.25 These secrets can be used for positive ends 
like healing, but also negative ones, like curses. Given their potentially destructive 
power, dabotooɗo Abou Dem told me that clerics do not teach this knowledge to 
students in the typical daara. Instead a prospective student has to approach a cleric and 
request that he teach him. The cleric might ask for money or invite the student to work 
for him over several years. If he sees that the student is hard-working and of good 
character, he may impart secrets slowly as he sees fit. Usually, however, this knowledge 
is guarded and given only to the clerics’ sons. In Medina Diallobé, the well-known 
dabotooɓe had been taught by kin, and Abou Dem was the only one I knew of who had 
learned from a cleric not of his family. However, his brother reckoned that “People 
don’t talk about mystique much but everyone does it”. Samba Ka also explained that if 
they do know, they keep it secret: 
 
Ceerno Ousmane, he would say ‘No, I don’t know those things,’ if you ask, he 
would deny it. So not only is he modest because it’s not his speciality, but also 
there is certain knowledge that it’s not easy to get out of him. He would give it 
to his son, or people who are very, very close him who have done a lot for him. 
He will direct you to someone else, he’ll say, ‘I’m a teacher, not a dabotooɗo.’ 
But clearly he knows a lot, lots of marabouts who know the Qur’an know some 
mystic secrets, and his father knew all the batin, all the lasarar. 
 
4.32 Status and identity  
 
In addition to accumulating baraka, daara education also confers significant social 
status. “The value is so embedded, it’s a prestige,” explained Omar, a tooroɗo man of 
the clerical Sy family, in his forties. “My son could become a bricklayer if he wants, but 
for me as a father, that my son memorised the Qur’an is a prestige.” Such status 
translates into material returns in the form of influence in village affairs, political 
leverage, and greater marriage prospects. The seal of status for the students who finish 
memorising the Qur’an is the mbaaral celebration. Their family hosts a party where the 
young man recites a significant part of the Qur’an in front of a large public audience, 
                                                 
25
 This term is derived from the word dabare, meaning sorcery or magic, and the verb dabaade, meaning 
to perform sorcery (Niang 1997, p.19). Dilley (2000, p.157) describes dabare as being “offensive” 
sorcery, but in Medina Diallobé the practice did not necessarily carry negative connotations. 
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before his family slaughters a large sheep or cow and prepares a meal for guests. I 
attended one mbaaral in Medina Diallobé, in honour of the imam’s nephew in his early 
twenties. It was a prestigious event, with easily one hundred people in all their finery in 
attendance, including high-ranking members of the village.26 The man also receives an 
embroidered cover for his alluwal, which I saw prominently displayed in people’s 
homes. When I initially met my host family in Medina Diallobé in 2010, the first things 
my 24-year-old brother Abderahmane showed me with enormous pride were his alluwal 
and mbaaral photo album from earlier that year. 28-year old tooroɗo, Kasim Sy, also 
described the prestige of completing memorisation of the Qur’an, including increasing a 
man’s marriage prospects:  
 
Your family will say mashallah, you’re a hafiz! It’s noble, grandiose, 
extraordinary. In the past you would celebrate your mbaaral and wedding on the 
same day. If you completed the Qur’an the women would be queuing at your 
door to marry you! 
 
The status of daara education is linked exclusively to male tooroɗo identity, especially 
those of clerical seeremɓe lineages. 40-year-old tooroɗo Moussa Dem said, for men of 
such families it was “a mark of weakness not to have learned the Qur’an”. Indeed, those 
families in Medina Diallobé who place most emphasis on daara education for their sons 
are the Sy family of clerics and the Ba family of the imam. The flipside of the status 
accorded to tooroɗo men through Qur’anic memorisation is the monopoly maintained 
over it, and restrictions of daara access to other social categories. This was not 
immediately apparent through people’s discourses, as many inhabitants of Medina 
Diallobé – especially tooroɓe - put low attendance of other categories down to lack of 
interest or ‘auto-exclusion’ linked to the customary divisions of labour. For instance, a 
pullo primary school director said: 
 
The pullo doesn’t have time to learn or teach the Qur’an, he has his cows to 
herd. The baylo has his occupation, so no time for the Qur’an. The fisherman 
fishes, he has no time for the Qur’an. The tooroɗo works his fields and teaches 
the Qur’an, that’s his profession. […] Everyone learns the Qur’an but to make a 
                                                 
26
 Similarly lavish graduation ceremonies have been recorded throughout Islamic Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
oldest reference is perhaps a Tuareg account from the 15th century (Reichmuth 2000, p.424). 
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living out of it, a profession, is different. […] Technically the Qur’an doesn’t 
‘belong’ to anyone, but it’s having the time… others had their own professions. 
 
Some inhabitants however framed this pattern of daara attendance in less neutral terms, 
stressing discrimination on the part of tooroɓe. These informants were either not 
tooroɓe, or were tooroɓe who had lived elsewhere and developed a more critical 
perspective on Haalpulaar customs. Omar Sy grew up in Nouakchott although his father 
was a cleric in Medina Diallobé. “The daaras are a system for tooroɓe,” he stated, when 
I asked why other categories don’t attend the daara. “If you know the cleric, and you 
send your children there, you will help him, he will help you. It’s a bit like a mafia. The 
other categories won’t be treated the same.” 
 
Anecdotes abound in the Futa Tooro about how non-tooroɗo daara students are usually 
not treated as well as tooroɓe (Penda Mbow, personal communication). In addition, a 
young baylo university student in Dakar informed me that it is clerics in Medina 
Diallobé in particular who reinforce the “indigenous discourse of difference” (Dilley 
2000, p.154) between social categories, stressing the importance of endogamy. Adama 
Seck, a Wolof administrator, also confirmed that clerics construct the authority to teach 
the Qur’an as dependent on the inherited baraka of seeremɓe tooroɗo lineage in 
addition to knowledge. Hence, non-tooroɗo men do not invest in Islamic education not 
only because they prefer their own profession, but due to the dominance of this 
exclusionary ideology: 
 
It’s since the time when Islam first came to Senegal. In the Haalpulaar context, 
the first to learn the Quran were tooroɓe. [...] So that’s how it spread and has 
continued to this day. And then their situation of…well, dominance in the 
society has meant that is has become their ‘property’ in a sense. A non-tooroɗo 
can learn and have knowledge, but he will never be of the same rank as a 
tooroɗo. 
 
A ceɗɗo collège teacher combined these two strands of discourse, revealing the link 
between discrimination and a self-perpetuating situation of auto-exclusion: 
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In 90% of cases, those who learn the Qur’an to the end are tooroɓe. Because in 
Haalpulaar society the tooroɓe are much more assimilated into learning the 
Qur’an. They were the first teachers. If you see a big cleric, you automatically 
assume he’s a tooroɗo. Because they think of nothing else but learning the 
Qur’an. […] Politically as well, it’s a form of domination. While transmitting 
knowledge, they dominate the people under their mantle, who become 
subjugated to their needs. […] The religion isn’t just for the tooroɓe, it’s for 
everyone. It’s not reserved for the tooroɓe, you’re a Muslim, you have the right 
to learn… […] But it depends on the motivation of the parents. There are people 
who are auto-excluded, that’s the problem. If you don’t take your rights, people 
will squash you. 
 
This philosophy that although everyone is Muslim, the tooroɗo is in charge of religious 
affairs, is captured in the pulaar proverb, “Yimbe fof ngara mosquée, kono tooroɗo woni 
yeeso” meaning “everyone goes to the mosque, but the tooroɗo is in front” 
(Abderrahmane N’Gaïde, personal communication).  
 
To counter this exclusion, there exist cases of young non-tooroɗo men choosing to go 
daaras in Medina Gounass in southern Senegal, which teaches all men regardless of 
social category. Even in the 1970s, men from the Futa Tooro, including non-tooroɓe, 
migrated there to obtain Islamic education free from social hierarchy barriers (Coulon 
1975, pp.76–77). I knew of two wayluɓe men in Medina Diallobé who had gone there to 
memorise the Qur’an. Hamidou Thiam, a 40-year-old baylo living in France, described 
a baylo man in his thirties, Ahmed Guissé, who had completed memorisation there and 
returned to the village. I also met another young baylo sanda from Mbayla while he was 
on holiday with his family, studying at Medina Gounass. Hamidou told me that 
although it is still rare for wayluɓe boys from Medina Diallobé to study the Qur’an in 
daaras, “more and more” are going to Medina Gounass as an alternative.  
 
While these men are few, their studying in Medina Gounass could have implications for 
the religious landscape in Medina Diallobé. Hamidou Thiam explained how his friend 
Ahmed Guissé had tried to use his education to challenge the local status quo which 
bars non-tooroɓe from Islamic knowledge and office:  
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He led prayer here, next door at the little mosque. But the old man Modou Ly, [a 
tooroɗo who lives nearby, and one of Ceerno Ousmane’s strongest supporters], 
came and started asking questions like ‘Where are you from?’ Guissé said 
‘Medina Gounass’. But Modou asked about his family, and he found out that he 
was a baylo, and he said ‘No baylo leads prayer here [in Medina Diallobé]’. He 
asked his son ‘How did you let this happen?’ His son replied, ‘He knows more 
Qur’an than you’. But Guissé stopped, he prays behind people now, because it’s 
not good in the religion, it can cause all sorts of problems [Hamidou infers the 
threat of a curse from the tooroɗo clerics]. 
 
Despite Ahmed Guissé’s attempts to challenge the status quo, his actions have not 
translated into greater openness among tooroɓe clerics in Medina Diallobé to allow 
non-tooroɓe to learn in the daaras. There have not been any changes in provision of 
education in the village, and non-tooroɗo boys must therefore continue to attend Islamic 
schools or daaras far away if they want an advanced religious education. Stories I heard 
from informants about other villages suggests that the trend of non-tooroɓe studying in 
daaras outside the Futa Tooro, and returning to establish themselves as teachers or 
clerics in their home villages, is a growing one. In contrast to Ahmed Guissé, some have 
managed to successfully challenge the tooroɓe clerics’ monopoly on religious education 
and roles such as imam (Thioub et al. 2014). 
 
-o0o- 
 
Like elsewhere in the Futa Tooro, the daaras in Medina Diallobé are an almost 
exclusively male environment. Young girls learn alongside boys with sandas or in their 
home, but the larger daaras typically only teach boys. The reasons given by inhabitants 
to justify women’s lack of advanced Islamic study echo those explaining the absence of 
non-tooroɗo boys in the daara; their identity is discursively constructed as incompatible 
with learning the Qur’an. A frequent explanation was that women could not attend the 
daara after puberty for fear of distracting men, as Diallo, a primary school director 
explained: 
 
Here, women at a certain age can’t approach a man to learn the Qur’an, men and 
women can’t sit together! In that setting how can a woman learn? Unless she 
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asks her brother or father or so on. […] She can’t learn with the cleric, so how 
will she do it? If there was a woman in the daara who was teaching it could be 
possible. But that doesn’t happen, it’s only men who teach! 
 
Beyond the risk of their sexuality, another reason given is that women’s bodies are 
polluting and that they therefore cannot touch the Qur’an. As one 35-year-old tooroɗo 
man said, women cannot learn the Qur’an in any intensive way, nor work within the 
religious sphere as an imam, because “God doesn’t like their bodies” and when 
menstruating or following childbirth they are considered impure and unable to pray or 
touch the Qur’an. 
 
Like the occupations based on social category, the most common justification from men 
and women alike for women not studying at the daara is the division of labour. Many 
explained that “women don’t have time” with the burdens of domestic labour from 
middle-childhood onwards, and the fact that they marry early, from age fifteen. This 
discourse remained prevalent although I observed that it no longer coincided with 
empirical reality. In the last decade increasing numbers of girls have been attending 
state school until their late teens and even twenties, but this trend has not been matched 
by growing numbers of girls pursuing advanced religious study in the village. One 24-
year-old tooroɗo woman, Khadidiatou Sy, studying at university in Dakar captured this 
inconsistency in her reply when I asked whether she had studied the Qur’an: “I have, 
but just the basics for praying. I’d like to learn more but… finding the time… You 
know, for girls it’s harder, there’s the work at home, and early marriage.” The fact that 
she had been able to delay marriage to her mid-twenties to pursue a Masters’ degree did 
not appear to her inconsistent with the idea that women categorically “don’t have time” 
to study their religion.  
 
As with men of non-tooroɗo categories, people would ask what sense there is in a 
woman pursuing advanced religious study when she cannot seek a livelihood with it, the 
professions of cleric, imam and dabotooɗo being restricted to men. Others expressed 
how there is also a tendency not to teach women the esoteric sciences because its 
secrecy would be compromised. Again, ‘natural’ female characteristics are blamed, 
such as women’s propensity to gossip, and that they will share secrets with their 
husband’s family once they marry. 40-year-old tooroɗo Moussa Dem told me: 
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Women don’t learn mystique because those secrets will go to her husband’s 
family. It’s also not advisable to tell women your secrets, here women don’t 
keep secrets. They will tell the secrets, what with sitting around not doing 
anything all day, talking loudly. Men spend time together too but talk softly… 
My father gives me secrets that he knows from time to time, but never to my 
sisters. Secrets are only given to sons, because we say a woman will marry 
another and we don’t want this knowledge to go to the husband. He will have 
the knowledge of his parents plus her knowledge, we want to avoid that, he will 
have more power than us. 
 
Other explanations reveal that the naturalisation of women’s absence from formal 
Islamic study disguises how men deliberately exclude them from the social authority 
and mystic power which Qur’anic memorisation accords. Ceerno Mukhtar Sall, a sharia 
and Arabic teacher, explained that women in the Futa Tooro do not learn the Qur’an 
because “Here women have a certain place in society – debbo ko debbo tan, a woman is 
just a woman, behind her husband.” Samba Ka, who had studied some anthropology, 
gave his analysis. His was the only statement I heard where exclusion of women was 
linked to discrimination, rather than being ‘natural’ and hence inevitable: 
 
This society is phallocratic, like many societies, so they always put men in front, 
the man decides, gives the orders, he is the head of the family. And women are 
considered as saints, but teaching of the religion is reserved for men. If there is a 
point that needs to be debated or clarified, we will ask men. […] A man doesn’t 
want his wife to know more than him in case she contradicts him in front of him, 
that is shameful. […] Even if people wouldn’t say it explicitly or even 
necessarily think it consciously, domination must be a part of it. Religious 
education in the Futa is more about reproducing the inequalities of society. 
 
Sidy, a lively 18-year-old tooroɗo man who took pride in finding logical explanations 
for the way of things, expressed a common discourse – which Ware (2014, p.174) has 
recorded in Dakar in the 1930s - which captures how the routes through which men and 
women can best acquire baraka are constructed as being different, which in practice 
reinforces women’s subordination to men: 
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Me: Why don’t women learn the Qur’an, if it means you get to go to paradise?  
Sidy: Well, women can be assured of going to heaven if they obey everything 
their husband says. In 99% of cases a woman will go to heaven if she follows 
what her husband says. Even if her parents object, she should follow her 
husband.  
 
Hence, tooroɗo women’s accumulation of baraka is linked to acquisition of religious 
norms and practice appropriate to their role as wives and mothers, emphasising their 
obedience and submission to men, rather than Qur’anic memorisation as it is for 
tooroɗo men. The content and context of their learning reflects this, as women both 
learn and teach within the domestic sphere. It is women who are primarily responsible 
for ensuring children’s needi, translated as up-bringing or moral behaviour. Indeed, one 
tooroɗo man in his twenties, studying sharia, informed me that women do not need to 
learn in the daara because they can learn what is necessary for them by copying or 
imitating, in the home. He gave an example:  
 
Women do learn the sharia, but it’s cultural. You see sharia is rules and what 
you should or shouldn’t do, so you can learn that at a sharia school, i.e. what the 
exact verse says etc., but you can also learn it at home. For instance, it’s written 
in the Qur’an that you shouldn’t eat with your left hand, but no one will teach 
you that in a school, but parents, especially mothers, will say to a child ‘Don’t 
eat with that hand!’ Or how to be modest… or how to pray. A child of nine or 
ten knows how to pray because they’ve learned it at home, it’s as if they don’t 
have to be taught per se. 
 
I was able to observe the women in my host family, an offshoot of the Sy clerical 
family, socialising junior household members including myself in moral behaviour – 
although these attempts were far from always passively accepted. The norms they 
instilled in children of both genders often revolved around monitoring whether they had 
prayed correctly and on time. We were woken with the refrain “Ummu sa julat!” 
meaning “Get up and pray!” in the morning, followed by “A julii? A julaani tawa?” 
meaning “Have you prayed? Why haven’t you prayed yet?” throughout the day. 
Tooroɗo reinforcement of pious behaviour was often done with explicit reference to 
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other social categories framed as less pious, thus tying Muslim identity to tooroɗo 
identity. As Coumba, a 30-year-old woman told me: 
 
The ñeeñbe, they do all kinds of jobs like blacksmith and weaver, they don’t 
respect the religion much, they wear God knows what. Then there are nobles, we 
have no profession, just learning and teaching the Qur’an. The nobles took the 
maccuɓe as servants. It’s like in the past, there was homo sapiens, who didn’t 
wear clothes and so on, those people are still like that, they know nothing, they 
don’t even know how to pray. 
 
As a further example of socialisation which combines Muslim and social category 
identity, young tooroɓe in my host family, especially girls, were subject to strict 
surveillance to ensure Islamic modesty in terms of dress. Before female members could 
leave the compound it was considered proper to wear a shawl which covered the hair, 
shoulders and forearms, as well as an ankle-length skirt. This was particularly marked 
among clerical and sharif families, women of which made sure of tightly tucking veils 
under chins and tugging sleeves over wrists whenever in public. Among the Ndaw 
tooroɗo family of village chiefs, I also observed an elderly woman retort to her 
grandson, when wearing low-slung jeans which showed his boxer shorts, to “Pull up 
your trousers, you look like a maccuɗo.”  
 
Similarly, family members monitored others’ mobility outside the home – especially 
among young women - to maintain the intersecting Muslim and tooroɗo identity. One 
girl I knew, 16-year-old Houley, violated strict norms about appropriate movement 
outside the compound for a young woman, by staying out after dark at a school friend’s 
house on the other side of the village. When Houley finally returned home at 11pm her 
grandmother Astou was livid and gave the girl a sound beating. Astou sobbed that her 
reputation at stake when Houley’s behaviour sullied their honour as clerics, and begged 
me to take her back to Dakar with me. Islamic restrictions on mobility also intersect 
with ideals prohibiting contact with ñeeñɓe. On one occasion, Houley and I crossed the 
village to visit a relation whose house lay in the tooroɗo neighbourhood next to the 
wayluɓe neighbourhood of Mbayla. On the path we met Houley’s cousin, who 
interrogated us as to where we had been, suspiciously asking whether we had been to 
Mbayla. Although she told me on several other occasions that she disagreed with her 
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family’s attitudes towards ñeeñɓe, Houley quickly justified our location, saying we had 
been to see the tooroɗo relation.  
 
These findings therefore show that daara education for boys and informal socialisation 
practices by women in the home are both mutually constitutive of tooroɗo identity 
rooted in religious piety. These examples support arguments in favour of going beyond 
the “formal/informal” distinction pervasive in educational debates (Lave 2011; Rogers 
2004), and indeed gendered notions of public/private divides in knowledge spheres 
(Froerer & Portisch 2012, p.340; Naji 2012), when making sense of the role of 
education in forming persons and their trajectories. 
 
4.33 Economic benefits  
 
When I asked what practical use there is in memorising the full Qur’an, many people 
replied that the value is not material or economic, but instead for ‘after’, meaning the 
afterlife. “It’s not for earning money!” Khadidiatou Sy the university student exclaimed; 
“You’ll use it when you’re dead.” A 25-year-old sanda agreed, “It’s useful for after; all 
this is impermanent!” This dichotomy between religious knowledge and the daara as 
being for spiritual development, and secular knowledge and the school for economic 
benefit, was neatly captured by one ten-year-old tooroɗo girl: “Ecole ina nafi e aduna, 
school is useful in the world”, she explained, while “the Qur’an is useful for 
afterwards.” However, this strict dichotomy quickly broke down in practice, as people’s 
discourses revealed several associations between daara education and economic 
rewards. 
 
Baraka acquired through daara education confers not only rewards in the afterlife; it 
can be converted into material wealth through endeavours conducted in the present 
lifetime. Samba Ka summarised this logic thus: “We say, if you want to succeed, you 
should have less knowledge and lots of baraka! […] If you go into commerce, or 
teaching, or whatever, you will succeed more.” Several middle-aged men also reported 
how the daara teaches young men skills associated with typical tooroɗo livelihoods. 
“You learn everything, you learn the Qur’an but you also beg, and through that you 
learn about the village and do odd jobs”, explained one 45-year-old cultivator who had 
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attended a daara. “So by the time you finish, you have a livelihood.” The ustaas of 
Medina Diallobé I primary school agreed: “In the daara you work the field for the 
cleric, you fix things around the house, building, fixing fences, you learn how to do lots 
of work, practical skills.”  
 
In addition, it is possible for daara graduates to go into religious professions, namely as 
a cleric of a daara. However, this profession is only really viable for a minority of 
tooroɗo men. To be a cleric of a large and successful daara, you need assets and 
inherited baraka of lineage. “Clerics are only respected if their father was a big cleric. 
It’s his son who inherits the daara, whether he has the same knowledge or not. This is 
the same for the whole region of St Louis,” argued Habib Ndaw. “Here in Medina 
Diallobé, if you learn the Qur’an and your father isn’t a big cleric, then you can’t be a 
cleric.” Moussa Dem corroborated saying:  
 
In Medina Diallobé, certain tooroɓe who learn the Qur’an, if they’re not from a 
big well-known family, like Ceerno Ousmane’s or Ceerno Amadou’s family, 
then people won’t accord them much importance on the mystic side of things. 
Even in the Qur’an they’re not accorded much importance. 
 
The importance of inherited baraka in contributing to the prestige of a cleric and 
therefore the success of his daara is reflected in the popularity of the four daaras in 
Medina Diallobé, as all are run by the prestigious Sy and Ba seeremɓe families.  
 
These accounts frame this situation in negative terms for those who might wish to be 
clerics but cannot as they are not of seeremɓe lineages. However, Samba Ka reveals 
how this reality might also be constraining for men obliged to become clerics because 
of their parentage: 
 
Usually they teach because their father has said you must. […] Some are kind of 
forced into it, like their father teaches and they feel obliged to take it on. But at 
the same time, the fact that their father did it makes them well positioned to do 
it, people know their father and their name. You are associated with his name. 
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Alternatively to being a cleric, daara graduates can work in the prayer economy using 
the esoteric sciences, as a dabotooɗo. However, “a person cannot live from dabaade 
alone”, one 35-year-old tooroɗo told me, who uses it only to supplement his main 
income from cultivation. Indeed, the tooroɓe men in Medina Diallobé who are not 
clerics of daaras but work as dabotooɓe, who sustain their households solely through 
this profession, were atypical for being from the sole family of sharif in the village. As 
such, they were perceived by other people as possessing exceptional quantities of 
baraka, and could request large sums of addiya, a form of sadaqa, in return for 
blessings. “My father Mamadou Sy lived off dabaade and addiya, when people give 
you loads of gifts for being a sharif,” explained Omar Sy, a 45-year-old working as a 
dabotooɗo to supplement his income as a school director. “My father would go 
preaching in villages too. He would go to the jeeri and bring back trucks of goats and 
sheep. People were jealous of that.” Omar’s 35-year-old cousin Seydou Noor, who had 
memorised the Qur’an and learned esoteric sciences from his uncle, also made a 
successful living from combining dabaade with seeking addiya. His cousin Mohamed 
once told me that Seydou Noor returned with two million CFA (£2250) worth of goods 
from his last trip to the jeeri – a small fortune at ten times the monthly salary of a low-
level civil servant. Whether this sum is exactly correct or not, Seydou Noor was clearly 
wealthy by village standards, with a car and two-storey house more typical of a migrant 
than a man who had never worked outside the Futa Tooro.  
 
Although dabaade and seeking addiya can prove lucrative options for tooroɓe with 
daara education, these livelihoods are facing strain due to socioeconomic change. An 
example I observed was Abou Dem, a 35-year-old tooroɗo and close friend of Seydou 
Noor Sy mentioned above. While Abou had memorised the Qur’an and learned how to 
heal afflictions caused by jinn from a specialist in another village, his income as a 
dabotooɗo remained modest. He argued that the prayer economy had become 
increasingly monetarised, and prices were rising which put clients off. Moussa Dem, 
Abou Dem’s older brother, told me “Before [those who had memorised the Qur’an] 
could recite the Qur’an for marriages and so on, and be given money, but now no one 
pays them for that so they are required to do mystique and charge more for it instead.” 
Many people who did not work in this profession framed this change in negative terms, 
accusing dabotooɓe of being greedy tricksters - a discourse documented more widely in 
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Senegal (Gemmeke 2008) - exemplified in the account of Diallo the primary school 
director: 
 
Marabouts have changed, before they did prayers and so on but they didn’t ask 
for so much money, or maybe didn’t ask for money at all, if it worked you 
would pay. You asked for a prayer, you gave 1kg of rice. Now he asks for a car, 
or 1 million CFA [£1100]! I.e. [to make a charm to ensure the success of your 
visa application] to go to France, they would say it costs 5 million CFA [£5500], 
but you can pay 1 million in advance. Then if it doesn’t work they have the 
million anyway. Clerics have become greedier and they exploit. […] Now there 
are many charlatans. 
 
The dabotooɓe themselves frame this shift in less negative terms. “If they ask for more 
money, it’s because the cost of living has increased.” explained Abou Dem. “You have 
to factor in time, to perform some kinds of prayers you need to be in your room praying 
for a month even, only coming out to eat.” Despite Abou’s knowledge, he found it hard 
to make ends meet through dabaade. Unlike Seydou Noor, he could not rely on 
inherited wealth from his father as his family had only moved to Medina Diallobé in the 
1980s, abandoning their land on the Mauritanian side of the Futa Tooro during the civil 
war. In addition, Abou did not have the privilege of being from a sharif lineage and 
hence was unable to supplement his income seeking addiya. Furthermore, not even this 
practice can be relied on anymore given increased costs of living, as sharif Omar Sy 
argued: “Fetching addiya, that shouldn’t be your profession. People are getting tired of 
it too, every week you get a sharif asking for addiya.”  
 
Given the low returns on agriculture and the restricted possibilities for working as 
clerics or dabotooɓe, most daara graduates do not work in professions linked to the 
skills acquired in the daara. Rather, daara-educated tooroɓe men in their forties and 
fifties in Medina Diallobé predominantly work as traders in Dakar, or migrate 
internationally, which many of younger generation of current daara students also seek 
to do.  
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4.4 Choosing the daara: An increasingly contested decision  
 
Baraka, moral education, status, identity, and economic incentives are all taken into 
account when people choose daara education for themselves or their children. That 
Qur’anic memorisation continues to be discursively tied to male tooroɗo identity 
explains why girls and non-tooroɗo boys do not study long-term as live-in students at 
the daaras in Medina Diallobé. During the 1970-80s, with the exception of people from 
the Ndaw family of village chiefs who attended state schools, the majority of tooroɗo 
boys in Medina Diallobé attended the daara. Now middle-aged men, they usually work 
in trade or have migrated outside Senegal. This emphasis on Qur’anic school followed 
by the ‘professions’ of trade and migration among the tooroɓe reflects the broader 
history of the Futa Tooro region described in Chapter Two, but more precisely the 
specific context of Medina Diallobé as both a ‘clerical village’ and host to a weekly 
market. Indeed, Oumou Wane, a tooroɗo woman who had married in Medina Diallobé, 
frequently told me how its case differed to her nearby natal village of Wuro Mawdo 
where the pro-school stance of the village chieftaincy lineage came to dominate instead: 
“There aren’t many intellectuals here, although there are in Wuro Mawdo, old men 
even. At time of independence many of them studied, although here in Medina Diallobé 
they did Qur’anic schooling and then went into commerce.”  
 
The parents of young tooroɗo men currently studying in daaras therefore made 
decisions for their sons at a time when full-time daara education was perceived to have 
overwhelmingly positive returns. Non-material moral and spiritual incentives were 
supported by material returns of status, and a generally high chance of economic 
success through several possible avenues. Mamadou Sow, a 24-year-old tooroɗo 
studying sharia at Ceerno Alfa’s daara, told me that although his sisters attended 
French school, his father, a migrant in Italy, forbade him from doing so, obliging that he 
go to the daara. As Omar Sy the 45-year-old dabotooɗo said “It’s about honour a lot of 
the time. And although it’s not useful per se for getting a job, the parents just plan to 
send [their sons] abroad after.” Again, while this predominance of tooroɗo boys being 
sent to daaras is typical of Medina Diallobé it contrasts with other places like Wuro 
Mawdo, as explained by Oumou’s 28-year-old brother Bachir Wane: “There, you don’t 
see what you see in Medina Diallobé of a big difference between casted people going to 
school and nobles going to Qur’anic school. Rather, everyone goes to school.” 
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However, my discussions with daara students, and tooroɗo parents currently making 
decisions for their young children, reflect how the relative merits of long-term live-in 
study at the daara are increasingly being debated. While all tooroɓe I spoke with agreed 
that it still confers baraka, moral education and material benefit of status, the likelihood 
of economic returns has become more uncertain. This is making the choice to attend the 
daara a more complex one.  
 
Many people, especially middle-aged tooroɗo men, argue that one can make a living as 
a migrant with daara or school education. This observation continues to justify 
investment in the daara education for its other benefits. Samba Ka, who spent eight 
years in Cameroon, explained “I know people who have gone to Cameroon and manage 
to learn enough French to get by within a few months, even if they haven’t been to 
school”. The ustaas at Medina Diallobé I primary school corroborated this: 
 
Often your studies don’t link to a profession, whether it’s French school or 
Qur’anic school. People here go to university, but then they migrate and become 
taxi drivers. I have an uncle who was a physics and chemistry teacher, he had a 
Masters’. He went to the US and is a taxi driver. 
 
Indeed, the majority of current daara students hope to migrate. “If he can’t get work 
here, he might go abroad”, explained a 20-year-old lycée student of her fiancé, who 
hoped to complete Qur’anic memorisation in a daara in the next few months. “Can you 
get me a visa to England? Or the USA?” asked the imam’s nephew after he celebrated 
his mbaaral. He explained, “I have a cousin who went to the US to see a relation, and 
came back saying it was a great there, and anyone who says the USA’s bad and there’s 
no work is wrong!” Many of these accounts revealed that these daara students have 
networks of family members who have already migrated, including those who have 
obtained European or US nationality, who they are confident will be able to help them. 
One 25-year-old sanda told me he wanted to go abroad, and when I asked how he hoped 
to do this he nonchalantly replied “My father works in Paris. He has papers, and comes 
back to Senegal each year, so hopefully I can go there.” The fact that the tooroɓe’s 
networks and wealth continue to enable them to migrate and thus simultaneously enjoy 
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the status benefits of Qur’anic school is supported by a statement by Oussein Sogo, a 
24-year-old baylo university student in Dakar: 
 
The tooroɓe go in for the Qur’an a lot, because that’s what they did traditionally, 
Qur’an and agriculture, or go abroad, and they do what their parents did. We 
learn the Qur’an, everyone does, but they go in for it more. And they tend to 
emigrate, few wayluɓe people have emigrated, it tends to be tooroɓe more. And 
there they get money fast, in five years they can build a house. So they have a 
tendency to say ‘What’s the point of school? You work for years here and get 
nothing’. It’s a question of means as well, it costs a lot to migrate. Plus [the 
tooroɓe] know the best marabouts, the ways of going. And they have contacts 
over there. 
 
That many young tooroɓe men belong to families with the necessary networks and 
wealth to migrate, and the discourse is still prevalent that one can succeed as a migrant 
without having been to state school, explains why the daara remains an attractive 
option among many parents and students for the status and baraka it confers. Thus, in 
comparison to assumptions among development actors based on observations from 
other parts of Senegal, daara education in Medina Diallobé is not the choice of the 
poorest parents who cannot afford otherwise. Rather, it is – historically, and 
increasingly so nowadays - a privilege for those who can afford it.  
 
Auriol and Demonsant (2012) propose that parents in the Futa Tooro choose the daara 
for their sons knowing that they will migrate, to teach them values which encourage 
them to send more remittances – as has been observed in other contexts such as 
Bangladesh (Rao & Hossain 2011, pp.628–629). I would argue that their methodology 
is flawed as they use current rates of migration among tooroɓe as ‘evidence’ of 
historical decision-making logic. In contrast, my data – and other qualitative research - 
shows that making such assumptions is risky, as evaluations of education options 
fluctuate from one generation, and individual, to the next in lieu of changing 
circumstances. In addition, Auriol and Demonsant never actually asked their informants 
why they sent their sons to daaras. The study, typical of economic research based on 
Rational Choice Theory, falls into the trap Bano (2012b, p.13) warns against, of being 
“inductive, driven by armchair theorizing, which is then tested through application to 
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large-scale survey data.” Parents never mentioned to me that they sent boys to the daara 
so that they would provide remittances. While it could be a reason, I doubt it is the 
overriding one when compared to moral education, baraka and status. Again, this is 
typical of another pitfall of standard quantitative Rational Choice Theory economic 
analyses, that “the intrinsic meaning that religion holds for people has been side-lined in 
favour of its instrumental functions” (ibid. 2012b, p.13). 
 
However, other people increasingly acknowledged that the daara offers low economic 
returns but stated that they are still committed to its other rewards. One example is 
Abou Dem, mentioned above, experiencing financial difficulties but nonetheless 
continuing his work as a dabotooɗo despite the tensions it created with his extended 
family. Abou Dem still lives in his father’s crowded compound with his unmarried 
younger siblings, three married brothers, their wives and children. When I first met 
them, his wife Rabia proudly showed me their bedroom, with an attractive wardrobe 
and double-bed, explaining that although they were not rich, Abou bought them with his 
income from dabaade. However, on subsequent occasions I witnessed clear tensions 
with Rabia complaining to her husband about money. Her sister-in-law Ramatoulaye 
told me privately she thought Abou should get ‘a proper job’. His brother Moussa Dem 
also expressed his concern that as the sole migrant he was under huge pressure to 
provide for everyone else. These tensions were manifest between Abou Dem and Rabia 
in the choice of education for their children. Abou explained to me how important it is 
to know God, and was going to send his eldest son Bilal, aged five, to the daara. When 
I asked Rabia about it separately she sighed and said: “Bilal doesn’t go to school. He 
just does the Qur’an. Because his father doesn’t accept that he goes to school. But my 
second son will do both, inshallah.” 
 
Another example of reconciling the tensions between intrinsic and material benefits of 
daara education, and persisting with the daara, is captured in the reflections of 25-year-
old tooroɗo daara student, Malik Ba. His father, Younouss Ba, had six wives and over 
twenty children. He is wealthy in the sense of owning several properties, but 
nonetheless has little disposable income to spend on his large family. Malik is the eldest 
son of his father’s second wife. He studied in boarding daaras in Dakar for eight years 
before moving home to the Futa Tooro when his father could no longer afford the fees. 
When I met Malik he was studying sharia in an advanced daara some hours’ travel 
143 
 
from Medina Diallobé. He is a sensitive young man, and was frequently preoccupied by 
the competing social demands of pressures to support his family economically given 
that he lacked the funds to migrate, and his somewhat domineering father’s expectations 
that he complete his Islamic studies: 
 
Me: You won’t emigrate then?  
Malik: Not any time soon.  
Me: What will you do for work?  
Malik: I don’t know. Once your studies are finished, you’re like a newborn. And 
they say ‘find work’, and that’s your baptism.  
Me: Why not study French? 
Malik: It’s too late, I’m too old, and have no time.  
Me: How long do you still have to go?  
Malik: Maybe two years or so before finishing… I could start French, but I think 
it’s best to continue on the path I’m on, if I started French then it would mean 
abandoning what I’ve worked for so far. I love these studies in my heart and 
spirit, if it weren’t for that I would leave it tomorrow. If I could, I would teach 
what I know, about the sharia, like my marabout. But I need to earn money. I 
learn the sharia for myself alone, and each day I want to quit and work, I want 
to give up my studies, but I haven’t got very far in sharia. But it can on forever, 
there’s no end. And it doesn’t lead to anything specific. It’s hard to find work 
here. You need to have a father with connections or whatever, it’s hard. I want to 
earn money for my mother, she’s old and has nothing. My father can’t provide 
everything, it’s been a long time since he retired. I’m her eldest son, I should be 
working. For men, working is an obligation in the religion. My mother’s co-wife 
has older sons who are abroad who send her money, but they don’t give money 
to my mother, or only occasionally, and it’s not enough. And it makes me feel 
bad. But if I suggest quitting, my father will just yell and say ‘ka kaangaaɗo’, 
[you’re crazy], I’ve educated you since you were a child, for you to just quit’ 
etc.  
Me: But doesn’t he want you to work?  
Malik: Mmmm… he values studying… 
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Malik also considers the viability of working in the prayer economy to be declining, 
because of increased costs of living: “These days everyone does dabaade, but it’s not 
feasible, not everyone can make a living off that, and you don’t get much.” These 
difficulties notwithstanding, Malik hoped that his infant half-brother would grow up to 
memorise the Qur’an as he had, as God might make his circumstances easier. 
 
By contrast, I encountered several examples of intergenerational tensions leading to a 
shift away from daara education among younger people. One case was Kasim Sy, a 28-
year-old tooroɗo who had chosen to abandon both state school and the daara. He 
emphasised that there is significant status associated with daara education and proudly 
introduced me to his cousin who had recently completed memorisation of the Qur’an, 
patting him on the back and treating him with affectionate deference. However, he 
explained why he himself quit Qur’anic education, and would prefer the state school for 
his sons:  
 
You gain respect, but aside from that… Feeding your family is more important! 
You can’t work with the Qur’an. Absolutely nothing. You have to start again 
once you’ve finished. Before, your parents would take care of you, and you 
would work the fields. People were under their parents’ care for a long time, it 
was the collective life. The world has changed, things cost a lot more, and we 
are forced to change with it. But people cling to their traditions, it’s so 
embedded. It’s hard to suggest anything different. 
 
In addition, difficulties that recent migrants to Europe and the US are facing are leading 
them to revaluate the role of daara education. “The interest in religious education is 
declining a bit,” according to 30-year-old Ali Ka, one of the rare male tooroɗo 
university graduates from Medina Diallobé, who works in Senegal as an engineer. 
“Before, you could trade or be a migrant without having been to school”, he added, 
“Now because of the economic crisis in Europe, people see the need for schooling and 
administrative-type jobs more within Senegal”. The latest generation of men who 
migrated from Medina Diallobé in the early 2000s are also challenging the idea that 
daara education is enough for a migrant in Europe or the US to get by with. Moussa 
Dem explained how it had changed school attendance patterns in his family: 
 
145 
 
Lots of migrants are now demanding that their younger siblings and cousins go 
to school, as a condition for sending money. My cousin in the USA does this. 
They went to the daara and have gone to the USA in 2000-2001 with 
[Mauritanian] refugee visas or commerce visas. They weren’t schooled, and 
realise they have to do manual labour while those with schooling who can read 
can be a team supervisor and sit at a desk all day. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter explored the rationales among people in Medina Diallobé who invest in 
long-term daara education. By revealing the complexity of intersecting factors which 
shape individuals’ decisions, these insights challenge several assumptions described in 
Chapter One. The value residents attribute to accumulation of baraka contrasts with 
understandings of educational value among international development professionals and 
the Western-educated Senegalese state elite. The importance people place on education 
for the afterlife, especially the role of baraka in this process, has been neglected in state 
education provision reflecting a lack of curricular justice. Rooted in an epistemology 
which recognises the intrinsic sacred value of the Qur’anic text and possible 
transmission of blessing between people, the idea of baraka is poorly understood – or 
dismissed as superstition - by people unfamiliar with this worldview. However, 
understanding the importance people accord to acquisition of baraka through the routes 
of Qur’anic memorisation, moral behaviour and transmission of blessing from the 
cleric, is essential to comprehending the continued popularity of daara education.  
 
Among Medina Diallobé residents, intrinsic value of daara education is also bolstered 
by perceptions of its economic value. This challenges the assumption mentioned in 
Chapter One of a dichotomy between state schools which people choose for economic 
value, and religious schools which people choose for ‘irrational’ non-economic intrinsic 
value or material deprivation. Perceptions of the economic value of Qur’anic schools 
have to be situated in the social context of the Futa Tooro, where tooroɓe with this 
education have historically been able to make a living from agriculture, trade, internal 
and international migration, and religious professions among seeremɓe lineages, 
supplemented with addiya in the case of sharif. People’s decisions are further linked to 
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immediate specificities of Medina Diallobé, namely the village’s reputation for Islamic 
scholarship and a thriving market. The stereotype that only poor parents send their sons 
to daaras does not apply to Medina Diallobé as both affluent and less well-off tooroɓe 
still send their sons, although those from families privileged with inherited wealth, 
baraka, and membership in networks facilitating trade or migration, are more likely to 
make significant economic returns.  
 
Qur’anic memorisation is also accompanied by material value in the form of status, 
mainly conferred on male tooroɓe given the exclusive twinning of religious authority 
with gender and social category. This ideology is deliberately perpetuated by tooroɗo 
clerics through exclusion of non-tooroɗo men from daaras, who despite studying 
elsewhere have failed to shake the tooroɗo monopoly over religious education and 
positions in Medina Diallobé. It is also maintained through celebration of feminine 
tooroɗo identity based on informal teaching and learning which, although valued, 
confers less social authority than formal Islamic education. These examples pose a 
challenge to formal/informal or public/private sphere distinctions commonplace in 
educational literature, as tooroɗo men and women’s religious teaching and learning 
practices are co-dependent and mutually constitutive of their social category identity.  
 
These observations also enable us to challenge several simplistic assumptions about 
decision-making described in Chapter One. The first is that Muslim parents are more 
likely to send their daughters than sons to Islamic schools as economic incentives drive 
school choice for sons, while social or religious values drive school choice for 
daughters. Findings from Medina Diallobé show that values drive parents’ school 
choices for both sons and daughters. The second assumption is the notion that Islamic 
schools are disempowering to women for inculcating norms in contradiction to Western 
standards of gender equality. This is countered by the fact that in this context exclusion 
of women from Islamic education, rather than state school, can be considered a 
challenge to gender equality, as women are barred from the knowledge which confers 
the most status and influence.  
 
The maintenance of an ‘Islamic’ identity among the tooroɓe is linked to the fact that 
religious authority, with political and economic power, underpins their privileged social 
status. Hence, the intrinsic value of Qur’anic school has been reinforced through its 
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conferring status and economic benefits. Commitment to the daara therefore produces 
certain social relationships, but it also contingent upon them. Nonetheless, this balance 
is being altered under shifting economic conditions, as Medina Diallobé inhabitants 
increasingly feel that a full-time live-in daara education no longer confers sufficient 
economic benefit. Some tooroɓe forfeit on economic returns and continue to invest in 
their own, or their sons’, daara education for personal religious fulfilment and status. 
Alternatively, in other families, people are more likely to send the current generation of 
young boys to primary school rather than the daara. This shift provides the opening for 
the focus of the next two chapters: the experience of attending secondary state schools 
in the village. Other alternatives to full-time daara education are to attend private 
Islamic schools or to study other subjects alongside the daara, considered in Chapter 
Seven. 
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Chapter 5. Attending state school (I): Dropping out of secondary school  
5.1 Introduction  
 
Despite the popularity of live-in Qur’anic education for boys of seeremɓe tooroɗo 
parents, the majority of Medina Diallobé children, whether male or female, tooroɗo, or 
other social categories, attend state schools. The primary school has long been present 
in the village and its popularity among families other than the clerical tooroɓe is 
ubiquitous. However, the collège and lycée are more recent establishments and people’s 
evaluations of, and engagement with them are more varied and contested. This chapter 
concerns the trajectories of pupils who never attend post-primary education or who 
drop-out during the lower secondary. Section 5.2 illuminates how post-primary schools 
are not only recent, but attending them is difficult and disrupted for several reasons. 
Section 5.3 analyses the cases of boys who drop out after primary or during collège. For 
tooroɗo boys with family links to trade and migration networks, the promises of long-
term economic gains from the school compete unfavourably with masculine ideals of 
being a breadwinner through professions which can be pursued immediately and do not 
require diplomas. Boys without these networks, who would like to attend school, drop 
out due to constraints.  
 
Section 5.4 moves to consider the experiences of female pupils who drop out because 
they get married. Contrary to many development policies which focus on parents as the 
key actors in defining girls’ educational trajectories, teenage girls’ stories show that not 
only is their own agency significant, but also the views of their parents and extended 
family. This section considers the wider social networks in which girls are embedded, 
including how girls’ and their parents’ views compete with those of husbands and in-
laws. Shifting demand among men inside and outside the village for schooled wives 
also has important implications for girls’ educational trajectories. Chapter Six 
complements these stories by addressing those pupils who do invest in achieving the 
BFEM or baccalaureate diplomas.  
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5.2 Secondary schools in Medina Diallobé: Recent and disrupted  
 
In the 1950s, few boys from Medina Diallobé attended primary school as inhabitants 
feared that it was ‘the school of the devil’. Although the colonial authorities demanded 
that the sons of chiefs attend, people recounted stories common throughout the Futa 
Tooro that chiefs sent one of their slaves or bribed local officials to exempt their 
children. Today, however, most children attend primary school except boys from 
seeremɓe tooroɗo families who prefer the daara, reflected in enrolment disparities 
between the two village primary schools. In Medina Diallobé I, there are twice as many 
girls as boys. This the director attributed to the clerical tooroɗo families, the Sy clerics 
and the imam, living to the north of the village, who send their sons to daaras. In 
contrast, in Medina Diallobé II there are almost equal numbers of girls and boys. The 
director argued that his school is to the south of Medina Diallobé, catering to non-
clerical tooroɗo families and other categories, so clerical families’ decisions do not 
affect the gender enrolment ratio. Hence, the status associated with ‘being schooled’ to 
primary level has become the norm – or “institutionalised” (Gérard 2001, p.64) - for a 
large proportion of Medina Diallobé’s population. Indeed, when I asked parents why 
they sent their children many shrugged to imply it was an obvious choice. Of her 16-
year-old daughter Houley’s schooling, 35-year-old Diara replied vaguely, saying “Le 
monde l’oblige, the world requires it.” Pupils seemingly feel the same, as Ismaila 
Gueye, 28-year-old lycée teacher, stated “Primary school is in fashion, if you don’t go, 
you’re marginalised a bit. That’s why people like to go to school now.”  
 
Despite the primary school being present in the village for sixty years, and attendance 
the norm for most children, post-primary state school provision is much more recent. As 
collèges and lycées were several hundred kilometres from the village until the 2000s, 
only three men from Medina Diallobé born in the 1960s, now in their fifties, had 
completed high school and university. Their cases are particular: they are all tooroɓe, of 
political lineages like village chief, whose fathers held colonial administrative posts 
including canton chief. Two grew up in towns where post-primary state school was 
more accessible and valued. More commonly, tooroɗo men from Medina Diallobé born 
in the 1960s studied at daaras, while other categories did not attend formal schooling 
whether state or Qur’anic. Hence, most parents of children and even adolescents in 
Medina Diallobé today did not attend state school.  
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From the late 1980s, demand among parents in Medina Diallobé for post-primary 
schooling grew. This was due, informants told me, to the influence of migrants arguing 
in its favour. Tooroɓe of the political families including of the village chieftaincy, 
seɓɓe, and some wayluɓe families, sent their children, including girls. It was still rare 
for gallunkooɓe to attend school. Even in the 1990s, attending collège required that a 
pupil travel to another town for the duration of their studies. This entailed either having 
relations there or finding a host family. Many people born in the 1980s, in their late 
twenties, described the difficulties of living with host families, and how they therefore 
abandoned secondary school. Girls in particular found it hard.27 It is rare that the older 
siblings of the current generation of children and adolescents in Medina Diallobé have 
completed collège or lycée. The opening of the collège in Medina Diallobé in 2001 and 
the lycée in 2011 therefore served to meet growing demand for post-primary schools 
among parents and young people.  
 
In general, demand for secondary education among Medina Diallobé inhabitants is 
linked to three forms of value. The discussion below, captured during a class debate 
between collège pupils in response to the question “What is the value of school?” 
reflects these different elements: 
 
Moussa: We need to be educated to prepare our future, it’s very important for 
everyone. Every human needs to go to school to improve himself, to speak 
another language fluently. 
Bineta: Education is the most important thing in the world. If you’re a person, 
you need to do things for your society. Everywhere you go, you will need your 
education.  
Kasim: Education is the key for good development in the country. If you aren’t 
educated, you won’t know anything about what’s happening in the world. 
Fatou: You won’t understand what’s on TV, on the news, if you don’t go to 
school. 
                                                 
27
 Schmitz (2009, p.103) notes a similar situation in the village of Mboumba. Until the construction of a 
school covering the full course of primary in the 1950s, pupils had to find a host family in order to attend 
school elsewhere. Gallunkooɓe and other poorer inhabitants of the village could not afford this expense. 
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Souleye: If you’re educated you will live peacefully. If you’re not educated, 
people will think you’re impolite, they will call you an imbecile. If you’re 
educated you can do what you want.  
Moussa: You can’t talk of development without education. Developing countries 
have more illiterate people. In Senegal and other African countries, there are lots 
of children begging in the streets, they have problems with their parents, forced 
marriages before 18 years old. I advise all parents and children to go to school. 
Abdou: The hospital and the school, you can’t get a job in those places without 
education. 
 
This discussion shows three forms of value attributed to the state secondary school – 
which mirror those considered for the daara. The first is intrinsic value of knowledge 
including general awareness of the world and foreign languages. The second form of 
value is material benefit in terms of individual self-improvement or status in contrast to 
‘uneducated’ people framed as ‘impolite’ or ‘imbeciles’. The third form of value is 
economic utility. Knowledge of French is considered the most important skill for 
finding work, although, officially, obtaining a job in the formal sector is contingent on 
obtaining the baccalaureate diploma. As Boubacar, an 18-year-old tooroɗo in 4ème 
collège said: “In Senegal you need a diploma to do anything, i.e. you need the bac or no 
firm will employ you.” 
 
However, despite increased access to post-primary schooling and multiple forms of 
value attributed to it, the experience of attendance is difficult. In Medina Diallobé, 
people frequently complained about the effects of policies implemented under pressure 
from development donors to increase enrolment. Pupils stated that the Zero Repetition 
policy in primary (Politique de Zéro Redoublement (PZR)) (Diouf 2010; Dieye 2012) 
and abolition of the collège entry exam (Coulibaly 2010) enabled pupils with low 
academic levels to move on a grade, which lowered the learning standard for all. Pupils 
and directors complained that the state’s recruitment of vacataire teachers lowered 
quality of teaching, and led to uncommitted teachers. Teachers complained of low and 
unpaid salaries.  
 
In addition, although the lycée was opened in Medina Diallobé in 2011 and teachers 
deployed, a physical lycée building did not yet exist and its pupils were taught in the 
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collège infrastructure. Classrooms were therefore overcrowded with a shortage of table-
bancs, with pupils improvising seating with plastic water containers. Neither collège nor 
lycée pupils were taught the full official syllabi, as the director reduced teaching in both 
schools under his management to accommodate lycée teaching into the collège building. 
He acknowledged that this was not an ideal situation but could see no alternative. All 
actors involved with the school therefore felt that the national push to open collèges and 
lycées had not been accompanied by adequate infrastructure or support of teachers. 
There was also confusion over who was accountable, as everyone accused everyone 
else. Fingers were pointed at pupils, directors, teachers, the commune, the mayor, the 
IDE in Podor, the IA in St Louis, the Minister for Education, the UGOMD village 
development association, and the parents’ association, for the various problems. 
 
Due to these grievances, strikes erupted at local and national levels, and throughout 
Senegal the academic year 2011/2012 was severely interrupted. In December 2011, a 
group of Medina Diallobé’s lycée pupils striked in response to the lack of table-bancs 
and school building. Local tensions collided with political unrest at national level in the 
run-up to the controversial presidential elections of March 2012. The unpopular 
president Abdoulaye Wade running for an illegal third mandate pushed people 
throughout Senegal to protest throughout 2011 and early 2012. From October 2011, a 
common discussion among families in Medina Diallobé was the worrying possibility of 
‘année blanche’ when, following significant disruptions, the state declares the academic 
year nul and no one moves up a grade. Although lessons in Medina Diallobé resumed in 
January after the lycée pupils’ strike ended, by mid-February 2012 another strike was 
announced, by collège and lycée teachers. A pupil had assaulted a teacher. Teachers 
demanded that the boy be expelled, but no punishment was delivered. The strike 
continued, but under the umbrella of the national teachers’ union campaign as salaries 
had not been paid. Teachers in Medina Diallobé continued to give some classes, during 
one or two hours each morning. Eight teachers out of twenty-six were vacataires who 
taught as, paid hourly, they would not benefit from the strike. The school limped along 
at reduced pace until the Easter holidays in late March, finally resuming normal practice 
in mid-April after four months’ disruption. Anneé blanche was never declared, but an 
unusually large proportion of pupils from Medina Diallobé failed the academic year.  
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The disruption of state schools stood in contrast to the steady pace of the daaras, whose 
almudɓe continued to learn peacefully throughout the year. This comparison was made 
explicit by one sanda on the occasion of a pupil protest in February 2012 against the 
teacher strike. One morning my host family and I were roused by the sound of chanting 
and tam-tams banging. A large crowd of collège and lycée pupils was marching through 
the main streets of the village, after forcing teaching to stop in both primary schools, 
and finally blocking the main road of traffic for over an hour. Members of my host 
family discussed the commotion, and one resident sanda known for being a bit of a 
joker told me the almudɓe were having a strike tomorrow. Everyone present erupted in 
giggles, as such an idea was clearly unthinkable. 
 
5.3 Leaving school to work: Boys who drop out of collège  
 
Although the collège and lycée are available in the village, the following tables 
demonstrate that not everyone attends. With respect to boys, numbers of pupils enrolled 
in Medina Diallobé in 2010/2011 show two trends. Firstly, there is under-enrolment of 
boys who ever enrol in collège, the evidence being that there are half as many boys 
enrolled as girls in the first year (6ème). The second trend is a slow but steady male 
drop-out throughout secondary school course.  
 
Table 5.1 Enrolment statistics by sex and grade for Medina Diallobé collège, academic 
year 2010/2011. 
 
 
Girls 
Boys 
Total 
6ème 5ème 4ème 3ème 
102 
64 
166 
74 
60 
134 
74 
52 
126 
46 
51 
97 
 
Table 5.2 Enrolment statistics by sex and grade for Medina Diallobé lycée, academic 
year 2010/2011. 
 
 2ème 1er 
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Girls 
Boys 
Total 
71 
65 
136 
32 
22 
54 
 
Despite the discourses circulating among parents and pupils of economic utility of post-
primary school, many boys’ narratives suggest that the promise of obtaining work 
immediately is more attractive. This is linked to pressure on men to be breadwinners. 
Their masculinity and desirability as husbands rests on their ability to provide. As one 
Pulaar proverb states, “Gorko soofataa, wasat” - a man is only ugly when poor. The fact 
that men can no longer rely on inheriting and working their family land to sustain a 
household means they must work for cash over several years. They often have to wait 
until their thirties or even forties to afford to marry for the first time. Finding work is 
therefore a constant consideration for young men. Kalidou Ndiaye, a bright and studious 
24-year-old ceɗɗo in terminal year of lycée, explained how seeking work conflicted 
with long-term study. His discourse is similar to that of sharia student, Malik Ba, 
quoted in the previous chapter: 
 
Sometimes I don’t know why I study, like where is it all leading? Life is so 
short. We are constantly thinking of our family, our parents. All they have 
suffered to help us, and I want to help them in turn, to ensure the dignity of the 
family. Those concerns weigh on you so heavily sometimes that it’s hard to 
concentrate on your studies. 
 
Given the demands on boys to earn money, they often work in the weekly market or 
luumo while attending school. Koïta, the director of Medina Diallobé II, said he sees 
many of his pupils, both girls and boys, working there on Fridays. This trend is often 
followed by boys especially leaving school after primary, or during collège, to work 
full-time. One 26-year-old tooroɗo man, Lamine, told me he quit school to work: “I did 
CM2, but as soon as I could earn money I left my studies. I work in the luumo, I buy 
and then sell on, and make a decent profit.” Diallo, director of Medina Diallobé I, 
argued that “the luumo is big cause of boy’s drop-out because they like to make money 
fast”. He added: 
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We teachers have been talking about SCOFI28 which encourages girls to come to 
school, but now we all say we need to encourage boys! Here, girls outnumber 
boys, double! Even triple! We teachers talk about it, but the state doesn’t yet. 
There are no NGOs on it, I don’t think. 
 
Dropping out to work in petty trade is linked to later careers in trade in Dakar or further 
afield, a profession especially popular among tooroɓe men given the celebration of 
commerce in Islam, and its customary association with their category. Trade can then be 
a stepping stone to migrating. “School doesn’t lead quickly to a job. So boys want to 
earn money fast, and go to Dakar. At the first occasion, they try and earn money,” 
explained Thioye, director of the collège. “Petty trade, lots of big traders start like that, 
and get enough money to go to Europe.” Several informants linked this low evaluation 
of school utility among some tooroɗo parents and adolescent boys to the fact that few 
men from Medina Diallobé have succeeded through this route to act as role models. 
Samba Ka stated: 
 
What I have understood is that here in Medina Diallobé there are men in the 
older generation who never went to school but are very aware, they worked in 
hotels and as chauffeurs, and they got to know white people’s ways. So they 
have a distinguished air, a noble air, because they had that training. So people 
until recently hadn’t yet seen a model of someone who had gone through school 
and succeeded. 
 
Oumoul, a 32-year-old tooroɗo woman who had married in Medina Diallobé but came 
from the nearby village of Wuro Mawdo, corroborated this trend:  
 
There are lots of intellectuals from my village [Wuro Mawdo], dating from 
colonial times, not like here [Medina Diallobé] where it’s recent, only among 
men in their fifties, like the mayor Ibrahima Sy. In my village, people have also 
decided that once they retire they will come back to their village to contribute to 
                                                 
28
 Scolarisation des Filles (SCOFI) is a project launched in the 1990s as part of the PDEF to address low 
female primary school enrolment. It has been credited with increasing enrolment of girls in the first year 
of primary, CI, from 38% in 1992 to 77% in 2000 (MEN 2001, p.15). 
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its development, this isn’t so much the case here in Medina Diallobé. If people 
succeed in Dakar, they build a house there and stay there. 
 
Most jobs young people in Medina Diallobé associate with school diplomas are low-
paid positions, not perceived by tooroɗo boys in particular as worth the investment. 
“Here there aren’t good role models for the pupils, so they don’t value schooling 
much,” said Thioye the collège director. “They see schooling, and they see what it leads 
to, they only see teachers, poorly paid civil servants, that doesn’t interest them.” In 
contrast to these jobs which are low in status and income, the attraction of migrating is 
much stronger, especially among tooroɓe who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
have the capital and networks to consider this route. “The youth see rich migrants who 
have gone abroad and build houses here and marry young girls, and that’s what they 
want,” Thioye argued. “I know three big houses in this neighbourhood being built by 
the most recent wave of migrants who went to the US. Those are the role models people 
see here.” While the previous chapter showed how the most recent wave of migrants is 
advising their families to send children to school rather than the daara, the role model 
of the unschooled migrant still influences the current generation of adolescent boys’ 
evaluations of secondary school, as Khadim Diop, surveillant at the collège stated: 
 
With migration, men have gone to Europe or central Africa, they send money 
home, build a house, their families are comfortable. People see that, and say 
‘Well, we can succeed without school’ - the myth of the school is finished. 
People have demystified it. Everyone knows you can succeed without going to 
French school. That’s why certain boys, with the basics of primary school, can 
make their way through trade. These days, only money counts. And that you can 
have without going to school. 
 
Migration and trade for tooroɗo boys can therefore be considered forms of “fallback 
employment” (Froerer 2011, p.704; Jeffrey et al. 2008, p.11), namely viable livelihoods 
young people know they can rely on which leads to lower investment in secondary 
schooling. 
 
In contrast, men who have ‘stayed behind’ often defend their positions by putting 
forward negative discourses about migration. Thioye captures several prevalent 
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arguments, namely poor conditions, precarious legal status, and lack of family or 
marital life: 
 
The youth don’t realise the bubble is bursting, it’s getting harder to go abroad. 
And what kind of life is it anyway?! You live in appalling conditions, often 
working picking fruit etc., treated like slaves. You save a bit. You can’t go home 
for years because you have no papers so once you come home you can’t go back 
again. Their wife sees no man for years, the man doesn’t have wife abroad. Or 
sometimes the man has a wife abroad, or a partner who hosts them, but they are 
a kind of sexual slave to them. That’s the reality, but the model of one migrant 
succeeding is enough to convince people. 
 
Similar discourses are repeated by young men who are studying, and have a low 
likelihood of migrating, like Kalidou Ndiaye:  
 
It’s hard here, girls prefer to marry a migrant who has a nice house, rather than 
someone here like the director of a school, because he can’t afford a huge house 
like that, or a car. So you get to thinking, what’s the point of it all… Some girls 
only want money, though others say they want to marry a man who is here, they 
don’t want someone abroad for twenty years. Some stay four years, others ten, 
twenty, some even die there. And they leave their wife here, that’s not normal, 
she will become a prostitute. She has [sexual] needs, both men and women do, 
it’s natural, and she will go elsewhere if you’re not here to satisfy them. 
 
However, the discourse celebrating international migration is even influencing the 
aspirations of boys who attend school, as Thioye explained: “School is seen as a 
trampoline to getting visas to be able to leave.”  
 
Some parents share their sons’ evaluations, and do not mind if their son quits secondary 
school: “If a son says he wants to leave school and go to Dakar and work, parents will 
rarely refuse,” said Thioye. However, in other cases parents value collège education but 
it is their sons who resist. This seems to be particularly the case among young tooroɗo 
men of the Ndaw village chieftaincy lineage, and others living in proximity to their 
neighbourhood. According to 40-year-old Habib Ndaw, from this family:  
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There is a tradition of education in this house, my father was one of the first to 
be schooled, but in the last few years the boys have been dropping out. My 
nephews don’t go to school, they all dropped out. After CM2, or in 6ème or 
5ème. When they drop-out, they have huge arguments with their parents, who do 
their best to take them to learn a trade so that they won’t become vulnerable to 
social temptations. 
 
The anti-school peer culture of young men who have dropped out exerts a strong 
influence on others who might wish to stay in school, as described by 24-year-old 
terminal lycée pupil Kalidou Ndiaye: 
 
The problem here is that people don’t have ambition, and they try to drag those 
who have ambition down. They say ‘Who do you think you are? You’re acting 
white.’ They call you names, and it hurts. But I’m dedicated to studying. 
 
For other young men, dropping out to work is less the pursuit of an alternative high 
status youth peer-group identity or to obtain a high-income profession, but due to 
constraints of direct or opportunity costs. This is exacerbated by high levels of grade 
repetition which means pupils can be well into their twenties before they finish lycée. 
For some boys, dropping out to work is directly tied to trouble affording enrolment fees 
and school materials. In 2011/2012, the annual registration fee for both collège and 
lycée in Medina Diallobé was 6000CFA (£7), equivalent to a bus journey to Dakar. 
Costs rise when factoring in materials such as stationery. Lewandowski (2011, p.47) 
estimates annual costs to be 12,000CFA (£14); one surveillant at the collège in Medina 
Diallobé suggested as much as 25,000-30,000CFA (£35), the same as a sack of rice to 
last a household one month. These costs do not include other expenses like having 
presentable clothes. For Chérif Konté, a 26-year-old ceɗɗo, the costs of schooling had 
forced him to drop out after 5ème collège at age 19: 
 
My father lives in Sierra Leone, but never sends money. My grandmother paid 
for my school fees, I started quite late at age 9 or 10, and I completed three 
years. But then she couldn’t afford it and I had no clothes to wear. I doubled 
CM1 and CM2. Then it was my teachers who forced me to study. To earn some 
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money, I did little jobs in the market on Fridays. I would go to the well and 
bring water to the market and sell cups for 10f, that’s how I satisfied my little 
needs. Then I went into collège here. I missed the first three months, I couldn’t 
pay the enrolment at 4000CFA [£5], and then you need eight or nine exercise 
books. After three months the director called me, the teachers had heard of my 
problems, they raised the money so I would go back. I had to repeat, so I did 
6ème again. My neighbours sometimes lent me clothes. So I did 5ème. That’s 
when I left, I made the decision then to not go to school anymore. Once I left 
school I became a welder. 
 
I was unable to investigate systematically the extent to which financial constraints 
coincide with social category. As mentioned in Chapter Three, it is illegal for schools to 
collect data on the social category of pupils or teachers. However, I observed incidents 
which demonstrate that social category intersects with socioeconomic status and work 
burdens, and impinges on pupils’ ability to stay in school. This information is of 
significant importance to international development actors, yet although the preference 
among clerical families for Islamic schools over secular state schools is well-
documented in Senegal, there is no comprehensive analysis of the impact of social 
category identity constructions on inequalities in state school attendance and 
achievement.  
 
One clear example is the case of 22-year-old Barro Cissé. Barro’s mother, Penda, is 
gallunkooɗo, and as a child her parents confided her care to tooroɗo Aïcha Tall in return 
for her domestic work. Although formalised slavery no longer exists in Senegal, 
clientelist relationships between freeborn and gallunkooɗo families persist for reasons 
of interpersonal relationships and economic inequality. Penda married in Dakar, but 
retains strong ties of loyalty and affection to Aïcha’s family because she grew up with 
them. Penda has several children including Barro, who explained to me that his father 
saw little value in school and wished instead for his sons to become apprentices in 
manual professions at the age of fifteen. Barro told me that he wanted to study as all his 
friends went to school, but his father was opposed, and his home was too crowded to 
concentrate well. However, Barro knew that the Tall family, his mother’s patrons, 
valued schooling. In 2000 when aged 11, Barro asked Aïcha Tall whether he could live 
with her in Medina Diallobé and attend school there. Aïcha and her husband agreed to 
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host Barro and pay his school fees in return for his labour, and he has lived in the 
village with them since then.  
 
Barro was in 2ème, the first year of lycée, during my fieldwork. In return for board, 
lodging and school fees, Barro does all the masculine household work like slaughtering 
and butchering animals, taking the family’s cow to pasture and minding the sheep. He 
told me he had not had a holiday in two years. When I saw him he was always working, 
while the tooroɗo sons of Aïcha Tall did no work, although some did study. “It’s tough, 
going to school and doing all the chores. My friends complain that they never see me, 
but I can’t leave the house even for two hours without someone needing me,” Barro 
said. “I’ve asked the other boys to help more, but they just sit there. But you have to 
work yourself, not sit around watching others work.” During the exam period in April, 
Barro was exhausted trying to revise alongside fulfilling his domestic workload, 
sleeping at 1am and waking at 6am. Other members of Aïcha’s extended family even 
perceived this situation as unfair. They commented to me that Barro was a well-behaved 
and hard-working young man, and that Aïcha’s own sons should work more, even 
accusing her behind her back of spoiling them. 
 
This example contributes to debates surrounding the possibilities client families have to 
achieve social mobility through education. Schmitz (2009) documents the case of the 
village of Mboumba in the Futa Tooro, where clientelist relationships between the 
dominant tooroɗo families and their gallunkooɓe in the 1950s enabled the latter to 
attend school and become teachers themselves. However, my findings from Medina 
Diallobé more closely resemble those of Morgan et al. (2010) who investigate whether 
the capital and information that parents in northern Nigeria obtained though clientelistic 
relationships with patron-employers made their children more likely to succeed in 
school. They concluded that no, rather client families gain little long-term as patron-
client relationships exist ultimately to serve the interests of patron families and to 
suppress possibilities of social mobility. Clients’ children were kept out of school if it 
was in the patron’s interest. The case of Barro Cissé shows a similar dynamic. Barro 
willingly fulfils the duties he feels he owes to his tooroɗo host family in return for their 
support. In the short-term it has enabled him to study, which he would not have been 
able to do otherwise. But, in the long-run it threatens his academic success. His case 
clearly shows the ways in which social category relationships underpin clientelism in 
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the Haalpulaar context, and the effects it can exert on school trajectories. These 
processes are more complex than individual families being better or worse off than 
others. They reinforce the need for contextualised analyses of social relations in 
understanding socioeconomic status and its links to inequalities in school outcomes.  
 
When abandoning school, young men adjust their evaluations depending on their 
shifting circumstances, which is reflected in Barro Cissé’s account. I interviewed him in 
October 2011 at the start of the academic year, when he voiced a fairly typical pro-
school, anti-migration discourse, arguing that diplomas represent a better economic 
investment, and more morally righteous path enabling him to contribute to Senegal’s 
development: 
 
If I get my bac, I’d like to train, either in medicine or in the police. Those are the 
two things I can think of. I thought of medicine because you can help people, 
and there aren’t many good doctors here. I’d like to study abroad, but then come 
back to help my village. […] In 2009 I thought of quitting school. To go 
elsewhere to find work. Half of my friends quit at the end of primary to look for 
work. But I said to myself, leaving school to go elsewhere isn’t easy. And if you 
have no occupation, and you migrate, you still won’t find any work there. I 
thought, you can start your activities in the holidays and if it works, you quit 
school, if not, you stay on. Plus, migrating requires money. If you don’t have 
money, you can’t migrate. So I prefer to continue with my studies to succeed 
and have something. I don’t think of migrating. People say there’s no work in 
Senegal, but it’s just that it’s work people don’t want to do. You can’t be in a 
country where there’s work to be done, and talk about migrating. And there are 
many people who have left for twenty years and never returned. I reckon one 
reason is that they didn’t find work, they failed, and can’t afford to come back. 
 
However, by April 2012, after months of strikes, and his heavy domestic workload 
interfering with his revision schedule, Barro was less optimistic about school. He told 
me he was considering dropping out to migrate instead: 
 
Année blanche has been declared in Louga and Ziguinchor, so it will happen in 
the rest of the country too, probably. And the universities are full of people who 
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aren’t well taken care of, they’re not moving on a year either. Loads of people 
have the bac in Senegal, it doesn’t mean anything anymore. I’ve been thinking 
of going to Congo, there are people I know there. I would just need money for 
the visa. I’ll finish this year though, and see how it goes. 
 
I quizzed him, reminding him how he had said that dropping out of school and 
emigrating were bad ideas. “That was then,” he replied glumly, “but this is now, with all 
the political problems and so on.” Six months after I left Medina Diallobé in 2012, 
Barro told me had dropped out because he was “disillusioned”. Three years on, in 2015, 
he is still trying to raise money to pay for a Congolese visa. 
 
5.4 The competing ideals of marriage and schooling: Girls who drop out of collège  
5.41 Girls’ and their parents’ preferences  
 
To complement the data on why boys drop out of collège and lycée, the following 
section considers girls’ experiences. The majority of unmarried adolescent girls in 
Medina Diallobé – and even some married ones - attend secondary schools. The 
exceptions are the daughters of Ceerno Alfa Sy, a cleric who still considers state school 
inappropriate for girls for spreading immoral behaviour, and isolated cases of very poor 
families, girls who find school especially challenging, or those with disabilities. 
However, female dropout throughout the secondary school course is steep, and more 
acute than of boys. As seen in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in section 5.3, despite girls 
outnumbering boys three to one in the first year of collège, by the terminal year of lycée, 
numbers of girls and boys are roughly equal. Less than half of girls enrolled at the start 
of collège remain by the end of lycée. In contrast to other areas of Senegal (Seck 2011), 
few girls drop out due to extra-marital pregnancy; only four such cases were identified 
in the collège in 2010/2011 out of three hundred female pupils. Teachers state that girls 
start to drop out from age fifteen mainly in order to marry – although marriage can be 
used to mask the shame of financial constraints and difficulties experienced in school. 
The following two sections consider the complex negotiations surrounding girls’ 
marriage and drop-out. 
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The recent institution of secondary state school plays a powerful role in shaping young 
women’s aspirations, and community attitudes towards girls’ schooling. The school 
personnel are the main actors advocating in favour of girls’ secondary education, and 
argue that it is useful for women to have income-generating options to then delay 
marriage or be less dependent on their husbands. 18-year-old tooroɗo Hadja told me the 
director put up a sign in school saying “Diplomas are a husband who will never leave 
you.” All teachers I spoke to considered that every case in which a girl drops out of 
school to marry is categorically negative, but although they counselled girls if they 
came to them for help they did not intervene in family affairs. Throughout the year, 
pupils’ groups also organised extra-curricular activities promoting girls’ attendance at 
school. In 2011, lycée pupils organised a Fosco or ‘Foyer Socio-Culturel’ lasting two 
days, including a speech by the collège director on the causes of girls’ drop-out, and 
theatre sketches against forced marriage. An association of university students in Dakar, 
called an Amicale, also returned to the village to do a three-day ‘caravane’ of 
promotion, advocating in favour of girls’ schooling and against their dropping out in 
order to marry.  
 
Parents and girls also see value in girls’ secondary education. Many parents send their 
daughters to secondary school approving of the idea that they might earn money for 
themselves and their families. Samba Ka was of the opinion that “When parents decide 
to educate their daughter they usually think of French school because they think of the 
possibility of making money.” Mothers who were not able to finish their own studies 
are especially in favour of their daughters studying and eventually working. This was 
the case of Binetou Dem, a 32-year-old tooroɗo with a 12-year-old daughter. “You 
should get your bac, go to university, get what you want before marrying. You 
shouldn’t rush into it. Dewgal yawataa, marriage shouldn’t be rushed, you shouldn’t be 
in a hurry. That’s what I hope for my daughter.” Female pupils are often highly 
ambitious, expressing the desire to finish their studies and train in high-status jobs. 16-
year-old Houley in 6ème wants to be a doctor; 13-year-old Nene “an ambassador and a 
fashion designer.” 18-year-old Hadja in 3ème stated:  
 
In the past in the Futa people said ‘Girls’ place is in the kitchen, just stay at 
home cooking all day.’ But now everyone knows schooling is good, children 
have built houses and taken their parents to Mecca. If you have children now, 
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you’ll send them to school, it’s the way it is. And there are even more girls than 
boys, and the girls are smarter. 
 
However, in addition to the attraction of the school for its income-generating potential, 
in Medina Diallobé as in Senegal more widely, marriage is central to dominant 
constructions of femininity. A proverb “Debbo yoodata ko dewgal”, roughly translated 
as ‘a woman’s beauty comes through marriage’, exemplifies the importance of the 
institution for girls’ sense of self. Marriage confers important status on a girl or young 
woman, and the wedding celebration is one of the most significant in her lifetime. 
Essentially, while girls and their parents are in favour of girls completing studies and 
working, they are also in favour of marriage – and it is difficult to combine these two 
ideals. Oumoul Wane, a 32-year-old tooroɗo primary school teacher, stated plainly “It’s 
engrained in the society to educate girls, but also to marry them.” In practice therefore, 
many girls get married before completing school.  
 
A significant factor influencing why girls marry before finishing school is prevalent 
ideals about the appropriate age at which they should marry. Most people feel girls can 
be married from the age of fifteen, and according to Islamic prescriptions ought to be 
married as soon as possible thereafter to control female sexuality and minimise the risk 
of shame through the sins of fornication or extra-marital pregnancy. As Bachir Wane, a 
26-year-old tooroɗo man, said: “Girls after age fifteen are seen as being at risk of 
adultery. So many people, to be in keeping with the religion, try and marry their 
daughters once they are fifteen.” He added, “If I had to choose between practising my 
religion and studies, I would choose my religion!” The preference to marry girls from 
the age of fifteen seems to be stronger among tooroɓe, as Ismaila Gueye, baylo lycée 
teacher, suggested when I asked whether there were many wayluɓe girls who dropped 
out of school to marry: 
 
It’s more common in other neighbourhoods, especially those who apply the 
sharia the most. Well, I know the Qur’an is the sacred book but I also know that 
God said you can go to China to seek knowledge, and there was no Qur’an there 
then! So God was talking about seeking other knowledge like school, it’s good, 
God likes it all. But maybe their interpretation is that school isn’t good as it 
changes you, you’ll lose your religion. They still think that girls are made for 
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marrying, they must submit to their husband. Especially in clerical families you 
see this. 
 
Most marriages which took place during my fieldwork, and five years beforehand, 
involved girls aged between fifteen and twenty. At the other extremes, I heard of two 
girls married at age twelve, and a handful attending university who were unmarried in 
their mid-twenties. Their husbands are usually ten to fifteen years older than them, 
although if they are second, third or fourth wives, their husbands could be up to twenty-
five years their senior. Marriages are strictly endogamous by social category29, 
preferably between cousins, although a marriage with another family across looser 
kinship ties is not uncommon. 
 
Within marriage, women are expected to take on domestic and reproductive roles. Even 
for women who work, having children immediately upon marriage is expected, and 
childbearing contributes to women’s social status. As Moussa Dem explains:  
 
For girls, the most important thing in life is to get married. It’s partly an 
economic thing because women are obliged to have a husband financially. But 
also, we see that women in Europe, many of them don’t ever marry or even want 
to have children. Women here would say ‘What’s the point of life then?!’ Here, 
if a woman doesn’t have children it’s very sad because it’s through that that she 
has a social role. 
 
Yagouba Sy, a 22-year-old tooroɗo man, suggested that long-term studies have few 
certain returns for girls, and can be a barrier to the more important ideal of child-
bearing: “When will you finish your studies? You don’t even know! Like you, you’re 
still studying! Studying can go on forever.” He added “It’s not good to wait too long, if 
you do, the menopause will come and you won’t be able to have many children. It’s not 
good to wait until thirty or thirty-five because it doesn’t leave much time.” Among the 
families I knew, few women used family planning as they were unsure of its legitimacy 
within Islam, and suspected it could negatively affect their fertility over time. Those 
                                                 
29
 I knew of no cross-category marriages in Medina Diallobé, although one tooroɗo informant, Cheikhna 
Sylla, told me that his sister had married a baylo man in another town. I did however hear rumours of a 
few cross-category extramarital affairs and illegitimate pregnancies. 
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who used it did so to space births every three years rather than delay a first pregnancy. 
Women and men both state that women need their husband’s permission to use 
contraception.  
 
This model of femininity linked to young marriage, domesticity and child-bearing is 
promoted by the vast majority of people in Medina Diallobé. Contrary to their explicit 
discourse promoting girls’ long-term study for employment, some school personnel 
simultaneously reinforce gender constructions which link a woman’s status to her 
domestic role and financial dependence on men. Teachers appointed gender-specific 
tasks like having girls sweep classrooms, and textbooks as well as homework examples 
portrayed women as wives and mothers while men worked. One of the collège teachers, 
Hawa Thiam, advocated in favour of girls’ schooling, but also constantly asked me why 
I wasn’t yet married. “Don’t you want a husband?!” she exclaimed. She explained how 
she got married while at university because she “was afraid of being called ‘an old 
girl’.” Pupils’ own activities like Fosco which promote schooling for girls also include 
beauty pageants, female dance performances, or having girls act mainly in supportive 
roles as hostesses. “It’s the culture, the natural order of things!” explained collège 
director Thioye:  
 
There are some tasks for boys, but in general sweeping is for girls. It’s not 
something official, but the natural order returns. The man must work and seek 
money. The division of labour is such that women do housework. That is 
embedded, all social organisation is based on that. You can’t imagine a man 
doing washing up! That is shameful! As if she wears the trousers and you wear 
the skirt! Like you can say a woman should succeed in school and do further 
studies, but contrarily there is this idea that a woman’s social success is not to 
have a PhD but to be beside a man. A woman can’t be happy if she doesn’t have 
a husband. The woman who has succeeded in her studies but hasn’t found a 
husband, she will be traumatized for life, she has failed in her role as a woman. 
You can work, you can access everything, but if you haven’t a husband, you 
have failed. 
 
Girls are strongly influenced by these ideals, and the desire for both marriage and 
diplomas is apparent among them. Zeinab, a 22-year-old tooroɗo, who was repeating 
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terminal year of lycée, happily told me one day in May 2012 that she had been married 
in the mosque. She asked me whether I was married to which I replied, “No, I’m still 
studying.” Zeinab exclaimed, “But it’s good to have a husband! To have diplomas and a 
husband is the best!” Thioye the collège director explained: “Girls themselves are often 
ok with it, they want to get married. Once a few in their age group at age fifteen get 
married, then all the rest want to. Or, by the time they are twenty or so, they consider 
themselves old, and want to get married.”  
 
In some cases, though, parents and extended families force marriage upon their 
daughters. Aminata Sylla, a tooroɗo aged 22 in terminal year of lycée, told her story:  
 
My family tried to force me to marry my cousin when I was seventeen. I said 
‘No, I’m an intellectual, I want to finish my studies’, and they wanted to marry 
me to a cousin who has no education and not even a job. My family said ‘You’re 
undisciplined and stubborn.’ I cried and cried. I want to finish the bac. And after 
that, get a job, whatever job I want. And I will sign a contract with my husband 
so that he lets me! I want to be able to satisfy all my needs and those of my 
children. But here in the Futa, they’re so traditional, it’s not easy. That side of 
my family still doesn’t speak to me anymore. 
 
Even where girls are not exactly forced, there is huge pressure to acquiesce to parents’ 
expectations, which girls often submit to. Fatimata Ndaw, a 20-year-old tooroɗo in 
terminal year of lycée told me “It’s tough for pupils here, we’re pressured to get married 
early, like fourteen or fifteen. Some succeed to the end of school but it’s few. My 
mother’s always going on about getting married, but I want to get a job afterwards, to 
earn money and have a life.” Nine months later, she finally agreed to marry due to her 
mother’s insistence. There is also huge pressure on girls as well as parents to agree to a 
suitor’s proposal, especially if he is kin. One such case is 19-year-old tooroɗo, Soumaya 
Hanne, who at fifteen became the second wife of her cousin, twenty-two years her 
senior. She separated from him three years later, and returned home. She told me how 
the engagement happened, and that she felt pressured to agree: “I was young and I was 
too embarrassed to say no. Even though my friends said he was old, and it’s polygamy, 
and I had no feelings towards him at all, I was too shy to say no.” Her parents felt 
equally bound by custom to agree to the marriage. Soumaya’s mother and father had 
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both wanted their daughter to succeed at school and earn money as none of their other 
children had done so. Her mother, Codou, explained: 
 
You see here when someone asks for your daughter, especially of the same 
family, it’s hard… He sticks to the girl like glue and never leaves her be. He’ll 
invite her over all the time, and if a girl doesn’t know now to defend herself, it’s 
hard. Like to say, ‘I’m studying’, or ‘it’s too soon’... And then she agrees to it, 
and in a week she’s married. 
 
In an unusual display of resistance, Codou had covertly obtained Soumaya an arm 
implant to avoid her falling pregnant. She encouraged her to come home when her 
husband tried to prevent her from studying, and advised her to make unrealistic material 
demands as an ultimatum on continuing the marriage knowing that her son-in-law 
would not be able to comply. Most parents I met would not interfere like this, believing 
that within Islam they lose any right to authority over their daughter after her marriage.  
 
5.42 Husbands’ and in-laws’ influence  
 
Given the personal value and status attached to being married, the social pressure to 
accept a suitor’s offer, and the potential economic returns associated with school 
diplomas, many young women – often with their parents’ support - try to have the best 
of both worlds by marrying and trying to continue at school once married. From 2007, 
the Ministry of Education ruled that girls could re-enter school after giving birth (MEN 
2007). However, balancing school and marriage is extremely difficult in practice, 
because girls’ – and even their parents’ – desires to have them study and work often 
conflict with their husbands’ or in-laws’ wishes. Many young women who abandoned 
school after marriage told me they had agreed to the engagement on the condition that 
they could continue their studies, and that their husbands and in-laws had agreed, but 
once married it became impossible with the burdens of housework and childcare. Young 
married women have the duty to perform all domestic work in their in-laws’ household, 
including going to the market, fetching water, cooking, cleaning, child-rearing and 
doing laundry. Older women pass these duties on to their daughters, who are not 
required to shoulder as much burden as daughters-in-law. Young wives share cooking 
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and other domestic duties equally with their co-wives and/or sisters-in-law, each 
working two consecutive days before taking days off. This distribution of labour was 
cited by several people as an incentive for women to marry into polygamous unions, 
and to have children as early as possible to take over their workload.  
 
Rabia, a 24-year-old tooroɗo from another village who had married Issa Kane when she 
was eighteen and in 4ème collège¸ was a typical case of a girl who had dropped out of 
school because of housework burdens despite her parents wanting her to continue. “My 
father, who is a cleric, wanted me to continue school, so did I, to be able to have 
something of my own,” she explained. “They discussed that before the wedding and my 
husband accepted. But once I was married and moved to my husband’s house and 
wanted to go to school, my husband said you have to cook.” In cases like this, parents 
rarely get involved. Many I spoke with consider that within Islam a girl becomes the 
responsibility of her husband once married, and is required to obey him under all 
circumstances.  
 
Statements from several of my informants demonstrate that often the pressure husbands 
place on their wives to leave school to fulfil their domestic duties is an indirect strategy 
to prevent them from obtaining diplomas, and thus well-paid jobs. It is not unusual for 
women in Medina Diallobé to earn money per se; many aged between twenty and fifty 
contribute to household budgets despite local norms that men are responsible for 
household expenses and a woman’s earnings are her own. The financial support that 
working women provide their families is not limited to spheres typically considered 
feminine like buying clothes for themselves and their children, supplementing food 
budgets, or buying medicines. The more successful traders and salaried women also 
contribute to paying the rent and bills, building and decorating their houses, and paying 
their children’s school and university fees. These women’s cases are particular, as they 
are either widows, or their husbands are international migrants, and in one case a school 
teacher, who are more exposed to the idea of women working. In general there is not a 
strong tradition of women from Medina Diallobé, least of all tooroɗo women, working 
in salaried posts, and men living in the village tend to be opposed. Samba Ka argued 
that this is linked to constructions of masculinity and men seeking to prevent their wives 
from working in order to maintain control over them: 
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Lots of men say to their wives before they marry ‘You can continue your 
studies’. But technically, if you agree to that, in the sharia you have to make the 
conditions that enable her to do so. But in reality, those who don’t want her to 
continue won’t make that effort. Because continuing studies reduces the hold the 
husband has on the wife, that’s my interpretation, it gives a woman the ability to 
escape their control. Men, according to Islam, are the head of the household. 
Women can work in Islam, but there is a cultural undercurrent which isn’t 
Islamic. There’s a bit of jealousy and an idea of controlling the women. The 
woman shouldn’t have to contribute anything to the household, but she has the 
right to work. As it is, in a marriage the husband brings everything financially, 
so that’s a system of domination, there is the idea that if I bring the resources 
then I have the right to make the rules. If a man brought some and a woman 
more, she would have more right. But the men would never accept that. Before, 
money came from fields, which belonged to men. Well these days, there is 
friction with modernity, and now people accept that women go to school. They 
know it’s not men who have everything, women notice that they can work and 
have possibilities like men. 
 
Indeed, Yagouba Sy, a 22-year-old tooroɗo explained how men’s social dominance 
rests on their earning more money than women: 
 
It makes sense that men make all the decisions because they contribute the 
money in the relationship and take care of the women in their household. Plus, 
in any relationship, work or whatever, you need one person to be in a position of 
authority for it to work, if both are equal it will never work, you need a superior 
and an inferior. 
 
Some tooroɗo men in particular hold a very strong discourse against women working 
outside the home. This was evident in a conversation I had with Malik Ba, 22-year-old 
tooroɗo sharia student mentioned in the previous chapter: 
 
Me: Can girls work? They have diplomas now.  
Malik: What kind of work?  
Me: Anything!  
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Malik: You know here, women don’t work. They get married and then it’s their 
role to stay around the kitchen. 
Me: But what’s the point of them studying then? In my country we study to find 
work afterwards.  
Malik: Here we don’t study to work, it’s for knowledge, to live better, to know 
important things. A girl of twenty, you have to find her a husband. She could 
study for a bit longer, but it’s not easy once she’s married.  
Me: But why don’t they work?  
Malik: Here in the Futa it’s rare to see a woman who works. It’s not part of our 
culture, it’s part of yours, but not part of ours. And she would need permission 
from her husband which isn’t easy. For example, in our family, no girl has ever 
worked. I would never accept my wife to have a job, never!! Even if I die I will 
provide for the family. That’s how it is, the man provides. 
Me: But you’ll tire yourself out! Why not let her work and help with the 
expenses?  
Malik: Never, never!  
Me: What about teaching? Or looking after children?  
Malik: I would never let her go outside of the house and work.  
Me: What if she taught the Qur’an?  
Malik: Hmm… if she does it inside the house. But not outside.  
Me: Why not?  
Malik: Because people will say that you have no control over your wife, that she 
controls you.  
Me: It would be shameful. 
Malik: Yes.  
 
This strong aversion among tooroɗo men to women working reflects the combined 
influence of constructions of masculine and social category identity. The previous 
chapter showed how Malik complains about the pressure on him to be a breadwinner, 
and his statements above show how this strain is exacerbated as he feels his honour as a 
tooroɗo man demands that his wife enjoy the privilege of the nobility of not working.  
 
In general, schooled tooroɗo men in their teens and early twenties seem more prepared 
than their daara-educated peers, and older generation of men, to allow their wives to 
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work outside the home. This is possibly because they have more likelihood of obtaining 
formal sector work and thus see less threat to their masculinity. Nonetheless, they often 
talk of controlling how much money they would allow their wives to earn in order to 
maintain their position of social dominance. When I asked what kind of girl he wanted 
to marry, Aliou Watt, an 18-year-old tooroɗo in 4ème collège explained: 
 
Ideally she’ll finish school first. She’ll be an intelligent girl, someone who has 
studied, not a savage! Not someone who knows nothing. And I don’t mind if she 
works. Some men don’t want their wife to work but it’s good, it’s easier to pay 
the expenses. But I don’t want a woman who tells me what to do. There are 
some women who run their husband, they say ‘Wash the bowls’! And they have 
to do it. If I had a wife like that, I would divorce her! I’ll have lots of money and 
if I have lots of money she’ll do what I say. Or I’ll get a maid, that’s the best. 
 
Hence, those young men who entertain the idea of their wife working do so as long as 
they feel they can earn more than her. They would refuse to do any housework 
constructed as feminine, namely childcare, cooking, fetching water, doing the washing 
up or laundry, but hope to find a maid to do these things instead. Through this strategy, 
boys, like Yagouba Sy quoted below, hope to maintain their financial dominance and 
hence decision-making authority, negotiating around the threat women’s paid work 
poses to their position of male superiority: 
 
Me: But who will do the housework if your wife’s working?  
Yagouba: We can pay a maid.  
Me: But that’s expensive. 
Yagouba: No it’s not… 
Me: There are lots of men here who wouldn’t accept that their wives work, why 
not?  
Yagouba: They’re afraid that if a woman has money she will ask for respect. If 
you tell her what to do she’ll refuse, and because she has money she’ll say she 
doesn’t need you and will just go back to her parents’ house.  
Me: Aren’t you afraid of that?  
Yagouba: Yes, a bit. But the world has become so expensive, what with all the 
nice clothes and their nice colours, all that costs money! But both ways there are 
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problems, if she doesn’t work and you can’t give her what she wants, and if she 
does work. But having only one person work for the expenses is difficult. 
 
The current generation of young women who abandon collège and lycée before 
obtaining diplomas once they get married therefore appears to be linked to their 
marrying an older generation of men generally aged thirty or over, who have 
predominantly studied in daaras, and strongly oppose women’s salaried employment. It 
is possible that once the generation of young men in their teens and early twenties who 
currently attend school marries, they will be more open to choosing wives who have 
school diplomas. 
 
-o0o- 
 
It is not necessarily only husbands who require that their wives give up school to do 
housework; in-laws also demand that the young wife performs their work 
responsibilities. Indeed, they can over-ride husbands who might support their wife’s 
study or work outside the home: “Parents-in-law are a problem, even if the husband 
says his wife can continue studying, parents-in-law might give her lots of work to do” 
reckoned Adama Seck, a Wolof administrator. Indeed, the two cases I knew of in 
Medina Diallobé of girls who managed to continue attending school even after having 
children, were exceptional for being married to their first cousins, and living with their 
own mothers or grandmothers. Hence, their ‘in-laws’ were in fact their own female kin, 
who convinced their nephews/sons-in-law to allow their nieces to study, and also 
shouldered the childcare burden. 
 
In individual cases, the conflicts between girls’ aspirations to study and work, their 
husbands’ views, and in-laws demands, all combine in unique ways. Girls’ own views 
about marriage and schooling also shift over time, adjusting to their circumstances, as 
documented elsewhere (Froerer 2012). This process is exemplified in the case of 
Ramatoulaye, who dropped out of 1er lycée at nineteen when she married Cheikhna 
Sylla, a 38-year old migrant working in Spain who had the baccalaureate. When I first 
asked Ramatoulaye why she had left school, she implied in her account that she had 
been powerless to alter the timing of the wedding:  
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The wedding was set for the start of June and the exams were meant to be the 
end of May but that year there were lots of strikes and the exams got delayed. 
And once the date of the wedding is set you can’t really change it. So what with 
the preparation for the wedding and the honeymoon afterwards I missed the 
exams. And then I got pregnant so I couldn’t continue. If I had done 1er I would 
have had just one year of school left. It’s a shame as I loved my studies and 
considered it above anything else. 
 
However, I heard a slightly different version of events from her husband Cheikhna 
which suggests that Ramatoulaye had preferred marriage over finishing school, but only 
later changed her mind: “Well, I said she should finish, but you know how they are… 
She wasn’t that motivated at the time.” His younger sister Aminata gave more details:   
 
Look at her, Ramatoulaye, she dropped out, and now regrets it, her life is ruined. 
I hear her crying in her room. And she was in 1er, one step away from finishing, 
so close. But it was her fault. Cheikhna wanted her to succeed and finish 1er. 
But she dropped out before the wedding and didn’t tell Cheikhna who was still 
in Spain. When he came for the wedding he found out and said, ‘What’s going 
on, you’ve lied to me’. He also gave her contraceptive pills, and said ‘I can’t 
force you, it’s your decision.’ She refused though, she said she wanted a child in 
her life. But now she regrets it all. She wants to go back to school but Cheikhna 
refused this time, he said it’s too late. She only has the BFEM, it’s nothing.  
 
Ramatoulaye was disappointed at having missed out on her schooling, but seems to 
have developed this attitude after becoming disillusioned with married life alongside her 
in-laws and onerous work burden. One day in June I visited the compound where 
Cheikhna’s elderly parents lived with their three married sons, their wives and children, 
and six younger unmarried children. It was the height of the hot season, and tempers 
were fraying. There were no smiles, the four young wives were running to and fro 
frantically washing clothes and cooking, while minding fourteen children under the age 
of twelve including several toddlers and wailing babies. Ramatoulaye said she was 
exhausted, her two-year-old son demanded her constant attention, and she just wanted 
to rest. “But here if you’re not constantly working people accuse you of being lazy. 
They treat you like a slave. Whatever I do they find reason to criticise.” I often saw her 
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fighting back tears. “I love my husband and he loves me, so I put up with a lot,” she 
added. “I want to make the marriage work so I do all I’m supposed to do with a smile 
and I never complain, but it’s just a brave face.” Not giving up hope, Ramatoulaye made 
constant efforts to find ways to continue her studies, and pursue her dream of being a 
doctor. She sought information on how to do a two-year training course in St Louis, got 
to know the personnel of the health centre to inquire about informal training, asked me 
and an NGO she knew for financial support, and approached her aunt about childcare.   
 
In this case, I knew Ramatoulaye’s husband Cheikhna well enough to ask his opinion of 
her doing a training course and working. Being schooled himself, he said he wasn’t 
opposed in theory but the issue was more his family and their view of his wife’s work 
responsibilities in the extended household: 
 
Rama talked to me about continuing school, but it would cause problems. My 
brothers’ wives are in the house too, they don’t want to do her work in her place. 
If there is a woman in the house and she’s married, she has the duty to do 
cooking on her two days. You see, if one goes to school, the others say ‘Well if 
you’re doing something, I want something’. If someone goes to school, who will 
work their two days? That will cause problems. People can’t forgive that. There 
are people who think like this, and say ‘o accii suudu mum, she has abandoned 
her room, or responsibilities’. And ‘ina hersinii – it’s shameful’. It’s like saying 
they’ve not respected their duties. Especially if a woman earns money, it will 
only go into her pocket, she doesn’t add it to the household expenses because a 
woman isn’t obliged to. So her husband has to continue paying for everything. 
People don’t see the interest in having her study as she will gain and others will 
have to do her cooking, there is this problem of jealousy. And so if Ramatoulaye 
were to do that, go and study, no one in the house would speak to her. They 
would ostracise her. And then what would happen? You know, it’s not me 
causing the problem! Or her. It’s the people who are there in the house, who 
decide ultimately. She asked me to negotiate with them but I can’t intervene, it’s 
complicated. And since it’s African society, we have family ties and if you try 
and go against it, everyone is against you, you’re isolated. And we’re educated 
in the way of union and community, and once they put you aside you feel bad.  
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These cases show that the Ministry of Education’s policy of allowing girls with children 
to re-enter school will only facilitate their reintegration into the system if accompanied 
by alternative childcare arrangements and, more importantly, a cultural shift in which 
people value married women’s schooling and salaried employment over their domestic 
work. 
 
While cases like Ramatoulaye’s are common, where young women want both marriage 
and schooling but become disillusioned when the two cannot be reconciled, there are 
some instances when girls do genuinely want to leave school, preferring the comfort 
and status of domestic lifestyle especially if their husband is financially secure. Bachir 
Wane, a 28-year-old tooroɗo man stated: “There are plenty of girls who want to drop 
out, they’re tired of studying. Especially once they get married, but even before they get 
married. Marriage is a priority for girls, rather than finishing their studies.” Ismaila 
Gueye, 28-year-old lycée teacher, stated that the income-generating potential of studies 
for girls was ambiguous: “In Europe you know that if you make an effort in your 
studies, that you will succeed. But that’s not the case here. The main thing is that you 
try. So if someone comes and proposes to marry you, well it depends, it might be worth 
it.”  
 
In some rare cases, young women may even go up against their parents and in-laws to 
achieve this domestic ideal. One woman, Diamilatou Sy, was one such case: at age 
twenty and in 4ème collège she married her first cousin, Ablaye, an affluent migrant 
working in Gabon. Diamilatou was in a position uniquely conducive to continuing her 
studies as her mother, Astou, and husband’s sister, Oumou, went to great lengths to 
convince Ablaye to let his wife remain in school. Astou cared for Diamilatou’s baby 
son, enabling her to reach 1er collège by age 24. However, tired of balancing school 
with childcare and domestic work, missing her husband, and not foreseeing many 
significant economic returns from schooling given that her husband was already well-
off, Diamilatou secretly arranged with Ablaye to get her a visa to join him in Gabon. 
Astou and Oumou disapproved, arguing that she would be more secure if she had the 
possibility to work, but three years on Diamilatou has had a second child, and no regrets 
about being a housewife at her husband’s side in Gabon. 
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5.5 Conclusion  
 
In contrast to the previous chapter on parents who prefer daaras, this chapter analyses 
preference for state school among Medina Diallobé’s inhabitants. Most consider 
primary school to have unquestioned value for basic socialisation and for skills needed 
in contemporary society. However, value of post-primary schools is more ambiguous, 
not least given disruptions to the school sector and the fact that few men from the 
village have used school diplomas to obtain high-status professions. Engagement with 
post-primary state school enables us to challenge the assumption presented in Chapter 
One that people prefer state schools for economic benefits, and that income is the main 
or only factor they consider. While many parents do send their children to secondary 
school for perceived economic value, many boys abandon in favour of immediate 
income-generating opportunities which confer quicker masculine status as 
breadwinners. Boys from tooroɗo lineages, for whom the high-status “fallback” 
professions of trade and migration are more accessible, are most conspicuous in seeking 
an anti-school youth identity.  
 
For girls, attending post-primary school for economic incentives also competes with 
constructions of gender identity, as feminine status is tied to marriage, childbearing, and 
economic dependence on a husband. Again, gender constructions intersect with social 
category as this ideal appears particularly strong among tooroɓe who historically 
associate women’s not working outside the home with nobility and privilege. Hence, 
not only is secondary school perceived by pupils as not conferring significant economic 
benefits, but their decisions are motivated as much by issues of status and identity 
informed by gender and social category constructions as income-generation. Notably, a 
state-school model of the educated person is not necessarily the principle identity 
people pursue. The relative influence of different factors on people’s decisions also shift 
over time when faced with new developments in personal circumstances. 
 
This chapter also challenges the assumption presented in Chapter One that fathers in 
nuclear families exert most influence over their children’s educational trajectories. Boys 
who go against their parents’ wishes demonstrate the influence of peer cultures on their 
decisions. A multiplicity of actors, from school personnel, parents, extended family, 
husbands and in-laws, all contribute to shaping girls’ aspirations and trajectories. As in 
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the previous chapter, migrants - as fathers but also uncles, nephews, cousins or brothers 
- strongly influence family decisions because they pay most household expenses. Their 
demand for schooled wives strongly influences girls’ schooling and their marriage age. 
In addition to extended family, young people’s own agency is important, including to 
resist or pursue marriages; negotiate to continue or leave school; or engage in 
educational activities outside or after school. These findings call for greater attention to 
be paid to young people’s agency and embeddedness in social networks to understand 
their educational trajectories, and their implications for development projects which aim 
to assist people who wish to stay in school but face barriers in doing so. 
 
These insights expose barriers to distributive educational justice, namely unequal access 
to the benefits of existing educational options. Despite the fact many young people drop 
out of secondary school to pursue more attractive alternatives, others would like to 
continue but are unable to do so for reasons relating to constructions of gender and 
socioeconomic status. For girls obliged to drop out of school against their desires, it is 
essential for education providers to recognise that female in-laws, such as mothers-in-
law, sisters-in-law and co-wives, as much as male family members, play decisive roles 
in facilitating or inhibiting girls’ pursuit of schooling alongside marriage, by monitoring 
their work and childcare. This is relevant to the state’s recent attempts to change the law 
permitting girls who have given birth to re-enter the school system. This move is 
unlikely to respond to the desires of women with children who wish to complete their 
schooling, if cultural values surrounding their domestic responsibilities do not also 
change.  
 
Forced drop-out from secondary school is also linked to economic constraints. Lack of 
access to wealth is affected by historical inequalities and current clientelist relations, 
influenced by social category identity. The influence of these factors challenges narrow 
economic definitions of household socioeconomic status as a way of making sense of 
inequalities in education outcomes, described in Chapter One. These findings call for 
more nuanced accounts of how deprivation leads to people abandoning school than is 
commonly employed in economic studies. Current measures of income treat households 
as isolated rather than as embedded within relationships. Future research on education 
in West Africa needs to consider how people’s access to wealth is affected by inherited 
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assets, access to well-paid professions and clientelistic relationships, and how these 
intersect with legacies of social category inequalities.  
 
The following chapter complements these findings by looking at young people who do 
persevere to obtain the BFEM and baccalaureate diplomas. 
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Chapter 6. Attending state school (II): Pursuing diplomas  
6.1 Introduction 
 
In contrast to the previous chapter on pupils who do not complete collège, this chapter 
analyses those who invest in the BFEM and baccalaureate diplomas, their assessments 
of the value of school, and their ability to realise their desired trajectories depending on 
their gender, social category, and wealth. Section 6.2 looks at how school attendance is 
considered by the current generation of young people from baylo and gallunkooɗo 
families of the Mbayla neighbourhood to have high material value. This high 
valorisation of school among Mbayla parents and young people must be understood in 
the context of their being constructed by the tooroɓe as socially inferior, excluded from 
the valued Islamic knowledge of the daara, and marginalised from economic wealth 
and political power in the village. This counters common official assumptions that 
social category identity does not come into play in the school setting. 
 
Section 6.3 considers middle-class tooroɗo women, another group of young people 
increasingly being encouraged by their parents to pursue diplomas, university degrees 
and formal sector employment. This situation is celebrated by development actors, 
along the assumption that it will encourage greater female financial independence, 
autonomy and decision-making authority. However, this section counters these 
assumptions by demonstrating barriers girls face in converting their diplomas into such 
benefits. First is the pressure tooroɗo parents place on their daughters to marry against 
their wishes. Second are customary restrictions on the kinds of work considered 
appropriate for tooroɗo women which limit the range of professions they can pursue. 
Those less well-off therefore face additional challenges to convert their diplomas into 
income-generating opportunities free of stigma.  
 
Section 6.4 describes how young people in general are differentially positioned in terms 
of accessing wealth, information, and contacts which enable them to convert their 
diplomas into employment. Most families in Medina Diallobé cannot easily afford 
higher education and other training opportunities which facilitate insertion into the 
formal economy. Hence, parents and young people are obliged to seek help from 
wealthier patrons, namely the local tooroɗo politicians employed outside the village as 
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high-ranking civil servants. In turn, these actors use dissemination of school-related 
favours to further their political positions, which is illustrated through the example of 
allocation of vacataire teacher positions to certain favoured families. Unpacking how 
favours flow within local clientelist networks reveals the complex, and not necessarily 
linear, interrelationships between social category, lineage and wealth on the one hand, 
and social mobility through schooling on the other. 
 
6.2 Educated persons: Mbayla inhabitants and the status of schooling  
 
Young people pursuing post-secondary school diplomas in Medina Diallobé hail from 
all social categories present in the village, and especially at baccalaureate level share a 
common camaraderie which surpasses these distinctions. However, in the collège and 
lycée, both male and female inhabitants of the Mbayla neighbourhood in particular 
stand out as articulating a positive group identity based on academic success. Like many 
villages in the Futa Tooro, Mbayla is named after the wayluɓe or smiths who live there. 
The Haalpulaar make a distinction between ‘black’ smiths (wayluɓe ɓaleeɓe) who forge 
iron or black metal, and jewellers (wayluɓe sayakooɓe) who work with gold and silver 
(Dilley 2004b, p.40). In Medina Diallobé, the wayluɓe specialise in the latter profession. 
Like other neighbourhoods dominated by one freeborn or artisan category, Mbayla is 
inhabited by families of wayluɓe, but also the gallunkooɗo families who used to be their 
slaves. In Medina Diallobé today, the wayluɓe and gallunkooɓe in Mbayla live in close 
proximity to each other, and enjoy strong and even affectionate friendship relations 
although intermarriage is strictly forbidden. 
 
In one sense, the fact that pupils from Mbayla use the school space so obviously to 
celebrate their social category was surprising given frequent statements I heard from 
many teachers and other state personnel in Medina Diallobé that the school is a neutral, 
democratic space where social category does not come into play. “[Social category] 
doesn’t influence education, and has no influence on classroom dynamics”, Hawa 
Thiam, the baylo collège teacher told me. “At the level of school you can’t see a 
difference. All students are equal,” said Adama Seck, the Wolof administrator. “No one 
wants to know who the pupils are, they are distinguished by their ability in school, not 
by clan or ethnicity. As schooling is increasing, maybe mindsets are changing, so future 
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generations won’t live this situation.” he added. Khadim Diop, the ceɗɗo collège 
surveillant agreed: “School has done a lot to level these issues of caste. Anyone can be 
intelligent, even from an inferior caste.” When I asked whether this is a deliberate 
policy or accidental effect of the school, he stressed that it was both: “On the one hand, 
someone might observe ‘That person has succeeded but he is supposed to be inferior to 
me!’ So the other says, ‘Why can’t I succeed too?’ Also, we teach human rights, so 
pupils know that they are equal.”  
 
Young people I met also often stated that they ignore social category in their 
relationships and that it was not relevant to them. “Education is education,” said 16-
year-old tooroɗo, Houley, mentioned in Chapter Four for her resistance to her family’s 
socialisation of tooroɗo superiority. “God didn’t make this an issue, it’s people. People 
did jobs, there were those who liked fishing, those who did smithing. But that’s not 
what’s important. Everyone is a person in the end. What’s important is to have a job and 
be honest.” Ismaila Gueye, 28-year-old baylo lycée teacher also explained: 
 
Once in school, there is no longer any tooroɗo, maccuɗo… People even say 
today that outside of school there isn’t even that. In any case what I’ve seen, I 
don’t see tooroɗo, baylo, maccuɗo, we’re all the same. […] You will see a baylo 
who hangs out with a maccuɗo, or a tooroɗo.  Like in friendship groups, and 
they date each other. You can’t see who is who. Nearly all the castes are there. 
Each is proud of who he is, but no one says he is inferior or whatever, or that I 
am superior. So each respects the other. The caste problem, we have put it aside, 
you don’t see it in school. Still, these days you can only marry the same, that 
still applies. Parents respect it until now, but from our generation we don’t 
respect these divisions any more. You don’t give me food or clothes or 
whatever, so you can no longer say you’re superior to me. But in the past, a 
maccuɗo had to submit to a tooroɗo. The tooroɗo had to give him to eat and 
drink but the maccuɗo had to work. He was the lowest of the hierarchy. But that 
doesn’t exist anymore. Each does what he can to survive. 
 
Indeed, the middle-aged informants who I spoke with were generally of the opinion that 
these distinctions mattered less to young people than it had to their generation. 
However, other statements hinted that, despite the widespread nature of this egalitarian 
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discourse strongly linked to norms imparted within the school institution, some young 
people still hold to notions of social category superiority learned through family 
socialisation processes described in Chapter Four. For instance, although two young 
tooroɗo women I knew had baylo friends, on the rare occasions they visited their  
house, the other tooroɗo women there glared at them, treated them dismissively, and the 
atmosphere was very tense.  
 
I therefore asked several Senegalese academics whether social category played an 
important role within the school space. Some Haalpulaar scholars suggested that based 
on historical evidence there might be visible examples of discrimination against ñeeño 
and gallunkooɗo individuals. During an interview, Penda Mbow, professor at the West 
Africa Research Centre (WARC) in Dakar, told me “After independence, if a teacher 
sent a pupil to wipe the blackboard, he would send his slave to do it.” Further examples 
are reported in the recent film Endam Bilaali (2014) created by Senegalese historians 
Ibrahima Thioub and Abderahmane N’Gaïde at University Cheikh Anta Diop. They 
interviewed gallunkooɗo school teachers who taught in the 1970s. One recalls how he 
was chastised by the school director for beating a tooroɗo pupil. Another remembers 
that tooroɓe pupils claimed all the new textbooks when they arrived. When he proposed 
to reward the best five pupils the director made him increase the list to ten to ensure that 
several freeborn would be included in order to avoid community tensions.  
 
After probing school personnel in Medina Diallobé further, I discovered that, 
unsurprisingly, such attitudes do carry over into the school space despite the official 
discourse of equality. “Children know who they are. The adults teach it at home. A 
baylo can’t sit on your bed [because it is considered polluting]. A maccuɗo kills the 
animals at the parties,” reckoned Diallo, one of the primary school directors. “In class 
they wouldn’t dare mention it because the teacher would forbid it, but once outside they 
know. They all play together, no problems. Maybe if they fight, it comes out.” In 
addition, there is evidence that despite official school policy to stamp out pupil practice 
which recreates social category hierarchies, local teachers might not be willing to follow 
this in all cases. Thioye, the Wolof collège director who was able to give an outsider’s 
view on dynamics in Medina Diallobé, gave an explicit example:  
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The first time I saw this caste issue in school was when a group of girls refused 
to sweep, three refused. I forced them, it almost caused a fight. I stayed while 
they did it, as they were afraid of me. But later I asked what the problem was, 
other pupils told me, they said ‘She can’t sweep but so and so can’, and I was 
told that the girls had said ‘It’s not normal that we should sweep when there are 
maccuɓe here.’ Had they said that directly to me, there would have been 
sanctions! These situations exist but the politicians don’t do anything. But these 
situations aren’t common, the school is for everyone. Whenever there is a 
problem with sweeping groups, it’s because of that. All teachers are told to 
create sweeping groups to clean the classrooms, if there are absentees it’s taken 
note of. It’s fewer now, but there are still those who find excuses not to sweep. 
Even at the level of surveillants and so on, who are from here, they don’t say 
anything against the sweeping groups, it’s very sensitive. The surveillant should 
discipline them, but they never do, they organise the groups, but don’t discipline 
those out of line, because they too are part of a caste, although not necessarily 
inferior. 
 
These examples paint a picture of the school as a site in which social category 
inequalities are reproduced by teachers and pupils despite official discourse that it is 
irrelevant. However, additional examples from the secondary schools in Medina 
Diallobé show that alongside these processes, wayluɓe and gallunkooɓe in particular 
celebrate their academic success within the school space as a way to positively reaffirm 
their social category identity. As noted in the previous chapters, many tooroɗo families 
in Medina Diallobé value the prestige of daara education for their sons and the 
professions of trade and migration. They can afford to follow these trajectories given the 
inherited economic privilege of their social category. By contrast, the wayluɓe and 
gallunkooɓe have been excluded from the daara, and historically lack the capital to 
trade or migrate. Indeed, Mbayla is located on the periphery of the village on the edge 
of the jeeri, far from the fertile waalo land. The wayluɓe definitions of educated persons 
for men used to centre on apprenticeship into the art of jewellery-making, as smithing is 
forbidden to women given the dangerous contact with jinn. However, with the decline 
in customary artisanal crafts, the wayluɓe and gallunkooɓe of Mbayla have recently 
developed higher evaluations of school and formal sector jobs within Senegal. Several 
of my informants described how parents there in the last twenty years have placed 
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greater value on secondary schooling for their children. Ismaila Gueye, 28-year-old 
baylo teacher in the lycée, recounted a generational shift whereby men in their forties 
and fifties almost never attended school, but that now all Mbayla parents send all of 
their children: 
 
In my generation, there were about fifteen of us age-mates from this 
neighbourhood, and of those, only six or seven went to school. The others 
worked. My father and grandfather are jewellers, so they all did that. In our 
neighbourhood [Mbayla] those who sent their children to school did so because 
my father persuaded them. He didn’t go himself, maybe that inspired him. 
During the droughts in the 1970s he left to go to Dakar, he was a technician and 
worked all over Senegal. He has had a lot of luck, so he has influence in the 
village. Now, everyone goes to school in my neighbourhood. I can’t think of 
anyone who doesn’t, and I would say my parents played a role. 
 
The wayluɓe have not abandoned jewellery-making. Middle-aged men still practice this 
profession, and several male collège pupils learn in the neighbourhood’s workshops 
during the school holidays. Nonetheless, Ismaila suggests that obtaining formal sector 
professions has become increasingly important after his father’s success in this domain. 
This was corroborated during an interview I conducted with Hussein Sogo, president of 
the Medina Diallobé Amicale30, an informal association which groups together the 
village’s university students and lycée pupils. Also baylo, he described the 
organisation’s membership and how over the last decade since its creation, wayluɓe and 
gallunkooɓe – although largely male - have predominated among those investing in 
higher education:  
 
The Amicale was founded in 2004 but there weren’t many of us university 
students at that point, around ten, and only one girl, Fati Mbow from Mbayla. 
They were mainly from Mbayla, and if you look at the previous presidents, you 
                                                 
30
 See also Coulon’s (1975, pp.72–73)  description of such an association in the village of Aere Lao in 
1970. Its 60 members consisted of the ‘young intellectuals’ of the village, namely university, lycée and 
collège students. It was represented by an elected committee, in which customary hierarchies seemed 
irrelevant as the president was a gallunkooɗo. The association undertook activities in the village over the 
summer holidays including seminars and theatre sketches, broaching controversial subjects like taboos on 
inter-caste marriage. Coulon argues that these activities had little impact on changing values in the wider 
society as notables and adults in general were invited but did not attend, seeing the young people’s 
actions as just ‘games’. 
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can see how it is dominated by Mbayla people. The first president was Karim 
Sogo, my older brother. His treasurer and secretary general were also from 
Mbayla. The second president was called Souleye Dia, he was from the lowest 
social category…the maccuɓe, as they’re called. The third president was 
Youssouf Ka, tooroɗo. The girl, Fati Mbow, a baylo, was 4th president. The 5th 
was Tidiane Dia, from the same family as Souleye, so again maccuɗo. 6th was 
Hamidou Guissé, maccuɗo. I’m the 7th president, again Mbayla, and same 
family as first president. You see, there have always been more wayluɓe and 
maccuɓe than tooroɓe. 
 
Indeed, I encountered several statements suggesting that many of the current generation 
of young wayluɓe now attending school strive for academic success claiming it as a 
form of prestige. “There is one baylo teacher who teaches in the terminal year of lycée,” 
explained director Thioye, referring to Ismaila Gueye. “It’s a great source of pride for 
the baylo people.” He added that the wayluɓe pupils publicise their collective success:  
 
Two years ago, after the BFEM exams, they showed off their results saying, 
‘We’ve got 100% success.’ They count their candidates compared to other 
categories. I asked one baylo teacher, Hawa Thiam about it, and she said ‘Yes, 
we’ve had good results this year.’ 
 
Several informants stressed that the recent valorisation of school diplomas among 
parents, and their pursuit by pupils, in Mbayla is linked to achieving status to counter 
their inferior social position. “Those who felt inferior enrolled their children to have 
social success” stated collège surveillant Khadim Diop. When I asked director Thioye 
about common arguments people gave me that the categories were all equal and no 
longer relevant, he disagreed saying “It’s not true, if you look at Medina Diallobé, the 
baylo people try to succeed through school, they crow about their success, it’s a way of 
affirming themselves. It’s felt in education.” Ismaila also stressed this dimension of 
social mobility, saying that: 
 
If you look at all the students in university from Medina Diallobé, there are 
twenty or so. Out of those, fourteen are from my neighbourhood. In the past, the 
tooroɓe were superior. Now it’s starting to change. Our neighbourhood was the 
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most diminished in the past, the poorest. Maybe that’s why people have really 
started trying in school. 
 
One tooroɗo informant, Habib Ndaw, had also noticed this trend, and cited it as one 
reason why tooroɗo parents were now seeking to invest in their children’s schooling to 
counter the possible threat the other social categories posed to their dominance: 
 
The people with most diplomas from the village, the intellectuals, most of them 
are not tooroɗo, they are maccuɗo, baylo and ceɗɗo. Because there used to be a 
huge gap between them and the tooroɓe. They were marginal, the tooroɓe did 
everything. They were the imam, the chief. Castes weren’t consulted, they had 
no voice. Even at meetings, everyone agreed with the tooroɗo, and people 
listened to other castes but no one followed it or agreed with it. So they said to 
themselves, ‘Seeing as society is evolving, the only way to go on is to study.’ If 
people want someone with a diploma, they don’t specify by caste. So if 
tomorrow, a government post opens which needs a diploma, they will give it to 
them [non-tooroɓe]. There are lots of teachers from Medina Diallobé but the 
tooroɓe don’t make up many, the rest are other castes. In the collège and lycée, 
there are two teachers from here: Hawa Thiam, baylo, and Ismaila Gueye, baylo. 
The surveillant, Khadim Diop, is ceɗɗo. No tooroɓe! In Medina Diallobé I there 
is one teacher from the village, a ceɗɗo. The tooroɓe realised that if they didn’t 
educate their children, the village would be run by maccuɓe and wayluɓe! Even 
the clerics, well some of them, have noticed it. Ceerno Ousmane has a daughter 
in university. They have seen that they will be behind the castes. Now tooroɓe 
see they are losing terrain, in the modern world, the village chieftaincy doesn’t 
count any more. 
 
However, this situation of baylo commitment to school needs to be nuanced further. 
Ismaila added that “In my generation, the best pupils came from our neighbourhood. 
But now…I don’t know. Last year we saw that the level has gone down. People see that 
even those with a Masters’ don’t have work.” He continued:  
 
It’s rare to see someone [from Mbayla] in 4ème or 3ème collège who drops out. 
Because it’s fashionable. Some only study because they want to stay in school, 
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to be with their friends. In the school, it’s a bit cool, you know, you get to know 
people, people know you. Even my nephew goes [to school], although he 
doesn’t like it. 
 
This statement suggests that universal collège attendance among the current generation 
of young people from Mbayla cannot be wholly attributed to their parents’ high 
evaluations of schooling, or young people’s pursuit of diplomas and formal sector 
employment, despite several following this path. Rather, it has become normalised 
among some young people, and its intrinsic value is perceived to coincide with material 
benefits of social status and the intrinsic pleasure of socialising. Attending school to 
socialise is not restricted to pupils from the Mbayla neighbourhood. 16-year-old 
tooroɗo Houley frequently used the justification of “revising lessons” to spend long 
afternoons and evenings at her cousins’ and friends’ houses avoiding doing her 
domestic work, although I observed that she actually revised little in the run up to 
exams. Her older cousin once remarked that “Houley only goes to school to dress up 
pretty and gossip with her friends!” Indeed, the appeal of school among young people 
for socialising has been documented elsewhere, for instance in southern African 
contexts (Ansell 2004). However, certain pupils from Mbayla were especially 
noticeable for appropriating the school space to increase their social popularity, 
developing an anti-school orientation not dissimilar to that of tooroɗo boys described in 
the previous chapter, yet within the school space. 
 
This process became evident during the Foyer Socio-Culturel or Fosco, an annual 
occasion integrated into the secondary school calendar around April or May. According 
to Thioye, the collège director, Fosco can last up to three days (Friday through Sunday) 
comprising of social and pedagogical activities such as theatre or a conference with 
teachers about a school-related theme, and performances by language clubs. Parents, the 
mayor, other local officials, and pupil representatives and teachers from neighbouring 
village schools are invited. The director can allocate funds for catering and a prize-
giving ceremony, or pupils will distribute envelopes to local shop owners and 
businessmen for donations. Thioye told me that officially the aim is to build 
relationships between pupils and teachers, give pupils the opportunity to gain 
experience in organisation, and to promote schooling in the village. In his opinion, the 
Fosco was well-organised in 2011 according to these criteria by two studious tooroɗo 
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girls. However, in 2012 Thioye was opposed to hosting Fosco given how disrupted the 
school year had been. He was especially opposed to the group of Mbayla boys who had 
proposed to organise the event who he felt used the space officially intended for 
pedagogical purposes to further their own social agenda: 
 
The boys who want to do it this year are bandits. Two years ago they organised 
it and they said they were inviting people and needed money for this and that, I 
gave 70,000CFA [£78]. Then on the day there were no guests, just a big party. 
Last year the girls organising it raised 80,000CFA [£90] off their own back. But 
this year it’s the same boys who did it two years ago and I told them to get lost, I 
said ‘You’re not serious.’ All they want is a party, there is nothing pedagogical. 
 
Facing pupil pressure, the director eventually agreed to allow Fosco to take place on a 
Saturday in July which would not disrupt classes. In many ways, the event resembled a 
neighbourhood youth party or soirée. Throughout the warmer months, groups of 
adolescent friends from the same age-set or fedde hosted parties in open public spaces in 
their neighbourhoods. Taking place at weekends, the parties began at sundown and 
could last until the early hours of the morning, and were therefore called ‘[the 
neighbourhood] ne dors pas (doesn’t sleep)’. Accompanied by a sound system and 
microphones, soirées typically included performances like comedy sketches, male 
rappers, choreographed dances and beauty pageants by girls. Young people from all 
over the village attended, sometimes even sandas, despite a prevalent moralising 
discourse among adults and tooroɓe in particular, that the activities were not strictly 
Islamic. These parties enabled socialising between neighbourhoods and social 
categories, while maintaining an element of friendly competition surrounding whose 
neighbourhood puts on the best event. The Fosco was reminiscent of the ‘Mbayla ne 
dors pas’ party organised a month previously, in terms of content and the prominent 
role ‘popular’ youth from Mbayla played in its organisation and performances. When 
school was occasionally mentioned during the Fosco, it was in negative terms. The main 
organiser made a speech inspired by the recent pupil strikes, demanding classrooms, 
and arguing that the director and other politicians deal with the problems more 
effectively. However, aside from pupils only the director and one teacher were present 
to hear the remarks. When director awarded prizes for an interclass football tournament, 
several boys booed when he made an appearance. This was followed by pupils taking 
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the microphone to perform derogatory impersonations of teachers. Director Thioye’s 
response afterwards reflects how he felt the Mbayla pupils had used the event and 
school space to promote their social status: 
 
It was organised by mediocres, I really argued with them this year. In the official 
brief you’re meant to choose the best pupils to organise it, but they were voted 
in because they’re most popular and side-lined the better pupils. 
 
These accounts reveal that although the school’s statutes may officially reinforce a 
discourse in which difference between social categories is irrelevant or even non-
existent, in reality constructions of social category identity continue to permeate pupils’ 
experiences of the school, their educational trajectories, and evaluations of school value. 
Legacies of discrimination, and lacking the capital to migrate or succeed financially 
through trade, are key to understanding the investment parents and pupils from baylo 
and gallunkooɗo families have made in school diplomas and formal sector work in 
recent decades. Many of the current generation of young people from Mbayla still 
celebrate academic success, and school-based definitions of educated persons, to 
reinforce a positive social identity associated with their category. However, others 
attend school less for perceptions of its economic utility or even status associated with 
academic success, but because it has become fashionable and provides them space to 
socialise and perform an anti-school identity which confers status among their peers. 
The growing desire among tooroɗo parents to enrol their children in school rather than 
the daara also suggests that, rather than social category identity becoming less salient, it 
remains an important factor in parents’ decisions. For those who perceive that school 
skills and diplomas are becoming the most important resource needed to earn money 
and acquire status, the value of school is couched for some tooroɓe in terms of 
maintaining their superiority, and preventing other social categories from overtaking 
them socially, economically and politically.  
 
6.3 ‘Noble work’: Status constraints on occupations for tooroɗo women 
 
Next to young people from baylo and gallunkooɗo families, it is tooroɗo girls who are 
most likely to be encouraged by their parents to obtain BFEM and baccalaureate 
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diplomas. This may come as a surprise given how, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, it is often tooroɗo parents who place importance on marrying their daughters 
during adolescence while still at school. However, many middle-class tooroɗo parents 
encourage their daughters to attend university and also find prestigious formal sector 
work. The fathers of some of these families have attended state schools themselves, 
such as members of the village chieftaincy, and Omar Sy, the 45-year-old dabotooɗo 
who works as a school director. Yet, fathers keen to push their daughters through 
schooling also include those who have not attended school themselves. They come from 
lineages whose men typically attended daaras. Indeed, the most striking example 
people mentioned most often was of Rugiyatou Sy, daughter of Ceerno Ousmane, who 
was doing a Masters’ degree in Dakar. Taken together, these men could be considered 
middle-class; either of the political elite, or with income from civil service employment, 
commerce, or clerical activities. Parents’ investment in their daughters’ education to 
such an advanced level is celebrated by development actors who see it as encouraging 
girls to have greater economic independence and decision-making authority in their 
families. However, this section counters those assumptions in several ways. 
 
Some tooroɗo parents who encourage their daughters to study do so to give them 
greater opportunities for self-realisation. They support their daughters but do not force 
them into any particular trajectory. For instance, 45-year-old tooroɗo Omar Sy said of 
his 18-year-old daughter Mama: 
 
I want to send her to Europe as she is well-behaved, and likes studying and 
studies hard, mashallah. I feel confident that she can study abroad as I’ve done 
the work here to prepare her, she is mature and prepared. The lycée director is 
helping her and some others with the university enrolment documents. I gave her 
suggestions on what to study, but it’s her decision. I said medicine, maybe 
gynaecology, but she said it takes too long, i.e. eight years. So I suggested 
aviation, being a pilot, but she said it was a man’s job. So she said she wants to 
do finance, which is fine by me. 
 
On the other hand, some parents are more directive as education presents an important 
source of status for them. One example is 18-year-old Hady Ba, half-sister of Malik Ba 
the sharia student mentioned in Chapter Four. In June 2012, in the run-up to the 
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baccalaureate, Hady told me how her father Younouss Ba was pushing her to succeed. 
Her account mirrored what her brother reported about being under pressure from his 
father to complete his studies for the status they confer:  
 
My father bought a cow already, saying we’ll eat it if I get the bac. The pressure 
is awful, you have to do everything to satisfy him. I want to study 
telecommunications, at a private university in Dakar for a couple of years, but 
it’s expensive, and then hopefully get a scholarship to go abroad. But my father 
is forcing me to do medicine! I can’t stand it, if I had to give someone an 
injection I’d mess up and probably kill them! 
 
From the perspective of development actors this recent trend in Medina Diallobé, of 
middle-class tooroɗo parents supporting their daughters to pursue degrees and formal 
sector jobs, would appear to demonstrate changes in tooroɗo constructions of gender, 
freeing young women from constructions focused on marriage by permitting their 
employment. However, this situation needs to be nuanced further, in two respects. First, 
girls’ education can potentially benefit parents indirectly by increasing their daughters’ 
marriage prospects to men with high-status jobs – who are typically based outside the 
village, whether in Dakar or abroad. Thus, the pattern considered in the previous chapter 
of tooroɗo families placing pressure on young women to marry a cousin or prestigious 
suitor can apply equally to highly-educated young women. A stark example occurred 
within the Ndongo family, related to the Ndaw lineage of village chiefs. 25-year-old 
Amina recounted to me how her aunt, Souadou Ndongo, had married an affluent 
businessman in Dakar and had had three daughters before her husband divorced her. 
The eldest, Binetou aged 24, had been studying in Switzerland, where she met another 
Haalpulaar student whom she wished to marry. However, an older cousin, working as a 
lawyer in the USA, had already approached Souadou Ndongo to request Binetou’s 
hand. Although Binetou did not want to, her mother forced her to marry her cousin. As 
Amina explained:  
 
Binetou’s mother forced her to marry her cousin although she loved another man 
who also had good prospects. She never liked him, even in her wedding photos 
you can see she is crying. She had to live with him and keep studying but didn’t 
like him. 
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In Dakar, I came across several other stories of young Haalpulaar people, male and 
female, with high levels of education including university degrees who were 
nonetheless forced by their families into marriages against their will. Indeed, many felt 
obliged as they were indebted to their family for their education. Hence, the affluent 
tooroɗo parents in Medina Diallobé who support their daughters to obtain high-status 
baccalaureate and university degrees can still push them into marriages for the family’s 
status. Despite their education, young people are often powerless to refuse such matches 
because of the social repercussions. Similar patterns have been observed elsewhere, for 
instance in parts of India, where parents send their daughters to school to prepare them 
for roles as wives and mothers and instil restrictive notions of femininity (Agarwal et al. 
2006; Jeffery & Basu 1996; Jeffery & Jeffery 1998). 
 
In addition to potentially being pushed into an unwanted marriage, the assumption that 
highly educated tooroɗo women stand a better chance of earning money and thus 
increasingly their autonomy is flawed in a second way. Regardless of their educational 
level, most tooroɓe in Medina Diallobé continue to subscribe to discourses which 
impose restrictions on the nature of work tooroɗo women can do based on constructions 
of the category’s social superiority. Yagouba Sy, 22-year-old tooroɗo in lycée, 
expressed these notions during a discussion about tooroɗo women’s work: 
 
Me: Would you want your wife to work? 
Yagouba: Definitely, as long as it’s noble work.  
Me: What work counts as noble, or not noble? 
Yagouba: Like working in an office, that’s noble, but not washing clothes or 
working in the fields, or working in a restaurant. 
Me: Why isn’t it noble, because it’s hard work?  
Yagouba: Hard, but also dirty.  
 
Yagouba’s statement about what ‘noble’ work he thinks would be appropriate for his 
wife hints at the fact that many tooroɗo inhabitants consider it shameful that tooroɗo 
women perform occupations associated with other social categories. Trade, teaching, 
and as Yagouba says ‘working in an office’, are considered appropriately high status. 
However, manual labour outside the domestic sphere is considered shameful as it is 
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linked with gallunkooɗo women, as are any jobs resembling ñeeño women’s customary 
professions. Such constraints on tooroɗo women’s income-generating activities were 
evident in the case of cousins Tacko and Diara Sy, two 35-year-old women, who both 
traded in fabric but wanted to increase their profits by opening a restaurant in the 
village. Tacko and Diara tried to employ a maid but found no one appropriate and 
willing, so were left doing the manual work required. After only two months they 
closed down the business. Declining profits and heavy workloads were factors, but also 
significant was the stigma surrounding the endeavour given their social category. 
Tacko, who did not mind challenging these customary barriers, explained that her 
family’s reaction to the gossip forced her to stop:  
 
Diara’s mother came to my house and said we should abandon the restaurant, 
that we are sharif and this kind of work isn’t for us. I suggested a smaller shop, 
like just selling drinks and cakes, even that she refused. My mother never 
refused, she just said ‘Make sure you get talki’ [s. talkuru, a charm against the 
evil eye and tongue]. Ten people now have come to say similar things. One day 
at the restaurant a client came, he said ‘I only know you to greet you, but I have 
to tell you that all the old men at the main square are talking about you, saying 
you are the daughters of a cleric and sharif, what you’re doing isn’t good. You 
should close up.’ I said to him, ‘I’m not doing anything that’s against the 
religion, let God be the judge of that. I just want to earn money for my children, 
put them in good conditions, where’s the harm in that?’ People complicate 
things. 
 
Similar restrictions barring tooroɗo women from certain occupations also affect tooroɗo 
girls with diplomas. Attitudes towards the profession of hair braiding are an illustrative 
example. Hair braiding is an important element of feminine beauty for the Haalpulaar, 
and women invest significant time on their hairstyles especially in the lead-up to 
lifecycle events and religious festivals. A woman cannot braid herself and must ask 
someone else to devote as many as five or six hours, sometimes spread over several 
days, to plait her hair into complex patterns of thin, cornrow braids. Often women asked 
their own kin, but if no one was available they might pay someone who specialises in 
this profession. Hairdressing salons, dedicated to more contemporary hairstyles using 
artificial hair extensions, are also popular. They are common in urban areas, and one 
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exists in Medina Diallobé where girls pay an expensive fee for exceptional celebrations 
such as weddings and baptisms.  
 
According to customary constructions of social category, the profession of braiding is 
associated with ñeeño women, and there is significant social stigma against tooroɗo 
women doing it. The shame is reinforced by notions of supernatural danger, and the first 
time I encountered this taboo was with Diara, mentioned above. She told me that she 
could in theory braid other women, potentially earning 10,000-15,000CFA (£11-17) a 
day – the monthly salary of a cook in Medina Diallobé - but her husband would not 
allow it. I enquired why, and she replied “If you do it to the public, you can end up 
braiding anyone, if you know what I mean.” I did not know what she meant, so she 
explained “It’s not possible for our caste to braid lower castes. One woman did, and was 
turned into a goat!” Others later clarified to me that there is a risk when braiding for 
money that a jinn will visit you, and curse or attack you with witchcraft. Ñeeñɓe, 
associated as they are with jinn, are protected from such risks. 
 
These customary norms prohibiting tooroɗo women from braiding restrict even school 
graduates from working in this potentially lucrative profession. This was evident in the 
case of Coumba Sakho, a 26-year-old tooroɗo woman who had obtained the BFEM but 
dropped out of 1er lycée four years previously. She had completed an accounting course 
in Dakar but had not found work ‘in an office’ as she hoped, although she continued 
trying to have some financial independence before getting married. Her uncle, Racine, 
was considering starting up several businesses in the village including a hairdressing 
salon. He hoped that the project would create jobs for his extended family, and had in 
mind that Coumba could train and then work at the salon, as she was popular among her 
kin for being gentle when braiding and skilled in creating complex designs. Racine, like 
his wife Tacko mentioned above, ignored the customary prohibitions and saw no 
problem in Coumba’s working as a hairdresser. However, when I asked her what she 
thought of the idea, Coumba’s refusal indicated shame caused by a combination of its 
being a vocational profession for ‘unschooled’ people, but also associated with ñeeñɓe:  
 
Braiding, what kind of work is that?! It’s for people who aren’t even educated, 
and look at all the diplomas I have. And it’s not safe. There was one woman 
who braided, and they say she was braiding someone and a tiny hair got into her 
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eye and she turned blind on the spot. You see, that client was from somewhere 
else, they look like us except that they have feet like hooves [a jinn]. It’s not 
safe. 
 
I pushed Coumba further, saying that her cousin Diara had told me that braiding for 
money was dangerous for people of her social standing. Coumba replied “Yes, now you 
understand, you see here the society is divided up [into categories]…” Despite 
desperately wanting to work, Coumba refused to work in a hairdressing salon for the 
dishonour she felt it would bring her, as both a school graduate and woman of tooroɗo 
category. Sadly, unmarried and still unable to find work, she could only resist the 
gendered social pressures surrounding her for so long. A year after I left Medina 
Diallobé she had been forced by her mother to marry.  
 
Other scholars have noted how pursuit of respectability, involving a complex set of 
practices defined by appropriate behaviour, language and appearance, is a signifier of 
class which always intersects with gender identities (Rao 2011; Skeggs 1997). Stories 
from Medina Diallobé demonstrate the further complexity which arises when the 
hierarchical logic of social category combines with class. As a comparable example, 
evidence from Hindu contexts shows that people’s understandings of their caste identity 
intersecting with gender can ironically restrict their ability to take advantage of new 
economic opportunities. Mies (1982) analysed how in India, ideologies framing high 
caste women as housewives and not workers limited female lacemakers to low-paid 
work within the home since they could not imagine alternative respectable employment 
activities. They acknowledged that women of untouchable or lower castes were able to 
work outside the home and earn more money, but still maintained their discourse of 
caste superiority, looking down upon the other women with contempt for not being 
respectable housewives.  
 
Coumba’s story stands in stark contrast to that of another young tooroɗo woman in the 
village, Fatou Ly, 28-year-old daughter of Hammet Ly, one of the few middle-aged 
tooroɗo men working as a high-ranking civil servant in Dakar. During an interview, 
Hammet told me that Fatou had obtained the BFEM in Medina Diallobé but had then 
dropped out of school. He had therefore paid for her to pursue vocational training as a 
hairdresser in Dakar: 
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She wants to get her diplomas, and then work in a hairdressing salon, or open a 
salon. So we discussed, I asked around, and found a very good private school. I 
have enrolled her and she’s doing IT and management there in the afternoons, 
because if she finishes it’s to open her own salon. I said ‘If you finish, you can 
make one of my houses into a salon. I will buy you all the materials, one million 
CFA [£1200], no problem. I will help you. I have a good salary.’ Each month 
costs 22,500CFA [£25] not including what she buys as materials, and what she 
does for homework, simulations. It’s pretty expensive, but it’s no problem for 
me. 
 
I subtly enquired about Fatou’s choice of profession, given the widespread stigma about 
tooroɗo women braiding for a living. Hammet replied:  
 
You’re right. And the remark has already been made, as people here talk a great 
deal. Even I thought about it, and I said to them, ‘This is a profession she is 
learning, a modern profession.’ It’s less about braiding - though of course she 
will know how to do that because when you open a business you need to know 
what it entails. Fatou still braids, she can do it well, which contributes to the 
elimination of certain prejudices, to show that these days such things are very 
subjective. But rather, you see, Fatou will be a hairdresser in the modern sense, 
because not only will she be a hairdresser who knows how to braid women and 
make money from it, but she’ll be the future boss of her own business! Because 
her father will open a salon for her. It’ll cost two million [£2400] to install all 
the materials, all the machines, mirrors, in order to braid ten women at the same 
time! Because she will employ her own hairdressers, three or four, and pay them 
each month as a function of the profits. That’s why she’s also studying 
management, accounting and IT. But she might have to braid from time to time 
because that’s her profession. So I explained it to people like that and they 
understood. But it takes someone to dare to get these things rolling. 
 
Despite his insistence that social category is becoming irrelevant and that he is beyond 
such things, it is with the privilege of belonging to an aristocratic tooroɗo lineage and 
possessing wealth through a civil service job that Hammet is able to discursively 
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uncouple his daughter’s braiding from the associated taint of social category stigma. He 
does so by rearticulating her type of hairdressing as a distinct ‘modern’ profession in 
implicit contrast to ‘traditional’ local braiding, but also by positioning it within 
acceptable constructions of tooroɓe as socially and economically superior ‘bosses’. 
Furthermore, his daughter’s business will be geographically removed from the 
immediate social context of Medina Diallobé by being in Dakar, making the social 
category stigma weaker. Examples of Haalpulaar ñeeñɓe redefining their characteristics 
to be compatible with ‘modernity’ and contemporary professions have been 
documented elsewhere, especially in urban areas. Mbow (2008, p.78) cites the case of 
an organisation of lawɓe woodworkers pushing for reforestation in Senegal, or awluɓe 
praise-singers working in politics or the media by using the gift of speech associated 
with their category to rally people, while calling themselves “traditional 
communicators” rather than griots. In all of these examples, social category 
constructions are not necessarily being eroded, but rather, the professions associated 
with them are being redefined and revalorised to make them compatible with ‘modern’ 
economic and social opportunities.  
 
However, the conclusions to be drawn from the different cases of tooroɗo women 
hoping to find employment with their diplomas are that they are differentially 
positioned with respect to finding work which can be considered compatible with the 
high status of their social category. Tooroɗo women from more affluent families have 
more chance of finding office jobs considered respectable for their standing. Others who 
are less well-off struggle, as the power of taboos against their doing work associated 
with ñeeñɓe or gallunkooɓe are immense. These social constructions are, however, not 
insurmountable and women do resist the social sanctions and try to negotiate a re-
evaluation of social category professions. Yet, the examples of Coumba Sakho and 
Fatou Ly show that it is those with more privilege and wealth who are better positioned 
to discursively convince local opponents of such changes. It is therefore still the 
tooroɗo women from more affluent families who find it easier to access opportunities 
which enable them to make economic returns on their school diplomas. Those more 
vulnerable tooroɗo women with fewer options like Coumba Sakho continue to be the 
most constrained by custom and least able to challenge the gender and social category 
constructions which limit their ability to find work and resist undesired marriages. 
Indeed, while young women of ñeeño and gallunkooɗo families face financial 
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constraints on completing school and finding formal sector employment, they can 
however take opportunities to do ‘manual’ work as attitudes within their families 
towards such employment are more liberal.  
 
6.4 Finding work after school: Social mobility and the politics of patronage  
 
The two previous sections have demonstrated that pupils usually invest in secondary 
school diplomas hoping to then attend university or find work in the formal sector. 
However, achieving these goals is not straightforward, especially given that unpaid 
internships or further qualifications are required for well-paid positions. This section 
reveals the negotiations involved in obtaining these opportunities among parents and 
young people in Medina Diallobé. The official discourse is that the benefits of school 
are accessible to everyone. Many inhabitants agree with this notion, in particular that all 
social categories can reap the benefits of diplomas. However, the case studies presented 
below demonstrate a more nuanced reality as the likelihood of finding work is strongly 
affected by the degree of one’s clientelistic relations with the local tooroɗo political 
elite.  
 
The discourse described in section 6.2, that the school exerts a democratising influence 
through being accessible to all regardless of social category, is linked to a similar 
argument that formal sector jobs are equally accessible to all graduates with school 
diplomas. The logic goes that because of schooling, hierarchies based on social category 
are being replaced by hierarchies based on wealth through formal employment. Indeed, 
based on evidence from central India, Froerer argues that this is the case in that context 
(2011). This logic is reflected in the statement by Modou Ka, a tooroɗo civil servant 
working in Dakar: 
 
Education is democratising because anyone can get educated, no matter what 
caste, and get a post. Education can help you get out of caste and poverty. This 
is what lower castes are doing, and succeeding […]. The tooroɓe are likely to 
become the poor ones, because they currently learn the Qur’an which has no 
occupation attached to it, and then have to work to found a family once they’re 
old enough. 
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However, in Medina Diallobé the belief that work opportunities are equally accessible 
to members of all social categories possessing school diplomas is challenged when 
considering who manages to find formal sector employment afterwards given the 
additional costs required. For instance, Hammet Ly described in the previous section, 
described how he was going to ensure that his son succeeded: 
 
He studied banking and insurance for three years, I sent him to a private 
university in Dakar. In one year he should finish. And I have already prepared 
for him, there are three big banks in Senegal, my cousin is the Director General 
of one of them, and my son does an internship there each year. So once he has 
his degree they will take him on, and the bank will pay for his Masters’. He is 
very serious. I have money aside so he can build a house, and buy a car, as a 
banker you need a car. He’s always on his laptop – I bought that last year. He 
has two even. 
 
This model is possible for the top elite of Senegalese society, but is unimaginable for 
most inhabitants of Medina Diallobé. The first barrier is information. Hammet Ly is one 
of the few men of his generation born in the 1960s who, with his privileged background, 
obtained a university degree in the 1980s and high-ranking government positions, and 
uses his experience to guide his children. More commonly, young people in the village 
have parents who did not attend school and cannot advise them on future careers. In 
such a competitive environment, this makes a great difference, as Moussa Dem, 40-
year-old tooroɗo migrant living in France, explained: 
 
People from an intellectual family, they might see the point of studies, and know 
that these studies will lead to this job, because they live in that, they know, they 
can foresee. But in my family, I did up to terminal, and my father didn’t even 
know which year I was in! He only knew that I went to school each day and 
came home. He hasn’t studied, he doesn’t know! He can’t give me advice, do 
this or that in your studies! Take my little sister, Madina, she wanted to do L 
[languages and literature stream in lycée] but I said do S [maths and sciences]. 
It’s hard, but you have more options with it. Otherwise she would have done L 
which limits you. As Senegal doesn’t have many jobs, if you do L you can only 
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be a teacher, or a lawyer but for that you need further studies, and the faculty of 
law at UCAD is full. So I help Madina to revise by buying her books and so on. 
But others don’t have that guidance.” 
 
The second barrier to well-paid jobs is wealth, as few families have the capital Hammet 
Ly does to pay for higher education tuition and other privileges like laptop computers. 
Therefore, many young people who have managed to obtain the baccalaureate are often 
ambivalent about their options, and pursue vacataire teaching positions as a last resort. 
For instance, I asked Bachir Wane, a tooroɗo aged 26, studying law at university in 
Dakar, what he hoped to do afterwards: 
 
“I like contract law, I’d like to work for a firm. But it’s hard in Senegal, unless 
you have someone with a lot of money to help you get an internship and so on. I 
will probably end up teaching, seeing as that’s the only sure thing these days, 
that and healthcare. You do that for a few years to help support yourself, start a 
household. It’s tough here, the labour market isn’t good. Often studies don’t lead 
to anything specific.” 
 
Despite low-pay vacataire teaching being unattractive, young people’s accounts suggest 
nonetheless that it is a route through which they can valorise their status as graduates. 
This is reflected in a statement by 28-year-old tooroɗo Harouna Sakho: 
 
“I’ve been teaching in primary for three years. At the start I didn’t like it, I’d 
never even considered teaching. I wanted to do a course in business management 
but my father didn’t have much money then and it was an expensive course. So I 
went to public university, I did business administration. But I made a bad 
choice, I did bac L but in the second year there was lots of statistics and maths 
and I couldn’t keep up, so I left and taught. But little by little it’s grown on me. 
If done well, it can be an honourable profession.” 
 
The third barrier to obtaining a well-paid formal job relates to one’s contacts, as it is 
through networks that people obtain information about careers, favours such as jobs or 
internships, and funding for tuition. The importance of calling upon extended networks 
to ask for assistance within the educational strategies of young people and their parents 
202 
 
cannot be underestimated. The necessity of meeting the three conditions of merit but 
also money and connections has also been documented in students’ struggles to enter 
higher education elsewhere, for instance, in Nigeria (Willott 2011).  
 
In Medina Diallobé, the elite who young people mainly approach for help includes the 
mayor of the commune, Ibrahima Sy, and his second-in-command, Al Hassan Dia, who 
are both high-ranking civil servants. Ibrahima was locally elected, while Al Hassan was 
appointed by the mayor. From the colonial period, access to state school scholarships 
(Robinson 2000b, p.102), jobs, and other public privileges (Villalón 1995) has been 
mediated through clientelist networks of state-employed patrons. This has increased 
under decentralisation in the 1970s whereby some decision-making responsibilities 
were devolved to the locally-elected municipal councils or communes (Blundo 2000; 
Villalón 1995, pp.89–90). It has led to a new elite of political actors beyond the lineages 
of village chief, although their networks are often based on older clan-based ties 
(Olivier de Sardan 2011, p.26). Indeed, local politicians in Medina Diallobé frequently 
distribute resources and favours. These neo-patrimonial practices encompass both 
‘patronage’ where patrons use state resources to provide jobs and services for their 
political supporters, and ‘neopatrimonial clientelism’ where politicians and bureaucrats 
use state resources to economically support their personal network members. While the 
former is explicitly political in function, the latter is not (Therkildsen 2014, p.123). The 
clientelistic dynamics in Medina Diallobé prove a fascinating setting for illuminating 
the complex influence of social category and wealth on young people’s social mobility 
through education.  
 
Young people are more likely to receive help from members of the political elite based 
on their family’s proximity to these powerful actors, either through kinship or being part 
of their group of political supporters. For instance, Khadidiatou Sy, a 24-year-old 
tooroɗo university student, had had her degree tuition financed by the mayor, Ibrahima 
Sy. Not only is she a member of his extended family, but her mother’s sister is the wife 
of Baaba Ndaw, of the village chieftaincy lineage, and one of Ibrahima’s closest 
supporters. In contrast, at one point Cheikhna Sylla, mentioned in the previous chapter, 
approached Al Hassan Dia asking for help to pay for a training course for his wife 
Ramatoulaye, but was less successful. She told me:  
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I asked Al Hassan for help, we are related distantly, but he didn’t do anything. 
Even my husband Cheikhna went to see him and said ‘After all you’ve done for 
the village, can’t you help my wife?’ Al Hassan was ashamed. He said ‘Call at 
any time.’ I called but it always went to answerphone. I don’t want to keep 
hassling him. 
 
It is of note that although they are tooroɓe, Cheikhna’s family lacks political leverage or 
kinship ties to the aristocratic clerical or political families. They fled Mauritania during 
the civil war and are comparative newcomers to Medina Diallobé without land or 
inherited wealth. These are likely reasons why they were less successful in receiving Al 
Hassan’s support. 
 
Such clientelistic relationships mediating access to school-related resources became 
increasingly explicit in the run-up to the presidential elections in March 2012. During 
the election campaign, a rivalry emerged between mayor Ibrahima Sy and his second-
in-command Al Hassan Dia for leadership of the commune and local branch of the 
ruling party, the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS). My informants knowledgeable 
about the internal politics of the commune suspected that Al Hassan hoped to take the 
mayor’s place in the next local elections. Both men were perceived as evenly matched 
in terms of legitimacy to political authority, being members of aristocratic tooroɗo 
lineages. Ibrahima is from the clerical family of Ceerno Ousmane Sy through his father, 
and the family of the imam, through his mother. Al Hassan’s mother is also from the 
imam’s family, making him Ibrahima’s cousin, and his father is of the chieftaincy 
lineage in the neighbouring village of Wuro Mawdo. However, Ibrahima Sy had 
developed a more longstanding local popularity in Medina Diallobé. Despite not being a 
member of the village chieftaincy lineage, his dissemination of wealth gained through 
civil service employment and projects supported through donor funds helped him get 
elected mayor of the commune in 2008, a trend documented elsewhere in Senegal (Sall 
2001; Lavigne-Delville 2000; Blundo 2000). By contrast, Al Hassan Dia was somewhat 
peripheral to the ruling elite in Medina Diallobé at the time of my fieldwork. He had not 
been raised in Medina Diallobé or ever lived there, had never been involved in any 
development activities in the village, and was only appointed second-in-command at the 
commune by Ibrahima in 2008. By 2012, Al Hassan was therefore doing all he could to 
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become an important patron, in order to establish a name for himself to increase his 
political popularity in the wake of the next local elections.  
 
While Ibrahima Sy had won the local municipal election in 2008 hands-down, by 2012 
numbers of supporters at his rallies were much lower. A growing discourse of 
dissatisfaction with Ibrahima emerged among village residents, while Al Hassan Dia 
was praised for his actions. These differences in popularity were directly linked to local 
norms meaning that people expect political representatives to personally help their 
constituents in return for votes (Olivier de Sardan 1999, p.258). One discourse I heard 
very frequently was that Ibrahima had failed to help ‘the village’ and ‘young people’. In 
reality, as president of the UGOMD village development association, Ibrahima had 
played a pivotal role in constructing the collège and second primary school in the 2000s, 
as described in Chapter Three. As president of the UGOMD, Ibrahima had undertaken 
additional infrastructural projects in the village in collaboration with external donors. 
He also used his salary as mayor to create a bursary to fund the village’s university 
students’ accommodation. Nonetheless, criticisms circulated that Ibrahima had not used 
enough of his own funds or personally helped inhabitants. As Moustafa Sy, my older 
host-brother stated, “Ibrahima Sy has done nothing for the village, nothing. The money 
for the [infrastructural projects], none of it was his own money, it was people in Europe 
and Dakar raising the money.” Chérif Konté, leader of the village youth movement, also 
remarked of the aforementioned projects that “Ibrahima said there would be jobs there. 
But if any youth from Medina Diallobé get jobs there it’ll be scooping up rubbish [as 
they lack the necessary qualifications].” Samba Ka corroborated that Al Hassan was 
more popular than Ibrahima because he understood that local people expect a degree of 
personal favouritism from politicians: 
 
Ibrahima Sy tends not to help individuals directly like Al Hassan Dia, but rather 
collectives, like he has paid for the university students’ accommodation out of 
his salary as mayor. He doesn’t help many people get jobs because he’s 
embarrassed of asking his boss [for favours]. And, Ibrahima isn’t liked because 
although he works hard and gets things done, he doesn’t have time to call 
people, he doesn’t have an open house where people feel comfortable and that’s 
what people like, hospitality. Whereas Al Hassan knows this, he calls people 
once a month and people like him. If Ibrahima Sy gave the heads of important 
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families here a phone call each month and 2000CFA [£2.30 or ten minutes of 
phone credit] here and there, it would do more [for his popularity] than [the 
infrastructural projects]. Al Hassan Dia is muscling in. 
 
Helping young people into work and higher education became a key area in which Al 
Hassan competed with Ibrahima Sy for popularity, hoping to take the mayor’s place in 
the next local elections. Samba Ka informed me of the dynamics involved in one such 
request for assistance from Baaba Ndaw, the prominent local political mobiliser and 
supporter of Ibrahima Sy and the PDS party: 
 
The mayor promised that he would fund the university tuition for Baaba Ndaw’s 
son, but he didn’t look after him too well. So, it was Al Hassan Dia who stepped 
in to provide his son’s university fees. Because il fait la politique31, he is doing 
politics, he wants to topple Ibrahima, that’s his objective. He’s playing with his 
influence to show the incapacity of the town hall personnel. 
 
Most significantly, Al Hassan asked a friend well-positioned in the government to 
arrange for several young inhabitants of Medina Diallobé to be appointed as vacataire 
teachers in schools in other regions of Senegal. This case study forms part of a wider 
trend of clientelistic appointment of vacataires in Senegal. One scandal broke in 2012 
in the Kolda region as the Academic Inspector, the Ministry of Education’s 
representative at regional level, was fired after it was discovered that he had been 
selling teacher appointments for 500,000CFA each (£560) (Anon 2012; Diallo 2013a; 
2013b). Furthermore, in late 2012 the newly-elected president, Macky Sall, froze all 
vacataire appointments to conduct an audit of existing personnel, after a World Bank 
report revealed that over 5000 such teachers on the Ministry’s payroll could not be 
identified (Dia 2012). Al Hassan publicised his manoeuvre widely, telling me about it 
explicitly in an interview. “You see, I have found work for a lot of young people, it’s 
making a big noise in the village.” He invited several of the teachers back to Medina 
Diallobé to participate in the election campaign in 2012.  
                                                 
31
 In Senegal, faire la politique or ‘doing politics’ refers to a struggle between political factions. It 
includes following a political leader, and evokes the mobilisation which precedes any confrontation 
between leaders and the strategies adopted to floor one’s adversary and to get the maximum of supporters 
on one’s side. Faire la politique means sharing the spoils with the winners and systematically excluding 
the opponents from managing public resources (Blundo 2000, pp.95–96) (my translation from French). 
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Most people I knew congratulated Al Hassan’s actions. “Al Hassan is nice, calling 
people and doing good things. He arranged for my friend to teach, he’s nice, he helps 
people.” said 16-year-old Houley Sy. Samba Ka agreed that it had added to his 
popularity, “It’s helping people get jobs that people really appreciate, so Al Hassan has 
done well there.” However, other inhabitants I spoke with criticised this patronage 
practice. They voiced concern over whether the candidates were qualified, questioning 
how they managed to pass the regional exam to be teachers, and suggested clientelistic 
appointments for political reasons. Indeed, I knew two of the teachers personally and 
they did not have the baccalaureate. One, a tooroɗo named Salif Ba appointed as an 
ustaas, had not attended state schools at all but daaras, and could not speak Arabic 
although he spoke French learned from friends and kin. However, both of these young 
men were related to two of Ibrahima Sy’s strongest and most vocal supporters, whom 
Al Hassan would want on his side come the elections. Others in the village were also 
dubious of the political intentions behind Al Hassan’s appointment of vacataire teachers 
from Medina Diallobé. Although he had helped members of all social categories, his 
strategy ultimately reproduced his political interests. Ismaila Gueye, the 28-year-old 
baylo lycée teacher stated: 
 
Al Hassan has arranged for many to teach, only some have the bac and that was 
years ago, so the quality won’t be good. Al Hassan was talking about this at the 
public meeting the other day, and lots of people like him for it. From Mbayla 
there were two teachers, this neighbourhood five… From all neighbourhoods 
and all social categories, pretty evenly spread, to show he’s helping everyone. 
And then when he needs it, he can call on those neighbourhoods for support. 
[…] It’s all strictly political. 
 
These examples clearly show that despite the prevalent discourse that graduates of all 
social categories have equal chances of securing formal sector employment, access to 
resources to realise the economic utility of school diplomas are mediated through 
clientelist relationships. The advantages particular young people enjoy over others are 
not defined by the wealth of their immediate family, or by belonging to a lineage with 
inherited baraka as with graduates of the daaras. Rather, it is associated with their 
relationships to important patrons. These patrons are all tooroɗo men of the local 
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political elite, from customary aristocratic lineages, with significant personal salaries 
and high-ranking civil service positions which enable them to grant favours and 
mobilise additional funds. Importantly, although the patrons are male members of the 
tooroɗo aristocracy, beyond this level the correlation between wealth and social 
category is not so simple. Other tooroɓe not of aristocratic families are not necessarily 
better positioned within these clientelist networks than members of other categories.  
 
These examples provide a counter-balance to the case of Barro Cissé considered in the 
previous chapter, whose clientelistic relations with his tooroɗo host family in the long-
term undermined his attempts to succeed in school. By contrast, this section suggests 
that engaging in relations with the political elite has positive implications for the social 
mobility of client families. However, in the long-run it supports the findings of Morgan 
et al. mentioned in the previous chapter, that clientelism as a system benefits the patrons 
more. The patronage relationships documented here whereby – some dissenters aside - 
the majority of people vote for the mayoral candidate who dispenses the most material 
favours, indirectly reproduce the overall hierarchical political structure which underpins 
the elite positions of members of the tooroɗo aristocracy. Ideological or material 
barriers to other categories’ access to political positions ultimately inhibit possibilities 
of genuine structural social reform. In India (Jeffrey et al. 2008, p.125) and Bangladesh 
(Rao & Hossain 2011, p.627) the requirement to pay bribes to obtain civil service 
positions has led to lower investment in state school among poorer parents and young 
people. Time will tell if comparable trends emerge in Medina Diallobé. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter analysed several groups in Medina Diallobé who are conspicuous for 
pursuing long-term post-primary schooling in the village. Findings show that social 
category identity is extremely important in shaping people’s trajectories, despite the fact 
that statistics on this form of difference are not collected, and official discourses deny 
its relevance in contemporary Senegalese society. In Medina Diallobé this is revealed 
by baylo and gallunkooɗo families seeking to valorise their status through seeking a 
school-based educated identity; tooroɗo families sending boys to state schools so as not 
to be economically and politically ‘overtaken’ by other categories; and tooroɓe 
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investing in girls’ education so they can earn money outside the home as long as it is 
‘noble work’. This in turn requires discursive ‘work’, as people appropriate 
constructions of ‘modernity’ in contrast to ‘tradition’ to overcome customary 
ideological constraints on social category behaviour.  
 
Gender, social category and wealth intersect in complex and unpredictable ways, and 
generalisations cannot easily be made. For instance, the previous chapter noted that 
tooroɗo families pressure girls to marry before completing school, and many tooroɗo 
men in the village prefer wives without diplomas or formal employment, yet this 
chapter showed that is it also among tooroɗo parents – especially the middle-class who 
can afford the investment - that high value is accorded to their daughters’ schooling and 
even university education. This latter scenario also counters the stereotype mentioned in 
Chapter One, that schooling, higher education and formal employment are empowering 
for women, as they increase their authority, autonomy and financial independence. 
Rather, being educated does not necessarily enhance tooroɗo girls’ ability to resist 
marriage to a suitor their family considers appropriate, or negotiate around the stigma 
concerning vocational professions. As with the previous chapter, these findings stress 
the need for research on inequalities in education outcomes in West Africa to consider 
the crucial combined role social category and gender identities play on decision-making 
processes. Their intersection with people’s socioeconomic status, and hence ability to 
realise their desired trajectories, also needs to go beyond narrow measures of household 
income to take into account how people are embedded within clientelistic relationships, 
and how this influences their access to assets.  
 
Indeed, section 6.4 problematized the promises made by the state and development 
agencies that school diplomas provide meritocratic and equal employment opportunities 
to all graduates. While the daara is increasingly recognised by Medina Diallobé 
inhabitants as reproducing tooroɗo dominance as only the aristocratic lineages can truly 
benefit economically, in reality the state school space also risks being appropriated by 
certain elite toorobe to reinforce their superior social position. By channelling funds for 
university tuition, and even vacataire jobs, to their kin and political allies, members of 
the tooroɗo elite exclude from these opportunities anyone who might seek to challenge 
their political monopoly in the village. This constitutes a barrier to distributive justice, 
namely equal access to the benefits of schooling. These examples also contribute to 
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debates surrounding the influence of clientelist relations on education outcomes and 
social mobility, concluding that while they help client families in the short term, they 
support unequal power relations and patrons’ privilege in the long run. Time will tell 
whether these processes will alter parents’ and young people’s investment in secondary 
schooling.  
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Chapter 7. “Doing both”: The challenges of acquiring religious and secular 
knowledge  
7.1 Introduction  
 
The previous three chapters suggest that attendance in either Qur’anic schools or state 
schools in Medina Diallobé is mutually exclusive. However, in reality seeking 
knowledge associated with both types of school is an integral part of all young people’s 
learning strategies. Everyone I met during my research, whether Senegalese in the Futa 
Tooro or in Dakar, or European academics, argued that “Everyone does both”. The 
model of ‘doing both’ I came across most often in Dakar is the pattern common among 
the urban middle-class dating from the colonial period, of preschool-aged children 
attending the daara to learn the basic Qur’anic verses, before dropping out within the 
first few years of starting primary school. While this trajectory is followed by many 
children in Medina Diallobé, the ‘daara-then-school’ model is not universal, and the 
range of additional strategies inhabitants pursue is far more diverse. This chapter shifts 
away from considering the daara and state schools separately, to discuss the various 
means parents and young people employ to help the latter acquire a combination of 
knowledge and skills associated with the different schools. 
 
So far, I have shown how parents’ and young people’s reasons for valuing the daara or 
state school full-time are motivated by the intersecting considerations of faith and other 
intrinsic benefits, social status relating to gender and social category, and economic 
utility. Their trajectories clearly reveal the influence of embedded social norms, most 
importantly the intimate and exclusive association constructed between tooroɗo 
masculinity and daara education. Tooroɗo boys especially of clerical lineages attend 
the daara, while adolescent girls’ and non-tooroɗo boys’ enrolment in state schools is 
linked to their exclusion from the daara. However, full-time attendance in neither the 
daara nor the state school fulfils all the educational demands of inhabitants. The daara 
meets the spiritual needs of tooroɓe boys, and contributes to their prestige and social 
status, but, with the exception of a minority with specific inherited privileges, it is 
perceived as failing to provide satisfactory income-generating skills. The state school 
promises income-generating opportunities through diplomas and provides the important 
skill of French literacy, although well-paid formal employment afterwards is restricted 
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to those who can afford additional training, or have links to patrons who can help them. 
And, despite government reforms to integrate a larger religious component into state 
schools, the current secondary public schools still do not meet the demands of 
inhabitants for advanced Islamic instruction, particularly among tooroɓe.  
 
In considering strategies people use to obtain knowledge associated with both daaras 
and state schools, the most obvious alternative is enrolment in private Islamic schools. 
Section 7.2 of this chapter describes the extent to which reformed Islamic schools, 
whether private or state-run, are accessible to people in Medina Diallobé. It concludes 
that they are located far away and while they exert some influence on the local 
educational landscape, an accessible and affordable secondary school which teaches 
both religion to advanced level and French with other subjects does not yet exist in the 
commune. Section 7.3 considers young people’s attendance in private, fee-charging 
Islamic schools as a strategy restricted to more affluent families. Section 7.4 considers 
solutions to this quandary found by less well-off young people, namely self-directed 
learning outside of formal institutions. This can be considered a ‘tactic’ among more 
disadvantaged pupils, whether girls and non-tooroɗo boys excluded from the daaras, or 
tooroɗo boys who cannot afford private tuition who learn French alongside memorising 
the Qur’an in a daara. Section 7.5 looks at how pupils alternate between several types 
of school over the duration of their educational career. It reveals that the way in which 
they do so reveals logics at odds with state, development actors’, and Islamic reformers’ 
evaluations of valuable knowledge, but also possible alternative education formats of 
interest to policy-makers. 
 
7.2 The influence of reformed Islamic schools in Medina Diallobé  
 
Despite the fact that most young people in Medina Diallobé attend state schools, 
everyone I spoke with insisted that every child needs some Islamic education first. As 
18-year-old tooroɗo Aliou Watt in 4ème collège said “You can have the Qur’an but not 
French school, but the other way around isn’t possible, i.e. to just have French school!” 
Pupils who attend state school, regardless of social category, consider basic religious 
knowledge to be crucial, and of more inherent importance than things learned in state 
school. Seydou Coulibaly, a 26-year-old gallunkooɗo man who had obtained the 
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baccalaureate, said “When you learn the Qur’an, you have to learn it for life, it’s not 
permitted to forget any of it. In French school, you learn something for the exam and 
you move on.” Astou Ndiaye, a 22-year-old gallunkooɗo woman who had dropped out 
of 4ème collège, made a similar comment: “The sharia is so important, it’s more 
important than what you learn at French school. There’s stuff they don’t teach you in 
French school that’s in the Qur’an.” I also encountered a strong argument among 
parents and teachers in Medina Diallobé that basic knowledge of the Qur’an helps 
children succeed later in state school. Harouna Sakho, a 28-year-old tooroɗo primary 
school teacher, argued that “Children who learn both are the best pupils, they are good 
at memorisation but also have a good analytical capacity.” This view has been 
documented more widely in Senegal, from the 1930s (Ware 2014, p.193) and in other 
contexts such as Morocco, Yemen and Nigeria (Boyle 2006, p.495). 
 
Another similar discourse I encountered throughout Senegal is that both religious 
education and state school skills are needed in combination for shaping moral but also 
economically productive persons. This is captured perfectly in a sketch teachers wrote 
and pupils performed at Medina Diallobé II school, at an event on the topic of ‘religious 
education and the crisis of values’, as recounted by Koïta, the director: 
 
There were three families, one was rich, the second was average, the third was 
poor. Seeing as the theme was ‘religious education and the crisis of values’, in 
the rich family the Africans want to imitate the life of the whites. So these were 
rich and had forgotten their culture, they wanted to adapt to French culture. They 
didn’t even teach their children the religion. All they wanted is that their 
children succeeded in school. The second family, the child learns the Qur’an and 
goes to French school. The last family, they adopted their nephew and instead of 
teaching him the Qur’an or sending him to school, sent him to work in the 
market. He doesn’t learn anything. And then in the end, what happened? The 
child who learned both finished his Qur’anic studies, got his diplomas, got his 
bac, and went to the university to pursue his studies, but he will be polite and 
respect his religion. So this child learned good habits and Islamic ideals. Now, 
the rich family, the father finishes by being fired from his job, the family has 
nothing now. And they start doing God knows what, they are uprooted, they 
can’t educate the daughter, she doesn’t have good behaviour and she does 
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whatever she wants. The poor family, the boy gets into trouble, steals 
something, the police have to intervene and the mother is responsible for his 
upbringing. It was great, the pupils acted all of that, and they did it very well! 
 
This discourse that both state school skills and religious knowledge are needed to create 
both moral and economically productive persons is also subscribed to by tooroɗo boys 
attending the daara to advanced level. Many sandas agreed that alongside the moral 
lessons and baraka conferred through Qur’anic memorisation in the daara, French 
literacy is also needed for finding work afterwards. The story below, recounted by 28-
year-old tooroɗo Lamine Hanne, reveals a common trope among Medina Diallobé 
inhabitants, of the economic pitfalls of only memorising the Qur’an but not learning 
French: 
 
You need French, it’s good as you can read and write, and get by talking to 
people. And with a bit of Arabic too you can read the Qur’an. That’s why the 
Franco-Arab school is good, you can do both. But here, it’s either one or the 
other, it’s hard to do both. Without French it’s seriously bad. My cousin studied 
the Qur’an at a daara in the Futa and finished when he was 30. He went to 
France and couldn’t do anything, he couldn’t speak the language at all, he didn’t 
know anything. He said to people ‘Give me French lessons’ before he went, but 
by then it was too late. If you study the Qur’an it’s possible to get French lessons 
on Thursdays and Fridays, the days you have off. But if you learn nothing, you 
have no chance. My cousin bought a driving license and a car but he couldn’t 
even understand signs that said ‘danger’ or ‘stop’. He was arrested and put in 
prison for two years and had to pay a fine, and they took his car. Now he’s in 
Dakar trying to find work…but if you have a bit of French you can get by, if you 
go to Cameroon, or Gabon. If you learn a bit of both, it’s good. 
 
However, acquiring Islamic education as well as French literacy and state school 
subjects is far from straightforward in Medina Diallobé. Chapter Two documented in 
detail the different kinds of Islamic schools which have been developed in Senegal over 
the past century to address this challenge. These include schools founded by Sufi 
leaders, clerics, Salafi-inspired reformists, and the state. Private fee-charging schools 
outside state recognition include boarding-school daaras dedicated to intensive 
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memorisation of the Qur’an within a few years; Arabo-Islamic institutes teaching 
Arabic alongside the Qur’an; and Franco-Arab schools teaching French and additional 
subjects alongside religion. The state has also created public Franco-Arab primary 
schools and some collèges in the past fifteen years. All these schools are typically open 
to girls as well as boys, and have no barriers to access based on social category. None of 
these models is however present in or near Medina Diallobé. The daaras continue to 
operate, as seen in Chapter Four, largely according to a model of long-term 
memorisation of the Qur’an under a cleric, paid for through manual labour and 
unquantified gifts after completion of study, restricted to tooroɗo males. The state 
schools available, as described in the previous chapters, are those based on the model 
inherited from the colonial period with limited religious content, not the more recent 
Franco-Arab schools. 
 
Despite the absence of these schools in Medina Diallobé and the surrounding area, 
evidence shows that the existence of alternative Islamic school models elsewhere in 
Senegal is starting to influence educational provision in the commune. The first 
example is that, since 2009, a 23-year-old Franco-Arab school graduate named Aissata 
Sall has started teaching girls and women basic religious practice and Qur’anic verses 
from her home. At age ten Aissata began learning at a boarding daara in Dakar, 
completing memorisation of the Qur’an when she was 15. When she was 16 she started 
learning Arabic and French at the prestigious private Al-Falah Franco-Arab school, 
reaching the equivalent of 5ème year in collège. At the age of 18, Aissata married and 
returned to Medina Diallobé to live with her husband and parents-in-law. She told me 
she stopped studying herself as there was no boarding school in the village. “But the 
Qur’an says that if you have knowledge you should teach it”, Aissata explained, 
following a pattern common among reformist-educated Muslim women to establish 
their own schools in their communities (Kalmbach 2012). “Teaching also helps you not 
to forget what you have learned.” Her practice has no precedent in Medina Diallobé, as 
prior to 2009 girls would usually be taught by male sandas. Aissata’s initiative is typical 
of the growing influence of reformist Islamic schools in opening new religious 
educational opportunities for girls, but still falls far short of a full-time Islamic school 
which caters to females at either primary or secondary level in the village. 
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As regards government provision of religious education, the new Franco-Arab schools, 
whether primary or collège, which split teaching equally between the state-school 
curriculum taught in French, and Islamic subjects taught in Arabic, are located several 
hundreds of kilometres away in the regions of Kaolack, Diourbel and Louga. They have 
had no impact on school trajectories of adolescents and young adults in Medina 
Diallobé. No one I spoke to was aware of their existence, and Franco-Arab schools that 
inhabitants attended were private fee-charging establishments in Dakar or St Louis. The 
state has also recently introduced six hours of religious education and Arabic a week 
into the existing public primary school curriculum, but the collège and lycée syllabi 
have not been altered. Pupils are not taught religious studies, although they do learn 
Arabic as a foreign language and some Islamic history. For many who attend the state 
secondary schools for the income-generating skills and diplomas conferred, they 
perceive the schools as insufficient for learning their religion to advanced level. 
Mohamed Sy, 15-year-old tooroɗo in 4ème collège, stated “In school we learn all about 
Molière and René Caillé but nothing about Cheikh Umar Tall who brought good things 
to Senegal, he taught us about God. Instead we only learn about people who did bad 
things to Africa.” Kalidou Ndiaye, 24-year-old ceɗɗo in terminal lycée agreed: “My 
history teacher at school knows nothing of Islamic history. It’s bad, I know more, and I 
go to books and another better teacher to find out more.”  
 
The following sections reveal the strategies young people use to acquire both religious 
knowledge and skills associated with the state schools, given the lack of options 
available which combine both in Medina Diallobé. Their multiple and varied pathways 
reflect similar common preoccupations, but large differences in ability to realise those 
aspirations. This type of evidence is significant given the lack of research on people’s 
experiences of engaging across different school types in contemporary African Muslim 
contexts, and the ways in which this engagement is embedded in common logics, rather 
than different rationales for different schools.32  
 
 
                                                 
32
 See, however, Bledsoe’s (1986) fascinating article on how cultural beliefs about the importance of 
esoteric “secret” knowledge and power attached to literacy influenced people’s evaluations of both state 
and Qur’anic schools in Sierra Leone. 
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7.3 Full-time study in private Islamic schools  
 
Several private Islamic schools in cities, which facilitate acquisition of religious 
education and skills useful for finding work, appeal to inhabitants of Medina Diallobé. 
The type of private school most frequented by young people is the boarding daara 
which teaches memorisation of the Qur’an, with board, lodging, and tuition paid for 
through monthly fees of 25,000CFA–30,000CFA (£28-34 – the cost of a large sack of 
rice which lasts a household a month). These schools do not teach French or Arabic, but 
as they teach memorisation of the Qur’an intensively within four to five years they leave 
graduates more time to learn other knowledge afterwards in other settings.33 As 
described in Chapter Four, long-term study alongside work for the cleric in the rural 
daara increasingly conflicts with young men’s aspirations to earn a living quickly in the 
cash economy. For instance, Binta Sy, a 45-year-old tooroɗo woman of a branch of the 
clerical Sy family, who sends all her sons to boarding daaras in Dakar, stated how she 
prefers these schools for the speed at which students learn the Qur’an: “Seydina [aged 
26] went to a private internat, he is abroad now. But see, he finished the Qur’an in 2003 
and his cousin Abderahmane who is the same age [and studied in a daara in the Futa 
Tooro] finished in 2010.” 15-year-old tooroɗo Mohamed Sy also told me why he would 
be able to study faster at a boarding daara:  
 
There [in the boarding daara] you can forget everything about your life here 
because you don’t go out at all, only Fridays for prayers, and you only see your 
family on religious holidays. If I stay here [in the classic daara typical of the 
Futa] I won’t learn well. There you only learn, you don’t have to work for the 
cleric. So what you learn in one year there could take you four years here. There 
aren’t many schools like that in the Futa. 
 
Boys from the affluent tooroɗo families in Medina Diallobé, such as the Ndaw village 
chiefs, Sy clerical families, Ba family of the imam, and others with large land-holdings 
or wealth from migrants abroad, are most likely to have at least one son who attends, or 
who has attended, a boarding daara. However, despite their desirability, numbers of 
                                                 
33
 In comparison to daaras in the Futa Tooro, where the average length of time needed to memorise the 
Qur’an is ten years, 33% of talibés in the Dakar region memorise the Qur’an fully within only 3 years 
(MEN 2010, p.53). 
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boys from Medina Diallobé who attend these daaras is fairly low as it is an expensive 
option. Mohamed Sy explained his struggle to find the funds to attend such a school in 
Dakar, after his father had died: “I even asked my brother Djibril [a migrant living in 
France], but he said that if he paid for me then he would have to pay for anyone else 
who asked.” Luckily for Mohamed, his mother had inherited wealth from her family, 
and had sons abroad who regularly sent her money, so could afford to pay his fees.  
 
The lack of affordable Islamic school options in or near Medina Diallobé is leading to a 
stratification of access to valued knowledge, perpetuating forms of inequality which 
have their roots in the colonial period. As mentioned in Chapter Two, in the early 
twentieth century, only middle-class urban families could afford to take the best of both 
forms of education, by paying tuition fees for their children to attend the daara as day 
students, while simultaneously sending them to state schools. Poorer families valuing 
Qur’anic education were obliged to send their sons to be live-in students in the rural 
daara, and were excluded from the privileges the state school conferred in the new 
political and economic order. In this case, the preference is reversed: tooroɗo families 
do not want intensive state school education with the daara on the side, but the 
opposite, intensive daara education with French on the side. Nonetheless, the colonial 
period established inequalities between those who could afford to do both, which has 
not yet changed much for all the state’s reforms. Even today, only privileged families in 
Medina Diallobé can afford the private Islamic schools which enable students to pursue 
trajectories where they combine both forms of knowledge within a reasonable 
timeframe. These families tend to be tooroɓe of customary aristocratic lineages, large 
land-holdings and inherited wealth, with migrant members abroad, or patronage 
connections to the political elite mentioned in the previous chapter. 
 
Despite the fact that few tooroɗo boys attend boarding daaras in the cities, I 
encountered examples that suggest that this model, where students learn the Qur’an 
intensively, is leading to changed perceptions among young men in Medina Diallobé of 
the value of working for a clericin a rural daara. Diallo, the Medina Diallobe I primary 
school director, captures the still widespread ideology that not paying tuition fees to the 
cleric, but working instead as part of a reciprocal relationship, is necessary for 
accumulating baraka: 
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You need to work for the cleric and suffer a bit to get baraka. Before almudɓe 
worked in the fields, but the cleric wasn’t exploiting them! They wanted to work 
there. They bring wood so they can study by the fire in the evening. […] The 
cleric isn’t allowed to ask for money for teaching, but you have to work for him 
out of your own desire, and you benefit from the baraka. He will bless you a lot 
if he’s pleased with you. 
 
However, I witnessed a debate between sandas suggesting shifting views about the 
relative merits of working for the cleric. One sanda, Hammadi, in his early twenties, 
was extremely diligent in practising recitation of the Qur’an all day at home, virtually 
non-stop, according to a strict personal schedule. His desire was to complete 
memorisation as quickly as possible in order to start working. The other sandas agreed 
that he was making good progress. But Alfa, another sanda of the same age who spent 
less time reciting as he regularly went to work in his cleric’s fields, remarked behind his 
back “but Hammadi never works for his cleric, and that’s not good [for baraka]”.  
 
Hence, the valorisation of baraka derived through working for the cleric is being 
challenged by the new notion that sufficient baraka can be acquired solely through 
Qur’anic memorisation. Indeed, many inhabitants of Medina Diallobé argued that 
paying tuition fees at an urban boarding daara in order to memorise the Qur’an in five 
years, is preferable to long-term study in a rural daara for twice or three times as long. 
In the comparable context of the prayer economy in Niger, Butler (2006) has noticed a 
similar shift from long-term reciprocal relationships with clerics characterised by 
exchange of unspecified sums of money, to preference among clients for fixed-rate 
payments through short-term market transactions. Butler argues that clients prefer the 
latter as it works more to their economic advantage than long-term relationships, as the 
overall price paid in the one-off transaction works out as being less. In Medina 
Diallobé, economic incentives are also behind this shift, but a ‘time-is-money’ logic 
criticising the long duration spent studying in the rural daara seems to be the crucial 
factor considered, rather than dissatisfaction with the reciprocal cleric-almuɗo 
relationship per se. 
 
It is not only boys from tooroɗo families who attend the boarding daaras outside 
Medina Diallobé. These schools also appeal to a couple of tooroɗo families for their 
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daughters, and non-tooroɗo families for their sons. As revealed in Chapter Two, the 
daaras in the Futa Tooro associated with the Umariyya Tijaniyya Sufi order have 
customarily been barred to these groups. Nevertheless, just because they are excluded 
from long-term formal Islamic instruction does not mean that young women and non-
tooroɗo men do not value and desire to acquire more religious knowledge. With respect 
to women, as described in Chapters Two and Four, girls’ exclusion from the daara has 
been justified through ideologies which frame femininity as incompatible with formal 
Islamic education. However, as documented in Chapter Two, these ideologies have been 
strongly challenged elsewhere in Senegal, and Islamic schools run by Salafi-inspired 
reformists, Sufi orders and clerics in urban contexts are much more open to women as 
both teachers and pupils. Today, only two tooroɗo families in Medina Diallobé that I 
knew of had a strong tradition of sending their daughters to boarding daaras to learn the 
Qur’an. These include the parents of Qur’anic teacher Aissata Sall, mentioned above. 
These families are atypical, however, in being middle-class, and whose family 
members, mainly based in Dakar, are ‘ibado’34 or overtly anti-Sufi reformists. In these 
families, girls themselves prefer to attend the Islamic schools. In Aissata’s case, she told 
me “I was ten and I had two best friends, and they both left to go to internats and I 
really, really wanted to, as I preferred to learn the Qur’an. I cried until they sent me.” 
18-year-old Fatimata in terminal lycée, who is Aissata’s cousin, also told me how she 
would prefer to attend an Islamic school but her father could not afford it: “Here girls do 
less Qur’anic schooling than boys, but I would like to learn Arabic, English and French, 
nothing should be left out. But I don’t have much choice, and not enough time. My 
cousin is studying in Kuwait, she did the full Qur’anic stream in Dakar.”  
 
Although these families are a minority, discourses developed elsewhere in Senegal 
about the benefits of formal Islamic education for women are permeating into Medina 
Diallobé. Several men mentioned that they considered local women’s current state of 
religious knowledge and education to be insufficient. “There are parts of the Qur’an and 
Islam which a man can’t say openly to a woman,” explained Ceerno Mukhtar Sall, the 
local sharia expert. “It would be better if a woman teaches a woman certain parts of the 
                                                 
34
 The term ibado is derived from the name reformist association Jama’at ‘Ibad ar-Rahman. It is used to 
refer to Muslims in Senegal who follow Salafi-inspired interpretations of Islam, who usually oppose Sufi 
practice including superogatory prayers and the consultation of shaykhs. While in Medina Diallobé the 
term carries negative connotations,  in Dakar it has been appropriated by those to whom it refers (Cantone 
2012, p.14). 
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Qur’an and especially parts of the sharia, i.e. when talking about menstruation and 
marriage, a man is poorly placed to teach that to a woman.” Opinions such as these 
demonstrate a logic that women’s exclusion from Islamic education impacts negatively 
on their individual religious practice and spiritual development. However, another 
prevalent argument I heard from men is that women’s ‘ignorance’ of religion 
contributes to negative social consequences, and women’s failure to fulfil their domestic 
feminine roles. Through conversations with sandas, I learned that this is a popular 
current theme in the sermons delivered by clerics in the Futa Tooro. This argument is 
evident in a discussion between myself, lycée pupil Yagouba Sy, and his sanda friends 
Hammadi and Moustafa, all in their early twenties: 
 
Yagouba: Few women learn the religion in the Futa Tooro. They do the cooking 
and the washing and so on. They could learn alongside, but they’re not taught. 
Not even the girls in the clerics’ houses learn that much. There are women of 80 
years old who don’t know how to pray, they don’t know surat al-fatiha, they’ve 
just always copied what they saw other people doing. A marabout from P--- 
villlage said so.  
Hammadi: If you want a wife who has learned the religion, you should go to St 
Louis, there are lots who have learned the Qur’an there, at boarding schools. 
Yagouba: Or Dakar. But here in the Futa! Ina heewi gandal kono ina manki, 
there is lots of knowledge but something’s missing. It can also bring problems in 
a household, if she hasn’t learned you will forever be saying, ‘Do this, do that, 
that’s not good,’ etc. If a woman isn’t educated it’ll cause you problems. The 
children will be badly educated and do God knows what. Islam doesn’t like that 
– everyone should learn. 
Moustafa: A marabout from B--- village said this too. Here the girls prefer to 
learn French. They go to Dakar for the holidays and then come back wearing 
jeans. 
 
These young men’s arguments clearly associate the lack of women’s religious education 
with poor child-rearing practices, and social problems for men as husbands. 
Interestingly, this growing demand among men for women to start learning more within 
Islam is underpinned by the same logic that supported their exclusion of women from 
daaras in the first place; for them to successfully fulfil their roles as pious, obedient 
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wives and mothers. The shift in local men’s discourses reflects preoccupations about the 
encroachment of Western culture, which is linked to relatively recent experience of girls 
attending secondary state schools and enjoying the privilege of holidaying in Dakar.  
 
In contrast to these men’s emphasis on women learning the religion formally to prevent 
social breakdown, Aissata Sall’s justification is different, as she argues that women 
have an inherent right to Islamic knowledge which is currently being denied them. 
Aissata’s explanation for why girls in Medina Diallobé do not usually learn the Qur’an 
to advanced level stresses ideological barriers in contrast to the typical arguments I 
encountered, described in Chapter Four, which focus on practical constraints. This is 
neatly reflected in a discussion between myself, Aissata, and Chérif Konté, my well-
meaning but inexperienced interpreter who had a tendency to answer my questions 
himself: 
 
Me: It’s rare here that girls learn the Qur’an to the end – why?  
Chérif: The problem is that you have to send your daughter somewhere and it’s 
not safe to send her to the house of a cleric in another village. In her own village 
she has to cook, and there are other distractions like friends. 
Me: Could you ask Aissata please.  
Aissata: It’s because people here in the Futa only teach the girls how to pray, but 
God says that both men and women are equal in terms of education. Often 
women have regrets that they didn’t learn more when they were younger. Ina 
yurminii, it’s a shame. 
 
Indeed, women who sent their daughters to Aissata’s, or studied there themselves, 
tended to cite the intrinsic value of learning the Qur’an as their justification, rather than 
increasing their, or their daughters’, marriageability. One woman, 30-year-old tooroɗo 
Maimouna, explained that she sent her 8-year-old daughter Zara to learn the Qur’an and 
invocations as it was “a useful education” which the daaras neglected. Maimouna’s 
own father, a cleric since deceased, had taught her, which is why she wanted her 
daughter to have the same opportunity. This difference, with men justifying women’s 
Islamic education for upholding the patriarchal order, while women argue for its 
intrinsic and empowering value, has also been documented in Pakistan (Bradley & 
Saigol 2012, pp.679–683). 
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As well as urban boarding daaras, some Medina Diallobé parents and young people 
also seek out Islamic schools teaching knowledge additional to memorisation of the 
Qur’an. These schools are, however, less popular than the boarding daaras, not least 
because monthly fees are often higher, at 40,000CFA (£45, the monthly salary of a 
night watchman in Dakar). I only knew of a handful of young people attending such 
schools: Ceerno Ousmane sends his adolescent sons to Al-Falah Franco-Arab school; 
two other affluent tooroɗo families with a more anti-Sufi reformist orientation, 
including that of Aissata Sall mentioned above, send both their sons and daughters to 
Al-Falah. 24-year-old ceɗɗo in terminal year of lycée, Kalidou Ndiaye, also attended an 
Arabo-Islamic institute of Salafi-reformist orientation in St Louis, before returning to 
Medina Diallobé to attend secondary state school at the age of 15.  
 
It is important to note that Franco-Arab or Arabo-Islamic schools that teach within a 
Salafi ideology appeal to parents of both Sufi and Salafi-reformist orientations. The 
young people who attend have similar religious perspectives to their parents, and 
interestingly stress different incentives and benefits from attending these schools, which 
is linked to their social status. For instance, Kalidou Ndiaye, from a low middle-class 
ceɗɗo family (his father was a technician and then sold religious books after he was 
made unemployed), values the Salafi-inspired Islamic school for the intrinsic benefit of 
learning the religion. Typical of Salafi-inspired reformists, Kalidou considers that 
understanding the literal meaning of the Qur’an is of greater value than memorising the 
Qur’an without its meaning. Therefore, learning Arabic literacy and Qur’anic exegesis 
are, as far as he is concerned, the main value of the Arabo-Islamic school. Like many 
Salafis, Kalidou frames the importance of his education as being that his knowledge is 
more legitimate than that of Sufi clerics: 
 
I was at an Islamic boarding school in St Louis. Our house there is just opposite 
the mosque, on the same road. And my jamma [study group] is there, they are 
Sunnis35, they learn the tafsir, so they talk of the Qur’an and Sunnah of the 
                                                 
35
 The self-designation of ‘Sunni’ or ‘Sunnite’ is common among Senegalese who follow an interpretation 
of Islam influenced by Salafism, as Augis (2013, p.76) explains: “Adherents today refer to themselves as 
“Sunnites” to indicate that they work to correctly practice the Sunnah, or traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammed. Despite many blurred philosophical and political boundaries between orthodox and Sufi 
groups in Senegalese as well as West African history, this self-reference serves as a semantic distinction 
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Prophet. I studied there for a while and plus I go back there every summer 
holidays. There is a good library there too, I have learned a lot. I can’t say I 
enjoy living in the city, but it’s true that you can find things there that you can’t 
find here. People here are ignorant, and follow marabouts rather than the Qur’an 
and Sunnah. I see clerics here and I’m ashamed of their behaviour. Yet people 
go to see these charlatans, with their divinations and so on. 
 
It is clear from Kalidou’s account that the anti-Sufi ideology also appeals to him as it 
challenges the model typical of the Umariyya Tijaniyya Sufi order in the Futa Tooro 
which has excluded non-tooroɓe like himself from religious knowledge:  
 
In the past they were warriors, the ceɗɗo caste, religion didn’t even concern 
them. Rather, it was their magic, they would get together and sing and talk of 
their horse and their rifle. But it was my father’s faith which led me to learn the 
Qur’an. […] The fact that our caste couldn’t learn the religion was a myth, a 
myth propagated by fear and laziness, but we have broken through it. It’s not 
about being black or white which makes you superior, or your caste, or who 
your father is. […] Before some castes were held to be superior, and even I used 
to call people maccuɓe and so on, but I have since learned in the Qur’an that this 
is bad. 
 
Indeed, while Kalidou stresses the intrinsic value of the reformist Islamic school as 
being learning for its own sake, he cites another benefit of this education. His erudition 
in Arabic, and ability to quote directly from the Qur’an, has improved his social status 
by increasing his authority to challenge tooroɗo clerics’ discrimination on the basis of 
social category: 
 
In the little mosque at first I felt awkward, as if I’m not meant to be there as a 
ceɗɗo, it was all tooroɓe there. They have a kind of monopoly over the religion 
and I daren’t say anything. Then there was one day when we were all in line to 
pray, and I was in the front row on the right hand side. And someone from the 
imam’s family came in late and someone tried to push me aside to make room, 
                                                                                                                                               
for Sunnite activists, implying that their religious practices are more pure than those of brotherhood 
adherents and the vast majority of Senegalese, who are nonetheless also Sunni Muslims.” 
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but I refused. After we had prayed I said you don’t have the right to push me 
aside, we are all here to worship God, and they said ‘Yes that’s true… but the 
wise ones have the right to a place at the front’, or whatever. They agreed 
though that what I said was correct in the religion. People here have a tendency 
to continue tradition as a routine, in a way that goes unchallenged. But then 
there were some instances when I just couldn’t keep quiet anymore, things that I 
just had to correct. Like people here say that the Prophet was the first thing God 
created, even big marabouts say that, but it’s not true, the first thing God created 
was a quill, and He told it to write, and it wrote the universe, the history of 
everything that will happen. 
 
In contrast, Ceerno Ousmane’s 16-year-old son Amara Sy also attends an Al-Falah 
Franco-Arab school in Dakar, and has very different views of the benefits. In contrast to 
Kalidou Ndiaye, Amara’s family is one of the most religiously and politically powerful 
in the village. Their status very much rests upon the Umariyya Tijaniyya Sufi model of 
Islam and the authority it accords tooroɗo clerics of seeremɓe lineages. It is therefore 
unsurprising that Salafi ideology has less appeal for Amara. He stresses less the intrinsic 
implications of Arabic literacy for his personal religious practice or for challenging 
local hierarchies, but rather the economic utility of the school. He hopes to use his 
education to obtain a scholarship to study in Kuwait, and hence access more job 
opportunities. Indeed, from the 1950s, the leaders of Sufi orders have been sending their 
sons to Arabic-speaking countries for higher education, after they had attended 
traditional daaras and/or regional Sufi-affiliated Arabic institutes, to invigorate their 
own practice and guide the reform movement away from anti-Sufi critiques (Ware 
2014, p.227). 
 
Overall, however, few young people in Medina Diallobé see much value in learning 
Arabic; they value the Qur’an more for intrinsic religious benefit, and see French 
literacy as being more economically useful than Arabic: “There’s not much you can do 
with [Arabo-Islamic] schooling, go to an Arabic country or else do other courses like 
French” said 21-year-old female tooroɗo Juulde Sy, whose brothers are at boarding 
daaras in Dakar. Malik Ba, sharia student, feels the same: “Here arabisants [Arabic-
speakers] have nothing, there are lots of well-educated people but it doesn’t pay. You 
can teach in a private Arabic school and only earn 50,000CFA (£56) a month, that’s 
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nothing. French is privileged.” As a result, Franco-Arab schools for learning French 
after memorising the Qur’an appear to be valued over Arabo-Islamic institutes, although 
they are too expensive for most people. The following section therefore considers how 
young people obtain religious knowledge and French given these constraints. 
 
7.4 Part-time study alongside the daara or state school  
 
This section focuses on young people who consider the daara insufficient for teaching 
French, and the state school inadequate for teaching religion, but lack the means to 
attend private Franco-Arab schools. Instead, they engage in informal learning alongside 
full-time attendance in the daara or school. If we consider attending fee-charging 
Islamic schools as a ‘strategy’, to use De Certeau’s terms (1984), of the affluent, 
informal learning is by contrast an example of ‘tactical’ agency for those without this 
privilege. 
 
7.41 Sandas who learn French during or after the daara  
 
Many sandas try to learn French in their spare time. “My brother memorised the Qur’an 
just, in the Futa. But he also spoke French,” explained tooroɗo Aliou Watt. “He learned 
it off the pupils he shared a room with, he would take a notebook and ask them 
questions.” Another 25-year-old sanda told me: “I’m learning the Qur’an and sharia, 
but I also have a French teacher, and an English teacher [pointing to his two friends]. 
Wolof too. You need to know a bit of everything.” Indeed, the first thing most sandas 
would ask me when I met them was whether I could teach them French.  
 
Acquiring French language alongside the daara education runs alongside a broader 
orientation or Islamic identity among young men, which people in Medina Diallobé 
jokingly referred to as moderne. This term was used to refer to young men in Islamic 
study or professions who engaged in practices, or appropriated symbols, perceived as 
associated with ‘Western’ culture, such as wearing trainers, baseball caps and baggy 
trousers, attending soirées, or listening to popular music, despite discourses espoused by 
clerics that such behaviour is frowned upon in Islam. I once visited Omar Sy’s house, 
and met his resident sanda, Hashim, who was listening to a Senegalese rapper on his 
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phone. Omar exclaimed “A sanda who listens to music! So you’re a sanda moderne!” 
to which Hashim laughed somewhat sheepishly. I also observed Salif Ba, the young 
tooroɗo man with a daara education appointed as a vacataire ustaas described in the 
previous chapter, preparing to play football with his friends. His sisters were teasing 
him for wearing sunglasses, trainers and shorts. Salif quipped “I’m an ustaas moderne, 
see?” to which they all laughed. He added “All the kids in the neighbourhood where I 
teach laugh at me, because I’m modern.” 
 
Learning French informally while at the daara is, however, extremely burdensome. 
Many sandas hope instead to take private lessons after completion. For instance, 26-
year-old Abderahmane in my host family had dropped out of CM2 aged 12 and then 
memorised the Qur’an to completion in a rural daara by age 24. He asked me for advice 
on where he could learn English and French in Dakar for 35,000CFA a month (£40). He 
hoped to do three months of intensive study to get up to speed, funding himself by 
teaching Arabic. After spending two months in Dakar however, Abderahmane found 
finding employment much harder than expected and his plans to learn French fell 
through.  
 
These challenges tooroɓe boys face to memorise the Qur’an and learn French have not 
been ameliorated by the state’s recent reforms. The policies developed under Abdoulaye 
Wade overwhelmingly address primary schooling, catering to today’s children. Yet, 
they neglect the large number of young tooroɗo men who have chosen a religious 
education path but lack the funds to study the Qur’an quickly in a boarding daara and 
then supplement their skills in a Franco-Arab school or through private French lessons 
afterwards. This bias is due to the reforms being elaborated under pressure to meet 
donor requirements for universal primary school enrolment, rather than by taking a 
holistic view of the educational needs of the whole population and addressing them 
accordingly.  
 
Lessons about how to address this problem could be learned through insights from the 
comparable context of Burkina Faso, where Pilon and Compoare (2009) investigated 
the phenomenon of private evening classes which follow the state school curriculum, 
and are held mainly in urban settings. They found that most pupils were male and 
working in petty trade and similar professions. 35% had dropped out of state schools, 
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while 7% had been to Islamic schools. The authors show that government and 
development actors have paid the non-formal adult education sector very little attention, 
focussing instead on formal schooling. They argue that it would be worthwhile for the 
state to organise and invest in such evening classes to meet the demands of adolescents 
and young adults too old to enrol in state primary school, to acquire French literacy to 
assist in their day-to-day activities. The same might be said of Senegal. Alongside 
creation of new state religious schools starting from primary level, investment needs to 
be made in accessible, affordable adult education programs catering especially to less 
well-off graduates of rural daaras to enhance their abilities to learn French to find work.  
 
The state’s other proposed school is the “modernised” daara, which would have 
memorisation of the Qur’an as its focus, combined with Arabic and French. However, 
the state’s daaras have not yet materialised and are ambitious infrastructural projects 
requiring significant investment. Many clerics oppose the proposed curriculum for the 
daaras, accusing the state of unconstitutionally trying to control religious education, 
and treating the daaras like existing private schools similar to European models rather 
than as independent system (Abdourahman 2015; Lo 2015). A recent report shows that 
clerics in Senegal differ as to whether they would agree to incorporate other subjects 
including French into their daaras. 33% of clerics in 558 daaras in Dakar, Louga, 
Saint-Louis and Matam regions refuse integration of French school subjects in their 
daaras before Qur’anic memorisation is complete. 67% accept on condition that French 
teaching takes place on talibés’ days off (Thursdays and Fridays) and does not interfere 
with the clerics’ existing timetable of 30-40 weekly hours of Qur’anic study (MEN 
2010, p.67). The report recommends that different strategies be elaborated to respond to 
different providers’ preferences (2010, pp.97–99). Indeed, my data also suggests that, 
given the diversity of religious education demand among parents and young people, the 
one-size-fits-all school models proposed by the state seem inappropriate. Rather than 
trying to standardise all daara curricula, including integrating French, a more pragmatic 
alternative inspired by students’ current strategies would be for the state to work 
alongside daaras to provide French lessons to students on their days off. This idea is 
currently being piloted by NGOs in Senegal. 
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7.42 Pupils learning Islam alongside secondary state school  
 
Many young tooroɗo men who see the economic utility in state school also strongly 
value memorising the Qur’an for their personal faith, sense of identity, and baraka. 
Some therefore follow the ‘standard model’ I heard often, of attending the daara when 
they are young children, and then continuing to attend informally once they begin 
primary school. A handful of boys manage to continue memorising even while at 
collège. “I learned the Qur’an while doing school, I would take a notebook and ask the 
almudɓe in the street for help if I didn’t know something!” explained 18-year-old 
tooroɗo Aliou Watt in 4ème collège. I was also interested to hear how Bachir Wane, a 
28-year-old tooroɗo university law student, had memorised the Qur’an while attending 
state school. He explained how he did so, as it was important for his sense of identity as 
a tooroɗo of clerical lineage: 
 
I finished memorising the Qur’an about four years ago. Because my father is a 
cleric, it was obligatory! When we went to school, he would make us wake up at 
6:30am, we could study the Qur’an for half an hour. We would also do half an 
hour before going back to school at 4pm. During the summer holidays too, my 
father would let us rest for one week doing nothing, then we would learn the 
Qur’an! We were allowed half an hour a day of football and so on, but we had to 
learn the Qur’an too. All my brothers did the Qur’an and French school this 
way. If I finish my degree and do a Masters’, I’d like to spend a year in 
Ourousougui or somewhere, just learning sharia, it’s kind of a hobby of mine. 
 
However, studying informally like this is difficult and takes great self-discipline. 
Boubacar Tall, a tooroɗo in 1er lycée who diligently recited the Qur’an with the sandas 
resident in his compound when not attending school, remarked, “It’s hard to blend the 
two, it takes a lot of time.” Indeed, even Boubacar’s ability to invest time studying the 
Qur’an alongside attending collège reflected his privilege; he was exempt from any 
housework as gallunkooɗo Barro Cissé, described in Chapter Five, did all the work in 
the Tall household. Many boys at school are therefore often reluctantly obliged to 
abandon their informal religious study. Ablaye Haïdara, a 20-year-old tooroɗo in 
terminal year of lycée, told me he gave up Qur’anic schooling but is envious of his 
younger brothers, aged 12 and 18, who followed this path. Samba Ka also stated that “I 
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don’t regret my French education at all. But I regret that I haven’t learned the Qur’an, I 
would like my son to learn it alongside French school.”  
 
Given their desires – and often, family pressure - to do both, some tooroɗo boys instead 
drop out of state school to attend a daara. One example is 15-year-old Mohamed Sy 
from an offshoot of the clerical Sy family. He was in 4ème collège but failing his 
lessons and told me he preferred to study the Qur’an. “You can’t say you’re the son of a 
marabout if you haven’t studied the Qur’an!” he said. “See, all of Ceerno Ousmane’s 
sons have learned the Qur’an.” However, Mohamed found it impossible to do both 
while studying full-time at state school: “I’ve wanted to quit school for ages, because 
it’s hard to do both at once. The hours overlap, it’s hard, I can’t study the Qur’an 8-
10am and then go to lessons at 10am, and I can’t study in the evenings because I’m 
tired.” Strategies like Mohamed’s which, rather than just learning informally alongside 
full-time education in one kind of school, involve alternating between school types as a 
means of ‘doing both’, are considered in more depth in the following section. 
 
It is not only tooroɗo boys who seek to supplement their state schooling with religious 
knowledge. As few women and non-tooroɗo men from Medina Diallobé can afford to 
attend reformed Islamic schools and daaras in the cities, more commonly they learn 
religion alongside attending state school full-time. Aissata Sall’s school is popular 
among many local families, and she mainly teaches girls Qur’anic verses, the five 
pillars of Islam, and how to perform ablution and prayer correctly. Most of her younger 
students attend on weekdays after school or during the holidays. Parents approve of 
Aissata’s teaching for their daughters, adding that they learn useful invocations as well 
as Qur’anic verses which are not taught in daaras. Oumoul, a 32-year-old tooroɗo, 
sends her 10-year-old daughter to Aissata’s, explaining: “It’s a very good education. 
They don’t just learn verses, but for instance invocations, like what to say when you 
enter the toilet and so on.” I heard Zara, an 8-year-old tooroɗo girl, beautifully reciting 
the Qur’an in one of the bedrooms in her home, and she explained that Aissata was 
doing a conference and had asked for them to sing to see who was best.   
 
Women and non-tooroɗo men also learn the religion informally. Some older women 
visit Aissata Sall, as she explained: “Even older women here don’t know how to pray. 
They come to ask me, they’re ashamed to ask the clerics about that. Like how to do 
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their ablutions and how to pray, as no one ever taught them exactly.” 20-year-old 
Fatimata Ndaw and 16-year-old Oulymata Ba, both tooroɓe, also told me that they go to 
Aissata’s during the summer holidays. However, more commonly adolescents and 
adults study independently. A few, usually tooroɗo women of clerical lineages, 
memorise the Qur’an. For instance, I observed 30-year-old tooroɗo Maimouna Sy 
reciting from a copy she had at home. Some study Arabic language, like Maimouna’s 
16-year-old niece Houley Sy who sometimes leafed through a beginner’s primer which 
her boyfriend, a sanda, had given her. More commonly however, women and non-
tooroɗo men seek out information about correct Islamic practice and invocations or 
du‘a. For instance, Maimouna often felt tired and her sleep was disturbed by 
nightmares. Her dabotooɗo cousin Seydou Noor diagnosed the illness as ‘rafi baleejo’, 
a ‘black person illness’ caused by jinn. It could only be cured using the Qur’an, unlike 
‘rafi daneejo’ or ‘white person illness’ which can be treated by doctors using Western 
medicine. As part of her healing strategy, Maimouna kept a notebook of invocations and 
Qur’anic verses that she would recite to herself. I overheard her asking her younger 
brothers, who had both memorised the Qur’an to advanced level, if they could teach her 
the verse Ya-Sin (36:1), considered to have powerful protective properties. It is 
interesting to note that while Maimouna sends her own daughter Zara to Aissata’s to 
learn the Qur’an, she goes elsewhere for knowledge linked to healing. This is not 
surprising firstly given the personal and private nature of her afflictions. 
 
Another common way people learn religion informally is through books, usually written 
in French. 28-year-old baylo Ismaila Gueye, lycée teacher, told me that although he did 
not have time to memorise the whole Qur’an, “I try to learn from time to time, I have a 
Qur’an translated into French that I bought in Dakar. That way I understand what God 
says. And I go to my friends, the sandas who live nearby, and ask them for 
clarifications.” In addition to copies of the Qur’an, whether the original or versions 
translated into French, people own a variety of other works reflecting both Sufi and 
anti-Sufi perspectives. Several families possess a copy of Al Akhdari36 , a primer on 
                                                 
36
 The original Arabic title of Al Akhdari is Mukhtasar fi al 'Ibadat 'ala Madhhab al Imam Malik written 
by Abd Al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Saghir al-Akhdari al-Buntyusi al-Maliki (d. 1585). It was translated 
into French under the title Mukhtasar Al-Akhdari Fi al ‘Ibadat: La prière selon la rite malekite  (2009), 
and English as The treatise of Sheikh Sidy Abd Rahmaan Al Akhdari on the jurisprudence of acts of 
worship according to the school of Imam Malik Bin Annas (Saidy n.d.). The pulaar version is Jubbannde 
Ceerno Abdarrahmaan Lakhdary: Fiqhu…laaval e juulde e laawol Almaami Maalik (Bah 2001). Hall and 
Stewart (2011, p.134) identify Al Akhdari as a didactic text or teaching tool, used at relatively elementary 
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prayer and ablutions according to the Maliki school of law, usually in French although I 
saw one version in Pulaar. Several young tooroɗo women mentioned this book when 
explaining how they had learned how to pray. 32-year-old Djenaba showed me her 
father’s copy of Dimensions d’Islam: Selon le Coran et la Sounnah (Dimensions of 
Islam according to the Qur’an and Sunnah) by Senegalese Tijani Sufi Amadou Tall 
(1992). She recommended it for the many du‘a and invocations it mentions, as well as 
information on the five pillars, prayer and ablutions. Reflecting mystic interpretations of 
Islam, Dimensions d’Islam has been criticised by anti-Sufis for being shirk or bid’a37. 
Oumoul Sy, 32-year-old tooroɗo, explained how she had learned about “invocations, 
the Prophet’s life, the Sunnah, behaviour within the family, how to treat your 
neighbours, how to dress, and how to be professional” from La voie du musulman38 (the 
Way of the Muslim) by Algerian Cheikh Aboubaker Djaber Eldjazairi (1964) which she 
bought when studying at university in St Louis. Despite the fact that it reflects the 
strongly Salafi views of its author, a lecturer at the University of Medina39, Oumoul 
who is affiliated to the Tijanniyya nonetheless appreciates the book for the advice it 
contains on sharia. Kalidou Ndiaye, mentioned above, informed me of several books 
reflecting Salafi creed which he had read at a library in St Louis including Kashf ush-
Shubuhaat and Al-Usool-uth-Thalaatha by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.40  
 
In a similar way to the example of attendance at Al-Falah Franco-Arab school, the 
religious books people read are not necessarily indicative of their Islamic orientation, 
                                                                                                                                               
levels of education. They suggest that Al Akhdari (or possibly, a set of slightly different derivative texts 
all known locally as Al Akhdari, aimed at helping students commit it to memory), was perhaps the most 
important didactic text for beginners used across the Sahel from Mauritania to northern Nigeria in the 19th 
century. 
37
 For instance, several websites selling the book, such as 
http://www.iqrashop.com/Dimensions_de_l_Islam-Amadou_Tall-Livre_livres-Initiation_a_l_Islam-1758-
.html include a message stating “Important remark: We warn readers that this book contains dangerous 
things which do not conform to Islam or the Sunna of the Prophet” (my translation). This webpage 
includes a debate between reviewers of the book for and against its content (accessed 3rd September 
2014). 
38
 Minhaj al Moslim (Djaber Eldjazairi 1964) is a two-volume comprehensive guide to Islamic creed, 
etiquette, worship, relationships and business transactions translated into French under the title La voie du 
Musulman (Chakroun 1997), and into English as The way of the Muslim (Mujahid 2001). 
39
 See the debate between reviewers of the book on 
http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?18443-Book-Minhaj-Al-Muslim  
(accessed 3rd September 2014). 
40
 Kashf ush-Shubuhaat, translated as ‘Clarification of the Doubts’, is a treatise on shirk or polytheism. 
The English translation and commentary is An explanation of Muhammad’ Ibn ‘Abd ul-Wahhab’s A 
Critical Study of Shirk, ar. Kashf ash-Shubuhaat (Yasir Qadhi 2003). Al-Usool-uth-Thalaatha, or The 
Three Fundamental Principles, based on the three questions asked after death, has been translated into 
English as Explanation of the Three Fundamental Principles of Islaam (Al-Uthaymeen n.d.). 
232 
 
and the consumption of Salafi literature for information on sharia does not preclude 
affiliation to the Tijaniyya Sufi order and esoteric worldview. This is similar to 
Lambek’s (1993, p.61) analysis of how people frequented Islamic and spirit healers on 
the Comores archipelago, as “claims of mutual exclusion are transcended in the practice 
of ordinary people”. 
 
However, while informal learning from religious books enables those excluded from the 
daara to study Islam, in general such materials are an expensive luxury and access to 
this medium reflects and perpetuates hierarchies of wealth and status. There is a trader 
who sells Islamic books and pamphlets at the weekly market in Medina Diallobé, but 
most books people own were purchased further away such as in Dakar or even during 
visits to Mecca. It was not uncommon for households to have no books, and all the 
people cited above who owned any come from affluent tooroɗo families and/or have 
salaried jobs. Saharan scholars have for centuries amassed large libraries of religious 
books to build their reputations and prestige (Lydon 2004), and the one such example I 
heard of in Medina Diallobé had been compiled by El Hajji Sy, deceased member of the 
clerical Sy family. His son, 15-year-old Mohamed, described how his father had 
amassed a significant library of books in French, Arabic and Pulaar through his travels 
including to study at Al-Azhar. I discovered the extent to which books are considered a 
highly valuable commodity when I gave a photocopied English-Pulaar dictionary to 
some of my friends. Assuming it would be shared with other family members interested 
in using it, it was coveted and created some jealousy. In a similar vein, Mohamed told 
me that El Hajji had encouraged him to read his books, but once his father passed away, 
his library had been confined to the care of his cousin, dabotooɗo Seydou Noor, and 
Mohamed felt he could no longer access them. 
 
In addition to books, people also learn through cassette sermons. Several members of 
my host family explained how El Hajji Sy’s elderly sister, Astou, possessed several 
cassettes of sermons recorded by local clerics in Pulaar which they listened to. 18-year-
old Hadja told me that one of these cassettes explained how to fast during Ramadan, 
how it was sinful to believe that Jesus is God, and how to behave well towards others 
including Christians. Circulation of cassettes is however not particularly common. 
While many households own televisions or radios, only a handful has a cassette player. 
Hadja also showed me a cartoon film on her phone, labelled as coming from website 
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www.islamexplained.com, depicting angels judging the souls of the dead, the paradise 
awaiting the believer, and the abyss of fire the unbeliever. Hadja told me her classmate 
had shown her the video, and she copied it onto her own phone. 
 
However, the most accessible way for state school pupils to learn religion informally 
appears to be through attending public conferences, and sometimes taking written notes 
alongside. For instance, 26-year-old tooroɗo Coumba Sakho explained that: 
 
I continue to learn all the time, I learn everyday. I write it all down in a notebook 
and learn it. Like what is good, what is bad. I learn at conferences when clerics 
talk, on the TV, people telling stories… For instance, a cleric here was saying 
qul huwallahu41 is such an important surat, you can recite it three times for 
protection or healing. 
 
Baylo Hamidou Thiam also explained how several young men of the wayluɓe 
community attend Islamic conferences to learn informally, and compensate for their 
exclusion from the local daaras: 
 
It’s rare to see someone from Mbayla learn the Qur’an to the end, although my 
uncles and grandparents live in a village called Bélinaydé42, they are all wayluɓe 
there, they are big marabouts, all have learnt the Qur’an to the end and are 
jewellers too. But here it’s rare. Even if you learn to the end, you can’t become a 
cleric or even lead prayer, so people think, why bother? They learn the basics. 
But the youth go to Bélinaydé for a ziara which takes place after korité [Eid al-
Adha]. That way they celebrate religious learning and their caste. 
 
These examples corroborate a trend documented in Muslim societies around the globe, 
namely how increased availability of print and electronic media over the 20th century 
has facilitated alternatives to face-to-face, individualized knowledge transmission. This 
has enabled more people to study part-time outside of formal Islamic study (Adely & 
                                                 
41
 Qul huwallahu is the local term for surat al-ikhlas, 112th verse of the Qur’an. 
42
 Bélinaydé Mbayla (alternatively spelt Bélnaïbé Mbaïla) is a village in the region of Matam, and is one 
of the rare villages in the Futa Tooro inhabited solely by ñeeñɓe, in this case wayluɓe. Many have 
abandoned their customary profession of smithing to become clerics. One in particular, Ceerno 
Abdoulaye Paate Mbow, is well-known throughout the region for his erudition and esoteric skills (Kyburz 
1994, p.152). 
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Starrett 2011; Eickelman & Piscatori 1996; Hirschkind 2006). While many scholars 
have noted how democratisation of access to Islamic knowledge has enabled women 
(Dilger & Schulz 2013; Kalmbach 2012) and youth (Adely & Starrett 2011; Janson 
2010) to challenge their customary exclusion from knowledge and hence religious 
authority, the evidence from Medina Diallobé shows that this is equally applicable to 
the destabilisation of hierarchies based on social category. These stories also reveal that 
an important element in people’s increased access to part-time religious education is 
French literacy, another form of value that state schools have for Medina Diallobé 
inhabitants. However, while challenging older patterns of exclusion from formal Islamic 
education, informal study through media is affected by differential access to 
commodities such as books, cassette players, and phones. While open to a wider set of 
people than private reformed schools, again media is more accessible to those from 
affluent families, whether based on customary sources of privilege or rare jobs in the 
formal sector. 
 
Having thus far considered attendance in reformed Islamic schools and informal study 
as ways of ‘doing both’, the subsequent and final section looks at a third form of 
strategy to address this challenge; alternating between different school types.  
 
7.5 Alternating between school types  
 
All young people I met who attended private Islamic schools and boarding daaras did 
so in combination with other school types. For instance, Tidiane Ba, 26-year-old 
tooroɗo and older brother to sharia student Malik Ba, recounted his trajectory: “I 
memorised the Qur’an in a boarding daara in Dakar. Then it took me three years to get 
the bac in French in a Franco-Arab school.” Aissata Sall, the 24-year-old tooroɗo 
teaching girls in the village, also told a comparable story, stressing how she wanted to 
complete the Qur’an before learning Arabic or French: “When I was ten I started at an 
Arabo-Islamic boarding school in Dakar. I learned the Qur’an first while at the same 
time learning Arabic, but I gave up Arabic to concentrate on the Qur’an. I finished 
memorising the Qur’an when I was fifteen. When I was sixteen I went to Al-Falah 
Franco-Arab school.” Mamadou Sow, a 24-year-old tooroɗo sanda who had studied at 
Ceerno Alfa’s daara for ten years, also hoped to learn French in a Franco-Arab school 
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after the daara: “I’ve finished the Qur’an, now I’m learning sharia. My father, who’s in 
Greece, refused that I go to French school, but said that once I finish I can go to a 
Franco-Arab school and learn French there.”  
 
All of these young people’s trajectories share a common element. They value and 
prioritise memorisation of the Qur’an over other forms of religious knowledge. 
Attendance in Arabo-Islamic or Franco-Arab schools to learn Arabic and/or French 
takes place after memorisation of the Qur’an. I knew of no cases of young people who 
had only attended Arabo-Islamic or Franco-Arab schools without having memorised a 
large proportion – if not all - of the Qur’an first. While learning Arabic but especially 
French are considered useful, these subjects are considered secondary and should be 
learned after the Qur’an. The following quote from 21-year-old tooroɗo woman Juulde 
Sy captures this sentiment: 
 
My little [8-year-old] brother is at a [fee-charging] daara in Dakar. My mother 
wants him to learn fast, because he’s young he can, and he can finish in a few 
years. Then, when he’s 11 or 12, he can go to a Franco-Arab school. Some teach 
Arabic with a bit of the Qur’an, others less Qur’an or not at all. But, the Qur’an 
is the most important, it’s the religion. The Franco-Arab school is like French 
school with something added, i.e. Arabic. But Arabic is just a language, not the 
Qur’an. The Franco-Arab school may well put an end to the Qur’an, but it’s 
important to put it in perspective, the Qur’an is the religion. 
 
Juulde’s uncle, Yaya, expressed a very similar opinion about Franco-Arab schools: 
“They are just secular schools with a bit of Arabic thrown in, invented by people who 
brought back knowledge of Arabic culture, etc. from the Arab world. But knowing 
Arabic isn’t the same as knowing Islam.” Indeed, Ware cites several clerics from both 
Tijan and Murid parts of Senegal who feel that Franco-Arab schools prioritise Arabic 
literacy over moral education. As one remarks: “In the daara we teach and educate: 
that’s the difference. [In the école arabe,] Arabic comes first. But the moral education 
has a way to go.” Ware paraphrases another, saying  
 
Although students learn good spoken Arabic and even much about religion, 
books are read without a component of spiritual education and thus too easily 
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become xam-xamu saay-saay (cynical knowledge) – knowledge without faith or 
religious practice (2014, p.230). 
 
These educational trajectories and associated evaluations of knowledge push us to 
question the applicability to Senegal of conclusions made by Brenner (2000) in the 
neighbouring context of Mali. He argues that greater supply of reformed Islamic schools 
teaching religious and secular subjects (known in Mali as médersas) has led to greater 
value being accorded to Arabic literacy than memorisation of the Qur’an, with people 
even rejecting the legitimacy of esoteric forms of Islamic knowledge. However, in line 
with evidence from across Senegal including Dakar, Medina Gounass and the Murid 
heartland of Djourbel (Smith 2008, pp.58, 88), the majority of Medina Diallobé 
inhabitants who are committed to pursuing an advanced Islamic education still accord 
memorisation of the Qur’an the highest value among the types of religious knowledge 
available, including for baraka and other embodied and esoteric properties. Thus, 
people invest in learning Arabic or French in Arabo-Islamic or Franco-Arab schools 
only after attending a daara.  
 
Brenner’s analysis suggests that the shift in Mali towards higher evaluations of Arabic 
literacy over Qur’anic memorisation is linked to the material status that médersa 
graduates in Mali enjoy, as they are more likely to be employed in the state bureaucracy 
than Qur’anic school graduates (2000, p.16). In contrast to Mali however, the Sufi 
orders in Senegal have far more political influence than reformist Islamic associations. 
As shown in Chapter Two, the tooroɗo aristocracy of the Futa Tooro have translated 
their customary status – derived largely through memorisation of the Qur’an and 
acquisition of baraka – and wealth into contemporary political connections and 
economic capital. This continues to make their ‘occupations’ of trade and migration 
more attractive than the main professions available to reformed Islamic school 
graduates, namely teaching Arabic in private or public schools. Therefore, in Medina 
Diallobé the logic of value which the tooroɗo clerical elite subscribes to, which 
prioritises memorisation of the Qur’an over Arabic literacy, continues to enjoy popular 
support. 
 
It is also interesting to consider what kinds of professions young tooroɗo men hope to 
secure through “multiskilling” (Froerer & Portisch 2012, p.339) by attending different 
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school types. The opinion of government and development actors, described in Chapter 
One, is that state school diplomas are useful for finding work especially in the formal 
economy; the Arabo-Islamic and Franco-Arab schools are useful for employment as an 
ustaas; and the daaras are not particularly useful for earning income. However, tooroɗo 
men from Medina Diallobé who combine memorisation of the Qur’an with French or 
Arabic literacy see rather different forms of utility and have contrasting career 
intentions. As noted previously, becoming Arabic teachers is low on their list of 
aspirations. Rather, some tooroɗo boys hope to use their combined educational 
trajectories to pursue more lucrative and prestigious Islamic professions in the 
globalised religious and prayer economies. Mohamed Sy, 15-year-old tooroɗo of sharif 
descent, explains how, seeing as he already has the essential skill of French literacy, 
collège diplomas are not as economically useful as memorising the Qur’an:   
 
If I did the Qur’an to the end, I would go to America and do dabaade. My uncle 
does that in the Congo. Especially if you say you’re a sharif people will give 
you addiya. Or you can be the imam of a mosque, they pay you each month. My 
mother’s brother, he’s an imam at a mosque in America. Even my father did 
that, getting addiya in America. If I finished French school I could still go to the 
USA, but what job could I do?! 
 
Mohamed’s uncle Omar Sy is another example of a middle-class tooroɗo man of sharif 
descent, with an educational trajectory combining state school and religious education, 
who uses his knowledge repertoire to reinvent the customary local profession of 
dabotooɗo. 48-year-old Omar is fluent in French and Arabic having been raised in 
Mauritania where he attended state school to baccalaureate level. He also memorised 
one tenth of the Qur’an with sandas. When aged 18 he started to learn dabaade from his 
father in Medina Diallobé. He trained as a teacher, works as a school director, and as a 
dabotooɗo overseas during the school holidays: 
 
Mystique, healing, divination is my job, alongside teaching. People come from 
five, ten, even fifteen kilometres away over the border in Mauritania to consult 
me. I have travelled a lot, to Morocco over a hundred times, to Tunisia, Saudi 
Arabia. I hope to go to Jordan during the holidays, to earn a bit of money, and 
invest it back in some business projects. With my job and some contacts I have 
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in the government, I could get a visa to go to France. I think it would work, there 
is a lot of demand there. 
 
These aspirations further challenge the state’s and development actors’ assumptions 
described in Chapter One that Qur’anic memorisation holds only personal and spiritual 
benefit, while Arabic and French literacy and school diplomas are useful for finding 
work principally in the formal sector. Instead, these tooroɓe men from Medina Diallobé 
are using French and Arabic literacy, acquired through combined school trajectories, to 
reconfigure, ‘modernise’, and internationalise the customary tooroɗo religious 
professions of clerics, imams and dabotooɓe. Such strategies build on the precedent of 
West African Sufis using state school knowledge to enhance their baraka and 
legitimacy (Clarke 1988)43, and Senegalese Sufi orders creating vibrant transnational 
networks which link clerics and disciples, and providers and consumers within the 
prayer economy, over increasingly large distances (Buggenhagen 2010; Hill 2012; 
Soares 2004). In pursuit of education which combines religious and secular elements, 
young tooroɗo men in Medina Diallobé are not drawn to piety movements or reformist 
interpretations of Islam which denounce mysticism, a trend commonly documented 
among middle-classes in other parts of the Muslim world. Rather, their mixed education 
is based on valorisation of esoteric forms of Islam, including Qur’anic memorisation for 
accumulation of baraka, and status through sharif lineage, to appeal to prayer economy 
clientele in the West African diaspora but also Arab world. Their strategies provide 
support for recent arguments that “anthropological understanding of Islam’s articulation 
with the contemporary cannot simply be confined to general pre-occupations with and 
anxieties over the modern, be these in the guise of Islamist political agendas or middle 
class piety” (Marsden & Retsikas 2013, p.21), if it means neglecting the ways affluent 
and middle-class Sufis are transforming their learning and praxis to adapt to the 
opportunities of globalisation.  
                                                 
43
 Clarke describes the case of Muhammad Jumat Imam, a charismatic Sufi leader from Ijebuland in 
south-western Nigeria, who claimed in 1941 to be the Mahdi or renewer of the age. At the time, the 
position of Chief Imam at the mosque in Ijebu-Ode, capital of Ijebuland, was contested, and Jumat Imam 
argued that the other candidates were not qualified as they lacked knowledge of Arabic and English. 
Clarke states “That such a view was met with the support of many is an indication of how both the 
expansion of Western education and the improvements in Islamic education (attributable to, among other 
organisations, the Ansar-ud-Deen society and the Islamic Reformation Society founded by the Mahdi in 
the 1930s) were altering the traditional criteria for leadership. Learning was becoming almost as 
important as age, seniority, and good character, once the main and virtually the sole requirements for 
leadership.” (Clarke 1988, pp.159–160). 
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Finally, the kinds of knowledge people in Medina Diallobé value, and the educational 
trajectories they pursue to acquire that knowledge, raise questions about whether the 
state’s recent reforms will meet people’s demands to learn both religious and secular 
knowledge. To clarify, among local residents wanting to memorise the Qur’an, the 
preferred strategy is to do so in childhood without competing demands of learning other 
subjects, as it is easiest to assimilate the text as this age. However, the state school 
model since the colonial period dictates that the official ‘correct’ age at which pupils 
ought to start primary is seven, and that pupils must learn several subjects 
simultaneously. Thus, the state school timetable has been designed in such a way as to 
be incompatible with many local people’s learning priorities of memorising the Qur’an. 
There is widespread evidence throughout Senegal that since the colonial period parents 
have overcome this challenge by sending their children to the daara, and arranging for 
their birth certificate to be forged so that they can enrol in primary afterwards at the 
‘correct’ official age (Ware 2004a, p.86). The state school today is still incompatible 
with people’s desires. Children enrolling in the first year of primary school later than 
age seven are automatically considered for statistical purposes as ‘over-age’, perceived 
by state and development actors as a problem because curricula are not adapted for 
multi-grade classes (Lewin 2008; Little 2008). Local people have sadly internalised this 
negative construction of their being ‘behind’, as Kalidou Ndiaye stated after he told me 
that he is taking his baccalaureate aged 24 because he spent his childhood in daaras and 
Islamic schools: “I’m behind. But being behind is programmed into being African.”  
 
The state’s reforms since 2002 claimed to respond to popular demand for Islamic 
education combined with secular subjects. However, rather than taking memorisation of 
the Qur’an as the priority, the state’s new Franco-Arab primary schools and collèges 
follow a schedule reminiscent of the existing state schools, teaching the Qur’an, Arabic, 
French, and secular topics simultaneously from the first years of primary. This should 
not be surprising given that one of the government’s main incentives was to meet donor 
demands for universal primary enrolment, and hence reformed Islamic schools had to 
conform to the now globally universal school model inherited from the European 
experience, including the ‘core curriculum’ described in Chapter One. Indeed, the 
state’s Franco-Arab schools mirror closely the Salafi-inspired reformist Islamic schools, 
which privilege Arabic literacy and Islamic sciences over Qur’anic memorisation, as 
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they were also inspired by the European model of school. The state Franco-Arab 
primary school curriculum teaches memorisation of only one-tenth of the Qur’an which 
is inadequate for inhabitants of Medina Diallobé. Similarly, the recently proposed 
official curriculum for daaras allocates only three years to memorisation of the Qur’an 
before proceeding to the existing primary school syllabus (Lo 2015).  
 
The way in which Islamic knowledge has been integrated into the Senegalese state 
school system is similar to the ways in which ‘indigenous knowledge’ has been added 
to school curricula in other contexts. For instance, in the context of Australia, Nakata 
(2007) argues that caution needs to be taken when attempting to integrate indigenous 
knowledge into school curricula. Too often, understandings of indigenous knowledge 
are separated from the people and processes through which this knowledge is produced 
and valued, and instead interpreted by Western knowledge specialists. What aspects of 
indigenous knowledge get represented in schools, and how, “reflects a complex set of 
intersections of interests and contestations” including  
 
what aspects of knowledge are recognised or valued; what can be envisioned in 
terms of […] utility; […] to the particular interests of scientists or disciplinary 
sectors; […] to what is misinterpreted during the process of abstracting 
indigenous knowledge; and what remains marginalised at the peripheries and at 
risk of being written out, not recognised as valid knowledge, or forgotten (2007, 
p.9).  
 
The fact that some forms of Islamic knowledge have been integrated into state schools 
in Senegal is a significant improvement from people’s perspectives, compared to the 
school system devoid of religious content prior to 2002. However, the kinds of 
knowledge prioritised (namely Arabic literacy over Qur’anic memorisation, for the end 
of literal understanding of the Qur’an and work in the formal sector over acquisition of 
baraka), and the format and schedule of teaching adopted, all reflect the agendas of the 
state and international development actors to meet EFA, and the value-system 
characteristic of Salafi-inspired Muslim reformers influenced by European school 
models, as opposed to the high valorisation of baraka and moral transformation within a 
daara education valued by Medina Diallobé inhabitants. I agree with Smith (2008, p.84) 
that unfortunately “neither Arab oil-exporting contries nor the western donors are 
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willing to support and develop a school system contrary to their social and educational 
norms, even if it qualifies students and answers the needs of the population.”  
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter illuminated the means employed by parents and young people in Medina 
Diallobé to enable the latter to ‘do both’, i.e. to combine religious and secular 
knowledge. These trajectories break down the idea of different school types as separate 
in lived terms, and as in Chapter Four challenge the dichotomy between formal and 
informal modes of learning prevalent in much educational research. These multiple and 
varied pathways reflect similar common preoccupations, but large differences in ability 
to realise those aspirations. 
 
People’s strategies also illustrate continued state failure to deliver an accessible and 
adapted school supply which meets popular demands. Religious knowledge – including 
memorisation of the Qur’an - is important for many people’s sense of social well-being. 
Religious authority carries significant social influence, and current patterns of unequal 
access to Islamic education underpin unequal relationships of power. Broadening access 
to religious knowledge and authority is therefore a social justice issue of the same order 
of importance as access to secular knowledge, and should therefore feature as a 
development priority. The state’s recent reforms have had little impact on Medina 
Diallobé’s immediate educational landscape or on people’s opportunities, demonstrating 
barriers to distributive justice. Indeed, for young people who wish to ‘do both’ a clear 
distinction has emerged between those who can afford the strategy of private or Islamic 
schools, and those obliged to engage in informal learning as a tactic to address their 
exclusion – customary or financial – from schools that meet their needs.  
 
Furthermore, young people’s trajectories of alternating between different school types 
also raise several questions about the potential of the state’s recent reforms to deliver 
curricular justice. The state’s new Islamic schools and proposed “modern” daaras place 
emphasis on French and Arabic literacy and do not enable full memorisation of the 
Qur’an. Indeed, rather than using people’s own logics of educational value to guide 
their conceptions of new schools, state actors have developed these schools from the 
242 
 
standpoint of their own epistemological and pedagogical framework. They have 
engaged with certain types of Islamic knowledge but less with others, essentially 
functionalising Islam to meet international development agendas of EFA and the 
MDGs. Nonetheless, young people’s strategies point to possible educational responses 
adapted to Qur’anic schools’ current functioning which the state, policy-makers and 
practitioners could consider.  
 
These trajectories also uncover the shifting bases of Islamic authority. In some aspects, 
tactics among young people in Medina Diallobé to ‘do both’ outside of formal 
institutions challenge customary barriers and destabilises tooroɗo men’s monopoly over 
religious knowledge. However, these tactics reveal differential access to media, 
reflecting these young people’s relative access to wealth. Furthermore, although 
increased support for women’s Islamic education in Medina Diallobé potentially 
promises to meet women’s unmet need for religious knowledge, this development needs 
to be tempered as its acceptance appears to be contingent on its compatibility with 
patriarchal social norms and male power. Indeed, men’s support for women’s Islamic 
education appears to be largely premised on its potential to maintain women’s 
subordinate social position. A comparable observation can be made with respect to the 
broadening of access to religious knowledge according to social category. While this 
chapter shows that rimɓe other than tooroɓe are able to claim Islamic authority with 
their knowledge through studying elsewhere, Chapter Four on wayluɓe men studying at 
daaras outside the Futa Tooro shows that this is not the case for ñeeñɓe. No wonder, as 
it would pose a more profound threat to the social order upheld by the tooroɗo clerics.  
 
These educational trajectories also uncover the multiple ways people realise themselves 
as ‘being Muslim’. They add weight to arguments against using descriptive labels such 
as ‘Sufi’ or ‘Salafi’, ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘reformist’ uncritically, as while of course there can 
be clashes between people of different ideological stances, these should not eclipse the 
fact that most ordinary people draw upon a range of ideological resources in their 
everyday lives including seeking and consuming various forms of Islamic knowledge 
from different and even opposing theological viewpoints simultaneously. Everyday 
projects of self-making as practiced by the sandas or ustaas’ to articulate a ‘modern’ 
Islamic youth identity which draws upon customary forms of advanced Islamic 
education as well as elements of popular youth culture also reveal the complexity of 
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identity constructions in contemporary Muslim contexts. Finally, these articulations of 
Islam are not limited to pre-occupations with Islamist political agendas or middle-class 
piety, forms of Muslim modernity which receive most scholarly attention. Indeed, 
young men of seeremɓe and sharif lineages in Medina Diallobé are less likely to be 
attracted to disenchanted forms of Islam, than pursuing Qur’anic memorisation within 
the Tijaniyya Sufi network of daaras combined with French literacy. Thus they 
embrace international travel and overseas economic opportunities to enhance and 
reconfigure their social role and religious authority as Islamic scholars, and specialists 
in the prayer economy, embedded within a mystic Islamic paradigm. 
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Chapter 8. Contributions to an applied anthropology of education and 
development 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis opened with the observation that people’s patterns of educational decision-
making between state and Islamic schools, in the commune of Medina Diallobé in 
northern Senegal, run counter to dominant ‘common sense’ expectations within 
international development and comparative education scholarship. This final chapter 
presents the insights generated from investigating the actual logics informing people’s 
trajectories, by paying combined attention to their preferences and practical factors 
affecting realisation of those preferences. While this village reflects a particular and 
unique configuration of actors, relationships and dynamics, it is situated in a wider 
region which shares historical and social conditions shaping education provision and 
preference in similar ways. As earlier chapters have shown, education preferences in 
this village are also comparable to those in other Muslim societies and developing 
countries more generally. Insights from Medina Diallobé are therefore relevant to the 
study of education and development more broadly.  
 
This chapter unpacks the theoretical and methodological challenges that people’s 
preferences in Medina Diallobé pose to dominant conceptualisations of educational 
decision-making, especially in relation to faith-based schooling. In addition, these 
findings are used to make contributions to broader anthropological debates, particularly 
the influence of faith-based ideas on development scholarship and practice, and the 
shifting constructions of gendered, Muslim and social category-based identities in 
contemporary West African and Islamic contexts. These threads are woven together to 
complete this ethnography in the spirit of applied anthropology of education. This 
entails not only exploring the values and meanings people attribute to education, its role 
in projects of self-realisation, and constraints on these aspirations and ensuing 
inequalities, but also contributing to practical debates around the modalities required to 
improve existing educational provision to promote social justice.  
 
245 
 
8.2 Faith, wealth and school trajectories: “Quality education” and preference 
revisited  
 
The first assumption that this thesis tackled is that state schools constitute ‘quality’ 
education conferring economic benefit while Qur’anic schools do not, which 
supposedly drives school choice. This assumption rests on the logic, informed by 
Human Capital and traditional Rational Choice theory, that there exist objective and 
universal economic and social benefits to pupils of mass state schooling, and that 
economic incentives are the main factor informing school preference. However, the 
historical account of schooling in Senegal complements evidence from multiple 
contexts in resource-poor countries which demonstrate that the global school model and 
its associated definition of ‘quality’ education is far from objective and value-neutral. 
Instead, it reflects the materialist and secularist biases of a system developed in 
nineteenth century Europe for creating a skilled labour force. In Senegal, many aspects 
of the form and content of this school model continue to be incompatible with 
livelihood and cultural realities, people’s worldviews and epistemologies, and other 
valued educational opportunities such as Qur’anic schooling and/or apprenticeship, 
manual or domestic work.  
 
Furthermore, evidence from Medina Diallobé demonstrates that people do not only take 
economic returns into account when evaluating education. In addition, they consider 
intrinsic value and material value including through improvements in status. It is 
important to stress the importance of intrinsic value, as although education features 
strongly in strategies of social mobility (Froerer & Portisch 2012), it is also implicated 
in people’s projects of self-realisation in less materialistic ways. By acknowledging 
intrinsic value, one avoids attributing the popularity of faith-based schools to solely 
instrumental reasons, such as economic deprivation, as is common in much Western 
sociological and economic scholarship.  
 
Indeed, the value Medina Diallobé residents confer on accumulation of baraka within 
Qur’anic schools is rooted in an epistemology which recognises the intrinsic sacred 
value of the Qur’anic text, and possible transmission of blessing between people, for 
personal spiritual benefit in this life and the next. The idea of baraka is poorly 
understood, or rejected as superstition, by people - including many Western-educated 
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scholars - unfamiliar with this worldview, who are quick to dismiss the Qur’anic school 
as having little use. However, comprehending the intrinsic value people accord to 
acquisition of baraka is essential to understanding the continued popularity of daara 
education in Senegal. These insights are sorely needed, as despite significant 
anthropological interest in Islam in Africa, research on reasons for people’s engagement 
with Islamic schooling in contemporary African contexts is relatively under-studied 
(although for exceptions see Butler 2006; Hoechner 2011; 2014; Launay n.d.; Ware 
2004b; Ware 2014). 
 
These findings contribute to broader debates in anthropology of development, by 
responding to recent calls that greater attention be accorded to the role of religion in 
framing theory and practice. Rather than focusing solely on the role of faith-based 
organisations (FBOs), scholars (e.g. Clarke 2013; Deneulin & Bano 2009; Deneulin & 
Rakodi 2011) argue that we must use faith as a broader lens of analysis to uncover the 
often hidden ways in which faith-based ideologies – including constructions of 
secularism – permeate development theory and practice. This thesis does that by 
revealing how contrasting theoretical ideas about the appropriate role of faith in 
schooling pervade different forms of education provision in Senegal, and how power 
relations underpin which ideologies dominate. Indeed, despite rejection of the 
secularisation thesis by Western social scientists, implicit assumptions associated with it 
continue to permeate Western education theory and international education policy. The 
practical implications are that state schools in Senegal are still based on a predominantly 
secular and rationalist model despite the religious affiliation of the population and their 
demand for faith-based education within an esoteric Islamic paradigm.  
 
While it is important to acknowledge intrinsic value underpinning education preference, 
this thesis also shows that people are more likely to accord intrinsic value to education 
if it coincides with material and economic benefits. Notions of ‘educational utility’ are 
constructed based on context-specific experiences, historical trends, and social, 
economic and political realities. To illustrate, evidence presented in this thesis reveals 
that the widespread academic assumption that Qur’anic schools have declined in 
popularity among all but the poorest parents, in favour of state or private Islamic 
schools for economic and social skills, reflects the colonial and post-colonial 
experiences of many majority-Muslim countries, but not all. In French West Africa, but 
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Senegal in particular given the high number of Sufi orders which emerged by the early 
20th century, Qur’anic schools have been protected against the competing options of 
state schools and reformist Islamic schools. This unusual situation is linked to French 
colonial policy informed by laïcité and Islam noir, and the charismatic Sufi leaders’ 
continued economic, social and political power after independence.  
 
In the Futa Tooro region specifically, Qur’anic schooling prior to colonisation was 
embedded in a social hierarchy in which clerics dominated economic and political 
power. It conferred status and self-worth on men from tooroɗo clerical lineages, but 
also economic skills for agricultural livelihoods, trade, and religious professions among 
seeremɓe lineages, supplemented with addiya in the case of sharif. Qur’anic school 
education still confers material benefits today as it is compatible with careers through 
internal and international migration. These sources of income, as well as conversion of 
customary political authority into elected positions, have been dominated by the 
Haalpulaar clerical aristocracy to maintain their social position. Perceptions of the 
material and economic value of Qur’anic schools among tooroɓe in Medina Diallobé is 
further supported by the village’s reputation for Islamic scholarship, thriving market 
and legacy of male emigration. The assumption in development studies that Qur’anic 
schools inevitably give way to state or private Islamic schools for the economic 
advantages of the latter therefore needs to be problematized to take into account 
alternative patterns of school preference grounded in specific economic contexts. 
 
Indeed, these findings contest wider presumptions informed by the secularisation thesis 
that religion will retreat to the private sphere and is incompatible with economic 
growth. The religious economy in Senegal, diaspora and other Islamic countries, 
towards which middle-class male tooroɓe from Medina Diallobé are increasingly 
orienting themselves, contributes to a growing body of evidence that although religion 
diversifies during processes of modernisation, it does not necessarily decline. Faith-
infused trajectories of economic growth are possible and even compatible with 
neoliberal economies (Otayek & Soares 2007, pp.18–19; Rudnyckyj 2009; Tripp 2006). 
Nonetheless, the prejudice that overt expressions of religion are incompatible with 
modernity and economic growth remain within mainstream economics, development 
studies, and much Western development practice (Jackson & Fleischer 2007). The 
resulting assumption that strong faith-based schools, teaching a predominantly moral 
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education over the ‘core curriculum’ of literacy and numeracy, do not have economic 
benefits is therefore based on a narrow understanding of how these schools are linked to 
the learning of trades, and ignores the thriving market for religious knowledge and skills 
in Medina Diallobé, other African contexts (Butler 2006; Soares 2005) and African 
diaspora (Gemmeke 2011; Soares 2004). 
 
People’s trajectories also reveal flaws in presenting state and Islamic schools, formal 
and informal learning, or public and private spheres, as separate, despite the fact that 
such distinctions are pervasive in educational debates (c.f. Froerer & Portisch 2012, 
pp.339–340; Lave 2011; Naji 2012; Rogers 2004). Indeed, people’s everyday 
educational practices, where they both seek and impart knowledge within different 
institutions and learning spheres, form part of coherent strategies of self-making. For 
instance, Qur’anic school education for boys and informal socialisation practices by 
women in the home are both mutually constitutive of tooroɗo identity rooted in 
religious piety. Similarly, obtaining both religious knowledge and skills associated with 
the state schools is a preoccupation for everyone in Medina Diallobé, pursued through a 
variety of creative strategies and tactics. These various pathways often reflect similar 
common preoccupations, but large differences in abilities to realise those aspirations. 
They support academic arguments in favour of going beyond formal/informal 
distinctions, and their theoretical and methodological implications, when making sense 
of the role of education in forming persons and their trajectories.  
 
The assumption that Qur’anic schools supposedly lack economic benefits is 
accompanied by the presumption that state schools confer unequivocal social and 
economic returns. This thesis builds on a growing body of qualitative anthropological 
literature (Froerer 2011; 2012; Froerer & Portisch 2012; Heissler 2011; Jeffrey et al. 
2008; Naji 2012; Rao & Hossain 2011) to demonstrate that despite the prevalence of 
this discourse among state and development actors and often parents and young people 
themselves, reinforced through international commitment to EFA, promises of social 
mobility or economic gain through schooling are rather ambiguous. As in many 
contexts, most inhabitants of Medina Diallobé consider primary schools essential for 
socialisation and basic literacy and numeracy skills, yet value attributed to the only 
recently accessible secondary schools is more contested. Many parents and young 
people consider the promise of skills for formal employment within secondary 
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schooling as not worth the investment. For boys from more privileged families, 
“fallback” (Froerer 2011, p.704; Jeffrey et al. 2008, p.11) employment options in trade 
and migration appear more accessible, lucrative and high status. Such perceptions 
reflect widespread disruption in the state school system, and few male role models from 
the village who have become wealthy through schooling. For many girls, marriage 
entailing domestic work and economic dependence on a husband is seen as more 
certain, high status and comfortable than the vague possibility of gaining formal sector 
work.  
 
To make sense of how local political economies influence people’s engagement with 
and evaluations of schooling – state or Qur’anic – I follow anthropologists who have 
drawn on Polyani’s concept of “embeddedness” (2001) to describe economic and social 
worlds as mutually constituted, as expressed by Olivier de Sardan (2005, p.61): 
 
The classic economic phenomena (production, exchange, and consumption of 
wealth and services) […] cannot be arbitrarily isolated from their social 
dimensions (for example, cleavages of age, gender, status, condition, class), 
their cultural and symbolic dimensions (norms of respectability, modes of social 
recognition, criteria of prestige, solidarity and achievement), their political 
dimensions (patron–client relationships and factions, neo-patrimonialism) or 
their magicoreligious dimensions (for example, accusations of witchcraft).  
 
Indeed, understanding people’s rationales for engagement with schools in Senegal 
requires sensitivity to epistemology, but also local ‘economies’, or norms of reciprocity 
and duty, and interpersonal relations of affection. The “conflicting collective 
rationalities” circulating in such contexts therefore “mobilize various registers of social 
reality” and have to be considered simultaneously (ibid. 2005, p.61). 
 
8.3 Knowledge, status and identity: Realising selves through learning  
 
Further assumptions in development studies which this thesis aimed to address related 
to the role which identity plays in shaping people’s education preferences, experiences 
of school, and ability to realise their desired trajectories. The first assumption was that 
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state schools are empowering to girls while Islamic schools are not; the second that in a 
strongly Muslim context, parents will prefer Islamic rather than state schools for their 
daughters. The third assumption was that nuclear families are the principal decision-
making unit and that, due to gender and age hierarchies, fathers will have far more 
influence than women and children. These assumptions are rooted in dominant ways of 
conceiving of families, gender and Islamic identity, widespread in economics but also in 
development studies. These assumptions helpfully acknowledge that identity and 
pursuit of status, not just economic benefits, play a role in shaping attitudes surrounding 
education. However, they fall into the trap of making value judgements about certain 
identities, and conceptualising dimensions of identity as monolithic, inherent qualities 
of individuals, rather than being context-specific, complex, multiple and intersecting. 
Identities are also constituted through constant negotiation by people in social 
interaction, who reproduce but also subvert and resist dominant framings.  
 
The first important contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of how identity 
informs educational trajectories in northern Senegal is by drawing attention to the 
significance of social category hierarchies. Many ethnic groups in West Africa and the 
Sahel have for centuries been characterised by a distinction made between freeborn, 
artisanal and (former) slave lineages, which continues to have profound influence over 
people’s sense of self and the educational opportunities available to them. The previous 
chapters detailing the complex influence of social category identities on educational 
decision-making contribute to wider anthropological scholarship on the way these 
constructions shape people’s subjectivity and material existence in contemporary West 
Africa (Buggenhagen 2011; 2012; Jourde 2012; O’Neill 2012; Scheele 2012).  
 
Since the 1990s, global spread of human rights ideologies and democratisation 
processes have created new spaces for former slave categories and artisans to challenge 
social hierarchies through ‘confrontational’ social movements (Hahonou 2011; 
Leservoisier 2003; 2005; Messaoud 2000; Ould Ahmed Salem 2009; Pelckmans 2011; 
Thioub et al. 2014; Tidjani-Alou 2000). However, we should remain aware of more 
subtle yet ongoing and everyday contestations. Indeed, tensions in Medina Diallobé are 
much less visible to an outsider than social movements, but demonstrate that struggles 
related to category identities are nonetheless salient in people’s everyday experiences. 
Access to knowledge and education are key arenas in which people attempt to 
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reproduce or reconfigure social category identities. Evidence from Medina Diallobé 
therefore complements the findings of other studies, such as Humery’s account of how 
ñeeñɓe and gallunkooɓe in the Futa Tooro embraced Pulaar literacy programs for 
knowledge to revalorise their identity (2012). These examples also demonstrate that the 
enduring and persistent inequalities of social category hierarchies in West African and 
Sahelian societies are not statically inherited throughout history. Instead, individuals 
constantly renegotiate and creatively challenge the ideological basis of these identity 
constructions, and the relationships between different categories to social status and 
political power.  
 
These insights suggest that scholars and practitioners of international development 
working in West Africa and the Sahel need a much greater awareness of social category 
hierarchies. While researchers interested in human rights may engage with 
anthropological literature on contemporary emancipation movements of slaves and 
former slaves, there is less awareness among scholars working in other fields, including 
education, that social category is a broad and all-encompassing axis of difference – as 
important as gender – relevant to all development processes and endeavours. Indeed, the 
emphasis on gender as the defining aspect of identity which shapes social relations, 
combined with the methodological predominance of quantitative studies based on 
predetermined variables, means that other equally important axes of social difference 
are ignored in much international development research.  
 
A thorough understanding of the local cultural context is essential for comprehending 
how the identity of being educated has coincided with other identity constructions. 
Much rigorous qualitative scholarship on the intersections between social category, 
knowledge and power has been undertaken by historians and anthropologists of the 
Sahel. However, if they consider the impacts of social category on issues of 
contemporary development interest, they tend to publish in anthropology rather than 
international development, economics or comparative education journals. This tendency 
has been noted for qualitative and ethnographic analysis of culture and identity in the 
field of comparative education more broadly (Masemann 2005, p.113). Nevertheless, 
such research needs to be made more accessible to development practitioners and 
theorists working in or on West Africa, in order to illuminate the impacts social 
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category identities have on educational preference and achievement, including 
associated barriers to social justice. 
 
The educational trajectories of young people in contemporary Medina Diallobé also 
demonstrate the multiple ways in which they realise their Muslim identities. Islamic 
societies around the world have experienced processes of modernisation, namely 
urbanisation, expansion of non-religious education and scientific discourse, decline of 
family and village social hierarchies, and greater mobility and access to information. 
Rather than following the secularisation thesis’ assumption that all societies will 
demonstrate greater rationalisation and secularisation when undergoing modernisation, 
anthropologists have argued that modernities are multiple, not singular (Eisenstadt 
2000). Indeed, constructions of ‘modernity’ are produced by people everywhere, 
entailing an ambivalent relation with ‘tradition’ and an orientation towards ‘progress’ in 
the present and future (Ferguson 1999; Osella & Osella 2006; 2007; Soares & Osella 
2010, pp.3–5). In investigating people’s strivings to be Muslim and ‘modern’, much 
research has revealed the popularity of rationalised forms of Islam, piety movements, 
and creation or harnessing of educational practices which combine Islamic knowledge 
with European school models by the middle-classes. However, these preference trends 
are not played out in Medina Diallobé, thus defying simplistic predictions about the 
apparently deterministic influence Islamic identity exerts over people’s behaviour 
(Marsden & Retsikas 2013, pp.6–7), including education preference.  
 
Indeed, in Medina Diallobé, focusing only on those middle-class people attending 
reformist private Islamic schools would mask the alternative everyday projects of self-
making as practiced by the sandas or ustaas’ modernes to articulate a ‘modern’ Islamic 
youth identity which combines customary modes of advanced Islamic education with 
elements of popular youth culture which they share with state school pupils. This can be 
compared with Masquelier’s (2007) observations that marginalized young men in Niger 
are affirming Islam and being Muslim, but with less rigid attention to ritual and 
combined with hip-hop music and dress style. People’s negotiations of their social 
category status also reveal negotiations of being ‘modern’ in contrast to ‘tradition’. 
Some argue that social category hierarchies, including tooroɗo monopoly on political 
authority and customary barriers on certain occupations, belong to the realm of 
‘tradition’ and have no place in contemporary society. Others, however, would 
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appropriate notions of being ‘modern’ less to dissolve social category difference, but to 
reconfigure social category characteristics in order to access new economic 
opportunities, which for the tooroɓe serves to maintain their social superiority. 
 
Furthermore, Salafi-inspired ideology with its idea of affiliation towards a global, 
universalised imagined Islamic community, appeals to some. This orientation is 
especially attractive to those wishing to challenge the particularism of local ideologies 
subscribed to by the majority of Haalpulaar clerics, who construct differences in 
religiosity between social categories. However, young men of middle-class seeremɓe 
and sharif lineages in Medina Diallobé are less likely to be attracted to disenchanted 
forms of Islam, and instead pursue Qur’anic memorisation within the Tijaniyya Sufi 
network of Quranic schools, combined with informal acquisition of French literacy. 
They aspire to international travel and overseas economic opportunities to enhance and 
reconfigure their social role and religious authority as Islamic scholars, and specialists 
in the prayer economy, embedded within a mystic Islamic paradigm. This adds further 
weight to observations that contemporary articulations of Islam are not limited to pre-
occupations with Islamist political agendas or middle-class piety (Howell & van 
Bruinessen 2007; Retsikas 2013), or that young Muslims and Qur’anic schools are 
associated with radical and militant Islam (Bano 2012b, pp.45–46; Bayat & Herrera 
2010).  
 
They add to a growing body of evidence that, contrary to stereotypes of its association 
with ‘backward’ illiterate rural populations, Sufism is a highly adaptive Islamic 
orientation whose proponents engage with ideas of modernity (Seeseman 2011). It is 
increasingly associated with affluent and middle-classes including in urban settings 
(Haenni & Voix 2007; Howell 2007), linked by transnational networks (Damrel 2006; 
Villalón 2007; Werbner 2007). Findings from Medina Diallobé address the call from 
anthropologists that more attention needs to be paid to  the dynamic resurgence of Sufi 
or esoteric forms of Islamic learning and practice, and the intellectual challenges “a re-
invigorated, deeply reflective, and highly literate and globalised Sufism presents” 
(Marsden & Retsikas 2013, p.22) – including surrounding definitions of ‘quality Islamic 
education’ which challenge strict rationalism and rejection of esoteric knowledge. These 
insights also provide an illuminating counter-balance to most scholarship on 
contemporary Islam in Senegal which has tended to focus on the experiences of the 
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Muridiyya44, and more recently Niassiyya Sufi orders and reformist associations, to the 
neglect of the Haalpulaar contexts of the Futa Tooro and Medina Gounass 
predominantly affiliated to the Umariyya Tijaniyya (c.f. Humery 2012; Jourde 2012; 
O’Neill 2012; Smith 2008). 
 
In addition, while there are occasionally clashes between people of different ideological 
stances, these should not eclipse the fact that most ordinary people draw upon a range of 
resources in their everyday lives (Lambek 1993; Otayek & Soares 2007), as evidenced 
by their seeking and consuming various forms of Islamic knowledge from different and 
even opposing theological viewpoints simultaneously. These examples add further 
weight to anthropological arguments about the dangers of using descriptive labels such 
as ‘Sufi’ or ‘Salafi’, ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘reformist’ uncritically or assuming their 
separateness (Jourde 2009; Otayek & Soares 2007, pp.2–7; Weismann 2007). In West 
Africa, from at least the 1990s there has been co-existence across doctrinal divides with 
fewer distinctions between supporters (Kane & Villalón 1998; Kobo 2012; Launay 
2007; Masquelier 2001). Schools cannot be neatly categorised under any of these terms 
as there has been so much sharing of pedagogical techniques over time (Loimeier 2002; 
Ware 2014). In Medina Diallobé, people’s educational trajectories expose a similar 
trend.  
 
People’s trajectories also reveal the complex, unpredictable and fluctuating ways in 
which gender, social category, socioeconomic status and being Muslim intersect to 
shape people’s subjectivities and education preferences. They are influenced by the 
cultures and decision-making histories of individual families, in a myriad of 
permutations which can easily shift over generations. For instance, in the Futa Tooro 
from the colonial period boys from aristocratic political tooroɗo families have been 
especially likely to succeed through schooling and formal employment given their 
families’ inherited privilege. However, in Medina Diallobé today it is these boys who 
are likely to abandon state school for Qur’anic school education or work in trades and 
migration. Similarly, the ideals tooroɗo parents have to marry their daughters for the 
status and economic security it confers leads in some cases to girls dropping out of 
secondary school before gaining diplomas, but in other more middle-class families it 
                                                 
44
 See Triaud (2000, p.10) for a critique of Murid-centrism in scholarship on Senegalese Sufism. 
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contributes to their finishing school and even obtaining high status university education. 
This reinforces the point that attention to context-specific detail is needed to understand 
education preference trends. 
 
Finally, these different strands of theoretical insight combine to shed light on broader 
anthropological debates surrounding the everyday salience of Islam in Muslim people’s 
subjectivities, and its implications for education. Although I argue for the necessity of 
making the importance of amassing baraka known to development actors, I am aware 
of the risks posed in privileging religion as the principal foundation for Muslim identity 
and practice (Abu-Lughod 1989, pp.295–297; Grillo 2004, pp.863–864; Soares & 
Osella 2010, p.2). Such scholars argue rather that religion is but one factor motivating 
people’s behaviour, which is at times significant but at others less important. The 
popularity of participating in piety movements, veiling, fasting, or attending Islamic 
schools needs to be contextualised, and balanced by considering contrasting factors 
which lead people to reconsider, or lose interest in, religious commitments and 
orientations (Marsden 2005; Schielke 2009; 2010).  
 
Marsden and Retsikas (2013, p.2) use the term systematicity to describe the process of 
people making ‘Islam’ or ‘being Muslim’ more or less salient in particular times and 
places. They define it as “the efforts required and undertaken by […] people of Muslim 
background […] in order to evince and eclipse ‘the religious’ as being a more or less 
central dimension of their lives.” The ways in which tooroɓe, especially seeremɓe and 
sharif, present themselves as pious Muslims including through choosing Qur’anic 
school education for their sons to legitimise their social superiority, is an example of 
producing systematicity which needs to be situated in the social, economic and political 
context of the Futa Tooro and Medina Diallobé. In the current situation of economic 
insecurity within Senegal, and an international context which limits possibilities for 
migrants, even this deep-rooted commitment to Qur’anic school among tooroɓe is being 
challenged. Choosing the Qur’anic school now entails greater challenges in 
reconciliation of intrinsic, material and economic value, demonstrating that different 
aspects of tooroɗo selfhood are increasingly standing in conflict with one another (see 
also Marsden 2005; Schielke 2009; 2010). In contrast, wayluɓe men are no less Muslim 
than their tooroɓe neighbours, but rather than articulating a pious Muslim identity 
through Qur’anic school, they pursue state schooling and formal employment to 
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valorise their social category status while studying religion informally. These nuances 
also provide a response to calls that greater attention be paid to the diversity of Muslim 
masculinities, as focus on ‘gender and Islam’ has tended to concentrate on women 
(Soares & Osella 2010, p.7). 
 
8.4 Conclusion: Social justice in the age of Education For All  
 
This thesis uses frameworks developed within anthropology of education to illuminate 
the locally-ascribed and “culturally produced” (Willis 1981) value people in northern 
Senegal confer on education. In particular, it considers engagement with faith-based 
schools rooted in a different epistemology to state schools, in the context of profound 
changes in education provision in the last fifteen years due to EFA policies. In the spirit 
of transformative applied anthropological research, I use these empirical insights to 
expose challenges to both distributive and curricular justice in education, and propose 
practical solutions to promote social justice in Senegal and similar contexts. 
 
In Medina Diallobé, distributive justice, namely equal access to existing schools and 
their benefits, is hampered by the fact that the promises of secondary state school for 
self-realisation and social mobility are rarely delivered. This is due to structural 
inequalities linked to wealth, access to information, and constructions of gender. This 
observation reinforces mounting evidence that mass schooling is a “contradictory 
resource” (Levinson & Holland 1996, p.1), creating new forms of inequality in access 
and outcomes as much as creating opportunities. First, diplomas alone are insufficient 
for gaining formal employment, as young people also require information, contacts and 
assets mediated predominately by their family and its network. Their differential 
positioning in relation to these goods reflects deep-seated social and economic 
inequalities, which can be reflected in clientelist relationships between more powerful 
and affluent families and their dependents. The case of one politician appointing 
vacataire teachers in return for political support is a particularly strong example of how 
patronage logic counters assumptions of the meritocratic benefits accorded by 
schooling. These examples also contribute to debates surrounding the influence of 
clientelist relations on education outcomes and social mobility (Morgan et al. 2010), 
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concluding that while they help client families in the short term, they support unequal 
power relations and patrons’ privilege in the long run. 
 
Second, the trajectories of young women provide evidence to counter the discourse 
prevalent in international development policy that schooling and higher education lead 
to female ‘empowerment’ in the form of formal employment and decision-making 
authority. Within Human Capital Theory, mass schooling is promoted for girls for 
economic ends – whether supporting the wider economy through reproductive activities, 
or through their own productivity. In addition, many Western feminists assert that state 
schools should encourage more egalitarian gender identities, by providing girls access 
to valuable knowledge and income generating opportunities, and hence respect and 
authority in their families and communities. However, locally-situated processes of 
identity formation, whose intersections are complex, shifting, multiple and 
unpredictable, pose challenges to these simplistic predictions. Constructions of 
femininity centred on domesticity compete with secondary-school-based definitions of 
the “educated person” (Levinson & Holland 1996). Gendered constructions of social 
category can also restrict the income-generating opportunities of girls with school 
diplomas, or provide them little scope for negotiating when and to whom they get 
married. Contrary to assumptions in much literature on education decision-making that 
women and children occupy such a subordinate position within families that they have 
little agency in influencing decisions, girls do undoubtedly exercise agency over their 
educational trajectories. However, as girls are embedded in wider social networks 
encompassing parents, siblings, but also extended family and in-laws, in general most 
cannot easily counter these prevailing ideals. 
 
In addition to these barriers of distributive justice, the findings from Medina Diallobé 
reveal widespread constraints to curricular justice, namely that the content of existing 
state school provision is inadequate for people’s demands for religious knowledge and 
education. Indeed, despite lip service from international development organisations that 
religion is an integral aspect of people’s well-being and hence of central development 
concern, parents’ and students’ faith-informed definitions of ‘quality’ education have 
little influence over public sector school delivery. The importance people place on 
moral education for the afterlife has been neglected in state education provision, 
especially the role of baraka in this process. The Senegalese government’s recent 
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reforms integrate Islam into state schools according to models of ‘weak’ or ‘moderate’ 
faith-based schools, risking functionalising Islam in line with international donor 
agendas to achieve universal primary schooling rather than responding sufficiently to 
popular demands. These insights are crucial given the dearth of research on the impacts 
of, and reactions to, recent state engagement with Islamic schools in former colonies of 
the AOF in the past fifteen years to meet EFA (Villalón 2012; although see Villalón et 
al. 2012; Villalón & Bodian 2012; Villalón & Tidjani-Alou 2012 for exceptions).  
 
Indeed, young people’s strategies to ‘do both’, which blur conceptual divides between 
formal and informal modes of education, show that the state is failing to deliver 
accessible and adapted education options which enable people to combine the Islamic 
and secular knowledge they consider valuable. Firstly, the state’s new Franco-Arab 
schools are available to only a small proportion of the Senegalese population, and its 
proposed “modernised daaras” have been slow to materialise at all. Furthermore, 
findings from Medina Diallobé raise questions about the possibility that the state’s new 
Islamic schools will address people’s demands, given that the Islamic knowledge these 
schools privilege is Arabic literacy and Islamic sciences, to which people grant low 
intrinsic, material or economic value compared to Qur’anic memorisation. Private 
Islamic school providers understand people’s desire to memorise the Qur’an before 
learning skills such as French literacy and build this into their schools’ functioning, but 
they are only accessible to the wealthy. Yet, the state’s Islamic school formats, 
conceptualised in the context of meeting donor commitments to EFA, continue to reflect 
rationalist biases in favour of text-based knowledge over embodied learning, and 
literacy over memorisation. This is sadly characteristic of dominant approaches to 
integrating ‘indigenous’ knowledge into existing school curricula; the knowledge is 
chosen and packaged according to the priorities and worldview of the often non-
indigenous elite (Nakata 2007). The situation is also reminiscent of Deneulin and 
Bano’s observation that:  
 
the cherry-picking mode of engagement between donors and religious 
communities […] highlight[s] the limited effectiveness of current attempts at 
engaging with religion. They also bring to the fore the problems inherent in 
viewing religion only as a means to promote given ends, such as what donors 
conceive as valuable and desirable development outcomes (2009, p.25). 
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By investigating people’s pursuit of religious education, this thesis challenges the 
simplistic assumption widespread in development studies that state schools are more 
useful or empowering, including for girls, than Islamic schools. Rather, contemporary 
preference for state schools among members of non-tooroɗo social categories, and 
parents for their daughters, has to be considered in the context of the exclusion of these 
groups from Islamic education as the most highly regarded form of knowledge. Indeed, 
before colonisation the identity of the educated person which accorded the highest status 
and most social influence in the Futa Tooro was associated with long-term 
memorisation of the Qur’an. Given the power it conferred, Qur’anic school was 
restricted to men of the elite Muslim clerical tooroɗo category, which in turn reinforced 
their social superiority. The fact that women and non-tooroɗo men travel to Qur’anic 
and Islamic schools outside the Futa Tooro demonstrates the unmet need for knowledge 
which carries significant intrinsic value for people’s sense of well-being, and material 
benefit of social status.  
 
In some aspects, tactics among young people in Medina Diallobé to learn religion 
outside of formal institutions destabilises tooroɗo men’s monopoly over religious 
knowledge with progressive social implications. The transformative potential of 
increased support for, and informal provision of, women’s Islamic education in Medina 
Diallobé needs to be considered in a balanced manner. Men’s increased support for 
women’s Islamic education is largely premised on its potential to maintain women’s 
subordinate social position and appears to be contingent upon its compatibility with 
patriarchal social norms and male power. Indeed, the authority of the village’s first 
female Qur’anic teacher owes much to her status as a tooroɗo from a prestigious 
seeremɓe family, and her emphasis on teaching pious female behaviour in line with 
patriarchal norms. In common with other recent scholarship on the growing trend of 
women’s presence within positions of Islamic authority (Bano 2012a; Dessing 2012; 
Jeffery et al. 2012; Le Renard 2012), these examples show that the religious authority of 
female teachers challenges the social hierarchy subtly and slowly. However, this 
increased access nonetheless addresses women’s unmet demand for religious 
knowledge to some extent, with positive benefits for their sense of self-worth, and 
potentially for their respect within their families and the wider community. 
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A comparable example of the transformative potential of access to Islamic education is 
with respect to the broadening of access to religious knowledge according to social 
category. Non-tooroɓe men are seeking Islamic education outside Medina Diallobé to 
challenge the monopoly tooroɓe clerics have over religious knowledge. It is true that for 
the moment rimɓe other than tooroɓe have had more success at claiming Islamic 
authority with their Islamic education than wayluɓe men. Indeed, the inclusion of non-
tooroɗo rimɓe but not ñeeñɓe in daaras in the Futa Tooro has historical precedent, as 
religious authority in the hands of ñeeñɓe is perceived by tooroɗo clerics as a more 
profound threat to the social order. Nonetheless, this access to religious knowledge does 
pose a challenge to the constraining constructions of gender, social category and being 
Muslim perpetuated by the tooroɓe and contributes to non-tooroɓe men’s sense of 
spiritual well-being and self-esteem. 
 
However, the fact that religious authority carries significant social influence, and 
current patterns of access to Islamic education underpin unequal relationships of power, 
has been neglected by the state and development associations who focus solely on the 
emancipatory potential of state schools not Islamic schools. Yet, in this context, 
exclusion of women from Islamic education can be considered a challenge to gender 
equality, as women are barred from the knowledge which confers the most social 
authority and the means to directly contest religious discourse. Similarly, social 
category is an equally important axis of inequality, despite being widely ignored by 
scholars of development and comparative education. Broadening access to religious 
knowledge and authority should therefore be considered a social justice issue and 
development priority of the same order of importance as access to secular knowledge. 
 
The educational strategies of inhabitants of Medina Diallobé can be harnessed to find 
solutions in order to better address barriers to social justice. These solutions are both 
methodological and practical. First, for those individuals who aspire to attain the 
benefits of existing state schools, the findings of this thesis suggest an urgent need for 
more sensitive theoretical frameworks and methodological techniques to uncover the 
barriers to distributive justice. For instance, the widespread existence of clientelism 
challenges the narrow economic measures of household socioeconomic status, tied to 
the gendered ideal of a male breadwinner, as a way of making sense of inequalities in 
education outcomes between individuals. More research is needed into how people’s 
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access to wealth in the form of inherited assets or access to well-paid professions is 
relational. In the case of parts of West Africa, these relationships reflect legacies of 
social category inequalities. Analyses of socioeconomic status and education outcomes 
therefore need to pay more attention to context and culture-specific relational dynamics 
than the access individuals or households have to specific assets.  
 
Similarly, the findings of this thesis have implications for development measures which 
aim to increase access to secondary schooling for girls who are attracted to its promises 
of self-fulfilment. They need to acknowledge the ways that extended social networks 
beyond nuclear families and girls’ covert forms of agency influence educational 
trajectories. Rather than trying to convince parents to permit girls to attend school, as is 
the current dominant policy focus, instead interventions need to recognise the role 
husbands and in-laws play in managing girls’ schooling, domestic work and 
reproduction. In addition, although social category intersects with gender to shape girls’ 
aspirations and trajectories, including posing barriers to distributive justice in terms of 
access to school-related social mobility, this is ignored by the state, development agents, 
and academics despite the investment currently made in challenging gender barriers in 
access to state schools. The need is therefore great for more qualitative research which 
can identify locally-specific forms of inequality better than methods which employ 
predefined categories of analysis. 
 
Finally, addressing unequal access to desired forms of religious education should also 
be an urgent development priority. This thesis demonstrates that biases against strong 
faith-based schools are prevalent in Western educational theory. These biases are 
manifest practically in state education provision in Senegal – including recent reforms 
to the Islamic school sector to meet EFA - supported by Western development donors, 
and undermine many people’s right to the religious knowledge that they value. Hence, 
people who attend state schools have limited access to religious-based social authority, 
and those who attend Qur’anic schools face challenges gaining desired economic skills. 
Sadly, current  attempts by the Senegalese state and development organisations to 
integrate Islamic knowledge into existing state school systems, or impose “modernised” 
curricula on existing Qur’anic schools, raises problems surrounding what knowledge is 
valued, whose priorities dominate, and how to reconcile the multiple and competing 
educational demands evident among the population. 
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To practically address this problem, breaking down distinctions between formal and 
informal education can help us to imagine spaces for making state-provided education 
more compatible with the existing variety of additional (religious) educational 
opportunities. Students’ creative solutions and means of navigating learning 
opportunities available to them, whether formal or informal, point to potential avenues 
through which education provision by the state can be improved to deliver social 
justice. Indeed, as applied anthropologists of education Levinson and Pollock (2011, 
p.4) argue, “many of us are deeply engaged in efforts to improve or transform schools, 
even as we question their efficacy or superiority as sites for learning”. These efforts can 
be aided by “break[ing] down the barriers of theoretical orientation or educational 
practice that separate schools from other sites and modalities of learning”. Furthermore, 
recent debates in development studies call for an approach of “going with the grain” 
(Booth 2011; Kelsall 2008) by building on existing norms of governance in African 
countries to elaborate appropriate solutions to social problems. In Senegal one needs to 
note the importance of a “religious mode of governance” (Olivier de Sardan 2011, p.28) 
in which charismatic leaders supported by religious legitimacy play a significant role in 
people’s everyday lives, and that these leaders and associated religious bodies deliver 
collective services.  
 
Hence, lessons learned from people’s creative strategies of “multiskilling” (Froerer & 
Portisch 2012, p.339), by acquiring different forms of knowledge to maximise their 
future prospects, suggest the need for the state to engage with more innovative and 
alternative modes of non-formal education provision. These need not be limited to the 
model of the state school, and should work with the strengths of Qur’anic schools and in 
collaboration with their providers, without controlling them or imposing an alien 
epistemological logic. It makes pragmatic sense to work more collaboratively with these 
actors and their existing practices of service provision to address locally-defined 
development needs. The strategies of young people in Medina Diallobé point to possible 
extra-school educational responses adapted to the current functioning of the Qur’anic 
schools which the state, policy-makers and practitioners could consider. These include 
finding ways to accommodate non-formal numeracy and French literacy teaching 
alongside the timetables of existing Qur’anic schools for almudɓe, or for adults who 
have completed daara education. This would be easier and potentially cheaper than 
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investing in ambitious “modernised” Islamic schools which aim at a seemingly 
impossible reconciliation between the Qur’anic schools’ epistemology, and the form 
and curriculum of schools informed by a secularist, rationalist framework demanded by 
donors.  
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Glossary  
 
addiya  (Arabic): gift, especially given to Qurʾan teachers, clerics, and Sufi shaykhs 
adjami (Arabic): non-Arab; used here as African languages written in Arabic script 
alluwal (Pulaar): wooden boards for Qurʾan learning, from Arabic alwah 
Almamy (French): from Pulaar almaami, from the Arabic al-imam, leader or guide 
almuɗo (pl. almudɓe) (Pulaar): Qur’anic school student 
Amicale (French): association, e.g. of teachers, pupils, university students 
année blanche (French): annulled academic year when no pupil moves on a grade 
arabisant (French): arabophone 
baraka (Arabic): blessing, grace, benediction, divinely derived power 
bayda (Pulaar): young, beginning Qur’anic school student 
baylo, pl. wayluɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar smith category 
batin (Arabic): hidden or concealed, esoteric knowledge 
bid’a (Arabic): innovation considered unlawful within Islamic jurisprudence 
ceɗɗo, pl. seɓɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar warrior category 
ceerno (pl. seeremɓe) (Pulaar): Qurʾan teacher, cleric; plural denotes a clerical lineage 
chef lieu (French): administrative headquarters, e.g. of a canton, department or region 
collège (French): lower secondary school 
communauté rurale (French): decentralised territorial demarcation at village level  
cuballo, pl. subalɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar fisherman category 
daara (Wolof ): Qurʾanic school; from Arabic dar al-Qurʾan, house of the Qurʾan 
dabaade (Pulaar): to practice the esoteric sciences 
dabotooɗo, pl. dabotooɓe (Pulaar): practitioner of the esoteric sciences 
diamantaire (French): diamond trader 
dimo, pl. rimɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar freeborn rank 
du‘a’ (Arabic): supplication, invocation, call on God 
duɗal, pl. dude (Pulaar): hearth, Qurʾanic school, referring to study around a fire 
duusde (Pulaar): to show a guest out 
fedde (Pulaar): age set  
fiqh (Arabic): Islamic law as a discipline in the curriculum of Islamic study 
gallunkooɗo, (pl. gallunkooɓe) (Pulaar): liberated slave, descendant of former slaves 
gawlo, pl. awluɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar praise-singer/genealogist  
          category 
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hafiz (Arabic): keeper or guardian; someone who has memorised the Qur’an 
hajj (Arabic): pilgrimage to Mecca; fifth pillar of the Islamic faith 
hijra (Arabic): emigration in the face of conflict or persecution 
ibado (Wolof): Salafi-inspired Muslim, from Senegalese association Jama’at ‘Ibad ar- 
Rahman 
internat (French): boarding school, especially Qur’anic/Islamic boarding school 
ijaza (Arabic): authorisation to teach within Islam 
jaawanɗo, pl. jaawanɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar courtier category 
jeeri (Pulaar): less fertile land beyond the floodplain of the Senegal River basin 
jihad (Arabic): war or struggle against non-Muslims 
jinn (Arabic): intelligent non-human spirit in Arabian and Muslim mythology 
khalifa (Arabic): successor to the Prophet; representative of a Sufi order 
korɗo, pl. horɓe (Pulaar): bondswoman, female domestic slave 
korité (Pulaar): celebration of Eid al-Adha at the end of the fast of Ramadan 
labbo, pl. lawɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar woodworker category 
laïcité (French): French brand of secularism  
lasarar (Pulaar): esoteric knowledge, from Arabic al-asrar meaning secret 
luumo (Pulaar): market or fair 
lycée (French): upper secondary school 
maabo, pl. maabuɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar weaver category 
maccuɗo, pl. maccuɓe (Pulaar): bondsman, male domestic slave 
marabout (French): Muslim religious leader or notable, from Arabic murabit 
médersa (French): French colonial Islamic school, from Arabic madrasa 
mbaaral (Pulaar): public event to celebrate completion of Qur’anic memorisation  
mystique (French): estoteric sciences 
naalanke, pl. naalankooɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar musician category 
needi (Pulaar): behaviour, moral upbringing, manners 
ñeeño, pl. ñeeñɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar artisan rank 
njatigi (Pulaar): host, host family 
pullo, pl. fulɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar cattle-herding category  
sadaqa (Arabic): voluntary or expiatory alms, especially given to Qur’anic students 
sakko, pl. sakkeeɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar leatherworker category 
sanda (Pulaar): older, adolescent or adult Qur’anic school/Islamic sciences student 
sharia (Arabic): Islamic canonical law based on the Qur’an, hadith and Sunnah 
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sharif (Pulaar): descendant of the Prophet or his Companions 
shaykh (Arabic): honorific title for a male leader, elder or noble; French version cheikh  
      is a common male first name in Senegal 
shirk (Arabic): sin in Islamic law of practising idolatry or polytheism 
soirée (French): evening party usually with music and/or performances 
soutoura (Wolof): discretion; maintenance of privacy, dignity and respect 
Sunnah (Arabic): normative example, especially of the Prophet 
surat (Arabic): verse of the Qur’an 
surveillant (French): someone who exercises surveillance, e.g. in a school 
table-bancs (French): combined desks and tables used in classrooms 
talibé (Wolof): Qurʾan learner, disciple of a religious leader, from Arabic taalib 
talkuru, pl. talki (Pulaar): charm against bad luck, often containing Qur’anic verses 
tafsir (Arabic): Qur’anic exegesis or interpretation 
taqlid (Arabic): learning through imitation within the classical Islamic education system 
tariqa (Arabic): path, way, method, technical term for a Sufi order 
tooroɗo, pl. tooroɓe (Pulaar): member of the Haalpulaar Muslim clerical category 
ustaas (Wolof): Arabic teacher in the Senegalese school system, from Arabic ustadh 
vacataire (French): contract teacher in Senegalese secondary school 
volontaire (French): contract teacher in Senegalese primary school 
waalo (Pulaar): floodplain in the middle valley of the Senegal River basin 
ziara (Pulaar): event in celebration of a Muslim saint living or dead 
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List of acronyms 
 
ANSD  Association Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie 
AOF  Afrique Occidentale Française 
ASA  Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth 
BFEM  Brevet de Fin d’Etudes Moyennes 
CCIEF  Cadre de Coordination des Interventions sur l’Education des Filles 
CFEE  Certificat de Fin d’Etudes Elementaires 
DGCID Direction Générale de la Coopération Nationale et du Développement 
EFA  Education For All 
EGEF  Etats Généraux de l’Education et de la Formation  
ESRC  Economic and Social Research Council 
FBO  Faith-Based Organisation 
FNAECS Fédération Nationale des Associations d’Ecoles Coraniques du Sénégal 
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Auto Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
IA  Inspection Académique 
IDE  Inspection Departementale de l’Education 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organisation 
JIR  Jama’at ‘Ibad ar-Rahman 
MDG  Millennium Development Goal 
MEN  Ministère de l’Education Nationale (Senegal) 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
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